Preface

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is pleased to present the “United Nations Military Force Headquarters Manual” that sets new direction and standards for management of the Military Component, as well as, providing greater understanding and clarity to the field mission leadership in its employment.

Over a period of time since the launching of the first United Nations peacekeeping operations, we have collectively and systematically gained peacekeeping expertise through lessons learnt and best practices of our veteran peacekeepers. It is important that we must harness the knowledge base thus acquired for the benefit of the current and future generation of peacekeepers and provide appropriate and clear guidance for effective conduct of peacekeeping operations.

In recent times, peacekeeping operations have been evolving to adapt and adjust with increasingly hostile environments, emergence of asymmetric threats and complex operational challenges that require a concerted multidimensional approach and credible response mechanisms to keep the peace process on track. The Military Component, as a mainstay of a United Nations peacekeeping mission plays a vital and pivotal role in protecting, preserving and facilitating a safe, secure and stable environment for all other components and stakeholders to function effectively.

The Force Headquarters Manual is a pragmatic and cogent step toward that direction and will contribute meaningfully to the planning, organizing, management and application of Military Component activities in the field. In addition to providing greater awareness to the Mission Leadership Team on the organization, role and responsibilities of a Military Force Headquarters, it would further facilitate systematic military planning and appropriate selection of the commanders and staff by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

The Manual has been developed through extensive consultations and deliberations within the United Nations Headquarters, relevant United Nations system entities and the field missions to reflect strategic, operational and tactical issues applicable to a Military Force Headquarters in peacekeeping operations. The Manual encompasses the capabilities, crosscutting and overarching policies, integrated mission framework, organizational structure, commanders and staff functions, planning process, coordination aspects, in-mission training, maintenance of operational readiness and related templates.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the United Nations system partners, field missions and other peacekeeping practitioners and stakeholders for their dedicated support and substantial contribution to the development of this Manual. I further compliment the Office of Military Affairs for spearheading this initiative as part of the capability standards development framework in progress.

The United Nations Military Force Headquarters Manual is part of the doctrinal guidance on United Nations peacekeeping operations and shall remain a living document. As such, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support will continue to refine and update this Manual to ensure its relevance to the changing operational environment and to meet the aspirations of the Member States and the United Nations.

Hervé Ladsous
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
Purpose and Scope

Overview.
1. The United Nations Military Force Headquarters plays a vital role in the integrated mission framework to align and manage activities of the Military Component in support of the Mission Headquarters to achieve mandated objectives. The Force Headquarters is a systemic mechanism for a Head of Military Component to exercise command functions and to direct the Military Component to conduct United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Mission. Furthermore, there are military-led United Nations peacekeeping missions where the Head of Military Component is also the Head of Mission. That necessitates amalgamating additional responsibilities with Head of Military Component to address comprehensive and overarching issues related to United Nations peacekeeping.

Purpose.
2. The Manual aims to optimize the effectiveness of the Force Headquarters’ roles and responsibilities, and to empower the Head of Military Component in exercising command functions to accomplish the mandated objectives. Therefore, it is imperative to establish a versatile and multifaceted functional system and lay-down standardized structures, procedures and templates for the Military Component that supports integrated mission planning process and effective implementation of the mandate.

Scope.
3. General. The Manual is a guidance document applicable to the Force Commanders, Force HQ Staff and other relevant integrated entities that have a coordination and management function in the mission framework.

4. Audience. The Manual is intended to target the following audience:
   - **Primary Audience.** The primary audience for the Manual is the Force Leadership (Head of Military Component/Force Commander, Deputy Force Commander and Chief of Staff), the Force Headquarters Staff, and their subordinate entities.
   - **Secondary Audience.** The Mission leadership (Special Representative of Secretary General and the Mission Leadership Team) and the integrated structures (Joint Operations Centre, Joint Mission Analysis Centre, Integrated Mission Training Cell, Integrated Support Services, Joint Logistics Operations Centre and Security Information Operations Centre) shall be the secondary audience, for whom the Manual provides greater understanding and conceptual clarity on the role and responsibilities of the Force Headquarters.
   - **Tertiary Audience.** The Troop Contributing Countries, national and regional Peacekeeping Training Centres, and other Member States, that prepare, train and provide commanders, staff and military Experts on Mission for deployment in various Military Force Headquarters shall be the tertiary audience.

5. Focus of the Manual. The Force Headquarters Manual is focused on UN Military Component role, responsibilities and functions in a United Nations peacekeeping mission structure and their relationship with other mission components and external entities. The Manual amplifies the following conceptual, organizational, functional, managerial and application related aspects pertinent to a United Nations Military Force Headquarters in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations led peacekeeping operations:
   - Higher direction for conduct of UN peacekeeping operations.
   - Integrated mission framework.
   - Operational capabilities and concept of employment of Force Headquarters.
   - Organizational structure and functions.
   - United Nations policies and practices.
   - Role and responsibilities of Force Headquarters in mandate implementation.
   - Coordination and integration with mission components and external actors.
• In-mission training and education specific to the United Nations Military Component.
• Methodology to maintain desired operational readiness in the mission.
• Models and templates to support specific functions.

7. **Deliverables.** The Manual shall form the basis for delivering the following:
• Provide guidance to the Head of Military Component and the Force Headquarters Staff in execution of their responsibilities.
• Aid military planning process in Office of Military Affairs in structuring a Force Headquarters as per mission requirements and operational environment.
• Aid development of Statement of Force Requirements.
• Support force generation.
• Provide foundation to leadership development of Head of Military Component.
• Provide foundation to staff officer’s predeployment training and in-mission functions.
• Support liaison, coordination and integration functions of the Force Headquarters with mission and external entities.
• Guide formulation of standard operation procedures within the Force Headquarters in execution of its role and responsibilities.
• Support evaluation and monitoring of the effectiveness and efficiency of the military components of peacekeeping missions.
• Provide foundation for developing an evaluation mechanism for the Head of military Component, Office of Military Affairs and/or an independent evaluation function nominated by the Under-Secretary-General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

**Conclusion.**
The United Nations Force Headquarters Manual sets generic standards for the commanders and the staff officers of the Military Force Headquarters to enhance mission integration, synergy and coherence in conducting peacekeeping operations in support of mandate implementation. The Manual provides an impetus to the commanders and staff to augment their commitment and drive in pursuit of excellence in executing United Nations tactics, techniques and procedures. It promotes maintenance of high state of operational readiness, effective handling of operational environment and successful performance of the Mission Essential Tasks by the Military Component.
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Chapter 1: Higher Direction

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping is a unique global partnership. It brings together the General Assembly (GA), the Security Council (SC), the Secretariat, Troop and Police Contributors, and regional organizations as relevant, and the Host governments in a combined effort to maintain international peace and security under the mandate of the Security Council. Its strength lies in the legitimacy of the UN Charter and in the wide range of contributing countries that participate and provide resources. UN peacekeepers provide security and political and early peacebuilding support to help countries make the transition from conflict to peace. Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries navigate the path from conflict to peace in the most physically and politically difficult environments.

Peacekeeping has unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates. UN peacekeeping operations may use force to defend themselves, their mandate, and civilians, particularly in situations where the State is unable to provide security and maintain public order.

However, the boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred. Peacekeeping operations are rarely limited to one type of activity. While UN peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, they are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in early peacebuilding activities. UN peacekeeping operations are flexible and over the past two decades have been deployed in many configurations. Today’s multidimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law.

To be effective and successful, UN peacekeeping operations must:
- Be guided by the principles of consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate;
- Be perceived as legitimate and credible, particularly in the eyes of the local population;
- Promote national and local ownership of the peace process in the Host country;
- Have genuine commitment to a political process by the parties in working towards peace (there must be a peace to keep);
- Have clear, credible and achievable mandates, with matching personnel, logistic and financial resources;
- Have unity of purpose within the SC, with active support to UN operations in the field;
- Have Host country commitment to unhindered UN operations and freedom of movement;
- Have supportive engagement by neighbouring countries and regional actors;
- Have an integrated UN approach, effective coordination with other actors on the ground and good communication with host country authorities and the population;
- Have utmost sensitivity towards the local population and upholding the highest standards of professionalism and good conduct (peacekeepers must avoid becoming part of the problem).

1.2: Purpose.
This Chapter lays out the higher direction provided by the UN for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation mission in a conflict area.
1.3: Establishment of UN Peacekeeping Operations.

It is the prerogative of the UN SC, acting in its capacity as the organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to determine when and where a UN peacekeeping operation should be deployed. The UN SC may take the following factors into account when the establishment of new peacekeeping operations is under consideration:

- Whether a situation exists the continuation of which is likely to endanger or constitute a threat to international peace and security;
- Whether regional or sub-regional organizations and arrangements exist and are ready and able to assist in resolving the situation;
- Whether a cease-fire exists and whether the parties have committed themselves to a peace process intended to reach a political settlement;
- Whether a clear political goal exists and whether it can be reflected in the mandate;
- Whether a precise mandate for a UN operation can be formulated;
- Whether the safety and security of UN personnel can be reasonably ensured, including in particular whether reasonable guarantees can be obtained from the principal parties or factions regarding the safety and security of UN personnel.

The UN Secretariat plays a critical role in helping the SC determine whether the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation is the most appropriate course of action, or whether other options for UN engagement should be considered. As a particular conflict develops, worsens, or approaches resolution, consultations will normally take place among Member States, the Secretariat, the parties on the ground, regional actors, and potential contributing countries. One or more of the parties may even insist on a UN role as a precondition for signing a peace agreement.

During this initial phase of consultations, the UN Secretary-General may decide to convene a Strategic Assessment of the situation, involving all relevant UN actors, with the aim of identifying possible options for UN engagement. As soon as security conditions permit, the Secretariat usually deploys a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) to the country or territory where the deployment of a UN mission is envisaged.

Based on the findings and recommendations of the TAM, the UN Secretary-General normally issues a report to the UNSC, recommending options for the possible establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation, including its size and resources. The UNSC may then pass a resolution authorizing the UN peacekeeping operation’s deployment and determining its size and mandate.

The succeeding sections elaborate on the higher direction provided for establishing a UN peacekeeping Mission.

1.4: United Nations Strategic Assessment.

The Strategic Assessment is a process of conducting the UN-wide inter-departmental and inter-agency assessment of a political crisis, conflict or post-conflict situation that may warrant a multi-dimensional approach and allow senior UN decision-makers to consider new or re-oriented forms of UN engagement. The Strategic Assessment would likely involve consultations with Member States, including the potential host government and TCCs/PCCs, as well as regional and other intergovernmental organizations, and other key external partners. The Strategic Assessment provides a mechanism for joint analysis and strategic discussions that cut across the political, security, development, humanitarian and human rights areas of the UN. It allows UN planners and decision-makers to conduct a system-wide analysis of the situation, identify conflict resolution and peace-building priorities, and define the appropriate framework for UN engagement in conflict-affected countries where there may be a need

1 Chapter 4, Section 4.1, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 2008.
Strategic Assessment may lead to reformulation of strategy or reconfiguration of UN presence in the field.

1.4.1: Triggers. The decision to conduct a Strategic Assessment is taken by the Secretary-General, or the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) and/or by an Integrated Task Force (ITF) at Director level or above under the following circumstances:
- When there is a need to formulate (or reformulate) the UN’s strategy for engagement.
- When different parts of the UN system may lack a common assessment of the situation and/or common understanding of the UN’s strategic objectives.
- When there is drastic change in circumstances.
- When UN is generally underperforming.
- When there is a need to provide an impetus to strategic direction to UN activities in the relevant country.
- When the coordination amongst the various UN actors in a multidimensional presence is sub-optimal.

1.4.2: Initiation. A Strategic Assessment can be requested by a number of UN entities, including:
- The Secretary-General.
- A member of the Policy Committee.
- A member of the ECPS.
- The United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) ITF.
- The head of a UN peacekeeping operation or Special Political Mission.
- The (field) Integrated Mission Planning Team.
- The UN Country Team (UNCT).

1.4.3: Settings. Strategic Assessments are mandatory in all cases where the deployment of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mission is being considered to operate alongside the UN Country Team. Where no integrated UN presence is in place, a Strategic Assessment is undertaken by a Headquarters-based ITF in consultation with the UNCT.
- Where an integrated UN presence is in place, Strategic Assessments can be initiated at field or HQ level following a significant change in the situation or prior to a substantial change in a Mission’s mandate.

1.4.4: Characteristics. Important characteristics of Strategic Assessments are:
- It is a critical and honest analysis of the main ongoing UN activities.
- Focused on substantive and strategic priorities for the UN based on the country needs.
- Close collaboration between UNHQ and the field, as well as the ITF and the senior leadership throughout the process is vital.
- It is an inclusive, participatory and transparent process with joint ownership; reflecting views, substantive disagreements, if any; analysis and recommendations expressed by all participants.
- Analysis includes incorporation of human rights and gender expertise.
- Led by a senior leader from the lead department or a suitable member from the ITF.
- Includes consultations with non-UN stakeholders such as the government of the relevant country, civil society, including women’s groups, donors and international NGOs.
- Promotes and fosters joint planning and stronger coherence amongst various UN actors.
- Informs the UN input in the development of a larger peacebuilding and recovery plan.

1.4.5: Integrated Task Force (ITF). The Strategic Assessment should be undertaken by an ITF. It is a HQ-based inter-departmental and inter-agency mechanism to ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance to UN presences applying the principles of integration. The ITF is chaired by the lead department for the relevant country in the UN.
Secretariat, i.e. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) or Department of Political Affairs (DPA) on behalf of UN System. Representatives of all relevant UN entities, including DPKO, DPA, Department of Field Support (DFS), Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Department of Safety and Security (DSS), as well as UN Development Group (UNDG) and Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) members, field presences (the UNCT and mission), are members of the ITF, who are heavily involved in the shaping and conduct of the Strategic Assessment.

In the event of a likely DPKO-led peacekeeping mission deployment, an integrated planning and coordination function (such as Mission-specific Peacekeeping Planning Group) shall be created at the DPKO-DFS level to lead the process. Military staff from OMA will form an integral part in the planning process and shall be ready to provide staffing support for the start-up and undertake force generation as required.

1.4.6: Process. The process of Strategic Assessment involves the following:

- Establishment of an ITF.
- Define Terms of reference (ToR) and work-plan.
- Set timelines.
- Desk review of existing UN analyses and country strategies and relevant non-UN analyses.
- Detailed analysis to include field visits and consultations with external stakeholders.
- Preparation of report (Objectives, conflict factors, analysis, strategic options and recommendations).
- Internal consultations and endorsement.

1.5: Technical Assessment Mission (TAM).

A TAM is a cross-cutting assessment, fielded to gather information needed to produce foundational planning documents. As soon as security conditions permit, the Secretariat usually deploys a TAM to the country or territory where the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation is envisaged. The TAM analyzes and assesses the overall security, political, military, humanitarian and human rights situation on the ground, and its implications for a possible UN peacekeeping operation. As such, the TAM may also consist of representatives from several departments and offices in the Secretariat, as well as the specialized agencies, funds and programs, and should involve relevant actors from the UNCT. The TAM may take place at various phases of a mission’s cycle, including: start up, mandate review, mid-cycle review; restructuring, crisis response or in response to specific requests from the SC and/or draw-down. The TAM is followed by a report which usually forms one base for the follow-on Secretary-General’s report to the UNSC, stating options, including the size, resources and financial implications.

1.6: Mandate.

1.6.1: General. UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of mandates from the UN SC. The range of tasks assigned to UN peacekeeping operations has expanded significantly in response to shifting patterns of conflict and to the best address threats to international peace and security. Although each UN peacekeeping operation is different, there is a considerable degree of consistency in the types of mandated tasks assigned by the SC.

1.6.2: Mandates in General. Depending on their mandate, peacekeeping operations may be required to:

- Prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders;
- Stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire and create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;
- Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements;
• Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development.

1.6.3: Early Peacebuilding Mandates. Depending on the specific set of challenges, UN peacekeepers are often mandated to play a catalytic role in the following essentially peace building activities:

• Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants;
• Mine action;
• Security Sector Reform (SSR) and other rule of law-related activities;
• Protection and promotion of human rights;
• Electoral assistance;
• Support for the restoration and extension of State authority;
• Promotion of social and economic recovery and development.

1.6.4: Crosscutting/Thematic Mandates. UN SC mandates also reflect a number of cross-cutting, thematic tasks that are regularly assigned to UN peacekeeping operations on the basis of the following landmark Security Council resolutions (SCR):

• SCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security;
• SCR 1612 (2005) on Children and Armed Conflict;
• SCR 2086 (2013) on Multidimensional Peacekeeping Missions Mandates.

1.7: Secretary-General’s Bulletins. Secretary General’s Bulletins are binding UN directions for all peacekeepers and mandatory to be reflected in both policies and practices. Important SG Bulletins relevant to peacekeeping operations are referred below:

• Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law (ST/SGB/1999/13).
• Regulations Governing the status, Basic Rights, and Duties of Officials other than Secretariat Officials, and Experts on Mission (ST/SGB/2002/9).
• Special measures from protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13).
• Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling (ST/SGB/2007/6).
• Prohibition of Discrimination, Harassment, Including Sexual Harassment, and Abuse of Authority (ST/SGB/2008/05).
• Secretary-General’s Policy on Human Rights Screening of United Nations Personnel (Decision No.2012/18).

1.8: Mission Concept. Mission Concept is a statement of intent and strategy on how a peacekeeping mission plans to implement its mandate from the Security Council. It is a tool for mission managers to present their vision for mandate delivery, set priorities in order of importance and sequence, and direct mission components, sectors and regional offices, wherever located, to shape their activities in line with it. The Mission Concept is thus a starting point for further planning within the Mission. If there is no mission and/or planning capacity on the ground, UN HQ will formulate the draft Mission Concept, so that operational plans for military, police, support and substantive civilian sections, as well as the initial mission budget can be prepared on that basis. The planning responsibility, including the finalization of the Mission Concept, shifts to the field with the arrival of, and the issuance of the Directive by UNHQ to the HoM. Thereafter, authority and accountability over the development and execution/implementation of the Mission Concept rests with the HoM, reporting through the lead department to the Secretary-General. Mission Concept is applicable to all peacekeeping operations; while Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) is required only for those multidimensional missions operating alongside the UNCT for UN “integrated presence” (refer Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1, p.18, for further elaboration).
1.9: Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF).

1.9.1: General. ISF is required when multidimensional peacekeeping operations or field-based special political missions are deployed and operating alongside the UNCTs. ISF lays down the vision, shared objectives and means across the UN system in the particular country, through which the UN will promote peace consolidation on the basis of mandates, integrated assessments and the Directive to the Special/Executive Representative of Secretary General (S/ERSG), Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). It facilitates joint analysis and review of the UN-wide strategies and arrangements, combining elements of strategic, programmatic, communication and operational integration (refer to Chapter 2, Section 2.5, p.19 on application of ISF in Field Mission).

It is complemented by Strategic Assessments, humanitarian needs assessments, risk analysis or those led by other national, regional and international institutions. Consultations with Host National authorities, civil society, other local representatives, affected populations and key international partners are essential to incorporate local perspectives in setting UN priorities. It establishes measures to mitigate risks to all UN actors and activities, including to humanitarian operations.

1.9.2: ISF Process. It is a field level inclusive analytical and planning process that includes the following:

- Integrated assessments, UN role and comparative advantages.
- UN priorities, including for national capacity development and institution-building;
- Integrated approach (programmatic, functions and/or operational integration).
- Implementation arrangements and coordination mechanisms (responsibilities, timelines, results, etc.).
- Monitoring and reporting framework with indicators/benchmarks of progress.

1.9.3: Other Planning Frameworks. ISF should reflect existing national and international planning frameworks and articulate priorities of collective UN response. S/ERSG, Deputy SRSG (DSRSG), RC and HC may also decide to use other integrated planning processes, such as, UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) or Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), in consultation with other senior managers and HQ, and on the basis of a gap analysis of existing planning processes and products. Mission senior leadership should combine planning frameworks and harmonize processes (including content, timeframes, budgetary implications and degree of national ownership), regularly for respective programming and budgetary cycles. Agencies, funds and programmes must ensure consistency and align with ISF in application of respective frameworks, the country programme documents, country programme action plan, annual plans, etc.

1.9.4: Development, Updating and Endorsement of ISF. The development, finalization, endorsement, implementation, and updating/regular review of ISF is a joint responsibility of S/ERSGs, RC/HCs and Heads of Agencies, Funds and Programmes (AFP). The process at HQ and field is given below:

- **HQ.** Developed by ITF and endorsed by the USG of the lead department.
- **Field.** Developed jointly by the S/ERSGs, DSRSGs, RC/HC and Heads of AFPs and endorsed by S/ERSGs.
- **Review.** Reviewed every two years, or when there is substantial change in the mandate, circumstances on the ground, or Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC.

1.9.5: Integrated Mechanisms.

UNHQ. ITFs are the main forum for joint assessments, planning, coordination, sharing of information and analysis, consultations and decision-making support. Its responsibilities include the following:

- Analyse all issues that have strategic significance.
• Analyse programmatic impact in integrated settings, including entity-specific planning and reporting processes.
• Resolve policy differences between UN entities, ensure information-sharing between Missions and UNCTs, and consult thematic entities.

**Mission**. At field level, integrated UN presences are required to put in place mechanisms for joint information-sharing, analysis, planning, decision-making, coordination and monitoring. The Mission senior leadership is responsible to convene integrated mechanisms on a regular basis to discuss and make decisions on joint strategic and operational issues. These may include:

• **A Senior Leadership Forum.** This forum is a decision-making body on joint strategic and operational issues, and includes S/ERSG, DSRSG, RC/HC, Civilian Chief of Staff, Heads of Mission Components and Heads of relevant UN AFPs. External partners should be invited to participate where appropriate.

• **Joint Capacity.** A joint analytical and planning capacity to share assessments and analyses and develop, update, and monitor integrated planning frameworks.

1.10: **Directive to the Special/Executive Representative of Secretary General (S/ERSG), Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).**

As part of the integrated assessment and planning process, a Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC is drafted by ITF under the leadership of the lead department and issued/updated by the Secretary-General. It reflects the UN SC Mandate, Strategic Assessment and decisions of the Secretary-General and/or Policy Committee, and signifies the transfer of responsibility for subsequent planning of the integrated presence to the S/ERSG and the senior leadership team of the integrated presence.

The Directive provides political and operational strategic direction and priorities, initial responsibilities, the broad expectations for mandate implementation, an outline of structural and coordination arrangements, as well as basic planning parameters, including guidance on the development of an ISF. It also articulates the roles and responsibilities of the SRSG and the DSRSG/RC/HC where the mission is integrated and the RC/HC where the mission is not.

1.11: **Head of Military Component (HoMC) Directive.**

The directive for the HoMC is issued by the UNHQ (DPKO/DFS) and provides guidance and direction on the organizational and administrative responsibilities that a HoMC is required to exercise in the performance of duties in the mission area. The HoMC Directive may also include mission-specific objectives and benchmarks for achievement based on the authorising mandate of the peacekeeping operation. Such mission-specific guidance/direction will be issued separately by DPKO/DFS. Operational guidance and direction with respect to the employment of the military component is provided in the mission-specific military-strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPs) or military ToR. The Directive may be periodically reviewed based on recommendations of HoMC/OMA or as directed by DPKO/DFS. The directions and guidance provided in the HoMC Directive must be reflected on all the related Military Component documents for sensitisation. The Force Headquarters (HQ) shall institute necessary structures, systems and procedures for its adherence and practice by the Military Component.

1.12: **Military Strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPs).**

In the implementation of the SC mandate for a UN peacekeeping operation, the military strategic CONOPS articulates the strategic objectives and end-state for the utilization of military capabilities to support mandate implementation. The CONOPS should be consistent with the mandate, strategic direction and the Mission Concept, and should drive the formulation of Military Component operational plans. The objective of CONOPS is to link the mission mandate to the execution of key objectives, such as strategic intent, organization
and deployment (including timelines), security/force protection, terms of engagement, administration and logistics, and command and control. As part of the CONOPS, the military capabilities and the composition of the force are stated in the Statement of Force Requirements (SFR). The CONOPs should be reviewed annually or after every mandate renewal or following changes in the operational situation. CONOPs and ROEs are shared with the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) for compliance to UN legal standards and with OHCHR to ensure that they are compliant with human rights norms and standards. CONOPS also reflects assessments of the human rights situation and risks and threats prevailing within the country. The Force HQ is expected to generate mission-specific Operations Order (OPORD) and associated Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO), specific directives and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for the Military Component.

ROEs are issued by the USG/DPKO for each peacekeeping operation and provide the authority for the use of force and explain the legal framework, policies, principles, responsibilities and definitions of the ROE. ROEs must always be compliant with human rights and international humanitarian law, which are superior sources. ROEs are directions to operational commanders, which delineate the parameters within which force may be used by the military component of the peacekeeping operation while executing its mandated tasks. They are founded on the relevant SCR.

Where issued as prohibitions; they are orders not to take specific actions. Where issued as permissions, they are the authority for commanders to take certain specific actions if they are judged necessary to achieve the aim of the peacekeeping operation. While remaining predominantly defensive in nature, the ROE allow for offensive action, if necessary, in order to ensure the implementation of the tasks mandated by the SC. The ROE also provide definitions of the circumstances in which the use of force, including deadly force, may be justified.

The ROE are governed by the purposes of the Charter of the UN and relevant principles of international law, including the Law of Armed Conflict. Military personnel are required to comply with International Law, including the Law of Armed Conflict, and to apply the ROE in accordance with those laws. ROE are addressed to the HoMC, who is then responsible for issuing them to all subordinate commanders. While ensuring understanding, application and compliance with the ROE is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. The HoMC/Force Commander (FC) is ultimately responsible for the enforcement of the ROE.

As part of the CONOPS, the military capabilities and the composition of the force are stated in the SFR. Accordingly, the SUR is produced for each unit of the force. The SUR includes mission, tasks, organization, equipment and personnel, and will form the basis for Troop-Contributing Countries (TCC) to prepare contingents and for Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) to be agreed between the UN and the respective Nation. The SFR and SURs must be periodically reviewed to ensure that the capabilities and resources match the operational environment and challenges.

1.15: Military Capability Study (MCS).
OMA is responsible for the identification and deployment of military capabilities in a peacekeeping operation, in relation to the military component's assigned tasks. The MCS is a tool in this process and is a technical field assessment and/or desk assessment which analyses the current capabilities against current and future anticipated tasks. The MCS addresses all deployed military personnel and units in a mission. The objective of the MCS, in support of the mission's military component is two-fold:
- Assess the suitability and utilisation of current capabilities for current objectives, tasks and phase.
• Assess the suitability of current capabilities for future objectives, tasks and phases of the operation.

The assessment of the force and its units covers the configuration, its posture, the ability to function in relation to the operational environment and the ability to plan and execute all types of military operations on a 24/7 basis. The assessment is conducted through the examination of the capabilities that in combination deliver the effect. It is conducted at least every second year, under the aegis of the military Planning Service (MPS) of OMA.

The MCS informs the establishment and review of military strategic and operational direction, i.e. CONOPS, including SFR and SUR, ROE, at the UNHQ level and subsequently the Operations Order (OPORD) at the mission level. MCS also informs the review of Mission Factors. Mission factors are intended to compensate troop/police contributors for extreme operating conditions in the mission area, where conditions impose significant and additional hardship and are to be applied to lease rates. They include:
• Extreme environment such as mountainous, climatic and terrain conditions;
• Intensity of operations such as the scope of the task assigned, length of logistic chains, non-availability of commercial repair and support facilities and other operational hazards and conditions, and;
• Hostile action and forced abandonment.

1.16: Results-Based Budget (RBB).

RBB is the process by which all UN peacekeeping operations resource their activities and measure performance. The RBB process flows directly from planning and is a continuous activity conducted by the UNHQ entities and peacekeeping missions. For a mission start-up, the first full budget for a peacekeeping operation is submitted to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the General Assembly as soon as possible after adoption of a decision by the SC. The process for preparation of the budget at UNHQ is as follows:
• First of all, the Controller will issue specific budget instructions with a submission timetable and forms. The main parts of the initial budget are the RBB frameworks, staffing (staffing table, post justifications, organization chart) and cost estimates;
• DPKO/DFS will, subsequently, issue strategic guidance with key assumptions for the budget period, a mission/HQ submission timetable and a list of budget counterparts;
• DFS also issues additional budget guidance including standard costs and rations manual;
• To help the mission draft its budget in keeping with the controller’s deadlines, and especially where mission staff are not yet fully deployed, DPKO/DFS usually deploy RBB and ABACUS teams;
• DPKO/DFS/Mission budget proposal is completed and submitted to the Controller;
• Controller reviews it on behalf of SG, and submits a published budget document to the GA and ACABQ. ACABQ also receives a budget supplementary package;
• Budget is discussed in the ACABQ with senior mission managers as well as the Controller, DPKO and DFS representatives, who are called upon to answer questions by the committee. ACABQ issues a recommendation report;
• Budget and the ACABQ report are considered by the Fifth Committee, again with Controller, DPKO and DFS representatives. The Fifth Committee then issues a resolution approving the budget;
• Controller issues an allotment advice, based on the resolution, which constitutes the approval to spend funds.

It is good practice for the initial budget to reflect how mission and UNCT resources will complement each other and, in some cases, how they can be jointly applied for peace consolidation priorities. For instance, a peacekeeping mission may request posts for DDR officers, but it should be documented that a member of the UNCT (e.g. UNDP, UNICEF) would also provide reintegation staff and programme funding to complete the mandated
reintegration element of the DDR programme. A planned inventory of complementary UNCT resources is particularly important since the GA now requires reporting on the mission related funding provisions and activities of the UNCT as part of the budget process.

It is also important to ensure that mission planners are budgeted for and deployed promptly in support of the IAP. In addition to the planners fielded by DPKO, ITFs can play a role in ensuring that Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Office of the Resident Coordinator, through UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO) both promptly budget for and deploy strategic planners to start up missions and throughout the mission life cycle. These planners will serve as the secretariat to key structures within an integrated mission, including the Integrated Mission Planning Teams.

1.17: SOFA/ SOMA.
A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) is an agreement between a Host country and the UN which embodies the consent of the Host State to the presence of the peacekeeping operation on its territory and regulates the status, privileges and immunities of the peacekeeping operation in the Host country.

Under the provisions of the SOFA or SOMA, a government hosting a UN body or entity, including a peacekeeping operation, is responsible for ensuring the safety and security of the peacekeeping operation, its personnel, premises, and property and to take measures to protect members of the peacekeeping operation and its personnel, premises and property from attack or any action that prevents them from discharging their mandate. The SOFA or SOMA also provides that all members are obliged to respect local laws and regulations and to refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the impartial and international nature of their duties. Other provisions include issues like unrestricted freedom of movement, the wearing of uniforms, the carrying of arms, entry and exit into the country, immunity from legal process, and exemption from taxation. One of the most important provisions is the one which provides that military personnel of national contingents assigned to the military component of a peacekeeping operation are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating States in respect of any criminal offences which may be committed by them.

1.18: Conclusion.
The Force HQ leadership and the Staff, as well as the subordinate HQ, units and sub-units of the Military Component must have clear understanding of the strategic intent and objectives of the UN peacekeeping mission, set-out in the higher direction guidance and instruments. These directions and instruments must be analysed, aligned and interpreted within the framework of the UN peacekeeping operations by commanders at all levels. Relevant aspects of these directions and guidance must be integrated and reflected in the Mission/Force concepts/directives/orders to support effective execution of Mission Essential Tasks (MET). The Force leadership must deliberate and analyse the stated and implied responsibilities and tasks, clarify issues with the Head of Mission (HoM)/OMA and disseminate within the Military Component to accomplish the mandate effectively. It is also essential for all commanders to periodically carryout a reality check on the relevance of these directions and guidance vis-à-vis the operational environment and recommend necessary modifications as required to accomplish the mandates.

Note:
• List of Abbreviations used in the Manual is attached as Z (p.262).
• Comprehensive list of References made in the manual is attached as Annex AA (p.268).

References:
• Directive to the Special/Executive Representative of Secretary General (S/ERSG), Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).
• Model Status-of-Forces-Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations; Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly – A/45/594, 9 October 1990.
• DPKO/DFS Guidelines on UN Strategic Assessment, 2010.
• General Assembly Resolution on Result Based Budgeting, 55/231, 2001.
Chapter 2: Mission Framework

UN peacekeeping is based on the principle that an impartial presence on the ground can ease tensions between hostile parties and create space for political negotiations. Peacekeeping can help bridge the gap between the cessation of hostilities and a durable peace, but only if the parties to a conflict have the political will needed to reach the goal. Initially developed as a means of dealing with inter-State conflict, peacekeeping has increasingly been used in intra-State conflicts and civil wars, which are often characterized by multiple armed factions with differing political objectives and fractured lines of command.

Some UN peacekeeping operations are still based on the “traditional” model of a military operation deployed in support of the cessation of hostilities. These operations involve military tasks such as monitoring ceasefires and patrolling buffer zones between hostile parties and are carried out by UN peacekeepers who may or may not be armed. Although past military observer missions have also included non-military tasks, the majority of UN peacekeeping operations have become multidimensional, composed of a range of components including military, civilian police, political, civil affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender. Some of these operations do not have a military component but carry out their mandates alongside a regional or multinational peacekeeping force.

2.2: Purpose.
The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a brief introduction to the UN peacekeeping Mission Framework, with specific reference to types of Mandates, significance of Mission Concept, generic organizational structure, composition and functions of the senior Mission leadership, integrated structures for planning and coordination, and Mission support, including the Mission RBB process.

2.3: Mission Mandate.
2.3.1: General. The mandate for a peacekeeping operation, as established by the Security Council, is the starting point for defining a mission’s responsibilities. Depending on their mandate, multidimensional peacekeeping operations may be required to:
- Assist in implementing a comprehensive peace agreement;
- Monitor a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities to allow space for political negotiations and a peaceful settlement of disputes;
- Provide a secure environment encouraging a return to normal civilian life;
- Prevent the outbreak or spillover of conflict across borders;
- Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development; and
- Administer a territory for a transitional period, thereby carrying out all the functions that are normally the responsibility of a government.

2.3.2 Extended Mandates. While military personnel remain vital to most operations, civilians have taken on a growing number of responsibilities, which can include:
- Helping former opponents implement complex peace agreements by liaising with a range of political and civil society actors;
- Supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- Assisting with the DDR of former combatants;
- Supervising and conducting elections;
- Strengthening the rule of law, including assistance with judicial reform and training of civilian police;
- Promoting respect for human rights and investigating alleged violations;
- Assisting with post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation; and
- Setting up a transitional administration of a territory as it moves towards independence.
2.3.3: Military-led UN Peacekeeping Operations Mandates. Primarily, Military-led UN Peacekeeping Operations have a military-oriented mandate. Military-led Missions may be authorised to act under either Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter. Depending on the conflict dynamics and operational environment, military-led missions may be mandated to support implementation of additional responsibilities. Typically, some of the authorised Mandates for Military-led Missions are:

- Restore international peace and security.
- Supervision of the General Armistice Agreements.
- Assist the UN Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce.
- Maintain/Observe/supervise/monitor ceasefire.
- Monitor the cessation of hostilities.
- Supervise the disengagement.
- Establish a demilitarized zone or assist creation of a safe demilitarized border zone.
- Supervise the areas of separation and limitation.
- Monitor and verify the redeployment of belligerent forces.
- Confirm withdrawal of aggressor forces from a specified area, accompany and support Host forces to deploy in their side of the border and coordinate with both the Governments.
- Supporting the development of effective bilateral management mechanisms, facilitating liaisons and building mutual trust to assist border normalization.
- Support for the operational activities of Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, including support to the Ad-Hoc Committees.
- Assist specifically appointed UN Commissions.
- Assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region to fulfill their respective mandates.
- Protect UN personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment; ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel, relief workers and members of the Joint Military Observers Committee and Joint Military Observer Teams; within its capabilities and its area of deployment.
- Prevent isolated incidents from escalating.
- Monitor human rights conditions/violations.
- Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of relief workers.
- Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;
- Provide security for the region’s vital installations and infrastructure.
- Assist the Host Government in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry without its consent of arms or related material.
- Assist Host Government in restoring its effective authority in the area.
- Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.
- Use of force to protect the mission area “from incursions by unauthorized elements”.

NB:
In the past, Military-led peacekeeping Missions have also provided support to form the nucleus of some other peacekeeping operations for deployment worldwide at short notice.

2.4: Mission Concept.

2.4.1: General. Based on Mission mandate, the Mission Concept provides the vision for mandate delivery through statement of intent, priorities and implementation strategy for all the Mission Components (refers to Chapter 1, Section 1.8, p.10). A suggested template of Mission Concept is at Annex A (p.212). Mission Concept is a management tool for:

- Strategic Planning. Prioritize and sequence mandated tasks.
- Communication. Transmit the vision of the mission leadership for mandate delivery within the mission and in relation to external partners.
- Resource Allocation. Dedicate mission assets on priority areas (thematic or geographic) in recruiting/deploying personnel, developing budgets, and providing logistical support.
2.4.2: Process. The mission leadership will be in charge of developing or revising the Mission Concept from time to time to articulate the overarching priorities and approaches, and plan activities and resources to galvanize the mission components for effective implementation of the mandate. To support the mission in the process, DPKO/DFS shall provide strategic guidance and coordinate inputs from relevant UNHQ entities and finally endorses the Mission Concept. The field missions may be required to consult national, regional and international interlocutors in designing a Mission Concept (e.g., when the scope and capacity of the mission is limited; the main focus of the mission is institution building; or the mission is part of the UN-wide response to the country/situation).

2.4.3: Application. The Mission Concept is designed to enhance integration and cohesion within the mission, through clear linkages of planning processes and products, from the strategic to operational levels. As such, component-level objectives, expected accomplishments, and outputs must conform to the overall objectives, priorities, and core deliverables of the mission identified in the Mission Concept. When there is a new Mission Concept, activities undertaken by components will have to be readjusted. Mission managers will ensure that work plans for components and individuals are harmonized with the Mission Concept. Mission Concept provides strategic direction, operational objectives and benchmarks for the Military Component. All Force HQ guidance documents, orders and directives shall reflect objectives set-forth in the Mission Concept by the SRSG/HOM. HoMC/FC shall support review of the Mission Concept as and when necessitated.

2.5: Application of ISF in Field Missions. Peacekeeping missions must ensure consistency between the joint analysis, strategic priorities and responsibilities of the ISF and be reflected accordingly in the Mission Concept and component strategies/plans for effective mandate implementation. These strategies guide other mission-specific planning processes and products, including related technical assessments, component and support plans, concept of operations, administrative plans and results-based budgets (refers to Chapter 1, Section 1.9.1, p.11).
2.6: UN Mission Headquarters (Mission HQ).

2.6.1: Mission HQ Organisation. A Peacekeeping Mission HQ comprises the senior management team, the integrated decision making and support structures and various substantive components. A generic structure of Mission HQ is depicted below for reference:

![Mission HQ Structure Diagram]
2.6.2: **Overall Authority.** The command of UN peacekeeping operations is vested in the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. The Secretary-General, in turn, has delegated the overall responsibility for the conduct and support of these missions to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. The Secretary-General also, with the consent of the Security Council, appoints a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who serves as Head of Mission (HoM) and is responsible for implementing the mission’s mandate. The SRSG reports to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.\(^2\)

2.6.3: **Responsibilities of SRSG/HoM.** The HoM of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation is generally a SRSG. The HoM is the senior UN representative and has overall authority over the activities of the UN in the mission area. However, the Secretary-General may appoint a Chief Military Observer (CMO) or Force Commander (FC) as HoM in Military-led Missions. A modified Directive/Guidelines issued by the DPKO/DFS will define the roles and responsibilities of the HoMC/HoM as applicable to each mission context. Standard directives for SRSG/RC/HC heading multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations will be applicable mutatis mutandis to HOM/HoMC also. Generally, an SRSG/HoM may perform the following responsibilities:

- Represent the Secretary-General, lead UN political engagement and speak on behalf of the UN within the mission area.
- Manage international consensus and mobilize necessary support for mandate implementation. Understand limitations of external factors and take appropriate measures.
- Implement the Mission’s mandate, and develop strategies for achieving these goals using the political, institutional and financial resources available.
- Provide political guidance for mandate implementation through a mandate implementation plan/Mission Concept and set mission-wide operational direction including decisions on resource allocation in case of competing priorities.
- Ensure that operational decisions are based on the parameters of the mandate, international law, UN rules and procedures and local laws.
- Lead and direct the heads of all mission components and ensure unity of effort and coherence among all UN entities in the mission area, in accordance with the Mission ISF.
- Delegate the operational and technical aspects of mandate implementation to the heads of mission components and as far down the chain of command as possible.
- Manage the mission and its results, including the security and safety of personnel, discipline and morale and the effective management of resources.
- Promote a free flow of information on all developments (except sensitive information) among the various components of the mission.
- Establish the political framework for, and provide leadership to, the UN presence in the mission.
- Act as facilitator of political process, head of UN presence and interim or transitional administrator.
- Pursue an integrated approach to prevent a return to conflict through coordinated and mutually reinforcing activities of the mission and the wider UN presence.
- As the Designated Official (DO), ensure security and protection of staff of the Mission and the UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies as well as their eligible dependants.

\(^2\) For peacekeeping operations that have a primarily military mandate, the Secretary-General may appoint a Force Commander or Chief Military Observer as Head of Mission.
2.6.4: Deputy SRSG. Multidimensional peace operations generally have at least one DSRSG who supports the SRSG/HOM in executing the substantive civilian functions of the mission. Depending on the nature of mandate, political challenges, composition of mission substantive components and magnitude of integration requirements, an additional DSRSG may be authorized to assist the SRSG. Generally, DSRSG(s) core functions include the following:

- Management of mission components
- Provide policy guidance and overseeing development of component work plans.
- Ensure substantive civilian functions contribute to accomplishment of strategic mission objectives.
- Perform specifically-delegated HOM responsibilities.

An additional DSRSG is often appointed as Resident Coordinator (RC), Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and DSRSG who provides a bridge or primary point of contact and coordination between the mission and the UNCT, in addition to having substantive managerial roles. DSRSG/RC/HC may also be responsible for DDR, humanitarian, recovery and development coordination pillars. In some cases, responsibilities may also include areas such as protection of civilians, elections, gender affairs and civil affairs.

2.6.5: Director or Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS). The UN peacekeeping logistics support concept is based on the integration of UN-owned, contracted and contingent-provided resources. All Mission support or service functions, regardless of their origins, are considered common to the mission as a whole and fall under the responsibility of the DMS/CMS, who liaises with all components and segments of the mission. The DMS/CMS is a civilian head responsible for ensuring the provision of necessary logistics and administrative support to the Mission. DMS/CMS is also the senior most UN official within the Mission that is authorized to ‘expend UN funds’ associated with the Mission’s allocated budget. The DMS/CMS may also be supported by two civilian subordinate officials: a Chief, Administrative Services (CAS) and a Chief, Integrated Support Services (CISS). The Mission civilian staff provides administrative services, such as ensuring payment of mission personnel, as well as other services, such as health and safety personnel or IT and telecommunications services; all of which are crucial for the functioning of any peacekeeping operation.

- **Tasking Authority.** On behalf of the DMS/CMS, the CISS exercises tasking authority over all assigned uniformed logistics personnel and enabling units of the Mission, comprising medical, signal, logistics, construction engineering (except combat/field engineers), transportation and movements units, including military transport helicopters.

- **Financial Authority.** Only the DMS/CMS has the authority to commit mission financial resources for any purpose including making contractual arrangements for the use of local resources/services. All requirements for such resources/services should be addressed through the Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC). These may include, but are not limited to, accommodation, Petroleum Oil and Lubricants (POL), including aviation fuels, fresh rations, combat rations, water supply, equipment rental, public service facilities and civilian labour.

2.6.6: Head of Military Component (HoMC). HoMC is usually the senior most military officer in the Mission performed by the Force Commander (FC), Chief military Observer (CMO), or Chief of Staff (CoS). The HOMC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPKO Military Adviser in UNHQ. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPKO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM.

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2.6.7: Head of Police Component (HoPC). HoPC is usually the senior most police officer in the Mission performed by the Police Commissioner. HoPC reports to the HoM, exercises operational control and provides direction to all members of the Police Component of the mission. The HoPC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPKO Police Adviser at UNHQ.

2.6.8: Mission Chief of Staff (CoS). The Mission CoS performs a senior level staff and advisory function for the HoM and the senior management of the Mission. While their role will vary from Mission to Mission, they are generally responsible for the effective and integrated management of all the Mission's activities in line with the strategic vision and guidance from the HoM. The Mission CoS also coordinates mission policy and planning activities among the various components of the Mission, including the Mandate Implementation Plan or ISF and the RBB framework.

2.7: Mission HQ Responsibilities.
UN peacekeeping is a joint venture of many players with legitimate interests operating within the parameters of the mandate. Close cooperation at all levels is required. UNHQ has delegated significant responsibility to the field, but has retained oversight and guidance functions (final decision on vital policy and legal matters rests with UNHQ). UNHQ and the Mission HQ have complementary roles and comparative strengths in developing the political roadmap for the mission and managing its resources. UNHQ must be kept informed of all the political and security related developments, major issues/challenges and the progress of Mandate implementation. Generally, a Mission HQ is required to perform the following responsibilities.

- **Direction.** Provide political and operational direction and guidance to all Mission components on mandate implementation.
- **Mission Concept.** Prepare and issue a detailed Mission Concept/Mission Plan (or, mandate implementation plan, or integrated mission plan) to cover objectives, phases, benchmarks and the desired end state in support of the mandate.
- **Decision Making.** Support timely decision making through the MLT.
- **Operations.** Plan, coordinate, support and execute peacekeeping operations as per mandate and Mission Concept.
- **Operational Readiness.** Establish and update Mission operational requirements and conduct mission-specific scenario-based integrated exercises and rehearsals to maintain required levels of operational readiness. Provide advice and guidance on expected levels of operational readiness to all components. Ensure budgetary allocations, facilitate commitment of other components and maintain oversight in order to achieve required levels of operational readiness.
- **Crisis Management.** Manage critical situations and institute crisis response mechanisms.
- **Monitor and Report.** Monitor and report progress of mandate implementation based on benchmarks, adjust timelines and courses appropriately and manage performance.
- **Integrated Entities.** Provide direction and coherence to integrated mission elements such as JOC, JMAC, ISS/JLOC, IMTC, SIOC, etc. for synergistic effect.
- **Capabilities.** Engage key stakeholders and deployed senior national contingent commanders on the expected full operational capability requirements of units in accordance with the SUR issued from DPKO.
- **Mission Support.** Ensure effective logistic and administrative support of the mission components to facilitate accomplishment of mandated objectives through ISS. Budget and finance support.
- **Assessment.** Assess impact of Mission activities and mandate implementation and institute necessary remedial/enhanced measures to remain on track.
- **Integration.** Formalise relationship with UNCT and establish two-way communication channels. Link different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy, based on a shared understanding.
- **Transition Planning.** Mission planning must include a transition/exit strategy with the understanding that the strategy will require constant adjustment. Mission should pave the way for transition by creating sustainable political, administrative and legal institutions and work to develop a positive local administrative culture and public perceptions of the local authorities and institutions. Ensure coordination, planning and preparation of the political groundwork for a successor mission and systematic handover of responsibilities to local authorities and other partners/joint UN system effort to move from post-conflict priorities to a peace building process.

- **Networking.** Establish contact with parties to the conflict, and with key foreign and regional governments, civil society organisations and non-governmental organisation.

- **Relationship with Host Country.** Relationship between peacekeeping mission and the host government is unique. Invariably, the Host government appoints a primary person or office as interlocutors.

- **Expectation Management.** It is important to maintain balance between international expectations of the speedy implementation of the mandate with the need of bringing the local population on board and building local capacity.

- **Security.** Lay down Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) and Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS), emergency communication procedures, emergency notification systems, Security plans, contingency plans, staff tracking systems, vehicle operating guidelines, etc.

- **Conduct and Discipline.** Sensitise all mission personnel, issue mission-specific conduct and discipline directive and ensure its strict adherence.

- **Oversight.** Maintain oversight of all the mission activities, Mandate implementation

- **SOFA/SOMA.** Negotiate, finalise and disseminate SOFA/SOMA, under direction form OLA.

- **Public Information.** Develop Mission public information and perception management strategy.

2.8: Senior Decision Making Forums.

2.8.1: General. The SRSG/HOM of the mission will be assisted by senior managers in developing strategic vision, setting objectives and benchmarks and implementing the Mandates.

2.8.2: Mission Leadership Team (MLT). MLT is the senior decision making forum and advisory body for SRSG/HoM and generally includes the principal managers of a UN peacekeeping operation, including: SRSG/HoM, DSRSGs, HoMC, HoPC, DMS/CMS and Mission CoS. MLT is responsible to set Mission’s high-level strategy and clear direction/tasking of other managers. The meetings of MLT are chaired by SRSG/HOM. MLT, as a group, is the mission’s primary decision-making body. The MLT also establishes and communicates the shared strategic vision for achieving the mandate. Key tasks of the MLT include the following:

- Approving the Mission Concept (Mandate Implementation Plan) and reviewing the mission budget before submission to UNHQ.
- Providing political guidance and high-level operational direction to Senior Management Group (SMG).
- Approving high-level policy approaches for issues with mission-wide effect.
- Making decisions on issues referred from the SMG.
- As part of Crisis Management Team (CMT) act as critical decision-making body during a crisis.

2.8.3: Senior Management Group (SMG). In addition, most peacekeeping operations, particularly larger ones, will have a SMG, which is a wider management, planning and coordination forum. The SMG tends to include the members of the MLT, as well as the heads of various civilian components in the mission. These include political affairs, human rights, and public information sections, among others. Many of these substantive components may
not exist in a traditional peacekeeping operation; therefore the SMG will be considerably smaller than in a multidimensional peacekeeping operation with a broad range of civilian components. SMG is responsible to ensure the following core managerial processes:

- Mission planning.
- RBB.
- Secretary-General Report.

2.8.4: Security Management Team (SMT). Every mission and country team has an SMT chaired by the DO (who in DPKO-DFS missions could be the SRSG or the HoMC/FC). In integrated missions, members of the SMT are all the country directors of the AFP, and the heads of the substantive sections of the mission. The convenor of the meeting is the Chief Security Adviser/Chief Security Officer (CSA/CSO), as applicable. The SMT is the senior body taking decisions on mission level issues with regard to security. The CSA/CSO acts as the principal adviser to the SMT on security matters. Membership of the SMT is mandatory for the people involved and attendance of meetings is obligatory. The SMT is specifically named in the Framework of Accountability. SMTs meet as the situation demands, but in highly volatile missions, normally once per week.

2.8.5: Crisis Management Team (CMT). The CMT is the mission-wide critical decision-making body during a crisis. It ensures accelerated decision-making, issuance of strategic direction to mission components, coordination with the UNCT and liaison with external partners. The CMT comprises the MLT (SRSG, DSRSG, DSRSG/RC/HC, HoMC, HoPC, DMS and Mission CoS) and additionally, the Spokesperson, CSA, Chief PIO, Chief JOC and Chief JMAC. Other managers may be co-opted into the CMT as required, such as the head of the regional office of the affected region and the chiefs of the relevant Divisions, Services and Sections. Relevant members of the UN Country Team may also be invited to be part of the CMT.

Note:
- To be read in conjunction with Chapter 6, Section 6.12, p.127.
- Refer to Chapter 8, Section 8.6.6, p. 169 for further details on Crisis Management.

2.8.6: Senior Managers Compact. A Senior Managers Compact is instituted to increase the Organisation’s capacity to evaluate the performance of the senior managers. At the Mission level, the Compact highlights strategic objectives and priorities in support of the mandate implementation. It also contains special and managerial objectives and related performance measures as determined by UNHQ. The Compact is signed by the SRSGs and HoM, covering the period from July to June and is aligned with planning and budget cycles of the mission. DPKO and DFS are responsible for the overall performance assessments of Compacts, drawing from the Mission’s evaluation of accomplishments and challenges during Compact implementation. It is the responsibility of the MLT to align their respective components planning and conduct of operational and support activities with the stated objectives and expected accomplishments of the Compact. While the objectives and expected accomplishments reflect longer term goals, the performance measures should reflect what can be achieved during the specific Compact period. Mission’s Budget informs preparation of the Compact.

2.9: Coordination Mechanisms. It is incumbent upon the peacekeeping operation to regularly meet and share information with all actors and, to the extent possible, harmonize activities by seeking their input into the mission’s planning process. There are several mechanisms that may be used to ensure that the work of the military component is integrated into the efforts of the mission as a whole, including:

- **Strategic Planning and Coordination Cell (SPCC).** The Mission SPCC is a dedicated planning and coordination function to support the SRSG/HoM on implementation of the Mandate. SPCC in turn is supported by nominated planning experts from civilian,
military and police components and entities. The Joint Operations Centre and Joint Mission Analysis Cell provide short/medium/long term political and security inputs for planning.

- **Joint Operations Centre (JOC).** An integrated JOC to coordinate daily mission activities, including military, political, civil affairs, human rights, public information and other mission components. The JOC may even be used for coordination with elements external to the mission, such as other entities of the UN system;

- **Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC).** The mission should establish a structure and staff process that optimises civil and military information management and analytical processes through the mechanism of a JMAC. The JMAC is responsible for the management (collection, coordination, analysis and distribution of information and reports) of the mission’s civil and military information in order to support the SRSG’s and force commander’s decision-making process.

- **Integrated Support Services (ISS).** An ISS section under the authority of the mission’s chief administrative officer/chief technical services, which includes civilian and military logisticians;

- **Civil-Military Coordination Cell (CMCC).** An integrated civil-military coordination cell to harmonize activities with other civilian actors in a mission area, such as UN development funds, programmes and specialized agencies, humanitarian non-governmental organizations, international financial institutions, the donor community and local civil society representatives. The integrated cell can facilitate information sharing, mutual support, joint assessments, integrated planning and common strategies that are particularly useful during times of crisis. The cell can be reproduced at the regional and sectoral level; and

- **Integrated Mission Training Cell (IMTC).** The IMTC comprises integrated civilian, military and police training cells under a civilian chief to develop mission training plan, conduct mission-specific and scenario-based induction training, undertake specific and advanced crosscutting training and develop training solutions to identified gaps and lessons learnt. Based on the Mission Training Plan, each component will develop component specific training directives.

**Note:**
- Integration and coordination within the mission components are dealt with separately in Chapter 6 of the Manual.
- Integrated Mission entities are explained in Section 6.5 to 6.11, p.123 to 127.

**2.10: Mission Support.**

Logistic support may come from several sources. Primary logistic support for the Military Component will come from a national military logistic support unit under the control of the TCC. Civilian contractors may also provide support. Major items of equipment may accompany deploying units or the UN may provide these in the mission area. The Department of Field Support (DFS) provides dedicated support to peacekeeping field missions in the areas of financial reimbursements, logistics, communications and information technology (CIT), human resources and general administration to help missions promote peace and security. While support is delivered to the field missions, and in turn the TCCs, through DFS, the determination of financial reimbursement to UN Member States for their military contributions is established through the Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Working Group and the UN legislative bodies. The details of this reimbursement at the Contingent-specific level are included in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU is the primary source of modalities of logistics support for military units in peacekeeping missions.

**Note:**
- Refer Chapter 6, Section 6.14, p.127 for further details.
2.11: Mission RBB.
The Mission RBB process is triggered and directed by the Budget Instructions issued by the Budget and Performance Reporting Service (BPRS) in the Field Budget and Finance Division (FBFD) in the Department of Field Support (DFS). Mission RBBs are also guided by DPKO/DFS strategic guidance to SRSG/HOM. At the Mission level, it is the responsibility of the SMG to discuss key budget priorities prior to submission, so that Missions resource requirements are correctly projected and resourced. The Mission Chief of Staff (CoS) and Director Mission Support/Chief Mission Support (DMS/CMS) are the managers responsible for coordinating and ensuring coherence between the planning and budgeting processes.

The Mission CoS ensures that RBB objectives are aligned with the Mission Concept and input from substantive offices and component HQ are submitted timely as per format. The DMS/CMS is responsible for compiling the budget and consolidating the data for the performance report at the end of the financial period. The Chief Budget Officer (CBO) of the Mission is responsible for coordinating and advising the support and substantive components on RBB process. Mission RBB contribute to the standing budget cycles of the ACABQ and the Fifth Committee, which meet in the first and second quarters of each year, respectively, to review peacekeeping budgets. Following are the goals for RBB in the UN:

- To measure performance in order to show whether the activities of the Organization actually make a difference.
- To establish a top-down, logical framework, using a number of strictly defined concepts, such as objectives for the biennium, expected results, performance indicators and outputs.
- To use the biennial programme budget as a direct link between expected accomplishments and resource requirements.
- To become a management and planning tool, rather than another budgeting methodology by mapping the expected results for a biennium in advance and continuously tracking them.
- To focus on the question of “why performance was below expectations” and enable managers to detect deficiencies (rather than be a simple cost-cutting tool).

Force HQ is expected to provide budgetary (RBB) inputs to support the mission budgetary process as per existing work plan. All activities of the Military Component are required to be reflected in the RBB submission to the CBO.

2.12: Conclusion.
Every UN peacekeeping mission has its own peculiar political and operational challenges and multidimensional approaches, which dictate the configuration and structure. High degree of coordination and integration between various mission components, UN system entities and other stakeholders to the peace process is vital to achieve required levels of cohesion and synergy in accomplishing the mandate. The MLT, duly assisted by the integrated mission entities, plays a crucial role for developing a mission wide strategy with common understanding and shared vision.

References:
- Directive to the Special/Executive Representative of Secretary General (S/ERSG), Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).
- DPKO/DFS Code cable Number 2636 on Senior Manager’s Compact.
- Senior Mangers Compact for Special Representatives of the Secretary-General/Heads of the Mission, 2010.
- Result Based Budgeting.
Chapter 3: UN Military Component

3.1: Military Component.

**General.** The primary function of the military component is to provide a secure environment so that other elements of the peace process can be implemented, including the monitoring of human rights, national reconciliation and institution building, and the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Military capability can also be used to provide the space and opportunity for peacemaking and political negotiations to take place by preventing further violence. In places where a ceasefire agreement or agreements for other military arrangements are in place, the Military Component oversees their implementation, provides monitoring and liaison expertise and serves as an interlocutor with local armed forces.

Military Component of UN peacekeeping operations increasingly have to work in conjunction with the military forces of other entities, such as regional military groupings or international military coalitions, to implement a common international strategy for peace in a country or region. The increasing number of participating actors and the widening scope of work in multidimensional peacekeeping operations require a broader interface between military and non-military components. The complexity of the environments in which the Military Component must operate and the increasing need for rapid and sustained military deployments have resulted in new challenges that must be addressed for peacekeeping operations to be effective.

UN peacekeeping operations have been evolving to respond effectively to changes in operational environments. The manifestation of asymmetric threats in recent times has necessitated new approaches in UN peacekeeping. In that context, the Military Component must have credible capacities, better technological support, intensive training, dynamic junior leadership and a commitment for excellence in Mandate implementation.

3.2: Purpose.

The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a broad outline of the Military Component and define the managerial role of a UN Military Force HQ. The Chapter highlights capabilities and operational parameters, command and control arrangements, interaction with DPKO, DFS and the mission HQ, Military Component management, Military Planning Process and the Force HQ routine to establish a functional framework for the commanders and staff in a Force HQ.

3.3: UN Military Force Headquarters (Force HQ).

3.3.1: General. UN peacekeeping operations have grown in complexity and scope from mainly military observer missions to multidimensional operations overseeing the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements. The tasks of the UN Military Component have become increasingly complex, because conflicts in which they intervene no longer involve national military forces alone; but irregular forces, guerrilla factions and even armed criminal gangs. Consequently, the military capability deployed in UN peacekeeping operations has also changed and is no longer lightly armed, which was typical during the Organization’s first 40-50 years of peacekeeping.

3.3.2: Role. The fundamental role of the Force HQ is the command and control of the mission’s military operations in support of the implementation of the mission’s mandate. Regardless of the nature of the mission, every Force HQ has common functions executed by functional groups.

3.3.3: Head of Military Component (HoMC). Military Component in UN peacekeeping operations is commanded by a HoMC, who reports to the SRSG/HoM. The HoMC exercises operational control over all military personnel, including the National Contingents, UN Military Observers (UNMO) and Military Liaison Officers (MLO), in the Mission. The
HoMC establishes the military operational chain of command in the field. In multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the HoMC is generally designated as the Force Commander (FC). If the Military Component comprises UNMOs only, a Chief UNMO (CMO) or Chief of Staff (CoS) will be appointed as the HoMC. In some missions, the HoMC, CMO or CoS may act as the HoM. The roles and responsibilities of the HoMC (FC/CMO/Military CoS) are more comprehensively covered under directives for these individual positions, issued by DPKO.

3.4: Capabilities and Parameters.

3.4.1: General. The Force HQ and the constituents of the Military Component must be configured, prepared, trained, motivated, and well led to execute Mission Essential Tasks (MET) and accomplish the mandate and in an increasingly complex and challenging multidimensional mission environment. The Military Component is represented by diverse national contingents with varying degrees of professional ethos and culture. Therefore, it is essential for the Force HQ to integrate and synergise the disparate and multifaceted operational capabilities of all the contingents to effectively execute its operational responsibilities. This can only be accomplished with adequately resourced and mission capable Military Component. To that extent, Force HQ must periodically assess and establish capability gaps to adjust the Military Component configuration with the current and emerging operational environment and challenges. Regular review of CONOPS, ROE, and Statement of Force/Unit Requirements (SFR/SUR) must be carried out by the Force HQ. The Force HQ must also recommend necessary right sizing or additional capability building, if deemed necessary through MCS, TAM and Strategic Assessments conducted by UNHQ. For Mission effectiveness, it is imperative to maintain required levels of operational readiness, so as to respond effectively to all challenges, particularly during crises.

3.4.2: Force HQ Capabilities. The Force HQ and the Military Component must be capable of effectively accomplishing the mandated tasks in the mission area. A UN Military Force HQ must have the following capabilities:

- **Multifaceted Organizational Structure.** A Force HQ must have a multifaceted, functionally organized and integrated organizational structure that can effectively implement mandated roles, responsibilities and tasks. The mandates, type and size of the mission, operational environment and the scope of military involvement, etc. would influence the organizational structure.

- **Leadership.** Force HQ leadership (HoMC/FC, DFC and the Force CoS) must have the ability to provide dynamic and inspirational leadership to the diverse multinational military contingents/units for effective implementation of MET. The Force leadership must have the ability to carry out constructive engagement of all the stakeholders, including those not party to the peace process as directed by the HoM/SRSG.

- **Synergy.** Military commanders, staff and other units and sub-units being drawn from a wide range of national contributions, the capability for their intra-contingent synergy as well as, coordination with other Mission components is a prerequisite for success. Personnel and units of the Military Component must have adequate understanding and skills to function in a culturally diverse and multinational environment to optimize their respective functions. It is the sum total of the contributions of each and every sub-set, components and entities in a field Mission that drives effective mandate implementation.

- **Coherence.** A Force HQ must be able to generate coherence in the planning, organising and executing operational activities and MET at all levels (Force HQ, Sector HQ, units, sub-units and the peacekeeper on ground) of the Military Component, according to the Mission Concept and objectives.

- **Operational Ability.** The command, staff and military units and personnel must have adequate resources, capacities and capabilities to successfully accomplish mandated military objectives to support the political objectives. Force HQ shall issue directives, establish Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) and lay down mission-specific
standards to foster shared vision and common understanding. It must be able to plan, monitor, execute Mission level military activities, including management of proactive, protracted and prophylactic operations, in all weather, day and night, 24/7 conditions, in a designated Area of Operations (AOO).

- **Deterrence.** Force HQ shall ensure maintenance of a proactive, credible and omnipresent posture and orientation by the Military Component to establish desired deterrent effect, in space and time to engage the spoilers or perpetrators of violence. It must have systems and measures in place to protect, deter, dominate, or mitigate likely threats in the Mission area, in consonance with the Mission ROE.

- **Effective Response.** In order to operate effectively in a dynamic mission environment, the military component should be flexible, pro-active and responsive. The Force HQ/Military Component must be appropriately configured and adequately resourced to provide effective responses in defence of the Mandate. Robust mandates, mission capable units, clarity in direction, versatile leadership, individual and collective commitment and will of the peacekeepers and units provide the basis for effective response. The Force HQ must have the ability to determine the means and methodologies of engagements, with in the framework of UN principles, policies and practices. Options of response must be weighed to assess the effect of operations on the local population.

- **Command and Control (C2).** A Force HQ must be able to exercise effective operational command and control of all the subordinate HQ, units and sub-units to execute the MET with dependable, responsive and dynamic conventional C2 apparatus adapted to UN peacekeeping environment. It shall establish clear channels of command and control with responsibilities and accountability for all subordinate elements and allocation of resources as per task. The Force HQ shall maintain effective oversight of ongoing operations in accordance with orders, plans, directives and policies, and direct events in order to influence and control the outcome of military operations to ensure positive impact.

- **Communications & Information Technology.** A Force HQ must have a responsive, sustainable, secure and versatile communications and IT support with redundancy, provided by Mission’s Communications and Information Technology Section (CITS), as well as, through military signal/CIT support to function effectively on a day to day basis, and also during a crisis situation. Force HQ in coordination with ISS/CITS shall establish measures for effective communication, data exchange, interoperability and information security within the force’s units and elements.

- **Situational Awareness.** A Force HQ shall maintain 24/7 situational awareness and information management capability to plan and execute MET, ensure force protection and contribute effectively in Mission crisis management, through early warning, preventive/proactive actions, and appropriate and effective response. The Force HQ shall maintain a 24/7 Military Operations Centre (MOC) to plan, coordinate, direct, monitor and control current operational activities of the Military Component. It must be capable of acquiring (collection and collation), processing, analyzing, and passage (dissemination) of relevant mission-specific information to all stakeholders. UNMOs and UNMLOs must be deployed as per operational necessities to facilitate enhanced situational awareness. The Force HQ shall integrate with and provide necessary support to Mission SPCC, JOC, JMAC, SIOC and Police Component with regard to short, medium and long term information, as per policy. The Force HQ must be able to coordinate and share/obtain relevant information with the UNCT and local administration effectively. It should be capable of employing, tasking and handling multiple information gathering sources/resources and provide military-specific information analysis and prognosis as required. Force HQ must be able to integrate and optimise technological support to gain tactical and operational advantage to support timely and coherent decision-making.

- **Monitoring and Surveillance.** Electronic and physical monitoring of the Mission AOR is essential for early warning, preventive and proactive actions, as well as effective responses to threats and challenges. Adequate resources in terms of equipment,
infrastructure and skilled personnel, including analysts must be allocated under the control of the Force HQ.

- **Joint Operations.** A Force HQ must be capable of planning, coordinating, directing and controlling joint operations with the UNPOL, civilian substantive mission entities, neighbouring missions as part of the Inter-Mission Cooperation (IMC) and with Host Nation security forces (if mandated) as dictated by the Mission Concept/Mission Plan.

- **Mobility.** A Force HQ should be able to move and establish a temporary tactical HQ anywhere in the Mission AOR, if necessitated by operational environment. The Force Command Group must have protected mobility in high tempo/high threat peacekeeping operations. A Force HQ must be supported with aviation resources for operational reconnaissance, liaison and crisis management, on priority. It shall ensure maintenance of protected mobility and rapid reaction capability at all levels for executing mandated tasks or dealing with any crisis situation. Force HQ must be able to plan and execute securing a safe passage (including counter Improvised Explosive Devices - IED- capabilities) in a designated area for a specific duration with organic resources. It must have the capacity in terms of the military resources and support (logistics/strategic mobility support) to execute Inter mission Cooperation (IMC).

- **Force Protection.** Force HQ shall establish effective mechanisms to provide individual and collective force protection to all mission elements deployed in the AOR, from direct and indirect threats. It should establish protective measures by effective combination of risk analysis, physical security, tactical measures, procedural measures, environmental and preventive medicine measures. All personnel of Military Component must be sensitized to deliver measured and calibrated responses without collateral damage as per peacekeeping operational norms.

- **Protection from Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats.** In asymmetric threat environments, where CBRN threats are likely to manifest, the Mission personnel, including the Military Component must be able to survive a strike and evacuate to safety rapidly. Individual and collective protection measures are essential in addition to having specialised units with capacity for early warning, detection and limited decontamination to facilitate survival.

- **Crisis Management.** The Force HQ must be fully capable of crisis management, in terms of resources, capabilities and efficiency, according to the Mission Crisis Management Plans. Force HQ shall establish a responsive and foolproof mechanism, with structures, systems and procedures to undertake crisis management responsibilities as applicable to a mission setting. Strategic vision, operational foresight, contingency planning and preparedness, dynamic leadership and high operational readiness are essential parameters that support rapid and effective response. Force HQ must have adequate reserves at all levels and strategic mobility to respond effectively.

- **Outreach and Engagement.** The Force HQ (including through the subordinate HQ, units and sub-units) must have the ability to undertake outreach and engagement with the local population, key leaders, civil society actors and vulnerable sections. The Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) and welfare activities, Quick Impact Projects (QIP) and other humanitarian support measures also form part of this engagement. Ability to establish close liaison, cooperation, coordination and integration with other UN and Non-UN actors (UNCT, AFPs, Host National government/security forces/civil society groups, international organizations, NGOs etc.) in the mission area is vital for optimizing effort.

- **Logistics Agility.** A Force HQ must have logistic support for sustainability of the Military Component to meet crisis situations with the assistance of the mission support structure. It must have efficient routine replenishments, adequate stacking levels, high serviceability rates and multiple means of support for contingencies. Force HQ should be capable of undertaking additional logistic support responsibility and restore replenishment/re-supply rapidly to isolated operational bases and temporary operational bases (TOB).
• Public Order Management. Force HQ must have the ability to anticipate, plan, coordinate and execute public order restoration tasks when situation demands as defined in the Mission Concept. Units of Military Component must be adequately resourced, trained and prepared to address public disorder challenges.

3.4.3: Operational Parameters. UN Military Force HQ must consider the following operational parameters for conduct of peacekeeping operations:

• Deployment. Invariably a UN Military Force HQ will be co-located with the Mission HQ. In exceptional cases, a Force HQ may be deployed independently, with adequate force protection. Force HQ shall define the Area of Responsibility (AOR) and boundaries for subordinate Sector/Formation HQ, as also units and sub-units in the Mission. Invariably a Sector HQ will also be deployed together with the Mission Regional HQ. The deployment/re-deployment of various units and sub-units in permanent and/or TOBs shall be carried out in consultation with and on approval of the DPKO.

• Tasking. The Force HQ shall define and disseminate the MET for all units, sub-units and UN Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM) based on the Mission Concept, Military Mission Statement and OPORD. Force HQ shall clearly delineate Mission-level, Force-level, Sector/Regional-level and tactical-level roles, responsibilities and tasks. Force HQ shall issue Force Operations Order (OPORD), Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO), Force Directives and SOPs, as applicable to address generic, cross-cutting and military specific tasks and responsibilities.

• Operational Balance. Force HQ shall ensure technological edge (in relative terms) and operational balance in the mission area to establish tactical dominance and moral ascendancy. SOPs must be established for routine operational planning, organising and execution of responsibilities and MET. All operations shall be centrally coordinated, monitored and controlled as required at appropriate levels to maintain operational equilibrium and advantage. Force HQ shall provide timely and appropriate operational support through deployment of Force reserves, QRF and Force Multipliers to favourably influence critical operational situations. All units and sub-units shall be employed for night operations and be able to operate independently away from their respective permanent bases as dictated by operational environment.

• Mission-specific, Scenario-based Planning and preparation. Military planning, preparations and operational readiness must be based on detailed appreciation and analysis of operational environment, challenges and limitations based on the envisaged mission-specific scenarios, including contingency planning and effective response mechanisms.

• Visibility and Presence. A Force HQ shall plan and coordinate proactive mobile operations to dominate area of operations, monitor and verify peace arrangements, maintain visible presence in areas of potential threat, enhance security, encourage confidence of the local population and support the mission security framework.

• Movement Control. Operational and administrative movements will be termed tactical moves and shall be centrally coordinated and tracked in real time for effective operational responsiveness. Adequate protection in terms of armed escorts, protected vehicles, selective route clearances, preventive deployments, monitoring of likely threat manifestation, rapid employment of reserves, etc. are some of the considerations that must be deliberated at Force HQ level. Where required, the Military Component must be ready and capable of securing Main Supply Routes (MSR) or routes for humanitarian access and/or routes/areas for tactical purposes.

• Use of Force. The Military Component must maintain readiness and capacities to use force in self-defence and defence of the mandate as per ROE and Guidelines on Deterrence and Use of Force.

• Force Support. The Force HQ in consultation with Director of Mission Support (DMS) shall lay down minimum stocking levels for each operating bases. High state of equipment maintenance and serviceability state shall be ensured and steps must be taken
to address any inadequacies that affect mandate implementation. Procedures for employment of enablers and Casualty/Medical evacuation plans shall be established to retain agility.

- **Outreach and Engagement.** Military Force shall maintain high visibility in all vulnerable areas through force projection and conduct of protracted, proactive and prophylactic operations in support of the mandate. All sections of the population, including spoilers shall be constructively engaged to accomplish MET and to further the political objectives. UNMOs and UNMLOs must be optimally utilized to build confidence and faith among the local people towards the peace process.

- **Crisis Management.** Force HQ shall establish mechanisms and procedures to effectively handle military operational crisis situations within its capacities. Contingencies must be analysed and responses rehearsed by earmarked troops. It shall support Mission crisis response in coordination with CSA of the Mission. Force HQ shall earmark and maintain credible, high readiness and mission capable Force Reserves/QRF with strategic mobility for rapid employment. Mission evacuation plans shall be coordinated and rehearsed periodically. Force HQ shall prepare, coordinate and rehearse support to or reception of IMC. Crisis management being a mission-wide response, joint planning (including contingency planning) and rehearsals with other relevant actors must be carried out.

- **Operational Readiness.** Force HQ shall maintain high levels of operational readiness of all the elements of the Military Component (from arrival to departure) to respond effectively to challenges in the Mission area. It shall coordinate joint rehearsals, assess and evaluate the operational readiness, and institute remedial measures to address shortcomings/weaknesses of the constituents of Military Component. Mission HQ shall apportion necessary budgetary allocations to sustain required levels of operational readiness.

- **Conduct and Discipline.** Force HQ shall promote and encourage a strong sense of commitment and adherence to UN values and ethics by all military personnel. Conduct and discipline will be a command responsibility and all members of the Military Component must maintain strict code of conduct and high state of discipline. Any breaches/violations shall be severely dealt with as per UN rules, regulations and guidelines. Force HQ shall institute prompt inquiry by the Force Provost Marshall, followed by time-bound Board of Inquiry (BoI) in coordination with Mission Conduct and Discipline Unit.

- **Asymmetric Threat.** Asymmetric threats to UN peacekeepers, Mission entities and host population is an emerging challenge and is a reality. UN Military Component must have necessary individual and collective protective capabilities and measures. Superior situational awareness, advance planning, information dominance, high-technology and high performance units, and conduct of joint operations with parallel forces would be a prime requisite to effectively deal with many dimensions of asymmetric threats. The Military Component is expected to take all necessary measures to protect vulnerable sections and also for self-defence and defence of the mandate.

- **Coordination with Police Component.** Force HQ shall ensure coordination and integration with the Police Component (HQ, Formed Police Units and Individual Police Officers), particularly on information sharing, provision of security cover and joint operations.

3.5: **Command and Control Arrangements**

3.5.1: **General.** Military personnel contributed by Member States to a UN peacekeeping operation remain under the jurisdiction of their national armed forces. However, the operational authority over these forces and personnel is transferred to the unified UN command and control and vested in the Secretary-General. UN operational authority includes

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the authority to issue operational directives within the limits of a specific mandate, the mission area and for an agreed period of time, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a contingent would require the contributing country to provide adequate prior notification.

In some situations, where the peacekeeping operation is carrying out a strictly military mandate, the HoMC may also be the designated HoM. The HoMC is responsible to the SRSG for the implementation of the tasks assigned to the military component. The HoMC, when not serving as the HoM, reports to the HoM. The Force Commander (FC) exercises “operational control” over all military personnel, including military observers, in the peacekeeping operation.

The FC may delegate “operational control” of the military observers to the Chief Military Observer (CMO) or Chief Military Liaison Officer (CMLO). The CMO/CMLO exercises Operational Control over all UNMO/UNMLOs. The operational chain of command for such situations is: the CMO/CMLO, Sector Commanders/Senior UNMO/Senior MLO, UNMO Team Leaders and UNMO/UNMLO. In many missions, the Deputy Force Commander (DFC) also act as CMO/CMLO. Commanders of the different contingents that make up the UN peacekeeping force report to the FC on all operational matters and they should not accept instructions from their own national authorities that are contrary to the Mission Mandate.

3.5.2: Chain of Command. The HoMC will establish the military operational chain of command, as follows: HoMC; Division; Brigade/Sector; Battalion; Company and sub-units. Where such defined military structure does not exist, the HoMC will establish the necessary chain of command as appropriate to the military deployment in the mission. This military operational chain of command shall be issued as a Field Command Framework. The HoMC shall ensure that staff officers are not placed in command of formations or units. Commanding officers have to be aware of the existing chain of command.

3.5.3: UN Operational Authority. It is the authority transferred by the member states to the UN to use the operational capabilities of their national military contingents, units, Formed Police Units (FPU) and/or military and police personnel to undertake mandated missions and tasks. Operational authority over such forces and personnel is vested with the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. “United Nations Operational Authority” involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of:
- A specific mandate of the Security Council;
- An agreed period of time, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a contingent would require the contributing country to provide adequate prior notification; and
- A specific geographic area (the mission area as a whole).

The ‘United Nations Operational Authority’ does not include any responsibility for certain personnel matters of individual members of military contingents, such as pay, allowances, and promotions etc. These functions remain a national responsibility. In regard to disciplinary matters, while the discipline of military personnel remains the responsibility of the troop contributing countries, the UN may take administrative steps in case of misconduct, including repatriation of military contingent members and staff officers.

3.5.4: Levels of Authority5. UN peacekeeping Authority, Command and Control is established at three separate but overlapping areas with seamless links between strategic, operational and tactical levels.

- **Strategic Level.** The UN SC provides the legal authority, high-level strategic direction, and political guidance for all UN peacekeeping operations, and vests the operational authority for directing these operations in the Secretary-General. This responsibility is

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further delegated to USG DPKO for the administration and provision of executive direction for all UN peacekeeping operations.

- **Operational Level.** The field-based management of a peacekeeping operation at the Mission HQ is considered to be the operational level. In addition to the MLT, the joint, integration and coordination structures support mission-wide coherence at the operational level. These are not command and control structures but they support the integration effort across the peacekeeping operation under the authority of the HoM.

- **Tactical Level.** This entails the management of military operations below the level of Mission HQ (i.e. Force HQ, subordinate HQ, contingents, sub-units, etc). Tactical level commanders report directly to their respective operational commanders. This level of command and control generally involves the physical conduct of tasks in order to implement or safeguard the mission's mandate. Division HQ deployed in UN peacekeeping operations is considered to be at the operational level of command and control, although reporting to the HoMC at Mission-Force HQ.

The levels of authority at strategic, operational and tactical levels are depicted diagrammatically below:

3.5.5: **Command and Control and Reporting Lines.** The Command and control and reporting lines between UNHQ and the field mission are depicted in the following graphic:
3.6: Interaction with Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).
DPKO provides political and executive direction to UN Peacekeeping operations around the world and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates. The Department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities in the context of peacekeeping operations. DPKO also provides guidance and support on military, police, mine action and other relevant issues to other UN political and peacebuilding missions. The four main entities of DPKO are, the Office of Operations, Office of military Affairs, Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions and the Policy, Evaluation and training Division. The Organisational Structure of DPKO-DFS is at Annex B (p.214).

3.6.1: Interaction with Office of Operations (OO). The main role of the Office of Operations is to provide political and strategic policy and operational guidance and support to the missions. The OO is regionally organized and the cross-cutting operational management (including political guidance) and support of field missions is carried out in an integrated way, via Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) in which all relevant functionalities (political, military, police, support, etc.) are included. The military input is provided through Military Liaison Officers (MLOs) representing the Military Adviser. IOTs are designed to serve as the principal entry point for political, as well as integrated planning and operational issues for offices within DPKO, DFS, field missions, members of the UN SC, Member States, as well as other relevant peacekeeping partners on mission-specific issues. IOTs are responsible for coordinating the Secretary-General's mission-specific reporting obligations to the UN SC. The Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) of Office of Operations also acts as Deputy Head of DPKO.

3.6.2: Interaction with Office of Military Affairs (OMA). OMA is responsible for deploying the most appropriate military capability in support of UN objectives; and to enhance performance and improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of military components in UN peacekeeping missions. It coordinates with IOT of OO for military related matters. OMA is the principle arm of DPKO for military matters. OMA is headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, a serving military officer with the rank of Lieutenant General as Military Adviser (MilAd). OMA includes the Military Adviser, the Deputy Military Adviser (DMilAd), the Chief of Staff (CoS) and a number of seconded officers and civilian staff. Detailed organisational structure of OMA is at Annex C (p.215). The key responsibilities of OMA are:
• Advise UN leadership, missions and Member States and TCCs on all military issues.
• Identify required military capabilities.
• Generate adequate military capabilities.
• Monitor and provide oversight of current operations and UN HQ crisis response.
• Coordinate with regional and sub-regional organizations, and UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes.
• Contribute to UN HQ crisis response.
• Develop/integrate peacekeeping operations policies and doctrines as applicable to Military Component.
• Provide military strategic assessments and maintain information database.

The management of military affairs in DPKO field missions is an OMA responsibility delegated by the USG DPKO. It constitutes strategic guidance given by OMA to Military Components in the field or the strategic advice provided by OMA to the Mission leadership on behalf of OMA. The Missions Management Working Groups (MMWG) established at OMA for the purpose of monitoring current operations and to carry out short term planning and assessment, coordinates the information and output related to the Missions, advises the MilAd on courses of action, supports the planning process, and supports Current Military Operations Service (CMOS) to provide operational oversight on behalf of MilAd. Interaction between OMA and Force HQ include, but are not limited to the following:
- **Situation Reports and Military Information Summary.** Submission of daily and weekly situation reports/information summary to (CMOS) and Assessment Team (AT).
- **Strategic Assessments.** The AT of OMA shall share strategic forecasts, threat and risk assessments and military information/assessments/analysis based on specific requests from field missions.
- **Video Teleconference (VTC) Meetings.** VTCs between OMA and Force HQ leadership is organised by CMOS on an as required basis.
- **MCS.** MCS under the lead of MPS is conducted as per schedule.
- **Visits.** Coordination of visits by OMA leadership, Member States reconnaissance teams and predeployment visits.
- **Desk Officers (DO).** All services and AT has Dos designated for each Mission to coordinate reporting, information exchange, technical guidance, rotation planning, address operational/administrative issues, etc. AT OMA, all the service and team DOs are organised into mission-specific working groups. These DO working groups conduct routine teleconferencing with respective Mission Force HQ (Force CoS).
- **Guidance.** Policy and Doctrine Team (PDT) shall provide guidance support to Force Planning and Policy Branch (U-5) and Training Branch (U-7).

### 3.6.3: Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI)

OROLSI is responsible for coordinating the Department’s activities in the areas of police, justice and corrections, mine action, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and Security Sector Reform. These entities are also represented in the Mission as part of the civilian substantive component and the Force HQ Staff is required to interact, consult and integrate with them as applicable.

### 3.6.4: Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET)

DPET provides an integrated capacity to develop and disseminate policy and doctrine; to develop, coordinate and deliver standardized training; to evaluate mission progress towards mandate implementation; and to develop policies and operational frameworks for strategic cooperation with various UN and external partners. At the field Mission level, the IMTC and Mission Best Practices Officers are the focal points on policy and training issues. The evaluation team of DPET may undertake mission level evaluations on specific issues.

### 3.7: Department of Field Support (DFS)

DFS provides dedicated support to peacekeeping operations, special political missions and other field presences in the areas of budget and finance, logistics, human resources, general administration, and information and communication technology. DFS has five main offices in UN HQ in New York:

#### 3.7.1: Offices of the Under-Secretary-General (USG) and the Assistant Secretary-General (ASG)

The Office of the USG and the Office of the ASG provide executive support to the USG and the ASG and, in addition to their personal staff, include the Global Field Support Strategy Team; the Senior Leadership Appointment Section; the Conduct and Discipline Unit; the Audit Response and Board of Inquiry Section; the Field Procurement Liaison Team; and the Air Transport Section.

#### 3.7.2: Field Personnel Division (FPD)

FPD designs, recruits, develops and maintains a civilian workforce for field operations.

#### 3.7.3: Field Budget and Finance Division (FBFD)

FBFD’s mission is to provide peace operations with financial support services to ensure appropriate funding and responsible stewardship of funds. The Division includes the Budget and Performance Reporting Service and the Memorandum of Understanding and Claims Management Section (MCMS). The Division is responsible for the overall management of the contingent-owned equipment
(COE) system, the coordination of negotiations and preparation of Memorandum of Understandings (MoU) with police and troop contributing countries (P/TCC), and the reimbursement of the provision of COE (Major Equipment and Self-Sustainment) and other claims. The Division also calculates and certifies all COE Letters of Assist and Death and Disability claims for military contingents and formed police units and provides claims status updates.

3.7.4: Information and Communications Technology Division (ICTD). The ICTD provides strategic, secure ICT services and solutions to field operations. The Division supports command, control, communications and computer functions, including coordination for military and police elements in field operations. The Division is comprised of the Field Communications and Information Technology Operations Service and the Field Technology and Security Operations Section.

3.7.5: Logistics Support Division (LSD). LSD implements and monitors policies and procedures for all logistics issues in field operations, including planning and programme support; supply; engineering; contingent-owned equipment and property management; and cartographic and medical support, while minding the environmental footprint in the mission area. The Division also ensures the movement of military and civilian personnel and cargo to and from field missions by air, land and sea. The Division consists of two services: the Strategic Support Service and the Strategic Transport Service.

3.8: Interaction with Mission HQ.
The Military Component of a UN Mission draws its objectives and MET based on the Mission Concept and the CONOPS. The HoMC is directly responsible to the SRSG on all matters pertaining to the Military Component, as well as its integrated responsibilities with other components and joint structures. The HoMC, being part of the MLT, will also contribute to the SMG and CMT of the Mission. Generally, there would be weekly meetings of the MLT and a meeting with UNCT/other stakeholders which would be attended by the HoMC for decision making or coordination. The Force HQ Staff under the Force CoS shall establish effective integration with the civilian/police/security substantive focal points and sections as applicable.

Force HQ shall take the SRSG and the MLT into confidence on all critical operational issues and relevant information shared with the joint mission structures for enhanced synergy. The Mission support entities must accord high priority status to operational requirements, including employment of enablers and force multipliers to ensure timely and effective support to the Military Component. Periodic training and sensitisation to enhance mission coherence and integration would be jointly undertaken under the responsibility of IMTC. The Mission CoS, CISS and Force CoS shall work in close coordination to resolve any contentious issues. The SRSG shall be kept informed of all issues that have a detrimental impact on operational matters and logistic sustenance to ensure appropriate and timely Mission support.

3.9: Management of Military Component.
3.9.1: General. The UN Military Force HQ is responsible for executing the military Component operations in support of the overall mission mandate implementation to accomplish the political objectives. Key guidelines for management of Subordinate HQ, UN Military Observers (UNMO), Military Liaison Officers (MLO) and national contingents are described in the succeeding paragraphs.

3.9.2: Screening of Military Peacekeepers. In 2012, the Secretary-General issued a Policy on Human Rights Screening of UN Personnel, aimed at ensuring that the UN does not recruit or deploy individuals who have been involved in the commission of a violation of international human rights law or humanitarian law. The policy outlines a three-prong approach by which the UN will gather information for purposes of human rights screening:
States that nominate or provide personnel to serve with the UN are requested to screen their personnel and certify that they have not committed or alleged of having committed violations.

Individuals seeking to serve with the UN will submit self-attestations.

The UN Secretariat will conduct active screening of human rights conduct of candidates with an initial focus on senior appointments.

In recognition that UN military leadership plays a fundamental role to implement SC mandates which are increasingly centred on protection of human rights, the commitment and ability to give prominence to human rights has been included in the competencies required for the selection and performance evaluation of HoMC. Keeping that in view, it is the responsibility of the TCC to ensure that the Military Components Commanders, Staff and all contingent personnel, including National Support Element (NSE) nominated for deployment as part of the Mission has not been convicted of, or is not currently under investigation or being prosecuted for, any criminal offence, including violations of international human rights law or international humanitarian law. In the case of nominees who have been investigated for, charged with or prosecuted for any criminal offence but were not convicted, the National Government is requested to provide information regarding the investigation(s) or prosecutions concerned. The TCC is also requested to certify that it is not aware of any allegations against the nominated members that they have committed acts that may amount to violations of international human rights law or international humanitarian law.

3.9.3: Management of Force HQ. The management of Force HQ is described separately in Chapter 4, Organisational Structure, p.56.

3.9.4: Management of Subordinate HQs. The Force HQ is responsible for exercising command and control over all forces within the Mission area. This requires “Unity of Command and the Integration of Effort” at all levels of command leading to cohesiveness between all lines of operation. The Force HQ is responsible for providing orders and issuing direction which subordinate HQ receive, analyze and action as required. In doing so, the Force HQ ensures coordination between one or more subordinate HQ to ensure unity of effort and mutual support as required.

The management of military operations below the level of Mission Headquarters as well as the supervision of individual personnel is considered to be at the tactical level and is exercised at various levels by subordinate military commanders at command levels established within the military command frameworks (for example Brigade, Regional, Sector Commanders. Tactical level commanders report directly to their respective operational commanders. This level of command and control generally involves the physical conduct of tasks in order to implement or safeguard the mission’s mandate. Where a Division HQ is established in the operational chain of command, this HQ shall be considered to be at the operational level of command and control although reporting to the HOMC at Mission HQ.

3.9.5: Management of UN Military Observers. UN Military Observers (UNMO) are military officers assigned by National Governments to serve with the UN upon the request of the Secretary-General. UNMOs are considered as “Experts on Missions for the United Nations” as defined under article VI of the Convention of Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 22A(I)); this is an important aspect that lends credibility and legitimacy to their functions when they are deployed on mission. UNMOs are “the eyes and ears” of the Mission and their core role is the gathering and verification of specific and general information in the mission area. UNMOs also play a vital role in outreach and engagement with the local population and stakeholders.

UNMO Organisation. If the Military Component comprises Military Observers only, a Chief Military Observer (CMO) or Chief of Staff (COS) will be appointed as the HoMC. The
CMO then reports directly to the HOM and exercises Operational Control over all Military Observers. The operational chain of command for such situations is: the CMO, Sector Commanders/Senior Military Observers, Military Observer Team Leaders and Military Observers. In some missions, the HoMC, CMO or CoS may also act as the HoM. A suggested organizational Structure for a Military Observer Mission, where the CMO is also the HoM is at Chapter 4, Section 4.3.4, p.57.

In a multidimensional Mission, the DFC may perform the responsibilities of a CMO in the Force HQ to exercise operational control over all UNMOs assigned to the mission. In some missions, operational situation may demand delegation of operational control of UNMOs to the Sector Commanders (e.g. MONUSCO). CMO will be assisted by a Deputy CMO and a Military Observers office to plan, deploy, task, monitor and control activities of UNMOs. CMO will also ensure that UNMOs deployment and tasking also supports the JOC and JMAC requirements. UNMOs may be deployed independently as UN Military Observer Teams (UNMOT) in static team sites with specific Area of Responsibilities (AoR), or may be employed as mobile UNMOTs (by air and surface transport) from a static operational base. They can also be grouped or co-located with Sector HQ/Contingents for security reasons and/or as necessitated by operational requirements. UNMOTs in a Sector/Region may also be deployed under a Sector Senior UNMO, who reports directly to the CMO and keeps the Sector HQ informed. A suggested organizational structure of UNMOs in multidimensional peacekeeping missions is given below with three different models that could be configured as per mission operational need.

**UN Military Observer Organisation**

![Diagram of UN Military Observer Organisation]

Usually, UNMOs are not authorized to carry weapons. Protection, when required, will be provided by contingent troops. However, in exceptional cases, depending on the operational conditions, and safety and security concerns, USG DPKO may authorise carriage of weapons by UNMOs in accordance with procedures and criteria established by the Secretariat for that purpose. Generally, UNMOs will be accompanied by the liaison officers of Host Nation/parties to the conflict and are supported by interpreters.

**UNMO Duties.** The diversity and complexity of tasks for a UNMO depend upon the mandate of the particular mission, the political and military situation prevailing, and the conditions of the civilian population. UNMOs duties encompass a variety of tasks within the designated mission area of responsibility, typically inclusive of, but not restricted solely to:

- Supervision, monitoring, verification and reporting of cease-fire agreements, separations and withdrawals of forces, and cessation of outside assistance;
- Monitoring of the disarmament/demobilisation, regrouping and cantonment processes of military forces;
- Supervision of the disarmament of militia and military forces;
- Supervision of the destruction of armaments and weapons;
- Monitoring of checkpoints, border crossings, entry/exit points, and air and sea ports;
- Inspection of sites (demilitarized zone, troop deployments, incident sites, etc).
- Comprehensive investigation/verification of information on armed groups, land mines, explosive remnants of armed conflict, alleged violations of the cease-fire agreement or any other matter directed by the Mission.
- Assisting in the location and confiscation of weapons caches; and reporting of located or suspected mine affected areas;
- Facilitating or support formal and informal negotiation and mediation processes.
- Monitoring of conditions in potential conflict areas for signs of increased tension or conflict escalation;
- Observation and reporting on alleged abuses of human rights,
- Assistance with referendum or election validation, and conducting and coordinating liaison between combined and UN mixed military working groups and components, NGOs, and UN and civilian humanitarian agencies.
- Provision of liaison services to local governments, opposing military forces, neighbouring countries, NGOs, international agencies and UN agencies;
- Maintaining liaison with, and between, the belligerent factions;
- Assistance to Humanitarian Agencies through supervising and conducting POW exchanges, food distribution points and convoys, medical supplies and establishments, etc.
- Coordinating actions and procedures of several actors in the field for meetings and interaction (including high level interactions) between UN peacekeeping mission staff and other key actors.
- Carrying out confidence building measures, establish informal communication channels with identified stakeholders and facilitate perception management initiatives.

3.9.6: Management of UN Military Liaison Officers. UN Military Liaison Officers (UNMLO) are deployed to liaise and engage Host local/provincial/national Governments; National military forces and other security institutions; opposing armed groups; neighbouring countries in the conflict zone; international agencies and forces; other UN partners; international and national non governmental organizations, including human rights organizations; the humanitarian assistance community; local civil society groups including women’s groups; and other persons or organizations identified by the Mission. The operational environment and Mission mandate may dictate role and structure of a Military Liaison Organization in certain peacekeeping missions. Generally, like UNMOs, the UNMLOs are not authorized to carry weapons. However, in exceptional cases, depending on the operational conditions, and safety and security concerns, USG DPKO may authorise carriage of weapons by UNMLOs in accordance with procedures and criteria established by the Secretariat for that purpose.

Military Liaison Organization. Military Liaison Organization for each Mission varies based on Mission Mandate, operational environment and political sensitivities. It is also essential to know that UNMLOs may be tasked to perform some of the UNMO tasks, if situation demands. Past practices have established two different types of Military Liaison Organization as follows:

- **Generic Military Liaison Organization.** Usually, each Force HQ will have a Liaison Cell under the Operations Branch (U-3), with a military orientation. In addition, UNMLOs/teams may also be required to engage various parties to the conflict (based on mission requirements) and therefore located in close proximity to such groups. The responsibilities of the Liaison Cell in a Force HQ are given in *Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2, p.64*. In some missions, UNMLOs may be deployed in neighbouring countries as UN Liaison Teams (UNLT) as part of the conflict management arrangement and to coordinate necessary support for force sustenance.
**Mission-specific Military Liaison Organization.** The Mission-specific Military Liaison Organization (such as in UNMISS) will be headed by Chief Military Liaison Officer (CMLO), supported by a Deputy CMLO (DCMLO). CMLO is responsible for tasking, coordination, monitoring, reporting and evaluating the UNMLOs in coordination with Force CoS and U-3 Staff (Operations Branch). CMLO reports to the HoMC/FC and DFC (on delegated authority) on all activities pertaining to Military Liaison Organization. In the role of supporting the Host Nation, a number of UNMLOs may be deployed in each sector/region/state under a Senior MLO (SMLO) as Liaison Team leaders with specific responsibilities and tasks. In the event of being deployed as UNLT in the neighbouring countries, they will be tasked, controlled and coordinated by the DFC, through the Force CoS. A generic organizational structure of Military Liaison Organization is depicted below:

**UNMLO Tasks.** The aim of liaison is to establish communications, build productive relationships, and create mutual understanding. The task of UNMLO is derived from the type of mission and mandate. In most cases, liaison by the MLOs will be between the Mission and key stakeholders of the Host Nation in support of state administration and capacity building. In some cases, MLOs may be required to perform some of the tasks of UNMOs as well, based on the operational requirements. Typical UNMLO tasks include, but are not limited to the following:

- Liaison with key stakeholders of the Host Nation at all levels (political leaders, government officials, security forces, law enforcement agencies, civic society groups, etc.).
- Establish direct contact, liaison and coordination with relevant leaders and groups, Host military leadership and belligerent forces on local, regional, national and international level – within the Capital as well as in the Regions.
• Advise or assist key stakeholders as per Mandate/Mission Concept/OPORD.
• Advise the Head of Office of the Integrated Mission Teams (IMT) on military matters.
• Monitor and report developments in respective fields/Area of Responsibilities (AoR) to the Force HQ.
• Support the establishment of a Mission early warning system.
• Gather relevant information from all security related agencies and UN partners.
• Liaison International Organizations/Non-Governmental Organisations.
• Act as point of contact for military forces of the stakeholders involved in the mission mandate implementation.
• Maintain a databank of all key personalities and functionaries of the host government officials, rebel groups, security forces and agencies, civic society groups, local leaders, socio-cultural-ethnic-religious groups, etc.
• Participate in planning of programs.
• Assist in addressing/mitigating impediments in mandate implementation.
• Carryout negotiation and mediation as required.

Note:

3.9.7: Management of Contingents. Military contributions from Troop Contributing Country (TCC) is pledged and deployed on a request from the Secretary-General (Note Verbale). National military contributions come under the operational control once they depart home country. A national contingent may comprise one or several types of units. While each of the National unit commander exercises their functions in respective chain of command, the TCC shall appoint a National Contingent Commander (NCC) or Senior National Officer or Representative. The NCC is responsible for integrating the national contribution into the overall force, advises the HoMC/FC on National policies and caveats, and has ultimate responsibility in coordinating, monitoring and aligning national activities I support of Missions’ mandate implementation. The NCC is also responsible for providing updates to the National chain of command that may influence future decision making with regard to contributions to UN missions. The NCC may have dual roles of responsibilities with a position in the UN Chain of Command. The NCC roles are to:

• **Influence the Force HQ, in order to:**
  ➢ Provide input into the Force HQ and planning processes.
  ➢ Provide advice to the HoMC/Force Commander.
  ➢ Identify and deal with strategic and operational risks for national forces.
  ➢ Engage with partners to encourage unity of effort when applicable.

• **Direct.**
  ➢ Exercise operational command and control of National forces and direct their use in accordance with National policy and UN Mandate.
  ➢ Integrate the National contingent with the Mission/Military Component and institute measures to de-conflict, prioritize and align activities as per Mission Concept, CONOPS and OPORD.
  ➢ Assure the contingent brings with it sufficient sustainment capacity or negotiate UN/multinational Support.
  ➢ Determine and coordinate National contingent protection policy and posture.

• **Support.**
  ➢ Act as National figurehead, building and sustaining national contingent cohesion.
  ➢ Provide legal advice to the contingent.
  ➢ Facilitate the integration of the national contribution into the UN force structure.
  ➢ Provide administrative support as required to the National contingent.
Inform.

- Articulate the case for changes to the National contribution to the respective national authorities.
- Report tactical developments and changes to the National chain of command.
- Assist in the development/revision of MOUs & SOFAs.

**TCC Responsibility.** Based on the MoU, TCCs are generally responsible for ensuring the following:

- Predeployment training, preparation and self-evaluation.
- Selection, training and provision of skilled personnel.
- Provision of “Mission Capable” units as per SUR.
- Maintenance of operational readiness in the Mission.
- High state of serviceability state of weapons, equipment and vehicles.
- Timely execution of MET and effective implementation of mandates.
- Timely rotation of troops, replenishment of ammunition and spares, and replacement of vehicles and equipment.

**Contingent Management.** Once deployed in the Mission area, all National military contributions are under the UN operational control. The Force HQ must foster close cooperation, common understanding and professional commitment with the contingent and unit commanders to ensure synergy in executing MET and accomplishing objectives. Formal and informal interactions, interpersonal skills and partnership approach by the Force leadership are essential for positive effect in a multi-national and multi-cultural environment. Following issues merit attention at the Force HQ level:

- Ensure directive style of leadership.
- Consultative, collaborative and inclusive approach in mandate implementation.
- Engage all unit/sub-unit commanders to sensitise and inculcate common understanding on military objectives.
- Discuss and finalise responses and TTPs with due considerations to National military traditions.
- Provide clear orders and directions within the framework of UN peacekeeping operations (deployment areas, MET, ToRs, crisis management, contingency plans, etc.).
- Provide mission-specific standards and guidelines.
- Monitor performance and advise corrections/improvements as required.
- Provide feedback to deployed commanders, Mission HQ, OMA and respective National authorities on issues that merit attention and action.
- Monitor levels of tactical cohesion, esprit-de-corps, morale, motivation and will of the units and sub-units and support/advise respective unit/sub-unit commanders in addressing them to retain efficiency and effectiveness.
- Interact with TCC Permanent Missions during visits to UNHQ, in coordination with OMA.
- Interact with TCC authorities during their field mission visits and sensitise on issues that merit National support.
- Monitor conduct and discipline of the contingent personnel and take appropriate measures in case of violations as per UN rules and regulations.

**Deployment.** Units and/or sub-units of a National contingent may be deployed either independently (reporting directly to Force HQ) or under a Sector/Regional HQ. The deployments in permanent bases and/or its redeployments, and deployments in Temporary Operating Bases (TOBs) beyond 30 days will be approved by DPKO based on successive recommendations of the Force HQ, Mission HQ, OMA and OO. In all cases TCC consensus is vital.

**3.9.8: Management of Military Aviation Units.** UN Military Air unit provide operational and logistics aviation support to peacekeeping operations in hostile areas, especially in
medium and high threat areas, where the civilian helicopters cannot operate, and landing zones where there is no ground support or where airfield security cannot be guaranteed. DMS/CMS has responsibility for administration and financial management; accountable for the utilization and safety of military air assets. Military Air assets are utilized in accordance with the Letter of Assist (LOA). The DMS/CMS is further responsible for ensuring adherence to safety standards and provision under DPKO Aviation Manual (May 2005). Military air assets can be placed on Air Tasking Order as stand-by for specific pre-planned or rapid response at the request of the HoMC. Once scheduled on the Air Tasking Order, the HoMC has the authority to release the air assets for designated missions.

**Type of Assets.** IN UN Missions, the following types of aviation assets are deployed:

- **Rotary Wing (Light/Medium/Heavy).**
  - Utility Helicopters.
  - Multi-purpose Helicopters.
  - Attack/Armed Helicopters.

- **Fixed Wing.**
  - Transportation/Cargo.
  - Air Reconnaissance.

**Aviation Unit C2.** HoM will exercise OPCON over all military air units. HoM may delegate tasking authorities to CMS/DMS and delegate Operational Authorities to HoMC/FC. Military air assets operate under the overall authority of the Head of Mission (HOM) and support the achievement of mission wide priorities in support of the mandate. The Head of Military Component exercises operational control over military personnel while the aircraft are managed as part of integrated support services of a UN PKO. Deployment of military air asset for UN Peacekeeping Missions should be considered in terms of responsiveness to all anticipated needs, economic, flexibility, safety and security.

The HoMC exercises operational control over military personnel while the aircraft are managed as part of integrated support services of a UN PKO. The Force Commander is assigned a written monthly allotment of guaranteed flying hours for military utility helicopters, on which he or she can draw to execute movement of reserves and reinforcements, logistic support and related operational activities. Furthermore, military air assets in each mission may be earmarked on the Air Tasking Order as stand-by for specific pre-planned immediate rapid response at the request of the UN Military Commander and coordinated in advance. Once these assets are scheduled on the Air Tasking Order, the Force Commander has the authority to release the aircraft for designated missions provided the aircraft comply with UN directives and procedures.

**Aviation Tasks.** Depending on type of asset, LOA and operational situation, military air units can be tasked for the following:

- Reconnaissance/visit of designated Mission leadership.
- Aerial reconnaissance, observation, monitoring.
- Transportation of troops and equipment (deployment/redeployment).
- CASEVAC/MEDEVAC.
- Logistic support.
- Fire direction.
- Air fire support.
- Search and rescue.
- Recovery.
- Support to Host nation/local population (if mandated).

**3.9.9: Management of Military Maritime Units.** In certain Missions, operational requirements and terrain parameters may dictate deployment of a dedicated Maritime Task Force (MTF) for conducting maritime operations in the littorals adjacent to Mission AOO.
An MTF can be configured entirely from one TCC or it could be supported through a multinational arrangement. UN MTF can be employed autonomously across the entire mission spectrum or in support of a joint operation. It must be capable of providing force defence as well as combat support to joint operations ashore. The ships of MTF will be deployed directly into the Area of Maritime Operations (AMO). If the Mission has Military Riverine assets, necessary coordination for joint planning and joint operations as applicable shall be formalised by the Force HQ. The ports of call for resupply of ships will be mission-specific and designated depending on the AMO. Logistic support for the ships has to be arranged on a bilateral basis.

**Composition/Type of Assets.** UN MTF may comprise of a number of war ships of different classes depending on the assigned role and tasks as follows:

- Multi-role Frigate.
- Corvette.
- Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV).
- Fast Patrol Boat (FPB).
- Combat Support Ship.
- Mine Warfare Vessel.
- Fast Patrol Support Vessel.
- Maritime Helicopter.
- Maritime Patrol Aircraft.

**MTF C2.** HoMC/FC will exercise OPCON over all maritime assets. HoMC/FC will delegate command and control functions over the ships to the Commander of MTF. The Commander MTF may further divide the force into a number of Maritime Task Groups (MTG) to conduct a broad range of maritime operations. MTGs function under organic command and control arrangements at the tactical level. MTF core Staff or part of the Staff may be deployed aboard flagship or ashore to support command and control functions for the Commander of MTF.

**Maritime Tasks.** Within the framework of UN mandate and the assigned mission, the MTF will cover a wide spectrum of maritime tactical tasks, including:

- Active aerial and seaborne monitoring of sea areas for any infringement of the UN sanctions or embargoes and their enforcement.
- Patrolling and monitoring a maritime ceasefire line or demilitarised zone and the control of piracy and contraband.
- Patrolling and monitoring sea areas to control and/or enforce economic or legal agreements related to the mission, e.g. fishery, seabed exploration and international borders.
- Establish and maintain sea lines of communications (LoCs).
- Patrol and conduct Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) to deny use of LoCs by the hostile forces.
- Survey and conduct maritime reconnaissance.
- Conducting military evacuation operations and non-combatant evacuation operations.
- Fire support to forces ashore.
- Escort commercial ships carrying essential supplies.
- Mine countermeasures and ordnance disposal to enable freedom of movement.
- Humanitarian activities for confidence building.
- Conduct common training and exercises with naval units of Host country.
- Plan, coordinate and conduct joint operations with Riverine Force (if deployed), the aviation units and other army contingents.

**3.9.11: Management of Military Riverine Units.** Riverine operations in the Mission may be carried out by Marine Forces or Naval personnel/teams and Naval UNMOs (in some cases by other Contingent forces also) employing various types of floating units/assets in the configuration of COE or a combination of COE and UNOE, organized as a Mobile Riverine
Force (MRF). The MRF is considered to be a joint task force. The Riverine COE and Contingent Forces (Marine Corps or others, and Naval Personnel) provide a balance of tactical mobility, quick reaction and force protection, whilst the Riverine UNOE and Naval UNMOs provide an afloat-mobile base of operations and long-range surface mobility.

**Composition.** Riverine forces may include, but are not limited to, the following:
- Smaller afloat crafts and platforms to berth and/or lift troops and cargo.
- Repair capacity (shore-based).
- Fire support crafts; escort crafts.
- C2 and communication elements (shallow draft crafts equipped to provide C2 facilities).
- Patrol and interdiction crafts (could be RHIBs).
- High speed reconnaissance crafts (could be fast boats or RIBs).
- Tugs, pushers and barges (could be UNOE, locally contracted).
- Refuel craft (if fuel is not provided by the mission along the AoR).
- River salvage craft.
- Medical support (either afloat or ashore).
- Marine Corps Teams task organized to perform quick reaction and force protection tasks.
- Aviation combat element.
- Logistic Cell.

**MRF C2.** The Riverine Unit will be under Operational Control (OPCON) of the Force Commander. Tactical Control (TACON) of the MRFs should not be delegated below Sector HQ level. The MRF Commander exercises OPCON of the entire MRF and may station himself on board, on the shore-based facility, or may be airborne in command and control helicopters. The Riverine Forces and Naval UNMO Teams commands (within a MRF) are on a corresponding level of command with regard to their respective components. Based on Mission operational requirements, a Chief Riverine Operations Officer may be co-located at the Force HQ in order to facilitate integration of planning efforts and Riverine Operations advice to HoMC/FC.

**Considerations for Deployment.** Primary considerations for deployment of Riverine assets are:
- Riverine mission, forces available.
- Mode of operations, capabilities and limitations of the hostile forces.
- Capabilities of MRF based on operational requirements, threat and tasks.
- Reconnaissance and surveillance needed for security.
- Land areas (shore bases, river landing areas and helicopter landing zones) waterways (including areas for mooring assigned crafts) and necessary for manoeuvre and support.
- Defensibility of shore-based facilities without jeopardizing MRF capabilities.
- Operational and communication range of deployed elements of the MRF.
- Logistic supportability.

**MRF Tasks.** In UN peacekeeping operations, riverine operations may have the following tasks:
- Establish a safe and secure environment in defined AOR.
- Establish and maintain control of riverine lines of communications (LOCs).
- Deny, by interdiction, barrier, patrolling or surveillance operations, use of riverine LOCs (waterways) by hostile forces.
- Show UN presence; information collection; transportation/repositioning of troops and equipment;
- Naval riverine close fire support, naval gunfire or firebase support.
- Waterborne reconnaissance.
- Search and rescue operations.
- Escorting logistics vessels and other specified civilian vessels.
Establish a secure environment in the vicinity of designated landing zones/beaches where
ground operations will be conducted.
Outreach and engagement with people in interior/remote areas connected by water ways.
Civic action programs to support local population on essential support.
Re-embarkation/withdrawal.
Support local Marine/Riverine Forces.

3.9.12: Management of Military Special Force (SF) Units. Special Forces units (Company
size) are a Mission force multiplier which provides the HoMC/FC a high technology and
readiness reserve for executing rapid surgical operations to respond effectively during crisis
situations. SF units have inbuilt flexibility with strategic mobility (including high surface
mobility), ability to conduct protracted operations either independently or jointly and have a
longer sustainability.

SF C2. SF unit will be under OPCON of the HoMC/FC. TACON of SF Units should not be
delegated below the Sector HQ level. They are usually deployed centrally under the Force HQ
and can be staged forward to anticipated crisis areas to be effective in time and space. Mission
mobility resources must be dedicated and held stand-by for their employment. The
deployment of SF units should be considered in terms of responsiveness to all anticipated
needs, centralized control, flexibility and collocation with lift and other essential support
assets. Safety and security considerations must include arrangements to hand over camp
security to other units to enable rapid mobilization of the bulk of the unit.

SF Tasks. The SF unit must be capable of conducting independent operations or coordinating
offensive actions in support of force or sector operations. Some of the tasks that can be
assigned to SF units are as follows:
- Long range reconnaissance.
- Information gathering.
- Special escort operations.
- Limited civil military coordination.
- Guidance for insertion of other forces into the AOO.
- Provide relay communications and rebroadcast capabilities.
- Secure/prevent/deny the use of key infrastructure or terrain.
- Carry out surgical strike, rescue and extraction operations.
- Operate in remote/inaccessible areas.
- Observe and adjust indirect fire and attack helicopter support.

3.9.13: Management of Force Reserves. Depending on operational requirements,
peacekeeping Missions shall be resourced with Force Reserves to respond rapidly and
effectively to restore a deteriorating or adverse situation. Force reserves may be configured
with purely infantry, purely mechanised, or a combination of both units to retain requisite
levels of capabilities. It could also have an all arms configuration depending on the nature of
the mission assigned to them. Force reserves must have high mobility-technology-protection-
survivability capabilities and well trained and motivated. Force reserves may be centrally
deployed or deployed in the proximity of anticipated threats either preemptively or in
response to a developing scenario.

Force Reserve C2. HoMC shall maintain OPCON over the Force reserves and may be
delegated to Sector Commanders for specific duration and effect. Force HQ shall ensure the
operational readiness, including training, preparation and coordination for their employment
during crisis situations.

Force Reserve Tasks. Based on Mission operational challenges and requirements, Force
Reserve may be tasked for the following:
- Carryout preemptive preventive deployment in a designated area.
- Restore a deteriorating operational situation.
- Stabilise and mitigate an adverse situation.
- Undertake proactive actions to deter or mitigate a potential threat from manifesting.
- Reinforce sectors or other unit areas as part of Intra-Mission Cooperation.
- Support neighbouring Missions as part of Inter Mission Cooperation.
- Undertake specified Mission Essential Tasks, like other UN Infantry Battalions.
- Provide support to Host security forces if mandated (training, capacity building, etc.).
- Facilitate emergency humanitarian support.
- Protect vital installations/key area.
- Undertake surgical operations in collaboration with SF units, Attack Helicopters, FPUs and other Host security forces.
- Conduct independent operations against designated armed groups/adversaries (both lethal and non-lethal actions).
- Undertake rescue/extraction and cordon and searches.
- Provide secure area/lines of communication for a specified period of time.
- Provide support to FPUs or Host law and order institutions to stabilise public disorders.

3.9.14: Management of Combat Support Units. Military combat support units, such as Attack/armed/observation Helicopters and Combat Engineers, etc. will be placed directly under the Force HQ for operations and logistics support provided by the Mission Support Component. The HOMC shall exercise tasking authority and 'UN operational control' over these military enabling units, whereas the 'tactical command and control' is exercised by the respective unit commanders. During crisis or to meet operational emergencies, the military utility helicopters may be placed under the operational control of the HoMC.

3.9.14: Management of Enablers. Military units may be generated as Mission enablers to augment Mission Support systems in the field. Mission enablers include military units from aviation (Military utility helicopters and fixed wing aircrafts), construction Engineers (vertical, horizontal and well drilling), Logistics, Medical, Petroleum, Signals, Transport, etc. The required Mission enablers are generated by OMA, and managed by the Force HQ in respective Missions. The DMS/CMS exercises tasking authority over all assigned uniformed logistics personnel and enabling units. The DMS/CMS has tasking authority over military utility helicopters. The DMS/CMS will make a written allotment of specific flying hours of utility helicopter support required for operational movement of reserves and reinforcements; and emergency medical evacuation, under direct control of the HOMC on monthly basis.

3.9.15: Media Management. As the media play an instrumental role in support of peacekeeping missions, the HoM/HoMC should use the opportunities the media offer, while always keeping in mind the impact his/her statements could have on public opinion and the parties in conflict. The HoM/HoMC should designate a spokesperson, who would be authorised to make statements to the media, on or off the record, on his/her behalf. The HoM/HoMC and his/her spokesperson should devise a coherent media strategy for the mission, under the direction of DPKO and in consultation with DPA, the Department of Public Information and agencies active in the mission area. The HoM/HoMC may grant specific authorisation to other members of the mission to communicate with the media. The text of press releases and official statements, as well as significant media commentary and news items, or summaries thereof, should be widely circulated within the mission and forwarded to HQ. In some cases, it may be advisable to coordinate the contents and timing of press statements or releases with Headquarters.

3.10: Military Component Planning Process (MCPP).
3.10.1: General. MCPP in UN peacekeeping operations is unique in nature, as opposed to conventional military planning process in which planning process determines the resource requirements. In the UN context, many of the planning factors are determined as part of the strategic planning in UNHQ, and provided as guidance through the SCR, Mandate,
CONOPS, ISF, Mission Concept, etc. Therefore, primarily, the Force HQ planning process is focused on implementing the Mission Objectives through execution of MET and to handle crisis situations as necessitated by the operational environment.

MCPP is also important to support appropriate and timely decision making, effective and coordinated response and to establish operational and moral ascendancy in the Mission area. It assumes greater importance, particularly when employing/handling disparate National military contributions and working/operating with other UN and non-UN actors in the field; necessitating systematic, methodological and comprehensive approach to planning and implementation of MET. It is a logical process that facilitates timely planning and complex decision making required by peacekeeping operations.

3.10.2: Mission Level Planning. At the Mission level, based on the guidance of the HOM/SRSG and the MLT, the Mission CoS, duly supported by the SPCC, JMAC and JOC shall facilitate and coordinate Mission planning. Force HQ is required to support the joint planning effort at the Mission level, in addition to pursuing the MCPP within the framework of the Mission planning process. The HOM/SRSG, MLT, SMG and the CMT play a pivotal role in providing appropriate operational direction and guidance to support the Mission planning process and the MCPP. All major operational responses are vetted and approved by the MLT to ensure congruence with UN mandate and for coherent response.

3.10.3: Force HQ Level Planning. Characteristically, UN peacekeeping operations are non-linear and decentralized in nature, where commanders at all levels are required to take spontaneous and appropriate decisions to respond effectively and timely to rapidly evolving challenges in fluid situations. It is imperative that the decisions and responses must be based on UN values, principles and practices and in line with the Mission’s overall objective. It is only possible when systematic and detailed planning process is in place, due deliberations by the Mission/Force HQ is carried out and adequate operational readiness of subordinate commanders, HQ and units have been instituted.

The unit and sub-unit commanders must have a clear understanding of the higher commander’s intent, their role and responsibility in realising the intent in order to exercise drive and initiative for accomplishment of the MET. Operational missions/tasks assigned to subordinate HQ/units/sub-units; apart from the “who, what, where and when” aspects, should also include the reason “why” that task should be carried out in order to guide use of initiative by subordinates.

3.10.4: MCPP: Steps. Usually, MCPP is a sequential and cyclical process, where the analysis of the operating environment remains a constant and continuous factor influencing all other steps in the process. A typical UN MCPP may follow the following suggested steps:
• **Analysis of Operational Environment.** It is a systematic and continuous process of analyzing the threats and the operational environment in order to produce an appropriate description of how they affect mandate implementation. This is supported by defining commanders Priority Information Requirements (PIR) and Peacekeeping Information Preparation (PIP) of AoR. This process informs the HoMC/FC in selecting the appropriate Course of Action (CoA) for an effective and efficient implementation of the mandate. Analysis of the operational environment consists of three steps:
  - Defining the operational environment.
  - Describing the operational effects/impact.
  - Military threat analysis and adversary(s) CoA.

• **Guidance.** MCPP works most efficiently when a higher commander is able to set the intent and provide guidance at regular intervals, so that planning supports the intent. The Force HQ planners are required to receive, comprehend and interpret the Commanders intent/guidance as a foundation for the planning process.

• **Mission Analysis.** Mission analysis is the principal decision making tool that guides the planning process. It considers the higher-level guidance provided to the Force HQ and analyses it against facts and assumptions to refine and elaborate in greater detail the operational requirements. Mission analysis helps the command and staff elements to enhance their situational awareness and understanding in order to have better visualization of the operational environment. Mission analysis involves the following considerations:
  - Review the analysis of operational environment and analyse higher-level direction/guidance and expected responses.
  - Define commander’s intent (if not already done).
  - Consider the assigned mission and the factors bearing on the mission.
  - Consider critical facts and rational assumptions bearing on the mission.
  - Identify and analyse constraints and restrictions.
  - Define and analyse tasks, and prepare Staff estimates.
  - State the Mission (who, what, where, when, why, how).
  - Prepare Mission Brief/Mission Statement.

• **Courses of Action (CoA) Development.** This step primarily helps analysis and comparison of CoAs. CoA development involves the following considerations:
  - Review commander’s guidance.
  - Analyse centre of gravity. Understanding own and adversary’s centre of gravity is critical to developing a successful plan.
  - Generate broad options (in terms of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability and completeness).
  - Develop and propose detailed CoA.

• **Analysis and selection of CoA.**
  - Compare COAs (weigh any factors that may be more important than others).
  - Analyse strength and weakness of each CoA.
  - Prepare a decision-matrix and deliver decision-brief.
  - Recommend a primary and alternate CoA to the HoMC/FC.

• **Plan and Direct.**
  - Prepare operational estimates, plans and contingency plans.
  - Prepare and issue directions/orders.
  - Coordinate, direct and monitor operations.
  - Analyse effect and provide feedback to higher commander/HQ.

3.10.5: **Support to SPCC.** The Mission Strategic Planning and Coordination Cell (SPCC) shall be supported by the Force CoS and the Operations (Chief U-3) and Plans and Policy (Chief U-5) Branches in addressing short, medium and long term planning, coordination and implementation requirements/processes, particularly on military related issues of the Mission.
3.10.6: Planning Support. The routine/emergency/crisis situations that merit planning support from a military perspective in the field missions are as follows:

- Execution of MET of Military Component.
- Deployment/redeployment/rotation planning.
- Joint operations with other components.
- Joint operations with external actors (such as Host security forces).
- Intra-Mission Cooperation (between sectors/regions/provinces).
- Intra-Mission Cooperation and IMC.
- Contingency planning.
- Mission Evacuation.
- Response to hostile acts and aggression by armed groups/spoilers.
- Response to public disorder that requires military response.
- Humanitarian emergencies.
- Protection of civilians.
- Outreach and engagement plans (including CIMIC and QIPs).
- Mission surge/drawdown plans.
- Mission CBRN Response.

3.11: Force HQ Orders, Directives and Guidance.

3.11.1: General. The Force HQ/HoMC shall provide mission-specific directions and guidance through Military Component Work Plans, orders and directives to establish common vision, foster clear understanding, assign MET, standardise Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP), coordinate responses, amplify military guidance on cross-cutting and conduct and discipline issues; and set mission-specific minimum and reasonable performance standards. The orders, directives and guidance provided to the Military Component by the Force HQ shall be aligned and in consonance with the overall mission objectives and approaches and shall reflect the mission-specific best practices and lessons learned for optimising efficiency. These guidance documents must be consulted with other Mission Components and substantive entities, including the Mission legal and human rights entities. The orders and plans must be fully coordinated with Mission Support Component to ensure timely, appropriate and sufficient support is planned, earmarked and made available, particularly during operational crisis. Some of the important guidance documents provided by the Force HQ are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

3.11.2: Military Component Work Plan (MCWP). Based on the Mission Concept and Military Strategic CONOPS, the Force HQ shall develop a MCWP. It will be guided and approved by the HoM and DSRSG (if authorized in the Mission). It is also essential to coordinate and synchronise the MCWP with the Civilian and Police Component work plans. The basic elements of MCWP are the following:

- Analysis of relevant Mission objectives.
- Military Component objectives (as a contribution to mission objectives).
- Tasks necessary to achieve each stated objective.
- Resource allocation (staff, units, military assets, support resources) and responsibility for each task.
- Partnerships (internal to Mission and external) needed to deliver on tasks.
- Risks to achieving these tasks and proposed risk management strategies.

Accordingly, the Subordinate HQs and contingents/units shall also prepare respective work plans. These work plans must reflect essential guidelines of the Mission Concept, CONOPS, OPORD and Military Component work plan, and must be coordinated with and approved by the Force HQ.

3.11.3: ToR. Based on the work plans, the Force HQ should develop clear ToRs for all staff branches to encourage and ensure service delivery. The ToR must reflect how the scope/role/responsibility of the Staff Branches/other entities will be defined, developed, and
verified in achieving the MCWP. In addition, every work/project/plan must be supported with a ToR as a common basis for initiation and implementation. ToR shall define the following:

- Vision, objectives, scope and deliverables.
- Stakeholders, roles and responsibilities.
- Resource, financial and quality plans.
- Success factors/risks and restraints.
- Timeline.

3.11.4: Force Operations Order (OPORD). The Force OPORD is developed from the CONOPS. Generally, the OPORD will be generated at a Force HQ and issued to subordinate formations/sectors for executing the responsibility. Each subordinate military HQ/unit shall develop respective operational orders based on the Force OPORD. Force OPORD must be approved by the SRSG/HoM and coordinated with other Mission Components (particularly the Police and Support Components). A copy of the Force OPORD shall be shared with OMA. It will be the responsibility of the HoMC to review and update the Force OPORD periodically or based on the changes in operational environment. Force OPORD must address all the roles and responsibilities of the Military Component, guided by the Mission Concept and objectives. The military posture is driven by a comprehensive security assessment, the identification of allocated tasks and the level of resources available. A suggested template of Military Component OPORD is at Annex D (p.216).

3.11.5: Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO). FRAGOs supplement an OPORD, generally in an abbreviated form (verbal, written or digital) and usually issued by the Force HQ on a day-to-day basis that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It is issued after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order.

3.11.6: HoMC/FC Directives. HoMC may issue Force operational directives to provide detailed guidance on specific operational issues to supplement OPORD. These directives are binding on the intended audience and the Force HQ shall monitor its implementation/practice and periodic review (such as, HoMC Training Directive).

3.11.7: Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs). SOPs are a set of instructions covering those features of operations and administration, which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. It is appreciated that different mission, different conditions and different types of operation make each set of SOP unique in its own right. Promulgation of SOPs is a command responsibility. Each peacekeeping mission is required to develop mission-specific SOPs (reflecting UN policies, practices, and TTPs) and promulgate for implementation. A Force HQ may promulgate Force SOPs, signed by HoMC/FC for implementation and practice by the Military Component. Constituent units/elements of the Military Component in turn base their own SOPs on Force HQ SOPs and guidelines. SOPs at all levels are kept under review at regular intervals and relevant amendments initiated as judged necessary by the HoMC/FC. A suggested list of Force Directives, Orders and SOPs is attached at Annex E (p.219).


3.12.1: General. UN peacekeeping mission’s operations are on a 24-hour basis. Thus, in principle, to ensure the operational efficiency of the Force, all HQ military personnel are on duty 7 days a week; 24 hours a day. However, to permit reasonable rest and recreation, a weekend routine will normally be followed on one day a week basis, whereby only operation centres will be manned. The routine cycle of command and staff activities are intended to synchronize current and future operations. It consists of a series of meetings/conferences, reporting requirements, and other activities, which occur on a daily or periodic basis (weekly, monthly, quarterly, half-yearly or annually). Usually this cycle is managed by Force HQ CoS.
3.12.2: HoMC Routine. Many factors influence the cycle of command and staff activities and these include UN HQ reporting requirements, operation and the planning requirements. Important activities to be undertaken by HoMC are:

- Daily Operational Brief.
- Weekly Mission Management Meeting.
- Weekly operational update to SRSG/Stakeholders Meeting.
- Monthly operational update to SRSG and OMA.
- Monthly IMC VTC.
- Quarterly command conclave.
- Quarterly visit to all major units.
- Quarterly IMC meetings.
- Six Monthly Mission Operational Capability Review.
- Annual Force Report.

3.12.3: Force HQ Routine Activities. Following table provides a set of suggested Force HQ Routine Activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participants/Reporting line</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Shift Change</td>
<td>Operation Centre</td>
<td>Duty Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Situation Update to HoMC/FC</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>HoMC/FC, DFC, Force CoS, U-1~9, Personal Staff, Liaison Officers, @</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Daily Information Summary (INFOSUM)</td>
<td>U-2</td>
<td>DPKO/OMA (0600hrs NYT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Daily Situation Report (SITREP)</td>
<td>U-3</td>
<td>DPKO/SITCEN (0600hrs NYT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Weekly Information Report (INFOREP)</td>
<td>U-3</td>
<td>DPKO/OMA (0600hrs NYT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Weekly Situation Report</td>
<td>U-3</td>
<td>UNHQ DPKO/ SITCEN/OMA (0600hrs NYT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Senior Management Team (SMT) Meeting</td>
<td>Mission Briefing Room</td>
<td>HoMC/FC, U-2, U-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Monthly Military Strength Report</td>
<td>U-3</td>
<td>DPKO/OMA/OO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Military Monthly Report</td>
<td>U-3</td>
<td>DPKO/OMA/OO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td>HoMC/FC Conference</td>
<td>Sectors</td>
<td>FC, Contingent Commanders, U-2/3/5, @</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-annually</td>
<td>Inter-Mission Conference</td>
<td>Force HQ</td>
<td>Mission HoMC, U-2/3/5, @</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every 6 Months</td>
<td>Operational Readiness Report</td>
<td>U-3</td>
<td>DPKO/OMA/OO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad-hoc</td>
<td>Plans update to HoMC/FC</td>
<td>U-3</td>
<td>FC/DFC/CoS, U-1~9, Personal Staff, LOs, @</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad-hoc</td>
<td>Notification of Casualty (NOTICAS)</td>
<td>U-3</td>
<td>DPKO/OMA/OO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Required</td>
<td>Special Incident Flash Report (SINREP)</td>
<td>U-3 (JOC)</td>
<td>DPKO/SITCEN/OMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Required</td>
<td>Reporting following the Use of Force</td>
<td>U-3 (JOC)</td>
<td>DPKO/SITCEN/OMA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: @ Others as required
3.12.4: Reports and Returns. Force HQ shall establish a well coordinated reporting mechanism to keep the Mission HQ and DPKO-DFS informed of relevant issues. In addition, the Force HQ must establish reporting procedures of all the subordinate HQ, Contingents, UNMOTs, UNLTs and units that are placed directly under the Force HQ (QRF, Force Reserve, Combat Engineering unit, Force Signal Company, Force Attack Helicopter Squadron/Flight, Force Support Company, etc.). Templates of important reports and returns are appended at Annexure, as follows:

- Notification of Casualty – Annex M (p.228).
- Casualty Evacuation Form – Annex O (p.230).

Miscellaneous Reports and Returns. These include but are not limited to the following:

- Monthly report on “Good Order and Discipline State” of each unit to U-1.
- Reporting of allegations of misconduct on occurrence to U-1.
- After Action Reports (AAR).
- End of Assignment Reports (EoAR).

3.13: Conferences/Meetings.

3.13.1: HoMC Conference. A HoMC Conference shall be convened at UNHQ by OMA on an annual basis in the last week of June every year. The goals and agenda for the conference would be finalised at least three months prior by the MilAd in consultation with the HoMC. Discussions and deliberations on the current and emerging operational issues shall be the focus of the conference. In addition, any other specific issues may be dealt with at the discretion of the USG DPKO.

3.13.2: Inter-Mission Meetings. Missions in close proximity shall be grouped at regional/sub-regional basis to discuss common challenges, enhance coordination, share information, best practices and lessons learnt, as well as, support each other in times of crisis. To that extent, monthly VTCs shall be organised to link all the HoMCs of grouped missions. This will be further augmented with quarterly meetings held in rotation by the respective Force HQs. Agendas for quarterly meetings will be finalised co-jointly and OMA will be kept informed. MilAd/DMilAd/Force CoS of OMA shall be an ex-officio chair in such meetings. The proceedings shall be followed-up with meeting notes and feedbacks for action at all levels.

3.13.3: HoMC Briefings. HoMCs may be asked to brief the General Assembly, Security Council, C-34, and/or any other entities as directed by the USG DPKO on mission-specific operational issues. Such directions shall be issued well in time and the HoMCs shall develop their respective responses in consultation with OMA and DPKO.

3.13.4: In/De-briefing. Force leadership, particularly the HoMC shall undergo a structures In/De-briefing programme. In-briefing aims at providing guidance to newly appointed HoMCs to familiarise with the UN HQ, the Mission and the international organisations that play an important role in the field. Selectively and when feasible, the DFC/Force CoS may also be supported through this process at the discretion of the MilAd. The de-briefings focus on drawing upon the the best experience gained by the outgoing senior military leaders and to pass the military expertise to USG DPKO and through him to the mission.
Invariably, a Force HQ will be deployed together with the Mission HQ, where the security is provided under the Mission Security Staff from the DSS. The security of Mission HQ could be augmented by deploying additional military sub-units under the direction of HoM. When deployed independently, a Force HQ shall be protected by a Force HQ Support Company. Depending on operational environment, Military Commanders and Staff Officers in a Force/Sector HQ may be authorized to carry weapons and ammunition under specific authorization from DPKO. Close cooperation between Force HQ staff and the Mission DSS staff is important. The Mission Force Reserve or a designated military unit/sub-unit in close proximity must be tasked to respond to any threat to the Force HQ.

In addition, the Force HQ shall establish SOPs for office security, to include security of personnel, documents, cyber space and Information Technology assets, communication, fire prevention, etc.

3.15: Conclusion.
The Force HQ of a UN peacekeeping Mission plays a vital role in implementing Mission’s Mandate and accomplishing Mission Objectives. To be effective and efficient in planning employing and managing the Military Component, it is essential that the Force HQ is supported by dynamic leadership, skilled staff officers and mission-capable units. Coherence in vision and synergy in action that binds the operational and tactical levels of the Military Component is essential for success. Maintenance of required levels of operational readiness and appropriate application of UN TTPs must be ensured at all levels. Integration with Mission joint structures and Civilian/Police components provides a holistic approach to mandate implementation and crisis response. Challenges to integration and coordination must be addressed by the Force HQ in conjunction with the MLT. The Force HQ must institute measures and mechanisms to galvanise the disparate national contingents to function in unison for the defence/furtherance of the Mission Mandate.

References:
Chapter 4: United Nations Military Force Headquarters Organizational Structure

4.1: Introduction. Each UN peacekeeping operation is unique by nature of conflict dynamics and spectrum of challenges that are specific and peculiar to a particular mission setting. Therefore, “one size fits all” concept cannot be applied to peacekeeping operations. Correspondingly, a Military Force HQ configuration will also be based on the particular mission characteristics and the mandated objectives. Notwithstanding the differences in mission environments and UN approaches and responses, the Force HQ organisation needs to be dynamic, versatile and multifaceted to function in an integrated environment to accomplish multidimensional responsibilities. Keeping that in view, certain degree of standardisation of the Force HQ organisation is mandatory to reflect UN approaches and methodologies of executing the Mandate.

4.2: Purpose. The Purpose of this Chapter is to explain four generic Force HQ organisational structures and define various functional responsibilities of the Force Leadership and the Staff in managing the Military Component of the Mission.

4.3: Considerations. 4.3.1: A UN Military Force HQ may be organised according to the following interrelated considerations:
- Mandated tasks (military tasks and responsibilities).
- Mission type.
- Size of the Mission and/or Military Component.

4.3.2: Size of Staff. The factors affecting Force HQ staffing size are:
- Unity of command.
- Range of responsibilities.
- Combination of related activities and/or the quantum of work routinely performed.
- Requirements for complex tasks and/or contingency factors.
- Desired span of control.

4.4: Force HQ Organization. 4.4.1: Force HQ Models. A Military Force HQ may be configured in three distinct organisational structures as follows:
- Observer Missions. Observer Missions are typical military-led traditional Missions, which have a compact span of control and multifunctional staff entities.
- Small/Medium Missions. Military-led Mission’s Force HQ and/or small to medium size Military Components are encouraged to use the “U-staff” (United Nations Staff) and Observer Missions are organised in accordance with the U-staff structure, with the number of functional units reduced if necessary.
- Large Missions. Military-led mission’s Force HQ and/or large size Military Components are encouraged to use the “Modified U-staff”.
- Multidimensional Missions. Multidimensional and fully integrated Mission’s Force HQ are encouraged to use the “Modular Structure”.

4.3.2: Staff Functions. In military-led Missions, to optimize the span of control and promote coordinated efforts, the Force HQ is based on nine (09) standard U-Staff functional areas as follows:
- U-1: Personnel and Administration.
- U-2: Military Information.
- U-3: Operations
- U-4: Logistics
- U-5: Plans.
- U-6: Communications
- U-7: Training
- U-8: Engineering
- U-9: CIMIC

4.3.3: Staff Grouping. Based on the type of mission and the size of the Force HQ, these staff functions could be additionally grouped as follows:

- **Large Mission.** Staff functions of U-2, U-3, U-5, U-4, U-6 and U-8 under a single DCOS with U-1, U-7 and U-9 being directly controlled by the COS.

- **Multidimensional Mission.** The staff functions are grouped under three separate functional DCOS structure as follows:
  - **DCOS Operations** (to include U-2, U-3, U-5, U-6, LNOs, Information/Air/Maritime Ops).
  - **DCOS Policy, Evaluation and Training** (to include U-1, U-7, Best Practice, Evaluation)
  - **DCOS Operational Support** (to include U-4, U-8, U-9, EOD, Gender, Human Rights and Child Protection).

4.3.4: Military Observer Mission.

**General.** The HQ staff of an Observer Mission is organised in accordance with the basic U-staff structure. However these Missions do not require full scale staffing. Therefore the number of functional units can be reduced if a function is absent.

**Standard Observer Mission HQ Organisation.**

HQ in a Military Observer Mission commonly consists of the Military Observer and a civilian administrator. The Chief Military Observer (CMO) directs the duties of the Deputy Chief Military Observer (DCMO) and the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). The DCMO co-ordinates, and is responsible to the CMO for the operational (military) component. The CAO co-ordinates and is responsible to the CMO for the functioning of the Administrative/Logistics component. In such cases, military staff does not perform these functions. When a Chief Military Observer is the HOM, he/she may have a military assistant as a personal staff officer, and/or legal/political/medical adviser. The head of the human

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6 For example, planning can be merged into the operations as both share similar functionality in this type of Mission.
rights component – when such component is established – acts as the human rights adviser to the Head of Mission, in this case the Chief Military Observer, and supports integration of human rights into the work of Military Observers.

4.3.5: Standard Small/Medium Size Mission: U-Staff.

General. The U-Staff flat structure is suitable for small to medium size Missions where military strength is below 6,000.

Standard Small/Medium Size Mission Organization.

The Staff Officers control each function within their areas of responsibility. The functional areas listed should be adjusted to fit the Mission requirements and tasks while optimising the span of control. According to the complexity of the situation and the anticipated threat, a standing “Operations Centre” may be established with enhanced capabilities as defined in the Policy.

4.3.6: Standard Large Mission: Modified U-Staff.

General. Organization of the Force HQ with large Military Component (6,000~12,000 troops) includes the establishment of a Deputy Chief of Staff Operations (DCOS Ops) in order to reduce the Chief of Staff’s (CoS) span of control.

Standard Modified U-Staff Organization.

7 In a small size Mission, the Planning (U-5) can be combined with the Operations (U-3) and/or the Engineer (U-8) can be combined with either the Operations (U-3) or the Logistics (U-4) depending on the operational requirements.
The capability to run full scale operations provided by this structure is based on the nature of the mandate, the anticipated threat and on the complexity of the situation.

4.3.7: Multidimensional Mission: Modular U-Staff.
General. In recent years UN peacekeeping has changed to include thematic mandates requiring more interaction with mission civilian components and external actors in addition to the traditional military ones, leading to what are termed “multidimensional” peacekeeping operations. New challenging environments require a more dynamic approach to peacekeeping and a wider range of military components. The Council has requested that protection activities be prioritized by peacekeeping operations in the use of available capacity and resources. The establishment of a secure and stable environment, the promotion and protection of human rights and the protection of civilians in situations of imminent threat of physical violence are essential tasks of many UN peacekeeping mandates, which must be reflected into military tasking and operations. Therefore, in the multidimensional mission, the Force HQ is designed to operate as part of an integrated command at the operational level.
- In fulfilling these mandates, peacekeeping operations confront challenging tasks, including dealing with the violence of spoilers who seek to undermine the peace process or pose a threat to the civilian population.
- Today’s peacekeeping operations require unified civilian, military and police efforts within a complex, interconnected environment.
- Effective peacekeeping operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the different staff functions.

In order to meet these demands, the Force HQ in a multidimensional mission with a military component above 12,000 troops is designed as a modular Force HQ to perform a joint and multinational function within Mission HQ.

Standard Multidimensional Mission Modular Organization.
Modular U-Staff Organization.

General. The modular staff organization is designed to facilitate the planning and decision making processes that are crucial within a Force HQ. The basic architecture of the Force HQ consists of three main entities; Operations, Personnel, Evaluation and Training (PET) and Operations Support. The size of these organizations and the number of subordinate cells should be considered in the planning phase depending on the requirements. The functions of a Military Force HQ in such missions are arranged and re-grouped in order to provide the optimal response to mandated tasks. The purpose of this arrangement is to generate synergies between functions and avoid stove-piping work.

Military Personnel, Evaluation and Training

Military Operations

Military Operations Support
4.4: Functions of Commanders and Force HQ Staff.

4.4.1: HoMC/Force Commander (FC). The HoMC/FC is the commander of the Military Component in a Mission and is the principal military adviser to the HoM. Subject to the Mandate and control of the HoM, the FC is responsible for all the principal functions of Force HQ Staff. The FC should promote a climate of cooperation and teamwork with all other Mission civilian components as relevant. When needed, the FC delegates appropriate authority to Staff members. The FC provides leadership, direction and guidance to the Force HQ Staff. The FC is also responsible for organising training of Force HQ Staff for adaptation to the mission operational environment. The FC is responsible for personnel, including activities to ensure the observance of the UN of conduct and associated disciplinary matters, within the limits of the UN operational control (OPCON) authority level.

HoMC Responsibilities. Major responsibilities of HoMC include, but are not limited to the following.

- Aligning Military Component Operations with Political objectives set by SRSG/HoM and in accomplishment of Mission Mandate.
- Carry out military assessments and provide military perspectives to SRSG/HoM.
- Define military objectives, mission and tasks, and issue necessary orders/guidance to Military Component.
- Develop Military Component OPORD and MCWP on the basis of DPKO/DFS Military Strategic CONPOS, the Mission Concept and own assessments/appreciations.
- Plan and organise Military Component operations (task organise, establish mechanisms and procedures for execution of responsibilities and carryout contingency planning).
- Maintain effective Situational Awareness through systematic military information processing to decision making at Mission level and increase responsiveness of the military Component. HoMC must set Priority Information Requirements and define resources/means.
- Maintain high state of operational readiness by the Military Component to respond effectively (refer to Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Readiness Assurance Policy, Guidelines and SOP, 2013).
- Prepare Military Component to prevent any untoward incident and handle crisis situations effectively and with resilience.
- Ensure effective administration and management of Military Component to maintain high levels of motivation, esprit-de-corps, camaraderie and indomitable will to perform effectively in the mission area.
- Ensure conformity and compliance with UN principles, values, practices, rules, regulations, code of conduct, tactics, techniques and procedures; international legal instruments (IHL/IHRL/; Host country law, customs and practices; and mission-specific directives by the Military Component.
- Maintain effective and timely technical link and communications with OMA/DPKO.

HoMC human rights responsibilities have been recently spelt out in the DPKO/OHCHR/DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions (2011) and can be summarised as follows:

- Ensure that military personnel act in accordance with international human rights and international humanitarian law.
- Support the establishment of credible mission accountability mechanisms to investigate and follow up allegations of abuses by military personnel.
- Issue guidance and procedures which guide peacekeepers’ operations when confronted with human rights violations, including in situations of imminent threat of physical violence.

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• Together with the head of the human rights component and other parts of the mission anticipate, plan and prepare mission-wide plans for possible crises, escalation of violence and upsurges of human rights violations so as to devise rapid preventive and protection measures.
• Ensure that military planning and execution of military operations fully takes into account human rights advice with regard to the potential human rights implications and mitigating measures.
• Ensure that military personnel receive adequate human rights training prior to deployment to understand how the implementation of their mandated tasks intersects with human rights and to prepare them for their human rights responsibilities.

FC/HoMC shall be:
• Member of the mission Crisis Management Team.
• Member of the Security Management Team (SMT). Chair if appointed as Designated Official for security (DO).

4.4.2: Deputy Force Commander (DFC). The primary responsibility of the DFC is to assist the HoMC/FC in exercising the command functions, either in absentia or as delegated. The DFC extends the commander’s span of control in areas and functions as the commander designates. The DFC’s specific duties vary based on mission needs. For example, the FC may delegate operational tasks, responsibility for liaison, training and mission implementation to the DFC to facilitate accomplishment of the mission mandate. Usually, the FC assigns specific tasks and responsibilities to the DFC in order to maintain his/her attention on the main course of action of the peacekeeping military component. The DFC must be able and ready to assume operational command in all respect, at any time based on the operational requirements. DFC shall be:
• Alternate member of the mission Crisis Management Team.
• Alternate member of the Security Management Team (SMT).
• Act as the Chief Military Observer/Chief Liaison Officer in a multidimensional Mission.
• Could serve as DO a.i. in the absence of the FC if the latter is appointed as DO.

4.4.3: Force Chief of Staff (CoS). The Force CoS is the Commander’s principal assistant for directing, coordinating, supervising, and training the staff. In smaller or in observer missions, the CoS and Deputy Chief or Deputy Commander may be the same person. The CoS frees the Commander from routine activities. The CoS directs staff tasks, conducts staff coordination, manages staff processes, and ensures that staff works efficiently. The CoS supervises staff outputs and ensures coordination on overlapping issues. The CoS also ensures that procedures supporting human rights integration into the work of military personnel are developed, in close coordination with the human rights component. The COS undertakes the following tasks:
• Directing and supervising staff planning processes.
• Preparing, coordinating, authenticating, publishing, and distributing the Force HQ SOP, OPLANS, OPORDs, FRAGOs, and warning orders (WARNOs) to which other Staff Branches contribute (assisted by U-3).
• Reviewing plans and orders of subordinate units.
• Managing the commander’s priority requirements.
• Organizing, planning, and conducting staff training.
• Supervising tasks assigned to the staff.
• Ensuring the staff integrates and coordinates its activities internally, vertically (with UN HQ and subordinate units), and horizontally.
• Resources allocation and organisational management.

4.4.4: Deputy Chief of Staff (DCoS). The Deputy Chief of Staff (DCoS) deputizes in the absence of the COS and his/her main function is to direct, coordinate and supervise the work
of the each operational branch and advise the FC on military operational matters in the mission area. The main functions of the DCOS are as follows:

- Remain abreast of the operational situation, solves outstanding issues, updates the FC, COS, the Force HQ and operational units on developments in the mission area.
- Disseminate information to and coordinate with other military and civilian Staff Branches on pertinent matters.
- Coordinate all military activity and deployment of units in the mission area.
- Defines the responsibilities of subordinate Staff Officers.
- Produces and reviews all operational documentation. (Code Cables to UNHQ New York, special reports, operation orders, instructions, SOPs etc.).
- Supervises the preparation of contingency operations plans.

4.4.5: Role of Staff. The military staff are the FC’s principal staff and are directly accountable to the COS. Military staff are responsible for collating information and analysing the implications and consequences for the mission and operations. Military staff must provide timely and accurate recommendations to the FC in order to support the best possible decisions. They also support the FC in coordinating and supervising the execution of plans, operations, and activities. Collectively, through the COS, they are accountable for the FC’s entire field of responsibilities.

A military Staff Officer’s (SO) authority is limited to his/her functional branch. The SO advises, plans, coordinates, and integrates activities and personnel resources of the respective functional unit. An SO may have additional authority to act on specific matters or specific projects within his/her responsibility. A Force HQ may be authorised subject matter experts on cross cutting functional areas as advisers (such as, Human Rights Adviser, Gender Adviser, Child Protection Adviser, etc.) and/or nominate Focal Points (such as, Environment Focal point, for such functions to address specific issues. Staff management requires common sense, a pragmatic approach and flexibility from the military leadership.

4.4.6: Common Staff Activities.

- Advising and Providing Information to the FC. Provide timely and continuous information to the commander in order to keep him/her aware of the situation.
- Preparing, Updating, and Maintaining Estimates. Develop options or CoA to assist the commander in decision making based on facts, events, conclusions and recommendations.
- Preparing Plans and Orders. Prepare and issue plans and orders to carry out the commander’s decisions.
- Processing, Analysing, and Disseminating Information. Collect, collate, analyse, process, and disseminate information that flows continuously into the headquarters.
- Conducting Training. Assess training requirements in respective functional area.
- Performing Staff Assistance Visits. Visit subordinate units to obtain information, observe execution of orders/instructions, advise/assist on implementation measures and keep commander informed.
- Providing Liaison. Liaison with local, regional, national and international stakeholders and partners.
- Monitoring Execution of Decisions. Ensure that decisions reach the subordinate units and carry out the commander’s decisions.

4.5: Staff Responsibilities.

4.5.1: General. This section describes the responsibilities and duties performed by staff officers assigned to the Force HQ by function. Force HQ staff officers must know their own duties and responsibilities and also be aware of the duties and responsibilities of other staff members. The staff must establish and maintain a high degree of coordination and cooperation both internally and with higher and lower staffs as well as with other mission components and adjacent Missions. Each functional unit establishes procedures for
coordinating and integrating staff activities within his function and responsibility. In a Mission, additional staff officers can be added if the task is beyond the capacity of the established staff. These staff officers help the commander and other members of the staff in their professional or technical functional areas. The number of additional staff officers and their duties and responsibilities vary with the level of command, the authorizations, and the size of the command.

4.5.2: Office of HQ Support. The Office of HQ Support is responsible for Force HQ management related matters and the support of Force HQ staff officers. The Branch is responsible for the provision of office materials, items of equipment or personnel service for the Force HQ staff officer, in fact, the personnel service acts as the point of contact between the functional branch staff and Mission administrative units.

**Generic Office of HQ Support Organization.**

![Office of HQ Support Organization Diagram](image)

**Administration and Finance.** The Administration and Finance cell is responsible for coordinating the administrative and financial support for all Force HQ operations. The Administration and Finance cell’s specific responsibilities are as follows:
- Supervise disbursement of Mission funds.
- Perform limited funds accounting.
- Provide banking and currency support.
- Administrative support for Force HQ staff members (allowance, reimbursement, leave, etc.)

**Information Management Cell.** The Information Management Cell is responsible for ensuring consistency in information regarding activities in all reports, records and the standardization for data bases.
- Tracking of the in and out documentation.
- Control of the proper use of the interchange tools.
- Elaboration and dissemination of statistics.
- Control of the routine cycle.
- Registry and final control of the periodic reports.
- Responsible for key aspects of the information lifecycle.

**Protocol.** The Protocol cell is responsible for all Force HQ protocol functions and plans, coordinates, and executes all visits to the Force HQ by distinguished visitors. It is also responsible for:
- Plan, coordinate, and execute UN Medal awards, ceremonies, and other related protocol support.
- Plan, coordinate, and execute official visits, ceremonies, itineraries, escorts, logistic support, billeting, and information.
- Coordinate classified and unclassified briefings as required.
Military Liaison Cell. The Force Liaison Cell shall be responsible for the following:

- Establish direct contact, liaison and coordination with relevant leaders and groups, in particular with the military leadership on local, regional, national and international level; within the Capital as well as in the regions.
- Undertake extensive networking for furtherance of Mission Mandate and objectives.
- Assist HoMC (and the MLT as the case may be) in communicating evocatively with identified stakeholders to enhance functional relations for effective Mandate implementation.
- Carry out negotiation and mediation as required.
- Gather relevant information from all security related agencies and UN partners.
- Assist in addressing/mitigating impediments in mandate implementation.

(This section should be read in conjunction with Management of UNMLOs explained at Chapter 3, Section 3.9.6, p.41)

4.5.3: Personal Staff and Advisory Group.
General. The FC has a personal staff of officers who work under his immediate control and therefore have direct access to the Commander. Most personal staff officers perform duties as special staff officers, working with other staff officers. Personal staff officers also may work indirectly under the supervision of the COS. Following are the personal staff officers and their duties and the responsibilities.

Military Assistant (MA). The Military Assistant serves as a personal assistant to a general officer. A Military Assistant is authorized for general officers in designated positions. The rank of the Military Assistant depends on the rank of the general officer. Military Assistant’s specific responsibilities are as follows:

- Prepare and organize schedules, activities, and calendars.
- Prepare and execute trip itineraries.
- Meet and host the general officer’s visitors at his headquarters or quarters.
- Coordinate protocol activities.
- Acts as an executive assistant.
- Supervise other personal staff members (secretaries, assistant aides and drivers).
- Perform varied duties, according to the general officer’s desires (Provides for the general officer’s personal wellbeing and security).

Legal Adviser (LA). As a personal staff officer, the Legal Adviser (LA) provides legal advice to the HoMC/FC and maintains oversight on legal issues regarding the military component. The LA shall provide clarity on Mission Legal Framework and the implication and military application of various legal guidance, such as UN Charter (especially Chapters VI, VII & VIII), IHL and HRL, International covenants and statutes, Secretary-General’s Bulletins, Mission-specific ROE and SOFA/SOMA, UN rules and regulations, policies and procedures, environmental law, Conduct and Discipline guidelines, Laws and Customs of Host Nation, etc. The legal advisor’s main responsibilities are:

- Provide legal advice to the FC/HoMC, Sector Commanders and military units.
- Integrate legal advice in all military plans and OPORD.
- Provide specialised military legal advice on substantive and procedural issues on peacekeeping operations related to military components to include aspects of conduct and discipline of deployed military units and individuals, particularly with regard to Boards of Inquiry involving 'Serious Misconduct', requiring repatriation
- Provide legal services in administrative law, claims, contract law, criminal law, international law, environmental law, and operational law.
- Act as adviser and focal point for detention related issues.
- Develop programmes and impart training to Military Component on the UN peacekeeping “Legal Framework” and its military implications.
Exercise supervision and maintain close liaison with the Military Legal Advisors of lower formations (Sector/Brigade HQ) and Military Contingents (units) to monitor cases and other legal issues and assist them by providing prompt legal advice or directions, as warranted in the specific cases.

Represent the Force HQ in various standing and ad-hoc committees, working groups and task forces, when legal aspects of military operational issues are discussed.

Obtain periodic reports and returns, from the lower formations and units and maintain a data bank of legal cases at the Force HQ to be sent to UNHQ as an Annual report.

Provide specialised military legal input to UN HQ, based on analysis made on the data compiled from the reports and returns of legal cases in the Msn area for the development of new military policies related to wider issues of peacekeeping operations.

Draft legal documents, papers and presentations, on legal aspects involved in Peacekeeping operations in Mission areas.

Coordinate and work closely with Mission Conduct and Discipline Unit, OIOS Unit and Rule of Law entities to support development and implementation of mission legal guidance.

**Force Medical Officer (FMO).** The Medical unit is responsible for health service support to the Force HQ. The FMO is the Medical Adviser to the HoMC on all military operational and tactical medical matters. The medical cell provides advice to the FC on health related issues and coordinates additional health service support for contingents. The medical cell’s specific responsibilities are as follows:

- Plan, organise, and execute health service support functions for the Military Component.
- Advises the FC on how operations impact the health of personnel.
- Supervise the professional and clinical performance of the TCC medical facilities and preventive medicine and health education programs.
- Exercise technical supervision (to maintain professional and clinical standards) over all TCC Levels 1, 2 and 3 medical facilities, including assessments and evaluations.
- Assist the CMO in developing or reviewing the Medical Support Plan, SOPs and Guidelines for mission medical facilities and supervises their implementation in the military medical facilities in the mission.
- Establish guidance and procedures for medical evacuations pertaining to military personnel.
- Provide guidance and oversee the implementation of preventive health measures, disease prophylaxis and field hygiene, including food and water inspections, sanitization and waste disposal.
- Updating medical knowledge and first aid training of military peacekeepers.
- Create HIV/AIDS awareness and promote compliance on Mission Policy on HIV/AIDS.
- Promote awareness to Malaria prophylaxis.
- Promote road safety and accident prevention. Foster cooperation and coordination between all TCC medical facilities and other UN bodies, Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and local health authorities, within the Mission area.
- Oversee the collection and reporting of epidemiological and casualty data.

**Military Public Information Office (MPIO).** The Military Public Information Officer is a personal staff officer responsible for understanding and fulfilling the information needs of members of the public. The public information officer’s main responsibilities are as follows:

- Plan positive and continuous host countries’ relations programs to gain and maintain public understanding and goodwill that support Organization’s operations.
- Coordinate information with local media sources to ensure that disseminated information is not contradictory.
- Plan and supervise a commander’s public affairs program.
- Advise and inform the Commander of the public affairs impact and implications of planned or implemented operations.
- Serve as the commander’s spokesman for all communication with external media.
- Assess information requirements, monitor the media and public opinion, and evaluate the effectiveness of public affairs plans and operations.
- Facilitate media efforts to cover operations
- Develop, disseminate, educate, and train the Force HQ staff on policies and procedures for protecting against the release of information detrimental to the mission and personal privacy.
- Advise the Commander and staff when interacting with news media.

**Provost Marshal (PM).** The Provost Marshal (PM) is responsible for supervision of applicable law enforcement issues for the military components. The PM coordinates with the local host nation’s military and civilian police and assists with the handling of detainees, force protection and physical security policies. The PM is also responsible of developing and issuing policies, programs, and guidance for the planning and conduct of military police operations.
- Assist with the collection, processing, and reporting of military police issues.
- Advise the FC on technical and procedural aspects of physical security.
- Conduct investigation on alleged misconduct of military personnel.

Provide the FC with a focal point on all matters of law enforcement planning, policy, and reporting, and provide a liaison for the FC with UNPOL.

**4.5.4: Personnel and Administration Staff Branch (U-1).**

**General.** The U-1 is the principal functional unit for all matters concerning human resources, which include personnel readiness, personnel services, and headquarters management.

**U-1 Organisation**

![U-1 Organisation Diagram]

**Responsibilities.** The responsibilities of the U-1 are as follows:
- Analyse personnel strength data to determine current capabilities.
- Monitor unit strength status and reporting monthly military strength to UNHQ.
- Personnel replacement management (receive, account, process, and deliver personnel, request and allocate individual replacements).
- Coordinate and integrate personnel plans and procedures for locally employed civilian support to HQ.
- Ensure casualty reporting through the chain of command to make superiors aware of the status of forces.
- Arrange and coordinate UN Medal Awards for Force HQ staff and TCC with Protocol section.
- Force Commander, Deputy Commander hand-over/take-over arrangement.
- Staff planning and supervising, this includes morale support activities, including recreational and fitness activities.
• Ensure the timely preparation and submission of performance evaluations for assigned individuals in accordance with the established UN guidelines.
• Postal operations (operational and technical control).
• Responsible for conduct and discipline of all military personnel including aspects of prevention and response to alleged misconduct.
• Headquarters management (recommending manpower allocation).

Optional Cells/Staff.

Gender Officer. According to the UN guidance, a military gender officer should be appointed at mission headquarters in order to support mission-wide efforts to implement mandates on women, peace and security and other related matters. The focal point can also support liaison with the mission gender unit and local women’s organizations on UN civil-military coordination (UN-CIMIC) activities. This officer may be located in the U-1 branch in both the ACOS and DCOS structures and in DCOS Operations Support in a Modular Mission Force HQ.

Welfare Officer. The Force Welfare Officer shall disseminate relevant aspects of the DPKO-DFS guidance, including the Policy and SOP on Welfare and Recreation, and monitor its implementation, carry out evaluation and report to the Force HQ. Some of the suggested welfare and recreation activities are at Annex P (p.231). The Welfare Officer shall represent the military Component in the Mission Welfare and recreation Committee and liaise/coordinate with the Mission Welfare Focal Point. The Force Welfare Officer shall ensure the following:
• Monitor, evaluate and report on contingent level welfare and recreation arrangements.
• Analyse mission environmental factors and suggest appropriate approaches to maintain physical and psychological health of the military peacekeepers.
• Project and coordinate provision of mission level welfare and recreation support on as required basis.
• Plan and organise improved wellness, working and living conditions of military peacekeepers.
• Establish systems and measures in place to prevent unacceptable behaviour.
• Monitor effective utilisation of welfare and recreation funds as authorised to contingents.
• Ensure that all welfare and recreational activities (including organised) respect local culture or practices.
• Ensure that all welfare and recreational activity correspond to the required degree of safety and security conditions as per Mission procedures.

4.5.5: Military Information Staff Branch (U-2).
General. The Force HQ Information Staff Branch (U-2) is the principal functional branch for all matters concerning military Information (MI) and military security operations within the FHQ. U-2 Branch plans and coordinates the military information requirements including the location, activities and capabilities of those forces and elements related to the overall mission goal. It also provides accurate and comprehensive situational awareness to the HoMC/FC about issues relevant to all the military decision making process which could affect the fulfillment of the given Mission Objective and potentially require military action or involvement.

U-2 Organization. The U-2 Staff Branch size and composition will vary based on the operational requirements of the Mission, and the presence/absence of JMAC.
Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the U-2 are as follows:

- Support HoMC with short/medium/long term military information for accomplishment of military objectives in the mission.
- Analyse, define and acquire HoMCs Priority Information Requirements (PIR). Align Force PIR with Mission PIR.
- Act as lead in “Peacekeeping Information Preparation of Mission Area”.
- Assist/support/provide military information to U-3 Operations Branch for conduct of military operations in the Mission.
- Coordinate with and provide inputs to Military operations centre.
- Assist JMAC with military information. Provide required inputs to JOC and other integrated entities/Mission Components.
- Plan and manage the information collection plan and recommend PIR. A suggested template of Information Collection Plan is at Annex Q (p.232).
- Coordinate ground and aerial reconnaissance and surveillance operations with other collection assets, when the Mission operates these assets.
- Coordinate, collect and disseminate relevant inputs acquired through space Satellite Imageries, aerial, maritime and ground based surveillance and monitoring assets. Ensure only authorised surveillance and monitoring military assets are used or employed by the Force.
- Collect, process, produce, and disseminate MI in a timely manner.
- Monitor activities, capabilities and intentions of the opposing parties and of neutral parties.
- Assess threats and risks in the mission to identify vulnerabilities (Mission as well as local population) in time and space and carryout predictive analysis/prognosis of likely challenges.
- Establish regular information sharing with the human rights, JMAC and other civilian components as relevant, with due regard to issues of confidentiality.
- Provide early warning through targeted information analysis.
- Maintain an MI database of collected, collated and analysed information from all sources for utilisation by Mission/Force HQ, subordinate HQ and units/sub-units of the Military Component. It should also include details of all key external personalities and functionaries of the host government officials, rebel groups, security forces and agencies, civic society groups, local leaders, socio-cultural-ethnic-religious groups, etc.
- Maintain and support the as required.
- Prepare Weekly Information Summary to be submitted to UNHQ through Assessment Team/OMA.

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9 See Policy and SOP on Monitoring and Surveillance Technology in Field Missions.(November 2010)
• Maintain the current situation updates and the information estimates.
• Assist the U-5 in planning and the U-3 in information operations.
• Prepare the military information training plans.
• Operate 24-hour watch officers, if required.
• Maintain a direct technical link with OMA Assessment Team at UNHQ and share relevant MI.
• Co-locate with and support JMAC (if present in the Mission).
• Brief MLT on military-specific issues.

Note:
• Refer to Chapter 8, Section 8.6.2, p. 157, on Situational Awareness and Information Management by the Military Component.

4.5.6: Operations Staff Branch (U-3).
General. The U-3 is the principal functional unit for all matters concerning operations, and force deployment.

U-3 Organization. The U-3 Staff Branch size and composition will vary based on the mission, and the presence of JOC in the mission. (A number of the U-3 functions may be placed under the JOC.)

Responsibilities The responsibilities of the U-3 are as follows:
• Prepare, coordinate, authenticate, publish, and distribute the Force HQ SOP, FRAGOs (fragmentary orders), warning orders (WARNOs), and contingency plans (CONPLANS).
• Coordinate with the U-2 on operation of the reconnaissance and surveillance assets and recommend information requirements to the U-2, if the Mission is operating these assets.
• Plan troop movements, including route selection, priority of movement, timing, providing of security, quartering, staging, and preparation of the movement orders.
• Establish a 24/7 Military Operations Centre (MOC). Refer Annex R (p.233) for the organisation and functions of an MOC.
• Coordinate and direct terrain management (overall ground manager).
• Recommend the general locations of command posts.
• Recommend task organisation and assign missions to subordinate elements.
• Force protection.
• Information operations.
- Coordinate with the DDR team (if part of the Mission).
- Operate 24-hour situations or the duty officers (if JOC is not present).
- Air Ops: If it is not an independent branch, synchronize Air operations with Operations Staff Branch and Coordinate with U-2 or the Information and Communication Centre to operate the reconnaissance and surveillance assets and recommending information requirement.
- Maritime Ops: If it is not an independent branch, synchronize and coordinate maritime operations with Operations Staff Branch.
- Coordinate with all U-Staff Branches, subordinate HQ/units, and other UN and Non-UN actors (as necessary) to plan and execute operations.
- Act as lead for implementing screening and conditionality policy in coordination with advisers on human rights, child protection, civil affairs and JMAC.

**Optional Cells/Staff.**

**Information Operations.** The Information Operations (Info Ops) cell integrates and synchronizes the core capabilities of Info Ops with and related agencies and may be integrated as part of the Mission. The relationships between the military Info Ops cell and Mission organizations that support the Info Ops cell are per FC guidance. These supporting organizations provide guidance on the employment of their respective capabilities and activities. The use of information in UN peacekeeping is inherently multi-service and multinational. Info Ops cell should coordinate the military Information operations with other UN agencies; and non-governmental, private voluntary, and international organizations in the area of operations. Info Ops Cell is the principal cell in the Operation Centre for all matters concerning information operations in the military side of the operation and may establish Information Operations Working Group. The following areas and activities are the specific responsibility of the Info Ops cell. 10

- Develops information operations capabilities, plans, programs, and communications support as a part of mission’s strategy
- Maintains close coordination with UN components and partners within and outside the mission

**DDR Cell.** Involvement in a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme does not take the place of the normal military component command and control chains. However the military component can contribute to DDR operations by seeking information on the locations, strengths and intentions of former combatants who may or will become part of a DDR programme and by distributing information on a DDR programme to potential participants and the local population. Military staff officers could fill posts in a DDR unit or the military component can create a separate DDR cell for focal points of military support. The cell will be designed to meet the specific mission requirements.

**Military Liaison Cell.** The Liaison Cell Staff is responsible to maintain close and continuous liaison between HQ and subordinate HQ, Contingents/units, neighbouring UN Missions and Host Nation security forces to develop mutual understanding, information sharing and promote unity of purpose. Acting as a bridge between the Force HQ and other UN and Non-UN military/security actors in the field (conflict zone), Liaison Cell enhances cooperation and interoperability to establish required levels of synergy that contributes to the mission success. Military Liaison Cell commonly performs the functions listed below;

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10 Information operations are continuous operations within the information environment of a UN mission. They contribute, enable, enhance, and protect the implementation of the mission’s mandate and strive to achieve perception advantage across the full range of mission’s activities. They include interacting with the global information environment and preserving mission’s communication assets.
- Monitor Force HQ operations, understand FC’s intent, know the current situation and planned operations.
- Coordinate and synchronize current operations and future planning between the contingents, subordinate HQ and Force HQ.
- Establish contact/deploy MLOs with Host Nation security Forces.
- Establish contact and provide liaison support to identified and approved parties to the conflict as part of the reconciliation efforts.
- Assist Operation Branch and Force CoS in their respective functions.
- Acquire/share relevant information to support Force HQ in execution of MET.
- Coordinate with Mission UNLTs deployed in the neighbouring countries/conflict zone.
- Coordinate and monitor IMC.
- Provide necessary assistance to Outreach and Engagement Branch (U-9, CIMIC), in engaging civilian organisations, local population, humanitarian and developmental actors, etc. as defined by the Force HQ.

4.5.7: Logistics Staff Branch (U-4).

**General.** The military U-4 is the principal advisor to the Force Commander through the chain of command on the overall logistics that affects the military operations and is also the focal points in Force HQ and works closely with CISS as the majority of the Logistics military staff will be located with the CISS/JLOC and Force HQ U-4 will have mostly planning and coordination functions with reduced capacity.

**UN Integration of Support Services.** To ensure effective, efficient, economic and timely use of limited logistics resources, UN Peacekeeping Mission establishes the ISS under a Chief of Integrated Support Services (CISS). The ISS is the backbone of support in a peacekeeping mission.

**Integrated Support Services.** The CISS is responsible for providing logistics support to all mission components including military and CISS controls all logistics resources in the mission to include the UN owned, commercially contracted and military enabling assets and services like military logistics, construction and maintenance engineering, medical, movements control, communications and information technology, geographical information services (GIS), supply, and air and surface transport units/resources in the mission.

**Staffing Strategy.** To achieve better integration of limited logistics resources, all sections and units of the ISS are staffed with both civilian and military/police officers. However, ISS military staffs are not in the military chain of command.

**Working Relations.** ISS maintains a working relationship of trust and cooperation with the military components.

**U-4 Organisation**

- **Chief Logistics**
  - C U-4
- **Deputy Chief Logistics**
  - DC U-6
- **Logistics Planning**
- **Logistics Operations Coordination**
- **Environment**
Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the U-4 of Force HQ are as follows:
- Plan, coordinate and facilitate logistics support to the Military Component in conjunction with JLOC.
- Ensure close logistics support to Military Component during crisis situations.
- In close consultation with CISS, provide logistics policy and procedural guidance for military components deployed in the Mission. Such policy and guidance will be conformed to the Mission Support concept, Logistics SOPs and Logistics guidelines issued by Director/Chief Mission Support.
- Serve as the Force HQ focal point for coordination of logistics support.
- Inform the Force HQ of logistics support impacting mission accomplishment, monitor and synchronize logistics support through liaison with Mission CISS to exchange information and resolve problems at the lowest practical level.
- Act as the coordination interface between the Force HQ and the CISS/JLOC when the mission is integrated.
- Monitor implementation of UN Policy on environmental and provide guidance as applicable.

Optional Cells/Staff.
Environment Officer. Environment Officer. The HoMC/FC will appoint an officer of the Force to serve as the focal point within the military component of the mission to liaise with the Mission Environmental Officer and to deal with environmental issues within the Military Component following UN guidance on the subject. The designated officer deals with UNHQ instructions and operating procedures and takes other necessary measures to ensure that the Military Component will comply with the environmental policy and objectives of the mission. This officer may be located in the U-4 branch in U-staff structures and in DCOS Operations Support in a Modular Mission Force HQ or seconded within the Civilian Mission Support Environmental unit depending on missions’ structure.

4.5.8: Plans and Policy Staff Branch (U-5).
General. The U-5 is the principal functional unit for conducting future planning and the provision of advice to the FC on policy issues. They are guided by existing higher direction (Mandate, CONOPS, ROE, Mission Concept, etc.), specific guidance from FC/DFC/COS, operational environment and anticipated future challenges).

**U-5 Organisation**

- Chief Plans & Policies
  - C U-5
- Deputy Chief Plans & Policies
  - DC U-5
- Plans
- Policy

Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the U-5 Branch are as follows:
- Perform long-term planning, follow-on phase planning, and contingency planning (Force HQ OPORDs, FRAGOs, OPLANs and CONPLANs).
- Integrate appropriate staff/component involvement into PLANS and maintains oversight of the entire planning process within the Force HQ.
- Coordinate strategic and operational planning issues and guidance.
• Develop, coordinate, and implement Force HQ policy issues.
• Review military component commanders’ operation plans for adequacy, and ensure compliance with Force HQ guidance and policies.
• Advise the FC on political-military aspects of operations. (This function can either be provided by U-5 and/or by a special staff advisor.)
• Coordinate with the human rights component to integrate human rights and IHL advice and analysis into military planning, foresee the potential human rights implications of an operation and plan for preventive measures.
• Act as military lead in integrated planning process and support Mission Strategic Planning and Coordination Cell.
• Coordinate with Civilian Component (substantive sections) and Police Component.
• Act as lead Staff Branch for interaction with OMA.
• Provide budgetary support to Force CoS for supporting mission RBB.
• Act as lead for preparation of Military Component Work Plan.
• Act as military lead in support of Mission’s Protection of Civilian implementation plans.
• Act as lead for implementing screening and conditionality policy.

4.5.9: Communications Staff Branch (U-6).

General. General. The military Communications and Information Technology (CIT) Branch (U6) is the principal staff unit for all matters concerning military communications and IT related topics. The strategic and operational objectives are set by Mission’s mandate requires that the Mission has the capacity to exercise Command and Control (C2) throughout all civilian and military elements. Therefore, the responsibility of the U6 has a dual scope. On an operational and tactical level the U6 branch is responsible to support military and police operations of the forces. Therefore, the U6 branch has to align to the military C2 structure and the operational planning processes of the forces.

On the strategic/mission level, military CIT support is part of the overall CIT support for the Mission and therefore has to adapt and follow the Mission’s CIT support concept and regulations. Therefore, it is essential to implement efforts on an organizational and procedural level to achieve maximum coherence and synergy effects between the Mission’s CITS and the military U6 branch. This may include the use of military CIT capabilities for non-military CIT support tasks, based on the planning and decision of the UN Mission HQ.

U-6 Organisation

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Chief Communications
C U-6

Deputy Chief Communications
DC U-6

Plans & Projects
Operations
IT & Info Security
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Responsibilities.
• Advise the HoMC/DFC/CoS and other branches on current military communications and IT capabilities and status.
• Provide estimates on the ability and reliability of CITS and military Communication systems to support planned operations.
• Provide policy and procedural guidance for communications and IT support for Military Component deployed in the Mission.
- Liaise with the Mission’s CITS and serve as the Force HQ focal point to the subordinate HQ and Contingents for all communications and IT-related tasks and issues.
- Integrate military CIT resources and capabilities in the overall CIT Mission support.
- Support all planning and coordination efforts within the Force HQ and in close cooperation with the Mission’s CITS.
- Develop, update and implement all CIT-related guidelines, processes and SOPs specific to the operational needs of the Forces and aligned with the UN CIT concepts and regulations.
- Oversight and tasking of all subordinated military CIT support elements and monitoring of conduct and performance.
- Evaluate CIT-related training needs of subordinated military CIT units and Force HQ staff officers and develops required training programs.
- Act as the coordination interface between the Force HQ, Contingents, all military CIT support elements and the Mission’s CITS.
- Provide policy and procedural guidance and monitor key performance indicators for all military communications and IT operations in the Mission, while also coordinating with other branches and Mission’s integrated entities in communications-related activities.
- Maintain comprehensive situational awareness regarding the support and operational/mission impact of CIT.
- Ensure data, information and communications security for all subordinate elements and within the Force HQ.
- Develop rules and procedures through policies and SOPs, and define/regulate Force’s information security.
- Grant Staff members’ information access clearance.

4.5.10: Training Staff Branch (U-7).

General. The U-7 is responsible for incoming staff officer’s induction training and establishing the training needs of military contingents and supporting the integrated mission training cell (IMTC) in the delivery of training to the military component. The U-7 is also responsible for analyzing lessons learned and developing them into a report for UNHQ (DPET) to support the training of future contingents. The functions of Force Training Branch should be read in conjunction with Chapter 9, p.192 of the Manual.

**U-7 Organisation**

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Chief Training
CU-7

Deputy Chief Training
DC U-7

Exercise  Evaluation  Staff Training  Best Practice
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Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the U-7 are as follows:
- Prepare and supervise staff induction and in-mission training and the supervision of the training programme.
- Plan, coordinate, and supervise troop exercises.
- Prepare training guidance for the commander’s approval.
- Assist the commander in developing and training the unit’s task list.
- Identify training requirements, based on the Mandate, situation and training status.
- Ensure that training requirements reflect the conditions and standards of UN guidance.
- Determine the requirements for and allocation of training resources.
- Plan and conduct Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI) and evaluations required.
- Compile training records and reports as appropriate.
- Promote knowledge sharing within all operational areas of the military in coordination with the Mission Best Practices Officers (BPOs).
- Ensure that best practices are collected and shared in all areas of the work and train military staff on the use of the tools (Best Practices Toolbox reports), promoting and facilitating the production and sharing of reports.

4.5.11: Military Engineering Staff Branch (U-8).

**General.** The primary responsibility of U-8 Branch is to plan, coordinate and implement the assigned engineer tasks (field/combat and construction) in accordance with mission priorities. In a peacekeeping operation, engineers may be engaged for humanitarian and non-military activities. Often, peacekeeping engineer units are required to support rebuilding infrastructure of host countries. This entails supporting civilian construction projects that are deemed crucial to implement the UN mandate. This cell may be attached to U-3 depending on the operational requirement.

### U-8 Organisation

**Force Chief Engineer**

**Deputy Chief Force Engineer**

- **Project Planning**
- **Engineer Operations**
- **De-mining**
- **EOD**

**Responsibilities.** Responsibilities of the Engineer unit include:

- Advise HoMC, Force HQ Staff, Chief Integrated Support Services (CISS) and the Chief Engineer on military engineering resources, capabilities and employment.
- Develop Force Engineer support plans and programmes.
- Assess mine, IED and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) threats and develop counter Mine/IED SOPs and measures.
- Plan, coordinate, implement and monitor counter IED, de-mining and EOD tasks under military domain.
- Coordinate, liaise and assist mission EOD/de-mining resources and other UN partners in the planning of EOD and de-mining operations.
- Provide CBRN advice to the Mission.
- Maintain close liaison with Mission Engineering Section and other relevant offices for daily operation and management of engineering works/projects.
- Monitor and supervise the utilization of Military Engineering resources.
- Vet all engineering task orders for accuracy, relevance, and correctness and disseminate once approved.
- Ensure timely, accountable and cost-effective delivery of engineering support by Military Engineering Contingents.
- Identify military engineering shortfalls and advice Force leadership on other resources and solutions.
- Coordinate humanitarian and non-military activities assigned to military engineers.

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11 In some Missions, a Force Best Practices Officer may be authorized and placed directly under the Force CoS.
• Assess, coordinate and assist Mission response to severe weather impacts and natural/man-made disasters.
• Assist environmental protection programme managers to ensure that all projects are carried out in accordance with UN environmental policies and guidance.
• Prepare project concepts including design specifications, engineering plan and estimation of all construction and maintenance projects under Military Engineers domain.
• Prepare and submit Project Status Reports periodically.
• Develop, implement and maintain a comprehensive Quality Control Program to assure that all engineering, construction, equipment and workmanship provided for assigned projects are in compliance with required standards and sound engineering and construction practices.
• Develop methodologies and tools to enable full development and control of military engineering equipment.
• Coordinate mine awareness training of Military Component and local population.

Optional Cells/Staff.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). The explosive ordnance disposal officer is the special staff officer for coordinating the detection, identification, recovery, evaluation and final disposal of explosive ordnance. EOD officer may be authorized in the mission where EOD threat is anticipating. The EOD officer’s specific responsibilities are:
• Establish and operate an EOD-incident reporting system.
• Coordinate requirements for EOD support with requesting units and other UN partners.
• Monitor the supply status of special EOD tools, equipment, and demolition materials.

4.5.12: CIMIC Staff Branch (U-9).

General. The UN-CIMIC Branch has the principal staff function for all matters concerning civil-military operations (the civilian impact on military operations and the impact of military operations on the civilian populace). The U-9 facilitates interface between the Military Component and the other components of the mission (Civilian and police) of the UN Mission, as well as with the other civilian entities in the Mission area, such as humanitarian and developmental actors, Host civilian authorities and population, IOs/ROs/NGOs, etc.
Following are the areas and activities that are the specific responsibility of the UN-CIMIC.

U-9 Organization

Responsibilities. Responsibilities of the U9 are as follows:
• Coordinate the military UN-CIMIC operations with other UN agencies; and nongovernmental, private voluntary, and international organizations in the area of operations
• Plan positive and continuous community relations programs to gain and maintain host nation’s understanding and good will, and to support military operations
• Provide the U-2 operational information gained from civilians in the area of operations

- Coordinate with the U-3 on trends in public opinion
- Coordinate with the Military Public information and the U-3 to ensure that the disseminated information is not contradictory
- Provide guidance to TCC units in identifying, planning, and implementing programs to support the civilian populations and strengthen the host nation development
- Assist the U-3 with information operations
- Coordinate with humanitarian civil assistance and disaster relief (emergency food, shelter, clothing, and fuel for local civilians).
- Coordinate with Mission civil affairs office.
- Represent the Mission/Force in UNHCR National Protection Cluster.
- Update Humanitarian Advocacy Group on Military Component activities as required.


A suggested Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) is attached at Annex S (p.235), providing the authorisation Force HQ personnel and resources. The TOE describes the Force HQ organizational structure, personnel authorizations and lists authorized Staff Branches’ personnel and their responsibilities. Based on a mission’s specific need or the environment, TOE may be modified by Force HQ in the mission with the consultation of UNHQ OMA.

4.7: Force HQ Support Company.

Depending on the mission environment and operational conditions, A Force HQ may be authorised to have a Force HQ Support Company. The organisational structure, strength of personnel, equipment profile and capabilities will be mission-specific, as analysed and approved through the Statement of Unit requirements issued by OMA. The Force HQ Support Company shall function directly under the Force COS and will have the following tasks:
- Security of Force HQ (Static location and on move).
- Signal communication support particularly during crisis.
- Administrative support to routine operational functioning.
- Logistics support during crisis situations.
- EOD support.
- Medical support.
- Provide and maintain specialist equipments/vehicles.
- Any other tasks stipulated by the COS.

The functioning of Force HQ Support Company will be in coordination with mission security section, the CITS and medical support section. The capability standards for the company are provided in the Force HQ Support Company Manual.

4.8: Sector/Brigade HQ.

The Force HQ may have a number of Sector/Brigade HQs responsible for the execution of the mandate in a specified operational area, under which the military contingents/units/sub-units will execute the assigned operational tasks. Invariably, UN Force Brigade HQ is provided by a single TCC under a cohesive command, control and staff system. On the other hand a UN Force sector HQ may have a composite structure, mainly represented by the TCCs in a particular mission area. A Sector HQ may even function at a battalion level. While contingents are directly under the Brigade/Sector Commander, there is a need to integrate and coordinate the activities of the MILOBS for coherent reporting.

A Brigade/Sector HQ shall have a specified AOR and well defined tasks. A Brigade or Sector HQ may have the following the following responsibilities:
- Maintain safe and secure environment in the AOR.
- Provide operational command function to the UN military Units/Sub-units placed under it for execution of mandate and Mission Essential Tasks.
- Outreach and engagement with all stakeholders in furthering Mission objectives.
- Provide safety and security to all mission and UN entities on as required basis.
- Maintain effective situational awareness.
- Crisis Management.
- Undertake tasks as stipulated in Force OPORD.

**Sector HQ Organisation.** A typical generic organization of the Sector/Brigade HQ is depicted below for reference:

![Generic Organization of Model Sector HQ Diagram]

4.9: Special Appointments and Focal Points.
4.9.1: General. A Force HQ may be assigned with additional officers/sections in the form of focal points of substantive entities to carry out specific functions that are crosscutting and overarching in nature. The roles and responsibilities of the following are explained in the succeeding sub-sections:
- Military Best Practices Officer.
- Military Gender Adviser.
- Military Child protection Adviser.

4.9.2: Military Best Practices Officer (MBPO). The Knowledge Management Team of Policy and Best Practices Service in DPKO/DFS is responsible for maintaining Knowledge Database and coordinate the collection, validation and sharing of best practices on UN peacekeeping operations. Each Field Mission will have a civilian Best Practices Officer (BPO) and depending on the mission requirements, there could also be a military and police BPO. The civilian BPO/focal point shall be the lead in the coordination of the knowledge management in a field mission. The role of MBPOs will be complementary to the functions exercised by the civilian BPOs, in accordance with the Knowledge Sharing Policy of 2013. The MBPO will ensure that military best practices are collected, collated, analysed and formalised with the approval of the HoMC, and shared with the Mission BPO, other components and OMA/UNHQ, as well as relevant stakeholders. Force HQ shall establish systems and procedures in place to analyse on-going operations to identify the lessons and turn it into lessons learned for incorporation in the activities of the Military Component.

**Responsibilities.** The responsibilities of MBPOs are as under:
- Advise UN Military staff on best practices material and their applicability in any specific topic when required.

- Develop a knowledge management strategy and work plan for the Military Component in collaboration with Mission BPO.
- Promote the active use of the Mission/Force/DPKO-DFS knowledge sharing systems, tools and guiding principles by the Military Component.
- Capture and share lessons, experiences, reports and other best practices documents intra and inter missions and with OMA/DPKO-DFS HQ;
- Participate actively in the network of BPOs and Focal Points.
- Disseminate/implement known and validated best practices into existing mission activities.
- Foster a knowledge sharing culture, allowing different strata in the UN Military to more effectively communicate with and learn from each other.
- In collaboration with the civilian and police BPOs, participate in induction and other training activities for UN Staff.
- Assist HoMC/Force HQ in preparation of After Action Reports (AAR) and End of Assignment Reports (EoAR).
- Create a mission-specific databank to retain institutional memory. Suggested configuration of Military Best Practices Database is at Annex T (p.253).

4.9.3: Military Gender Adviser/Military Gender Focal Point. Working under the leadership of the Force Commander, the Military Gender Adviser/Military Gender Focal Point will support operational- and tactical-level implementation of mandates on women, peace and security, within the framework of the broader peacekeeping mandate. He/she will be supported in this function by the mission’s Gender Adviser, who will provide substantive support to ensure integration of a gender perspective into the overall mission mandate. Specific tasks include:

- Provide advice to the Force Commander and senior military leadership on strategies for effective implementation of existing mandates on women, peace and security within the military component.
- Monitor the inclusion of the security priorities of both local women and men in information analysis and assessments, to inform planning and execution of tasks by the Force Commander in the area of operation.
- Monitor and support delivery of gender training for all military peacekeepers.
- Monitor and support gender-sensitive reporting activities and the use of sex-disaggregated data to facilitate planning for military operations. Coordinate with Sector- and Battalion-level military gender focal points to support inclusion of gender-issues into regular reporting activities.
- Collaborate with the Mission Gender Adviser, the CIMIC-branch, and Civil Affairs to identify and support implementation of civil-military coordination (CIMIC) projects targeting women and girls.
- Establish and maintain contact with women’s organizations in the Mission to support military outreach activities, in conjunction with the Mission Gender Adviser.
- Monitor implementation of guidance on protection of women and girls from sexual violence in accordance with mission mandate.
- Oversee consolidation of good practice on implementation of existing mandates on women, peace and security by military peacekeepers, with support from the Mission Gender Adviser.
- Represent the military component on the mission-level gender task force, as well as on relevant inter-agency working groups.
- Monitor and advice on operational requirements for female military personnel at the operational and tactical level.
- Provide guidance and support to Military Gender Focal Points at the Sector- and Battalion-Levels.
- With the support of Mission Gender Adviser, coordinate development of a Gender Action Plan to guide the implementation of gender-related responsibilities of the Military Component.
4.9.4: Military Child Protection Officer. The Force Child Protection Officer is responsible for implementing the following tasks:

- Advice the HoMC and Force HQ on all issues related to the protection of children.
- Advise Child protection Focal Points of deployed military units and monitor implementation of Child protection measures.
- Act as a liaison between child protection actors and the Force HQ.
- Handle all issues related to child protection violations, including establishment of an alert system to transmit through command channel and also to the child protection unit/section, pertaining to information received on any of the six grave violations especially the recruitment or use of children by armed forces or armed groups, the killing or maiming of children, sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals, abductions of children, and the denial of humanitarian access.
- Coordinate with Civilian Child Protection Focal Point at the Mission HQ.
- Develop and oversee the implementation of specific SOPs on the handover of child soldiers captured in operations or those who have surrendered to the peacekeeping force.
- Develop guidelines on children’s issues including detention, conduct during the interaction with children and prevention of all forms of exploitation against children including child labour and sexual exploitation for the Military Components.

4.10: Conclusion.

The suggested Force HQ organizational structure is generic in nature, to facilitate military planning and force generation (Commanders, Staff and support requirements) at the Office of military Affairs. It offers a start point to commence the planning, and aids the configuration of the Force HQ as per mission-specific characteristics and operational environment, through plug in and plug off modules as well has options to double hat/multi-tasking of various branches as required. However, the HoMCs of respective Force HQ shall have adequate flexibility to utilise the resources as per mission requirements and project any additional requirements to Office of military Affairs.

References:
- UNSCR 1906/1925 – Conditionality Policy (Applicable to MONUSCO).
Chapter 5: Policies and Practices

5.1: Overview.
Execution of Mission and Force responsibilities in a peacekeeping mission area must reflect established UN values, time tested UN practices, best practices developed over a period of time from many missions as well as the lessons learnt from the past and current missions. This necessitates greater awareness, and understanding of UN policies and practices laid out in the form of formal directives and informal guidance for incorporation in respective component planning and execution of day to day operational tasks; and other administrative/logistic activities. All stakeholders, including TCCs, Mission Components and other UN system entities (as applicable) are obliged and expected to follow the stated UN policies and practices for effective implementation of the Mandates.

5.2: Purpose.
The purpose of this Chapter is to lay down applicable policies and practices relevant for the Military Component in UN peacekeeping operations and to suggest methods of operationalising and incorporating overarching guidance in the planning and execution of operational responsibilities in the field.

5.3: Legal Framework.
5.3.1: UN Charter. It is the prerogative of the UN SC, acting in its capacity as the organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to determine when and where a UN peacekeeping operation should be deployed. The legal basis for such action is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. While Chapter VI deals with the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, Chapter VII contains provisions related to “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”. Chapter VIII of the Charter also provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security with the proviso that, such activities are consistent with the purposes and principles outlined in Chapter I of the Charter.

5.3.2: International Law. International law is the term commonly used for referring to laws that govern the conduct of independent nations in their relationships with one another although certain parts of international law (for example international humanitarian and human rights laws, international criminal law etc) also have legal consequences for individuals. Treaties and rules of customary international law are two of the most important sources of international law. UN peacekeepers are bound by the obligation to respect fundamental principles of International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and Refugee Law in order not to become abusers or perpetrators of violations against the very people they are meant to protect. Furthermore, by the nature of their duties, it is also very important for peacekeepers to know their obligations to refugees and internally displaced persons as reflected in the UNSCR1674. The International Refugee Law is therefore another area that UN peacekeepers should be familiar with.

5.3.3: International Human Rights Law (IHRL). UN peacekeepers are required to respect the IHRL. The UN Charter promotes respect for human rights as does the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is the cornerstone of international human rights standards. The development of international human rights law within this normative framework is an integral part of UN peacekeeping operations. The UN military components are expected to promote and protect human rights while performing tasks such as patrolling, observation, liaison with host country military counterparts, training of local armed forces, etc. It is important that military personnel deployed in UN peace operations be trained and prepared to take up these functions. The Human Rights Due Diligence policy (HRDDP), stipulates UN peacekeeping missions can carry out joint operations with Host Nation Security Forces/Non-UN Forces only if it meets the conditions set forth in the policy. Further elaboration on Human Rights is highlighted in the following section 5.3.
5.3.4: International Humanitarian Law (IHL). UN peacekeepers must also strictly abide by the IHL or the Laws of Armed Conflict as stipulated in ST/SGB/1999/13. IHL, also known as “the law of war” or “the law of armed conflict”, aims to limit the effects of armed conflicts by restricting the means and methods of armed conflict. IHL aims to protect persons not taking part in hostilities, the sick and wounded, prisoners and civilians, and to define the rights and obligations of the parties to a conflict in the conduct of hostilities. IHL has developed progressively, and is contained in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977, among other sources. IHL also includes conventions and treaties that prohibit the use of certain weapons and military tactics and protect certain categories of people and goods, as well as cultural property and the environment during armed conflict.

The SC12 decided that where appropriate UN peacekeeping missions should provide for the dissemination of information about IHL and the application of relevant SCR. Furthermore, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping of the General Assembly (the C-34) in its 2012 report encouraged the widest possible dissemination of information among peacekeeping personnel about IHL, including in training materials. The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of IHL13 sets out the fundamental principles and rules of international law that may be applicable to UN peacekeepers. The Capstone Doctrine stated that peacekeepers must have a clear understanding of the principles and rules of IHL and observe them in situations where they apply14.

The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law of 6 August 1999 (ST/SGB/1999/13) sets out the fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law that are applicable to UN peacekeepers. Paragraph 1.1 of the Bulletin states: “The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the present bulletin are applicable to UN forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence”.

IHL is designed to protect persons who do not participate, or are no longer participating, in the hostilities and maintains a balance between military necessity and humanity. It enshrines the fundamental distinction between civilians and combatants in an armed conflict as well as between civilian and military property and objects and upholds the need to ensure necessity and proportionality of the use of force. IHL maintain the need to take precautionary and other measures to avoid or minimize loss of civilian life or damage to civilian property. UN peacekeepers are obliged to respect IHL whenever and to the extent that they are applicable. They must have a clear understanding of the principles and rules of IHL and observe them in situations where they apply.

5.3.5: International Criminal Law. One of the primary responsibilities of UN peacekeepers is to protect civilians in the mission area and upholding their Human Rights. In that context all peacekeepers must have basic awareness of International Criminal law. Mainly, there are three types of international crimes; namely, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. It is an international crime to commit these acts during wartime or peacetime. Both states and individuals can be held criminally responsible for violations. International criminal law can overlap and intersect with IHL, IHRL as well as national laws.

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13 ST/SGB/1999/13
14 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, Chapter 1.3
5.3.6: Genocide. Genocide is an international crime for which individuals, no matter their status and authority, may be indicted, tried and punished by the International Criminal Court (ICC). It includes the following:

- Killing members of a group
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
- Imposing measures intended to prevent births within a group
- Forcibly transferring children of a group to another group

5.3.7: Crimes against Humanity. As set out in the Rome Statute, crimes against humanity include crimes such as the extermination of civilians, enslavement, torture, murder, rape, forced pregnancy, persecution on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender grounds, and enforced disappearances - but only when they are part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. The "widespread or systematic" qualification for crimes against humanity is very important, as it provides a higher threshold, requiring a particular magnitude and/or scope before a crime qualifies for the Court's jurisdiction. This differentiates random acts of violence - such as rape, murder, or even torture - that could be carried out, perhaps even by soldiers in uniform, but which may not actually qualify as crimes against humanity.

5.3.8: War Crimes. War crimes include grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other serious violations of the laws and customs that can be applied in international armed conflict, and in armed conflict "not of an international character", as listed in the Statute, when they are committed as part of a plan or policy or on a large scale. War Crimes include:

- Crimes committed during and in connection with an armed conflict.
- Crimes committed against protected persons, such as, wounded or sick soldiers, prisoners of war, civilians and persons taking part in the hostilities.
- Crimes include (but are not limited to) murder, torture, rape, taking hostages, use of child soldiers, forced labor, collective punishment.

5.3.9: International Refugee Law.

Normally, peacekeepers have mainly been dealing with issues related to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). A situation like that of Ivory Coast and Liberia where peacekeepers have to with both cases at the same time requires them to understand the Refugee law and Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons. According to Article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his origin and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’

Even though no international tribunal exists to conduct enquiries or to adjudicate claims that refugees' rights under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol have been violated, Peacekeepers are to coordinate with the UNHCR which has been given supervision and compliance oversight and responsibility to provide protection and seek permanent solutions for their problems under Article 35 of the 1951 Convention. In 1988, the Representative of the UN Secretary General on IDPs formulated 30 the “Guiding Principle on Internal Displacement’ in order to strengthen protection and draw attention to the plight of IDPs. Even though the Principles in themselves do not have legal binding effect, they draw on the legally binding provisions of the domestic law, the IHL and IHRL, and to the basic principles of the refugee law.
Although all the 30 principles are significant, numbers 2, 5.26, and 27 worth highlighting for peacekeepers. While 2nd principle call on all domestic and international actors, irrespective of their legal status to observe the these Guiding Principles, the 5th principle call on all authorities and international actors to respect and ensure respect for their obligations under international law, including IHL and IHRL, in all circumstances so as to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of persons. Furthermore, the 26th and the 27th principles request for the respect and protection of persons engaged in humanitarian assistance with their transport and supplies against violence, and the provision of protection needs and human rights of internally displaced persons in line with international standards and code of conduct.

5.3.10: Status Immunities, Privileges, and Responsibilities of UN Peacekeepers.

The UN Charter, UN Convention on the Privileges and Immunities and the Status of Forces/Mission Agreement lays out the immunities, privileges and responsibilities of UN Peacekeepers in a mission area.

UN Charter. Following two provisions of UN Charter are binding on all Member States, whether or not they are parties to the General Convention.

- Article 104: This provision ensures that the UN has such legal capacity as is necessary to carry out its responsibilities and to protect its interests. This provision enables the UN to contract for goods and services (see also General Convention, below) among other things.
- Article 105(1): This provision ensures that Member States cannot, by judicial or administrative means, compromise the Organization’s ability to carry out its essential purposes.

Status of Forces/Mission Agreements (SOFA/SOMA). The SOFA and SOMA concluded between the UN and the host country and the agreements concluded between the UN and Troop Contributing Countries set out the obligations that troops and their contributing governments are bound to respect, namely the principle and spirit of the international conventions on the conduct of military personnel. It is intended to clarify the terms under which the UN force is allowed to operate. This is more concerned with the legal issues associated with military personnel and equipment and may also include entry and exit issues into the country, tax liabilities, postal services, or employment terms for host-country nationals and civil and criminal jurisdiction over the bases.

Status. The UN peacekeeper is an embodiment of the highest aspirations of the peoples of the world. He or she therefore bears a responsibility for demonstrating good attitudes and examples based on the great traditions of public administration that have developed in member states: competence, integrity, impartiality, independence and discretion. Above all, the peacekeeper has a special calling: to serve the ideals of peace, of respect for diversity and fundamental human rights, of economic and social progress, and of international cooperation.

Military members of national contingents assigned to the military component of a UN peacekeeping or other field operation shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating States in respect of any criminal offences that may be committed by them in the mission area. They shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. They are, however, subject to the jurisdiction of the host country/territory in respect of any disputes/claims of a civil nature not related to the performance of their official functions. The UN peacekeeper therefore enjoys in the territory of each of its members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of his/her functions toward the implementation of the mission’s mandate.

United Nations Convention on the Privileges and Immunities. This Convention was adopted by the General Assembly on 13 February 1946. It was intended to give effect and to
further delineate the requirements of Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations. The privileges and immunities enjoyed by the UN by virtue of Article 105 of the Charter are conferred in the interests of the Organization. These privileges and immunities furnish no excuse to the staff members who are covered by them to fail to observe laws and police regulations of the State in which they are located nor do they furnish an excuse for non-performance of their private obligations. Following are the important immunities and privileges:

- Immunity from personal arrest or detention.
- Immunity from suit and from other legal process in respect of acts and things done in performance of duty.
- Exemption from taxation on salaries and emoluments received from the organisation.
- Inviolability of papers and documents.
- The right, for the purpose of communicating with the organisation, to use codes and to send and receive correspondence and other papers and documents by couriers or in sealed bags.
- Exemption from currency or exchange restrictions to such extent as is accorded to a representative of a foreign government on a temporary mission on behalf of that government.
- The like privileges and immunities in respect of personal baggage as are accorded to a diplomatic agent.

Responsibilities of Peacekeepers.

- Uphold and respect the principles set out in the Charter.
- Uphold the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity.
- Neither seeks nor accepts instructions from any government or from any other source external to the organization.
- Discharge functions and regulate conduct with only interests of the organisation in view.
- While personal views and convictions, like political and religious convictions remain inviolable, they shall not adversely affect official duties or interests of the UN.
- Not use office or knowledge gained from official functions for private gains or prejudice the positions of those they do not favour.
- Not accept any honour, decoration, favour, gift or remuneration from any government.
- The property and assets of the Organization shall only be used for official purposes and with reasonable care.
- Respond fully to requests for information from staff members and other officials of the Organization authorized to investigate the possible misuse of funds, waste or abuse.
- Must comply with local laws and honour private legal obligations, including, but not limited to, the obligation to honour orders of competent courts.

Specific Instances of Prohibited Conduct

- Any form of discrimination or harassment, including sexual or gender harassment, as well as physical or verbal abuse at the workplace or in connection with work.
- Disruption or otherwise interference with any meeting or other official activity of the organization.
- Intentionally misrepresenting functions, official title or nature of duties to any entities or persons external to the UN.
- Intentionally altering, destroying, misplacing or rendering useless, any official document, record or file.
- Offering or promising any personal benefit to another staff member or to any third party with a view to influencing the performance of any official act and vice versa.

Respect for local laws and customs. All peacekeeping operation personnel must respect local laws and customs and maintain the highest standards of integrity in their personal conduct. When a peacekeeping operation includes a military component, especially formed military units of several thousand personnel, the presence of the peacekeeping operation is
seen and felt throughout the mission area. Respect for the peacekeeping force is directly related to its success in maintaining high standards of professionalism, integrity, impartiality and in its general behaviour in relations with the local population. This respect is required to sustain the cooperation and consent of the local population. Although the peacekeeping mission and its personnel will enjoy certain privileges and immunities accorded to the UN to facilitate its effective operation, these do not change the obligation of all mission personnel to obey local laws and respect social, cultural and religious norms. In particular, in their personal behaviour military personnel must always maintain exemplary standards of conduct, in accordance with the Code of Conduct. Those that breach the Code must be duly disciplined by their national authorities, including the imposition of legal sanctions, when appropriate.

References:
- The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
- The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.
- Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

5.4: Human Rights.
5.4.1: Overview. Human rights violations are a recurrent feature of conflict situations in which peace operations are deployed. Actually, in many cases, it is the visibility of human rights and humanitarian aspects of crises that prompts action from the international community and deployments of peacekeepers. Increasingly, peace operations are given strong and full-fledged human rights mandates and mandates instruct peacekeepers to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Strong emphasis is placed on preventing sexual violence and protecting the rights of children (e.g. UNOCI, MONUSCO) as well as accountability for perpetrators of HR and IHL violations. Parts of mission mandates that do not explicitly refer to human rights implicitly require the fulfilment of human rights functions (e.g. holding of free and fair elections, secure and stable environments, army and police reform processes etc.).

5.4.2: UN Charter and Beyond. The maintenance of international peace and security and promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all are purposes of the UN as defined in the Charter. The UN commitment towards human rights in the Charter was followed by the development of international human rights law which is an integral part of the normative framework for UN peacekeeping operations. The centrality of human rights in the peace and security agenda is well recognized in cornerstone UN documents (1997 SG reform report; 2000 Brahimi report; 2005 SG report In Larger Freedom; 2008 Capstone Doctrine) laying the foundations of multidimensional and integrated peacekeeping.

5.4.3: OHCHR. Since the early nineties, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has opted to integrate human rights components in UN peace missions instead of establishing separate OHCHR field offices in countries where the Security Council decides to deploy such missions. Most of UN multi-dimensional peace operations today have a human rights component, with double reporting lines to the Head of Mission (directly or through the Deputy HoM) as well as to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and with OHCHR contributing to mission planning, mandate definition and providing thematic substantive advice and support to human rights components.

5.4.4: Role and Responsibilities of Human Rights Officers in a Peacekeeping Mission.
- The most immediately visible role of human rights components is that of protection through deployments on the ground including in remote and at risk areas, monitoring, documenting responsibilities and engaging with perpetrators. As such, human rights
components are fundamental actors to implement mandates to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, often in close cooperation with UN military components.

- Timely preventive deployments to crisis areas and joint patrolling with uniformed components are critical to capture ongoing patterns of human rights violations and identify responsibilities, capture signs of risks of further violence and perpetrators’ intentions and devise strategies to prevent and stop further violence against civilians.
- Monitoring, investigations and reporting of human rights violations can also be a critical confidence building measure in electoral and peace processes, as in highly polarized political contexts, it prevent unchecked allegations from spiralling out of control and being used by unscrupulous political or armed actors. Regular public human rights reporting actually constitutes one of the most powerful means available to bring atrocities to light, to press for accountability and to protect through dissuasion and deterrence.
- Human rights officers engage in building and strengthening local institutional capacity to promote and protect human rights – key to secure lasting improvements of the human rights situation and to the exit strategy of UN peace missions.
- Finally, human rights officers perform an important advisory role towards the UN military and other mission components to support human rights integration into their tasks. This is done through development of Standard Operating Procedures, policies, training or in some cases appointment of human rights focal points or secondment of personnel.

5.4.5: Human Rights Integration. Human rights integration in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions was formalised in a Decision of the Secretary-General (2005/24) and its requirements were spelled out in the subsequent DPKO-DPA-DFS-OHCHR Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions (2011), which sets concrete and operational measures by which human rights can be integrated into all aspects of peacekeeping – including military work - in planning and mandate implementation.

Principles of Integration. Human rights integration builds on two fundamental principles:
- First. Human rights law must be the “rule-book” for all missions’ activities.
- Second. All UN peacekeepers have a responsibility to promote and protect human rights through their functions. This applies to the senior leadership as well as all mission components and their staff – including military and police – which are expected not only to uphold human rights but also to advance human rights through their tasks and activities.

These two points have real operational implications for military personnel; they require development of practical human rights training and guidance which prepare military peacekeepers to take up their human rights functions and the establishment of an effective partnership with the mission human rights component.

5.4.6: Synergy. Close cooperation between human rights and military peacekeepers brings mutual advantages. On the one hand, military unique skills and competences (e.g. expertise on weapons, command responsibility), their broader presence on the territory and access to local armed forces provide them with a unique comparative advantage in recording relevant human rights information and engaging with local armed actors. On the other hand, awareness of human rights threats and perpetrators is critical to peacekeepers’ ability to fulfill their responsibility to protect people from human rights violations including in situations of imminent threat of physical violence. Human rights assessments and analysis are also critical to peacekeepers’ self-defense, as a deterioration of the human rights situation may signal a change of attitude and tactics by belligerent forces. Finally, strict compliance with human rights norms and standards in the conduct of military operations is essential to ensure that military peacekeepers do not become part of the problem, but provide a positive role model. Failure to ensure compliance gives long term blows to the credibility and legitimacy of
peacekeeping operations and undermines their overall human rights protection advocacy efforts.

5.4.7: Human Rights Responsibilities of UN Military Component. Military human rights responsibilities are spelt out in the DPKO/OHCHR/DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights, notably its provisions concerning the UN Military (paragraphs 84-88) and can be resumed as follows:

- Military play an important role in recording relevant human rights information, such as allegations or signs of risks of human rights violations (e.g., killings, rape, etc.), while performing patrolling, checkpoints and searches. Such allegations should be promptly shared with the human rights component for verification, investigation and follow up.
- Military personnel are expected to be able to recognize a human rights violation and be prepared to intervene in accordance with the mandate and Rules of Engagement (ROE).
- Military can provide important support to human rights staff by providing escort and/or military expertise in the conduct of human rights investigations. Military/human rights cooperation can also take the form of joint patrols or joint advocacy with alleged human rights perpetrators to stop those violations.
- Military peacekeepers are expected to advocate for respect for human rights with local counterparts as part of roles they normally perform including liaison, negotiation and mediation. This has proved to be very effective as they share a professional culture, perspectives and language.

5.4.8: Examples. Positive examples of military personnel contributions to human rights in peace operations settings can be found in a lessons learnt report compiled by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) – Human Rights Integration in the Work of UN Military Components (2010). Here are some recent examples:

- In the context of Côte d’Ivoire post-electoral violence, in 2011, UNOCI established an Integrated Human Rights Monitoring and Investigation Task Force (IHRMITF) comprising human rights officers and other staff from UNOCI military, police and civilian components. The Task Force was organized in 12 field teams deployed across the country. For easy contact with victims, their families and communities, the Task Force established a 24-hour ‘Green line’ through which violations could be reported. With the dispatching of mixed teams in the field, the human rights component was able to rapidly document cases of violations, assess scale and patterns of abuses, deter further violence in some instances and re-assure the population.
- In UNSMIS, in Syria, human rights officers and military observers were expected to closely work together in the same team sites. Despite the increasing challenging and violent context in which they operated, their complementary skills and competences proved to be a real asset to the mission to timely investigate, engage with belligerent parties and report on violations of the Kofi Annan action plan.
- In MONUSCO, in Eastern DRC, the monitoring and investigations carried out by the human rights component and analysis on trends and protection threats, human rights records of local army brigades and rebel groups, changes in command structures, has been critical to identify hotspots and at risk areas and has allowed to determine where to set military temporary operating bases to mitigate risks faced by civilians.

5.4.9: Due Diligence Policy. Human Rights integration is a critical enabler to implementation of the S-G Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to non-UN Security Forces (2011), which in peace mission settings requires strong cooperation between the Military and the human rights components, to assess risks that forces receiving support from UN Military may commit grave violations, identify mitigating measures, monitor behaviour once support is provided and intercede if grave violations are committed. Missions which are mandated to provide support to local security forces and have been developing procedures to implement the HRDDP include MONUSCO, UNMISS and UNOCI. Implementation of the Due Diligence policy has proved to be fundamental to:
- Positively influence the behaviour of local armed forces which receive support with an immediate benefit of local populations.
- Enable them to take on their primary responsibility to protect their own population (mission exit strategy).
- Maintain the credibility and legitimacy of the UN and its military contingents.

5.4.10: Example. In UNMISS, the mission leadership has been implementing the HRDDP as an integral and cross-cutting element of UNMISS work and the Force has been a key partner in the policy’s implementation. Since 2012, implementation of the human rights due diligence policy has put human rights at the forefront of its engagement with the South Sudan government requesting support to transport troops to deal with violence in the Jonglei crisis and conduct disarmament. An HRDDP Task Force has been meeting ad hoc to consider requests for support from UNMISS as necessary. The Task Force has also developed an SOP to regularize the Mission’s approach to requests for support under the HRDDP.

5.4.11: HR Training. Adequate and effective training focusing on UN military functions is an essential part of peacekeepers’ preparedness to promote and protect human rights. Prior to arriving in the mission, military peacekeepers should develop a satisfactory level of understanding of their own role and the role and responsibilities of human rights components and of potential areas of partnership. In particular, training is fundamental to ensure that all military peacekeepers can recognize human rights violations and understand how the implementation of their tasks intersects with human rights. In-mission human rights inductions should be specifically tailored to mission-specific military personnel functions, mandate and operational realities and are useful to develop operational links with human rights mission colleagues.

OHCHR has developed sizeable parts of DPKO predeployment training materials to practically prepare UN military personnel to perform their human rights-related functions, and it contributes to delivery of training, with particular attention to senior mission leaders. OHCHR supports DPKO delivery in some cases, as was the case with the deployment of 300 military observers to Syria under UNSMIS, whose mandate had strong human rights elements (e.g. release of political detainees; peaceful demonstrations etc.). The UNSMIS induction experience provides a positive model for organising mission inductions.

5.4.12: UNSMIS human rights induction was interactive and practical in orientation, made use of role plays and aimed at providing the military observers with knowledge and practical skills to be able to assist the monitoring work of human rights officers, know how to act when faced with a human rights violation and protect through presence and visibility. OHCHR close cooperation with DPKO training services in developing the concept and ensuring complementarities between the different parts of the program as well as visible support from the HoMC, were critical to achieve active engagement by military observers.

5.4.13: Human Trafficking. The occurrence of trafficking in peacekeeping areas of deployment is actively combated by the UN not only because it is a serious crime and a human rights violation, but also because of its very negative impact on the mission’s legitimacy and its ability to achieve mandate implementation. Human trafficking is the illegal trade of human beings for the purposes of reproductive slavery, commercial sexual exploitation, forced labour, or a modern-day form of slavery. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish trafficking in Persons, especially women and children, was adopted by the UN in 2000. It is an international legal agreement which is included in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Any involvement of peacekeeping personnel in human trafficking or any other form of sexual abuse or exploitation constitutes an act of serious misconduct and grounds for disciplinary measures, such as dismissal or repatriation.
References:
- Tool 9.17 Conduct of Peacekeepers and Other Law Enforcement Personnel.

5.5: Security and Safety.
5.5.1: Security. Security policy for the UN is developed by a body reporting to the High Level Committee for Management (HLCM) named the ‘Inter-Agency Security Management Network’ (IASMN). The IASMN is chaired by the Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Safety and Security (DSS) and members are drawn from every agency, fund, programme and the Secretariat Departments of DSS, DPKO, DFS, DPA and OCHA. DPKO and DFS are represented on the IASMN by the Focal Point for Security at Headquarters. The IASMN meets four times per year to formulate and agree on draft policy which is then submitted to the HLCM (and if necessary to the Chief Executives Board [CEB]) for endorsement. Once endorsed these policies are mandatory across the entire UN common system.

Security policies are to be found in the Security Policy Manual maintained by DSS. Previously policies were found together with guidelines and procedures in the Field Security Handbook. The latter is now being phased out as new and updated policies are migrated to the Security Policy Manual. A complete list of old and new policies is included as Annex U (p.254) in this Manual and can be provided to the FC by the CSA/CSO of any mission. In addition to the Security Policy Manual, a separate Security Management Operations Manual (SMOM) contains guidelines and procedures for practical implementation of policies, cross-referenced to the applicable policy. The Division of Regional Operations (DRO) of DSS also provides a series of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and guidelines to facilitate implementation of policy. All of these policies, guidelines and SOPs are available online at a special website accessible only by registered security officials, and as such is accessible by the CSA/CSO of the mission. The two most important policies for the purposes of this manual are:

5.5.2: The Framework of Accountability. This policy lays down the accountability towards staff safety and security in the UN and clearly indicates the DO in the succession of accountability. This is applicable to FCs if appointed as DO. It also specifies where the Headquarters Focal Point for Security and CSA/CSOs fall into the succession of accountability and includes the Security Management Team (SMT), other security officials and the staff members themselves. This is the most fundamental of security policies. In order to ensure that DOs are well equipped for their role, special training is provided by DSS as soon as possible after appointment to this position. Appointment of DOs is done by USG DSS. Ref: Security Policy Manual Chapter II B.

5.5.3: Applicability Policy. This policy lays down which staff members fall under the umbrella of the Security Management System (SMS) and for whom the DO is responsible and accountable. Those falling under the SMS are:
- UN personnel: All UN system staff members, including temporary staff, in posts subject to international or local recruitment (except those who are both locally-recruited and paid by the hour); UN Volunteers (UNVs); individually deployed military and police personnel in DPKO/DPA-led missions, including, but are not limited to UN police officers, military observers, military liaison officers, military advisors and staff officers; and military members of national contingents or members of formed police units when not deployed with their contingent or unit.
- Consultants, individual contractors and experts on mission when actually employed by an organization of the UN system; and officials other than UN Secretariat staff members and similar non-staff officials of other organizations of the UN system with a direct contractual agreement with a UN System organization;
• Besides these primary individuals covered by the policy, other individuals covered are: Eligible family members (as determined by the staff rules and regulations of the organizations comprising the UN System); eligible family members (who are authorized to be at the duty station) of UNVs; UN fellows, either non-resident fellows studying in the country, or nationals who are on leave from the country of study; personnel and their eligible family members of Intergovernmental Organizations that have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with an organization of the UN system to cooperate on security matters.

It is clear therefore that military personnel deployed with their contingents in formed units do not fall under the umbrella of the SMS.

Although all security policy is relevant, other policies which should be studied by personnel accountable for security are: Determination of Acceptable Risk; Hostage Incident Management; Relations with Host Countries; IEDs; Measures to Avoid Risk; Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS); Security of UN Premises; the Security Level System (SLS); Security Risk Management (SRM); Use of Force; Close Protection; Security of UN Premises; Aviation Safety; Security of Special Events; and, use of Armed Private Security Companies.

5.5.4: DPKO-DFS Internal Security Policy. USGs DPKO-DFS promulgated internal departmental policy on the application of the Security Risk Management process in 2010. This policy places an obligation on SRSG/FC to conduct risk assessments according to the IASMN standard for military, police and civilian components of the mission. Ref: 2010.29 dated 1 November 2010.

5.5.5: Safety. Since 2012 DPKO-DFS has implemented a programme of field occupational safety to prevent or reduce personnel and asset loss due to workplace related accidents. The Field Occupational Safety Risk Management (FOSRM) policy was promulgated on 1 December 2012 for implementation in all DPKO- and DFS-directed missions (DPA also opted to join these two departments and the policy applies to their missions as well). Occupational safety focal points have been appointed in each mission and are charged with developing the field occupational safety plan for the mission and to report all incidents to a programme manager in the office of the Focal Point for Security at Headquarters. In 2013 the Office of the Military Adviser at DPKO HQ appointed a focal point as well and although the policy does not cover contingents, it is envisaged that field occupational safety principles would be applied in base camp areas in missions. Ref: Policy 2012.14 dated 1 December 2012. Ref: Reporting SOP 2012.16 dated 1 December 2012.

5.5.6: Crisis Management. Although crisis management is not a new term, there are currently (May 2013) developments to formalise the concept of an Organizational Resilience Management System (ORMS) in field missions and Headquarters. ORMS is an umbrella term pulling together various elements of crisis management under a single concept.

5.5.7: Security Plans and Directives. Each filed mission shall have its own mission-specific security plans; mass casualty plans; business continuity plans; and IT disaster recovery plans.

References:
• Security Policy Manual (available through the CSA/CSO).
• Security Management Operations Manual (SMOM) (available through the CSA/CSO).
• Field Security Handbook (available through the CSA/CSO).
• Security Analysis Handbook v1 2012 (available through the CSA/CSO).
• DPKO-DFS Field Occupational Safety Risk Management Reporting SOP. Ref: Reporting SOP 2012.16 dated 1 December 2012.
• UN Policy and Directive on UNHQ-level Crisis Management.
• DPKO-DFS SOP on Headquarters Crisis Response in Support of DPKO-led Field Missions.

5.6: Rule of Law.
5.6.1: Definition of rule of law. In 2004, the Secretary-General defined the rule of law as “A principle of governance, in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of the law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency”.

5.6.2: Rule of law and peacekeeping. A strong justice system can facilitate the maintenance of law and order and serve as a peaceful mechanism for resolving disputes, while preventing impunity for crimes committed during, as well as after, a conflict. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated, “justice is the cornerstone of the rule of law, underpinning all efforts to achieve international peace and security”. For this reason, the Security Council has mandated virtually all new peacekeeping operations established since 1999 to assist national actors in strengthening the rule of law. Within peace operations, such assistance is provided primarily by justice components working together with corrections, police, human rights and other mission components. Judicial affairs officers in justice components help host countries to strengthen or rebuild essential rule of law institutions, including courts, prosecutors’ offices and legal aid systems, as well as their legal and constitutional framework.

DPKO rule of law assistance efforts are based on key principles grounded in the fundamental values and objectives of the UN. They are aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of rule of law assistance; enabling the UN to respond to the needs of countries in a flexible manner, instead of providing one-size-fits-all formulas and imposing foreign models of justice; and addressing some of the challenges of implementing justice mandates, such as the need to deliver assistance in a coordinated manner.


The Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service. CLJAS was established at UNHQs in 2003 to support the implementation of rule of law, justice and corrections mandates of UN peace operations managed by DPKO. As part of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), it serves as the HQ counterpart for the justice and corrections components of UN peacekeeping operations and is organized into three teams: a Justice Team, a Corrections Team and a Policy Cell.

There are currently approximately 300 judicial affairs officers and 400 corrections officers authorized for ten DPKO-led peace operations in Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Mali and South Sudan. CLJAS also provides, in varying degrees and upon request, support to special political missions managed by DPA. These include the missions in Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Libya.

In support of field missions with mandates in the justice and corrections areas, CLJAS has four key functions:

- Planning the justice and corrections components in new UN peacekeeping operations and conducting reviews of existing components;
- Advising and supporting the justice and corrections components in field missions;
- Developing guidance tools and training materials to support the justice and corrections components in the field; and
- Engaging partners within and beyond the UN system on rule of law matters, and ensuring synergies and coherence of programmes and activities in the rule of law area.

The Service includes an expert on Islamic law and an expert on sexual violence in conflict, who also serves as the DPKO member of the Team of Experts on Sexual Violence – Rule of Law.

5.6.3: The Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity (JCSC). CLJAS also includes the Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity (JCSC), which along with the Standing Police Capacity (SPC) is located in Brindisi, Italy at the UN Global Service Center. Since its establishment, members of the JCSC have deployed to South Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Syria, Haiti, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, and (Mali). The JCSC, which was approved by the General Assembly in 2010, has two core functions:

- To start up justice and corrections components in new UN operations.
- To reinforce existing UN operations in providing assistance and support to national authorities in the area of justice and corrections.

5.6.4: The Global Focal Point (GFP). In September 2012, the Secretary-General appointed DPKO and UNDP as the Global Focal Point for the Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-conflict and other Crisis Situations. The Secretary-General’s decision on Rule of Law Arrangements (2012/13) seeks to strengthen the management and coordination of the UN country-level operational activities in the areas of police, justice and corrections. To facilitate the provision of joint support, both organizations have agreed to co-locate a portion of their respective rule of law teams in a single location at UNHQ.

The vision of the GFP is to deliver the best support the UN has to offer to strengthen host countries’ police, justice and corrections institutions. To this end, the GFP will marshal knowledge, people and advice on assessments, planning, funding and partnerships to ensure coherent rule of law assistance. DPKO and UNDP will take advantage of the United Nation system’s comparative strengths and networks of expertise. GFP partners will deliver police, justice and corrections support in post-conflict and other crisis contexts in a predictable, accountable and efficient way.

5.6.5: Key Military/Rule of Law Linkages.

Interim SOP on detention. UN personnel in peace operations are sometimes required under the terms of their respective mandates to detain persons in application of mission-specific military rules of engagement or police directives on the use of force and related matters. The purpose of the Interim Standard Operating Procedures on Detention by United Nations Peace Operations (Interim SOP), which was approved by the Under-Secretary-General of Peacekeeping on 25 January 2010, is to ensure that persons detained by UN peace operations...
personnel are handled humanely and in a manner consistent with applicable international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, norms and standards.

With a few specified exceptions, the Interim SOP requires that detained persons shall not be held by UN personnel for more than 48 hours before being released or handed over to national authorities. The Interim SOP sets out the procedures for the transfer, handover, and/or release of detained persons. It also requires missions to appoint a Detention Focal Point; establish registers to record information about detained persons, their property and complaints; compile statistics relating to detained persons; submit reports to Headquarters; carry out internal evaluations; and provide training to mission personnel on the Interim SOP.

A review and evaluation of the Interim SOP on detention has been initiated and will be conducted by a review team composed of OHCHR, OLA, and four DPKO components (OROLSI/PD, OROLSI/CLJAS, OMA and DPET/PBPS) during the second half of 2013.

5.6.6: Military Justice: Prosecution Support Cells and Other Initiatives. The UN SC specifically mandated MONUSCO to establish the Prosecution Support Cells (PSC) Programme to strengthen military justice in the DRC—an imperative, given the number of serious crimes committed in the country by those acting, to some degree, in military or police capacities. Since 2011, MONUSCO provides support to national military investigations and prosecutions of international crimes through the PSCs. These cells are designed to include six advisors - two military investigations advisors, two civilian investigations advisors, a military prosecution advisor and a civilian prosecution advisor. The PSC Steering Committee is composed of representatives from MONUSCO Justice Support Section and the PSCs, as well as officials from the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defence. The PSCs are currently operating in 5 towns and provide technical and expert assistance to investigations and prosecutions of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by FARDC in Eastern DRC. In this way, they support and strengthen the Congolese military justice authorities in the fight against impunity.

Moreover, the UN Mission in South Sudan is mandated to support the Government to develop a military justice system that is complementary to the civil justice system. A Military Justice Advisory Section (MJAS) was established to provide the South Sudan Military and Military Police with training and support in terms of criminal procedure and due process. Jointly with Government authorities, UNMISS has conducted a comprehensive review of the military justice system, including a country-wide audit of military detention facilities. MJAS provides technical advice on legal, regulatory institutional frameworks of the military justice system, record keeping/case management, advice on the oversight of military judiciary, capacity building of officials in the justice sector.

5.6.7: Sexual Violence in Conflict. A Team of Experts on the Rule of Law/Sexual Violence in Conflict (ToE) was established under SCR 1888 in 2009. The TOE is mandated to assist National authorities to strengthen the rule of law in relation to conflict-related sexual violence. The TOE draws from existing human resources from the participating agencies and is composed of three staff members from DPKO, OHCHR and UNDP, and a team leader based in the Office of the SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC). The TOE supports UN field operations and national Governments by providing expertise on conflict-related sexual violence.

The TOE focuses on strengthening the national capacity of police, justice and corrections actors in conflict and post-conflict societies. The Team aims to avoid duplication within UN rule of law programming by ensuring that any TOE interventions build on and complement existing initiatives on the ground. By identifying gaps and challenges faced by national authorities and institutions in responding to conflict-related sexual violence, the TOE has been able to support police and justice actors in a number of post-conflict states. Since its
establishment, the TOE has already deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Guinea Conakry, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Colombia.

In the DRC, in cooperation with MONUSCO and in coordination with the Auditore Militaire and the Haut Court Militaire, the Team supported the training of military investigators from Goma and Uvira and deployed a national expert to undertake case tracking within the justice system. In the beginning of 2013, the TOE deployed an expert on sexual violence investigations to the Prosecution Support Cells in Eastern DRC. The TOE has also provided advice on draft legislation and guidelines or protocols in a number of countries and made recommendations that reinforce the need to implement a comprehensive framework for combating impunity for sexual violence in conflict that includes protection initiatives. While the mandate of the PSCs is not specific to sexual violence crimes, as of January 2012, the PSCs in Eastern Congo had received requests, and provided support in relation to 44 cases, including 32 relating to sexual violence crimes.

5.6.8: Rule of Law Indicators. With support from several donors, DPKO (CLJAS, Police Division), and OHCHR developed the UN Rule of Law Indicators, a non-ranking instrument used at the request of the host country to obtain information regarding law enforcement agencies, the judicial system and the prison system, and the transformation of these institutions over time. This groundbreaking tool supports national authorities in their rule of law reform efforts – including the development of national rule of law strategies – and helps attract and target donor assistance.

To date, the tool has been implemented in Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan. Detailed reports for each country have already been completed. In this context, DPKO and OHCHR supported MINUSTAH and UNMIL in the organization of follow-up events. These were led by the national authorities, resulting in the formulation of recommendations that helped inform each country’s national plans and priorities based on the findings in the reports. A similar event is planned in South Sudan in June. It should be emphasized that the UN Rule of Law Indicators tool was not designed to evaluate the impact of United Nation activities in support of the rule of law per se. However the findings have already been used in Haiti and Liberia to ascertain positive change of institutions over time and the impact that the UN and others may have had in this regard.

The UN Rule of Law Indicators tool has already been used in some instances to measure the transformation of criminal justice institutions over time. For example, in Liberia it has been ascertained that there was decrease in escapes from 225.3 escapees per 1,000 inmates in 2009 to 24.9 escapees per 1,000 inmates in 2011. Similar in Haiti, the country report highlighted progress achieved in the justice sector in terms of children in conflict with the law.

5.6.9: Protecting judicial actors under imminent threat of physical violence. In light of the dangers faced by judicial actors, including judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers and witnesses in post-conflict settings, justice components work closely with military battalions and other mission components to address this issue. For example, in Goma, DRC, the Justice Support Section and other partners in MONUSCO, in close cooperation with the Conseil Superior de la Magistrature and the Auditeur Militaire General continue their efforts to redeploy civilian and judicial magistrates who had fled following the M23 advance. Most recently, in Somalia, there was a serious attack in April 2013 on the main Court house in Mogadishu. A number of legal professionals were killed, including a judge, prosecutors, lawyers and legal support staff. Two weeks later, Somalia’s deputy chief prosecutor, was shot dead by three masked men in Mogadishu after he left a mosque in the city centre. These

events highlight the serious security challenges faced by judicial actors in post-conflict environments.

5.6.10: Assistance to Mobile Courts. Justice components provide technical and expert assistance in organizing and facilitating the operation of mobile courts. Logistical, security and transport assistance is also often requested from military battalions to carry out these activities.

5.7: Civil Affairs.

5.7.1: Civil Society. While there is no universally accepted definition of civil society, there is nevertheless a common acknowledgment that it is a critical element in modern societies and a crucial interlocutor for the UN, especially in post-conflict contexts. One possible definition, provided by the World Bank, highlights the broad spectrum of actors that can be considered to belong to the civil society category:

"the term civil society to refer to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations”.

Bearing this in mind, it is clear that civil society is anything but a unified and coherent force. It reflects instead the multiple layers (i.e. ethical, political, religious, gender, age, etc.) that characterize any given society. In the aftermath of a conflict, there will be local civil society actors genuinely invested in finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict, while others will instead continue to fuel the conflict if they believe that their interests are better served by a different power balance. It is therefore imperative for peacekeeping missions to develop early on relationships with a broad range of civil society actors that have or can have an impact (whether direct or indirect, positive or negative) on the peace process. Building mutual trust and a constructive dialogue with civil society actors not only can provide an invaluable wealth of information to better understand the local context, conflict dynamics, security perceptions and vulnerabilities, aspirations and expectations that the peace process has generated at the local level, but it also allows the Mission to support the strengthening of legitimate institutions by fostering dialogue between the government and its citizens.

Engaging with civil society actors allows both the Mission and the host government to gain a better understanding of specific dynamics that can be at the root causes of the conflict, including ethnic rivalries, access to natural resources, socio-economic imbalances, gender power dynamics, youth exclusion, and so on. However, civil society – especially in post-conflict contexts – remains an extremely complex and politically sensitive phenomenon, representing different perspectives, conflicting interests, and potentially hidden agendas, that peacekeepers need to approach with caution. This requires the Mission to adopt a common strategy on how to engage with civil society actors based on a shared understanding of their role vis-à-vis the peace process and consistent messaging.

In this regard, UN military should always avail themselves of the significant knowledge and expertise that civilian colleagues, such as those working in civil affairs, human rights, political affairs, etc., have of civil society actors in the specific mission context to pursue a common approach in establishing and developing relationships with them in a way that is context and conflict sensitive, that is culturally adapted and gender oriented, and that ultimately addresses the root causes of the conflict.
References:

5.7.2: Civil Affairs. Usually deployed at the local level, Civil Affairs components facilitate the implementation of peacekeeping mandates sub-nationally and work to strengthen social and civic conditions necessary for peace. Civil Affairs Officers are often the primary interface between the mission and local interlocutors performing a variety of essential tasks. A key characteristic of Civil Affairs components is their flexibility, their ability to adapt to different needs at different times and in different places. Conditions vary dramatically between peace missions and Civil Affairs have taken on a range of tasks and roles over the years to reflect the needs of these different missions.

While tasks vary significantly, the DPKO/DFS Policy Directive on Civil Affairs (April 2008) sets out three core roles that depending on the mandate and the situation on the ground can be performed by civil affairs:

- **Role 1**: Cross-mission representation, monitoring the progress of the peace process and mandate implementation at the local level; provide the mission leadership with information about the local environment, conduct conflict analysis and early warning about local conflict, including efforts to protect civilians. Civil Affairs can play an important role in supporting coordination, cohesion and political consistency among local mission actors (including UN Military and Police Components) by advising on the broader context of mandate implementation or on specific aspects of relations with civilians.

- **Role 2**: Confidence-building, conflict management and support to the development of political space are integral to UN Peacekeeping and central to civil affairs work. Through this role, Civil Affairs actively support the development of social and civic conditions conducive to sustainable peace and popular engagement and confidence in the peace process.

- **Role 3**: Civil Affairs is responsible for confidence-building, conflict management and support to reconciliation processes. Civil Affairs actively supports the development of social conditions conducive to sustainable peace through support to reconciliation and conflict-resolution activities at the local and/or national levels. These efforts are undertaken in a number of ways, including: convening or facilitating dialogue between interest groups; direct outreach to the population; support to the efforts of civil society groups seeking peace and reconciliation; the identification, implementation and monitoring of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs); and promotion or protection of the interests of excluded, threatened, marginalised or minority groups.

Civil Affairs Officers at the field level will usually have several points of contact with the military component of the mission depending on the specific set up of the mission itself. While it is always the case that civil affairs would engage directly with the Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) Officer for that region, it is also often the case that they would interact with the senior officer in the region whether it is a Commanding Officer, a Military Observer or a Military Liaison Officer. At times, direct coordination and cooperation between civil affairs and staff officers in charge of operations (G3), planning (G5) or intelligence and security (G2) has proven to be the most effective approach in ensuring a fully integrated approach to the implementation of mandated tasks.

Civil Affairs Officers at the local and regional levels can provide military components with advice concerning civilian issues, cultural norms and the broader context of mandate implementation. Civil Affairs Officer are usually deployed for longer stretches of time than contingents and as such often carry the institutional memory for those duty stations, which is particularly important for continuity given troop rotations. They can help to manage any misunderstanding or conflict between communities and military units. The work that civil
affairs perform at the social and administrative levels countrywide can also help gradually to
demilitarize problems faced by the military, for example through encouraging dialogue or
civic interaction in buffer zones. Civil affairs can advise on selection and management
processes for QIPs and facilitate the involvement of the military in these, including by
advising on where and how this kind of involvement can be appropriate or inappropriate.
Where military contingents have their own resources for projects, civil affairs can advise on
ensuring that these activities are in line with overall mission priorities and approaches and
with DPKO policy. Civil affairs can also assist in the planning and implementation of joint
civil-military initiatives, including in relation to the protection of civilians.

In regards of the latter, Civil Affairs Officers are often playing a critical role in the
implementation of the DPKO/DFS Operational concept on the Protection of Civilians in UN
Peacekeeping Operations. This they do by facilitating processes that enable local political
leaders, local authorities and communities to identify, plan for and take concrete steps to
protect local communities from risks, and by supporting reconciliation and conflict
management at the local level.

Civil affairs also plays a particularly important role in an early warning function relaying
information on potential risks and threats to civilians and providing information on overall
local dynamics, which help to inform operational responses, the peacekeeping force to
answer to protection needs and to prevent and mitigate any unintended consequences of
military operations.

Finally, civil affairs support the establishment of a protective environment, by assisting
national actors – including authorities, communities and civil society – in strengthening
longer term social and civil conditions for peace and addressing the root causes of POC risks.

5.7.3: Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). UN peacekeeping operations often implement QIPs,
which are small-scale projects, used to establish and build confidence in the mission, its
mandate, and the peace process, thereby improving the environment for effective mandate
implementation. Projects are devised/selected according to one or more of the following
criteria:

- Contribution to promoting acceptance of the mandated tasks of the mission amongst the
  population and/or supporting the credibility of the mission by demonstrating progress in
  the implementation of these tasks where confidence is lacking.
- Contribution to building confidence in the peace process, and/or building support for the
  peace process, including through demonstrating early dividends of stability to the
  population.
- Contribution to improving the environment for mandate implementation by generating
  support for the mission, including through addressing immediate needs of the population.

QIPs may take a number of forms, including infrastructure assistance, provision of
equipment, non-recurrent training activities or short-term employment generation activities,
and depending on the specific mission context and confidence-building objective these QIP
can be implemented with the collaboration of military forces. The identification of suitable
QIPs should consider issues related to access to or benefit from the project for different
sections of the community, such as women, young people, different ethnic groups or
marginalized sections of the population. It is important to understand that such projects are
not a substitute for humanitarian and/or development assistance. It is critical not to support
projects that could be used to further political, ideological or religious objectives. For
example, avoid building churches or mosques or directly supporting political parties.

UN Military Commanders should work in close coordination with relevant substantive
components in the identification and implementation of QIPs, consistently with the QIP
Policy and Guidelines, to ensure synergy and deliver the desired impact.
5.7.4: UN Civil Military Coordination (UN CIMIC). In UN peacekeeping operations, the role of UN Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) is the operational and tactical coordination between the UN military and civilian partners, among them the civilian components of UN field missions, UN Police, UN agencies, funds and programmes, host national government, non-governmental organizations, and grass-roots organizations in line with their principles.

Within the UN integrated missions context, the focus is on coordination across the political, security, development, human rights and humanitarian dimensions, and rule of law. The UN-CIMIC concept is a military staff function in support of the Commander and the mission. UN Humanitarian- Civil-Military Co-ordination (UN-CMCoord), on the other hand, is a purely humanitarian function for humanitarian organizations and the wider humanitarian community. UN-CIMIC and UN-CMCoord should complement each other on the ground. Key to this is to have a good understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the functions. As defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), UN-CMCoord is “the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals.”\(^\text{18}\) As defined and as practiced, UN-CMCoord is therefore a continuing process of dialogue guided by humanitarian principles.

Beyond UN-CMCoord officers, one of the key civilian counterparts to UN-CIMIC officers at both operational and tactical levels are UN Civil Affairs Officers, due to their central role in mission coordination, strong relationships with key stakeholders and numerous mission initiatives, their representation of the SRSG and/or HC/RC, and the potential co-multiplier effects of UN-CIMIC and Civil Affairs cooperation and coordination. These officers should establish ongoing liaison, as appropriate, and become familiar with their respective mandates and roles in order to identify and exploit opportunities for civil-military synergies.

References:
- Civil Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC), 2010.

5.8: Conduct and Discipline

5.8.1: Overview. The UN expects all peacekeepers to conduct themselves in a manner that befits mandates given to serve and protect, as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. The need to maintain the highest standards of integrity for all UN personnel is enshrined in the Charter. All participants in a peacekeeping operation must accept special constraints in their public and private lives in order to effectively accomplish the objectives and promote the ideals of the UN. UN peacekeepers undertake to conduct themselves in a professional and disciplined manner at all times, respect local laws, customs and practices, treat Host country inhabitants with respect, courtesy and consideration and act with impartiality, integrity and tact. The UN has a zero-tolerance policy with respect to sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA).

UN rules forbid sexual relations with prostitutes and with any persons under 18, and strongly discourage relations with beneficiaries of assistance. The Do’s and Don’ts for UN peacekeepers “We Are UN Peacekeeping Personnel” is attached as Annex V (p.256).

5.8.2: HoMC Responsibility. Maintaining high standards of conduct and discipline is a command responsibility. HoMC is responsible for the discipline and good order of all personnel of the Military Component, including all members of the National military contingent. All members of the Military Component in a UN mission are under the authority and direction of the HoMC and are answerable to the HoMC for their personal conduct and performance of their official duties. HoMC shall ensure that they abide by the UN standards of conduct, mission-specific rules and regulations or the obligations towards National and local laws and regulations. In particular, the HoMC must ensure that all Military Component members:

- Conduct themselves at all times (both on and off duty) in a manner befitting their status as member of the UN Mission and that they carry out their duties and regulate their conduct solely with the interests of the UN in view.
- Refrain from any action incompatible with the aim and objectives of the UN as well as with the international nature of their duties.
- Comply with all UN rules and regulations, as well as policies, procedures and directives issued by the UNHQ, or by the HoM, the HoMC and the DMS/CMS.
- Respect the law and customs of the host country (including local population, in particular for vulnerable groups) as well as international human rights standards and international humanitarian law.
- Respect the impartiality and independence of the UN and exercise the utmost discretion in respect of all matters of official business.
- Do not communicate to any person not otherwise entitled, any information known to them by reason of their official position and do not at anytime use such information to their private advantage.
- Do not either engage in political activity, or publicly express any preference for any political, religious or ethnic entity within the mission area.
- Respond to all requests for assistance in a fair and impartial manner.
- Do not seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of their duties from their respective governments or from any other external authority.
- Do not receive any form of gift, award or remuneration from any government or organisation other than those entitled to receive from his or her government, unless prior authorisation is granted by UNHQ.
- Do not improperly use a position of influence, power or authority against another person, particularly in a working environment.

5.8.3: Standards of Conduct and Performance Criteria. Standards of conduct and effective performance of peacekeeping duties are fundamental to the success of all UN operations. Within the Military Component, the principles that govern these aspects are reliant upon commanders at all levels ensuring good order and discipline amongst their subordinates. The Force HQ and the military chain of command have a pivotal role in:

- Establishing the competencies and responsibilities of subordinates.
- Ensuring that subordinates are aware of, and strictly observe, their obligations.
- Ensuring that conduct violations are discouraged and that any instances are promptly and thoroughly investigated and that appropriate disciplinary action is taken; and
- Training subordinates in their responsibilities as part of routine training.

5.8.4: Authority over Conduct and Discipline. The HoM has the organization's authority to take appropriate administrative measures where failure to comply with official guidelines is
encountered. This authority may be delegated to senior staff of the UN Mission. The HoMC is to ensure that National contingent/unit commanders, senior National officers and UN military team leaders exercise responsibility in this respect, over their subordinates.

5.8.5: Responsibilities of Military Commanders. UN military commanders at all levels must:

- Ensure compliance with the guidelines on IHL for forces undertaking UN peacekeeping operations. This will take into account the nature of the UN forces, their powers, competencies and mandate.
- Enforce standards for Human Rights for the applicable sections of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- Ensure that all personnel comply with the standards established for the conduct of UN peacekeepers independence and tact.
- Establish a clear chain of command to ensure that inappropriate conduct and activities are appropriately and promptly addressed. This requires a clear linkage of the National responsibilities for discipline and the prerogatives of the UN commander to ensure appropriate follow-up of all alleged incidents.
- Monitor and investigate all alleged incidents of illegal activities and apply appropriate remedial action.
- Ensure that all personnel understand the mandate and mission assigned by the UN SC and that they comply with their provisions.
- Confirm that comprehensive mission preparatory briefings and training include an understanding of local customs and practices and respect for mission regional culture, religion, traditions and the gender issues.
- Foster respect for the law and customs of the Host country.
- Ensure respect for local laws, customs and practices where they are not in conflict with mandated activities and the privileges, benefits or immunities the UN and its officials enjoy or which have been further negotiated and incorporated in relevant SOFA/SOMA.
- Ensure that subordinates respect, manage and care for all material and goods supplied by the UN (radios, vehicles and equipment).
- UN military commanders must take immediate action where UN military personnel are involved in:
  - Exploitation of vulnerable groups in local communities, particularly women and children, either through position or financial status has occurred or alleged to have occurred.
  - Excessive consumption of alcohol or the use of drugs has occurred or alleged to have occurred.
  - Participation in criminal or illegal activities is detected or alleged to have occurred.

5.8.6: Channels of Communication. UN military commanders must also ensure that military personnel neither seek nor receive instructions relating to the performance of their duties from any unauthorised external source. Therefore legitimate communications with national authorities and with the media must be within clearly established guidelines to avoid inappropriate actions.

5.8.7: Investigations. A clear mechanism must be established for addressing complaints made against UN personnel within the mission and include actions at UNHQ and National authority levels. This must include a well-defined process for investigating, reporting and follow-up. Important guidelines on investigations are provided in the succeeding paragraphs:

- Serious Misconduct. Serious misconduct is defined as any act, omission or negligence, including criminal acts that is a violation of standard operating procedures, directives, or any other applicable rules, regulations or administrative instructions, that results in or is likely to result in serious damage or injury (any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property) to an individual or to the mission. Serious misconduct includes, but are not limited to:
Sexual abuse and exploitation of any individual, particularly children;
Harassment, including sexual harassment;
Abuse of authority;
Excessive use of force;
Unlawful discharge of firearms;
Breach of confidentiality;
Abuse of UN privileges and immunities;
Conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline;
Driving while intoxicated or other grossly negligent driving;
Intoxicated while on duty or in public on repeated occasions;
Repeatedly absent from duty without permission;
Use, possession or distribution of illegal narcotics;
Embezzlement or other financial malfeasance;
Willful disobedience of a lawful order; and
Unlawful acts (e.g. theft, fraud, smuggling, bribery) on or off UN premises, with or without the involvement of UN vehicles, and whether or not the individual was officially on duty at the time of the offence.

**Action by Force HQ on Serious Misconduct.** Force HQ shall ensure the following:
- Refer acts of serious misconduct to the field mission Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT). It may further be referred to OIOS (if represented in the field mission) through the CDT.
- Undertake investigation without prejudice to the authority and responsibilities of the OIOS.

**Minor Misconduct.** Minor misconduct is defined as any act, omission or negligence that is a violation of standard operating procedures, directives, or any other applicable rules, regulations or administrative instructions, but which does not result in or is not likely to result in major damage or injury to an individual or the mission. Minor misconduct includes, but are not limited to:
- Improper wearing of uniform;
- Neglect in performance of duty not amounting to a willful or deliberate act;
- Intoxication while on duty or in public;
- Negligent driving;
- Absence from duty without permission; and
- Malingering.

**Action by Force HQ on Minor Misconduct.** All minor breach of conduct shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary measures imposed by the HoMC or duly designated subordinate authority.
- UN Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM). Disciplinary measures shall be limited to a 'written censure or 'reprimand' and/or redeployment to another position/area and/or removal of UN administrative benefits and concessions, such as the UN mission driving license when appropriate.
- Military contingent. Contingent personnel are subject to respective national jurisdiction. The HoMC may request information from contingent commanders on disciplinary measures taken against their contingent members.

### 5.8.8: Disciplinary Action.

In response to any allegations of minor or serious misconduct made against a member of the Military Component, the HoMC is required to strictly follow UN rules and regulations. The HoMC is responsible for developing and implementing *inter alia* a strategy to prevent, identify and respond to allegations of SEA by members of the Military Component, in coordination with the other components of the mission.

**Formal Investigative Action.** The HoMC is to ensure investigations into allegations of misconduct by military personnel are conducted in accordance with relevant UN rules, which are self regulating.

**Repatriation Action.** In all cases, the decision to repatriate a UN Military Contingent member shall be made by UNHQ based on the recommendation of the HoM. Once
decided, repatriation shall be immediate and the national authorities concerned shall be contacted at once by UNHQ through the Permanent Mission concerned in New York. The expenses connected with repatriation and replacement shall be borne by the Member State involved.

If the presence of a military peacekeeper to be repatriated on disciplinary grounds is detrimental to the morale of the staff, the image of the mission or has other negative effects, the objective of the UN shall be to repatriate as soon as appropriate. In certain cases the HoM may decide to wait for the completion of the report of the Board of Inquiry if the HoM determines the preliminary investigation report to inadequate to support an immediate repatriation decision. In this event, the HoM shall inform UNHQ and provide a copy of the preliminary investigation report along with the factors and assessment that influenced the decision not to implement immediate repatriation. Also in this event, the Board of Inquiry shall be required to complete its work on a priority basis as quickly as possible.

The HoMC may also recommend repatriation on technical grounds if it is determined that a member of the Military Component lacks the requisite skills for the post he/she has been assigned to. For example, when poor vehicle driving skills or a lack of specific language skills are demonstrated by a military member when these skills are essential for the performance of assigned responsibilities, a recommendation for repatriation on technical grounds may be made. The HoMC request for repatriation of a military member on technical grounds must be submitted through the HoM to the MilAd at UNHQ who will take action on behalf of the USG DPKO.

5.8.9: Internal Investigations. The HoMC shall establish internal investigation procedures to assist in the conduct of preliminary investigations. These procedures should assist in:
- Establishing and maintaining an information management system on all serious and minor misconduct allegations and cases relating to UN military members;
- Producing regular reports on allegations in cases of misconduct, including sexual misconduct, relating to UN military members;
- The development of training materials on disciplinary procedures for the Military Component and the prevention of acts of misconduct;
- Analysis of the effectiveness of preventing, identifying and responding to acts of misconduct;
- The development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of mechanisms to strengthen accountability for misconduct by UN military members; and
- The coordination with conduct and discipline officers from UNHQ to ensure coherence and consistency with policies, strategies, procedures, and guidelines on addressing personnel misconduct.

The HoMC is authorized to undertake investigations or inquiries and to request information, reports and consultations, according to standard UN procedures. For members of the Military Component, the primary responsibility for disciplinary action is retained by respective National authority.

5.8.10: Rights of Personnel under Investigation. Following any investigation and before taking the final decision to impose any administrative and/or disciplinary measure against a member of the Military Component, the HoMC shall ensure that:
- The military member has been informed of the allegation (s) against him/her and of his/her right to respond to the allegations;
- The military member has the opportunity to submit comments on the results of the formal investigation and findings; and
- The findings, after considering the comments if any, will be forwarded to the UNHQ which will provide relevant information to enable the affected TCC to follow-up and undertake national disciplinary action where necessary.
5.8.11: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA). Men, women and children displaced by conflict or other disasters are among the most vulnerable people on earth. They look up to the UN and its humanitarian partners for shelter and protection. Anyone employed by or affiliated with the UN who breaks that sacred trust shall be held accountable and, when the circumstances so warrant, be prosecuted. Reiterating obligations contained in the MoU between the UN and TCCs, the Secretary-General Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from SEA provides that:

- SEA constitutes acts of serious misconduct and therefore provides ground for disciplinary measures, including summary dismissal.
- Sexual activity with children (persons under the age of 18) is prohibited regardless of the age of majority or age of consent. Mistaken belief in the age of a child is not a defence.
- Exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex, including sexual favours or other forms of humiliating, degrading or exploitative behaviour, is prohibited. This includes any exchange of assistance that is due to beneficiaries of assistance.
- Sexual relationships between UN staff and beneficiaries of assistance, since they are based on inherently unequal power dynamics, undermine the credibility and integrity of the work of the UN and are strongly discouraged.
- Where a UN staff member develops concerns or suspicions regarding SEA by a fellow worker, whether in the same entity or not and whether or not within the UN system, he or she should report such concerns via established reporting mechanisms.
- UN staff are obliged to create and maintain an environment that prevents SEA. Commanders at all levels have a particular responsibility to support and develop systems that maintain this environment.
- Members of national military contingents are subject to their Government’s exclusive jurisdiction in respect of any crimes or offences and to their Government’s disciplinary jurisdiction in respect of all other acts of misconduct or serious misconduct.

References:
- Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse [St/Sgb/2003/13].
- Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and TCCs (Including Annex H of the MOU) A/61/19 (Part III).

5.9: Women, Peace and Security.

5.9.1: Overview. To enhance the role played by women in the maintenance of international peace and security, the UN Security Council has to date adopted five specific resolutions on Women, Peace and Security. The resolutions recognize that women are disproportionately affected by conflicts, and that women have contributions to offer for peace-processes. DPKO/DFS has subsequently adopted a Policy on Gender Equality (2010), and Guidelines on Integrating a Gender Perspective into the work of UN Military in Peacekeeping Operations (2010), to provide guidance on implementation of the mandates on Women, Peace and Security.

Men and women experience conflict differently and can have different perceptions on how to build peace. Understanding the various roles, responsibilities and experiences of women and men, in and post conflict is critical to peacekeeping. A foundation for all gender-sensitive activities is active interaction with local women and men, who can provide information on security threats and vulnerabilities facing them. By taking into consideration the differences in threats and vulnerabilities experienced by men and women, tasks and actions of the military component can be made gender-sensitive.
5.9.2: Roles and Responsibilities of the Military Component. Every peacekeeper is responsible for taking into consideration that security threats and vulnerabilities can be different for men and women. The Force Commander has ultimate responsibility for oversight of integrating gender perspectives into the work of the military component, supported by appointed military gender focal points at the Force HQ, Sector HQ and at the Battalion-level. The mission gender adviser is responsible for supporting mission components in complying with DPKO/DFS Policy on Gender Equality, and mandates on Women, Peace and Security. The gender related responsibilities of Force HQ Staff is at Annex W (p.258).

5.9.3: Monitoring. Military personnel should interact with local women, and men, including political, religious and community leaders and representatives of women’s NGOs, and survivors of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV), who can provide information on the security situation and early warning indicators, especially concerning security threats facing local women in general, and in the context of special events, such as elections. Military should go where the local women are. Cultural sensitivity in interaction with local women requires that all peacekeepers are trained to understand the cultural context, and can require the presence of female peacekeepers. Female victims can be more confident in approaching female peacekeepers. Cooperation with Police and Civilian Components, female interpreters’ and/or host nation security forces, is required in cases where there are no female military peacekeepers. Examples of actions to be taken, whenever appropriate:

- Deploy mixed teams of male and female peacekeepers, whenever possible.
- When appropriate, engage female and male community liaison agents, and provide communications equipment (mobile phones, radios etc.) to improve early warning capabilities. Respect the confidentiality and security of the community liaison agents.
- Seek support from the mission Gender Adviser on the situational analysis of women’s interest on the ground, and on the best interventions with local women, on perceptions of security.
- Peacekeepers should monitor propaganda and hate speech that may be an early-warning indicator of violence, including sexual violence.

5.9.4: Reporting. All reporting should use sex-disaggregated data, so that any possible differences between men, women can be identified, analyzed and responded to. Examples of actions to be taken, whenever appropriate:

- Military Gender Focal Points should be appointed at Force HQ, Sector HQ, and at the Battalion Level, and a reporting line on specific issues relevant from a gender-perspective should be established through the focal points.
- TORs for GFPs should take into account gender considerations and staff should be held accountable for gender mainstreaming in their area of work, e.g. as part of their performance appraisal
- Regular verbal and non-verbal reporting should have a section on Gender issues, in addition to addressing gender-issues throughout the report.
- Reporting on gender issues should be supported by multimedia means for better review and analysis.

5.9.5: Analysis. Appropriate attention should be given to any differences in security threats facing women, men and children. The capacities of local women to contribute to peace should also be identified and analyzed. Gender analysis and community liaison not only ensures that peacekeepers are able to “see” why women/girls may be at risk in certain situations, it also enhances overall situational awareness and enables commanders to make better-founded decisions, based on sex-disaggregated security assessments. This can aid efforts, for example, to coordinate the calendar of patrols with women when they go to. Examples of actions to be taken, whenever appropriate:

- Consult local women on the threats that face women and girls in their communities. Gender Advisor can support these initiatives.
• Make note of the various threats that women experience, especially when these are different from men’s experiences.

5.9.6: Prevention. Liaison with local women and men is required to identify and respond to security threats effectively. Women should be key actors in the design of early response initiatives, with a critical mass of women participating as beneficiaries of any intervention. This may be supported by establishing a gender-balanced team of community stakeholders responsible for generating response initiatives or identifying key contacts within communities or institutions who will be consulted throughout the development and implementation of response interventions. Examples of actions to be taken, whenever appropriate:

• Liaise with representatives of local women, and relevant NGOs in conjunction with the Gender Adviser, civilian and military focal points. Provide safe space for meetings on a regular basis.
• Provide armed escorts to accompany women/girls while engaging in economic activities, such as going to markets, or collecting firewood beyond to anticipate and avert predictable risks such as “firewood rape”. Escort patrols are particularly effective when trust is built between participants and patrollers through committees that discuss timing, frequency, route selection, distance and how the patrol will be carried out; a translator accompanies patrols.
• Consider using QIPS to support men’s economic engagement to prevent violence against women.

5.9.7: Responding. Courses of action include all of the actions otherwise undertaken. The actions can be made gender-sensitive by adjusting the execution to respond to possibly differential threats identified by interacting with the women and men of the local population. Examples of actions to be taken, whenever appropriate:

• Deliver training support to communities on how to respond in cases of emergency, including attacks on women/girls.
• Consider using mission helicopters and vehicles to transport rape victims for treatment.
• Military personnel who are directly approached by victims of sexual violence must ensure their physical safety, respect the privacy and confidentiality of victims, and refer them to the police or appropriate NGO (according to the wishes of the victim).
• Consider establishing a distress call system (“911 Helpline Concept”) to activate a Quick Reaction Force to dispatch to a scene.
• Work with humanitarian agencies to establish grassroots referral networks for sexual violence victims to facilitate access to medical/psychosocial support.

5.9.8: Coordination. Different mission components and thematic units such as the Gender Advisory Unit, and other UN actors represented in the AOR can have valuable information and contacts concerning the situation for local women and men. Coordination on gender-sensitive interventions should thus be coordinated with the actors within the mission and the UN Country Team. The mechanism for coordination can be a Gender Task Force, when present in the country. The Gender team coordinates with other components through the establishment of civilian and military Gender Task Force. The use of a Task Force allows for the wide dissemination of gender information, knowledge sharing and information brokering. The Focal Points who are appointed to the Task Force share the responsibility for integrating a gender perspective into their work. Examples of actions to be taken, whenever appropriate:

• Military Gender Focal Points should take part in the Mission Gender Task Force.

References:
• DPKO/DFS Policy on Gender Equality in Peacekeeping Operations (2010).
• DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Integrating a Gender Perspective into the work of UN Military in Peacekeeping Operations (2010).

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5.10: Child Protection.

Protection of children in armed conflicts is a fundamental peace and security concern which is highlighted by eight SCR on children and armed conflict (1261 of 1999, 1314 of 2000, 1379 of 2001, 1460 of 2003, 1539 of 2004, 1612 of 2005, 1882 of 2009 and 1998 of 2011). In addition, the UN SC has included specific provisions for the protection of children in several Mandates of UN peacekeeping operations. These resolutions and Mandates require peacekeeping Missions to undertake several activities to promote child protection, namely:

- Monitoring and reporting grave violations committed against children.
- Negotiating action plans for the release of children from armed groups, and other grave violations.
- Ensuring that all peacekeeping personnel are trained on child protection issues.

Child Protection Adviser/Focal Points. At the Mission level, Child Protection Advisers (CPAs) provide guidance, advice and support on child protection issues. Force HQ/Military Child Protection Focal Point must keep the CPA informed of all developments and violations. Information acquisition, sharing and reporting must take into account confidentiality and the sensitivity of dealing with children’s issues.

Role of Force HQ. The Child Protection responsibility must be factored into all operational activities (planning and execution) in the field by the Force HQ. Force OPORD, directives and SOPs must reflect Child protection concerns, responsibilities and response mechanisms. The Force PIR and information collection plans need to take into account threats and vulnerabilities to the children and appropriate tasking of sources should be carried out. All military peacekeepers must be trained/sensitised on Child Protection issues. Being the eyes and ears of the Mission, military peacekeepers and the units and sub-units must maintain a close watch on threats and vulnerabilities to the children and take appropriate measures to safeguard them from danger. The outreach and engagement activities and the CIMIC/QIPs must also align the deliverables in support Child Protection.

Prevention. The military has a special role to play in promoting the protection of children in their areas of operation and in preventing violations, exploitation and abuse. Unit/sub-unit commanders and military peacekeepers must act to prevent Grave violations committed against children, such as:

- Recruitment and use of children by armed forces and armed groups.
- Maiming and killing.
- Rape and grave sexual violence.
- Abductions.
- Attacks on schools and hospitals.
- Denial of humanitarian access to children.

Compliance. Important issues that require compliance by Military Components are:

- Children should not be put in the direct line of danger or used in information-gathering in military operations.
- Where children are captured or separated from armed groups, they should not be interrogated.
- When a child needs to be interviewed to establish evidence, civilian mission personnel, where present the child protection officer, should conduct the interview. Girls should preferably be interviewed by a woman.
- When children are detained/rescued, SOPs should be followed for the immediate hand-over to child protection actors.
- Schools shall not be used by the military in their operations.
- Military personnel should refrain from all forms of exploitation and abuse of children.
- The use of children under the age of 18 by the UN mission for purposes of labour or other rendering of services is strictly prohibited.
- Military peacekeepers must be above 18 years of age.
- Facilitate child sensitive DDR process.

**Child Soldiers.** In the event of likely presence of “Child Soldiers” in the Host security forces or other armed groups/spoilers, efforts to rehabilitate them must be initiated as per Mission HQ directions. If they pose no threat, report the matter through command channel, Military Child Protection Focal Point and Mission CPA to arrange for safe transfer with protection actors. When encountered with Child Soldiers in operations, utmost care, restraint and fine judgment must be used in delivering calibrated responses based on ROE.

**References:**

**5.11: HIV/AIDS.**
HIV/AIDS continues to remain a formidable global challenge. At the beginning of 2012, there were 34 million people living with HIV and AIDS and over 2 million newly infected each year. Medications can provide highly effective treatment though not a cure for AIDS. In the absence of a vaccine, HIV prevention remains the mainstay in responding to the epidemic. Uniformed services personnel are identified as highly vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. Recognising that conflict and post-conflict areas are high-risk environments for the spread of HIV among peacekeepers and the community, UN Security Council Resolutions 1308 (2000) and 1983 (2011), underscore the importance of HIV/AIDS awareness training and prevention initiatives for UN peacekeepers.

DPKO has developed modules on HIV/AIDS as part of pre-deployment training for TCCs. Mission-specific HIV/AIDS awareness is also included in induction upon arrival in the mission area along with other DPKO HIV interventions and services such as voluntary confidential counselling and testing (VCCT), condom programming and post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) kits. Commanders shall nominate personnel for peer education training (PET) conducted by the HIV Unit, which shall be repeated to keep step with troop rotations. UN peacekeepers can be positive agents of change in the fight against HIV/AIDS in the mission and upon return from mission.

**Reference:**

**5.12: Security Sector Reform (SSR).**
**5.12.1: General.** The reform of a country’s security sector in the aftermath of the conflict is vital for sustainable peace and development to ensure that people feel safe and secure, and has confidence in their State. The UN support to national DSR efforts may be provided based on the Security Council mandates or by other UN actors on the basis of requests from Member States.

**5.12.2: Security Sector.** Security sector is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries,
legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.

5.12.3: Security Sector Reform. Security Sector Reform (SSR) describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. The UN supports security sector reform (SSR) to ensure the development of effective, efficient, affordable and accountable security institutions.

It is a process led by national authorities, and the reform should be undertaken without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. No single model of a security sector exists. However, the UN considers that security sectors usually include structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security. These could include defence, law enforcement, corrections, information services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies.

In some cases, elements of the judicial sector responsible for cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are included. The security sector should also include management and oversight bodies and, in some instances, may involve informal or traditional security providers. The reform of a country’s security sector is essential in post-conflict contexts. In those settings, making people feel safe and secure and (re)-building confidence between the State and its people are vital for sustainable peace and development. In other contexts, SSR can even prevent conflicts or crises from emerging or resurging, and it is also a process that many States undertake on a regular basis to respond to emerging threats or potential internal or external pressures.

5.12.4: SSR Team Responsibilities. In the field, SSR teams in various missions support national authorities to:

- Facilitate national SSR dialogues.
- Develop national security and defence policies, strategies and plans.
- Strengthen oversight, management and coordination capacities.
- Articulate security sector legislation.
- Mobilize resources for SSR-related projects.
- Harmonize international support to SSR.
- Education, training and institutional capacity building.
- Monitor and evaluate programmes and results.

5.12.5: Defence Sector. Defence Sector refers to the civil-military structures, and personnel responsible for the protection of the sovereignty of a State and its peoples while meeting the State’s obligations to contribute to international peace and security. The defence sector also includes those actors responsible for governance, oversight, management, and the command and control of defence, including legislative bodies, ministries, education and research centres and civil society groups.

5.12.6: Defence Sector Reform (DSR). DSR describes a nationally-owned process intended to reconcile, reform, transform, restructure, reengineer, enhance or develop an effective, efficient, accountable and affordable defence sector which operates without discrimination, with full respect of human rights and, under extraordinary and constitutionally defined circumstances, in support of the establishment, maintenance and upholding of law and order. In some specific cases, the reform process may include the assessment of the role of the private defence-related organizations and regularization of non-statutory forces.
The DPKO/DFS DSR Policy, 2011.17, outlines the parameters and components of the UN’s support to national DSR efforts, including elements for any mission concept, core tasks and constraints. The policy also highlights linkages between DSR and the broader processes of SSR, rule of law, early peacebuilding and longer-term development, among other priorities. An effective, efficient, accountable and affordable defence sector (an important component of the broader security sector) is essential for sustainable peace and development and should be considered an important dimension of UN assistance to Member States.

References:
- Defence Sector Reform (DSR) Policy, 2011.

5.13: Mine Action.
Mine action entails more than removing the threat posed by landmines, explosive remnants of war and explosive hazards. It includes actions ranging from providing risk education to people on how to protect themselves from the dangers in a mine-affected environment; clearing, marking and surveying suspected contaminated areas; facilitating support to victims and survivors; securing, managing and destroying of stockpiles of conventional weapons and ammunition; and advocating for a world free from the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war, including cluster munitions,

Mine action is not just about landmines. Mine action programmes address problems of landmines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and explosive remnants of war (ERW), which includes cluster munitions, UXO and “abandoned ordnance”, or weapons left behind by armed forces when they leave an area. In many countries, UXO pose an even greater threat to people’s safety. UXO comprises bombs, mortars, grenades, missiles or other explosive devices that fail to detonate on impact but remain volatile and can kill if touched or moved.

Mine action has also evolved into the technical specialists for all conventional explosive hazards to respond to the humanitarian crisis and requirements. In particular, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have become a global challenge which requires a global solution; part of this solution includes developing an organic IED disposal capacity in affected nations. Support to counter improvised explosive devices assists States in the removal and destruction of abandoned IEDs; IED awareness and IED recognition/reporting education, as well as, the development and training of an inherent capability designed to mitigate the threat of IEDs.

Another area of focus that has emerged relates to weapons and ammunition safety management (PSSM). This can include the safe disposal of unsafe or expired ammunition as well as advice and technical solutions related to the safe and secure storage of contingency owned ammunition and weapons.

There is an extensive international normative framework that is applied to mine action. These include: the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Convention), the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Associated Protocols (CCW), and the Conventional on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention). Part of the advocacy work involved in mine action is to support the compliance with these conventions as well as promote their universalisation.

Role of UNMAS. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) of DPKO is the focal point within the UN system on mine action. Mandated by the SC and the GA, UNMAS develops mine action programmes in support of the implementation of mandates for peacekeeping and special political missions, as well as coordinates humanitarian mine action responses in post-conflict environments. Notably, it is also charged with the responsibility to be the rapid response to humanitarian emergencies and crisis with respect to threats from explosive...
hazards. When requested or mandated, UNMAS also provides technical expertise and advice to national capacities related to the removal and destruction of abandoned IEDs, IED awareness and IED recognition. UNMAS also works to assist States in complying with their obligations under relevant treaties such as those listed above. Extensive policy work has been developed for mine action, particularly in relation to the areas of supporting victim assistance initiatives and promoting gender mainstreaming and gender balance. For further information, refer to the UNMAS website at www.unmas.org.

UNMAS also implements Weapons and Ammunition Safety Management/PSSSM projects on the basis of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) and the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). In its supporting role as part of DPKO, technical experts from UNMAS support the Force Leadership, U-4 and the SATO with advice and technical solutions related to the safe and secure storage of contingency owned ammunition and weapons. This can include the safe disposal of unsafe or expired ammunition and follows volume 12.10 “Ammunition on multi-national operations” of the IATG, which includes planning, deployment and operational aspects for the storage, handling and use of ammunition and explosives on multi-national operations.

Where deployed, effective links, cooperation, and information-sharing should be established with UNMAS field personnel in addition to regular liaison with UNMAS HQ. HoMC/FC and the Force HQ Staff should be aware that civilian or other military units may be deployed in their AOR and be coordinated by a UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) with units and teams tasked with mine and UXO clearance. It is important to set up a communication link with the MACC in order to ensure an information-flow between the mine-clearing elements and the Force HQ. MACCs tend to be supported or coordinated by UNMAS. Therefore, this underlines the importance to establish links with UNMAS as early as possible in a field deployment context and to include briefings from UNMAS in any pre-deployment schedule.

References:
- International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) http://www.un-casa-isacs.org/isacs/

5.14: Environment.

5.14.1: General. UN peacekeeping operations have the duty to have a good environmental management to mitigate the operations’ environmental impacts of its host nations. Some peacekeeping missions have been given a specific mandate by the SUN C (e.g OP32 SCR2100) showing the increasing scrutiny by Member States. Environmental sustainability is the seventh UN Millennium Development Goal. The DPKO/DFS Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions provides guidance to all UN peacekeepers in managing key environmental issues, such as, energy, water, wastewater, waste, hazardous substances, wild animals and plants, and cultural and historical resources management. Force HQ and major UN military Units shall have an environmental focal point to maintain oversight, coordinate, and implement the guidance, and shall liaise with the Mission Environmental officer. All personnel of Military Component, must be trained and be aware of their environmental duties.
towards the Mission Environmental Objectives, including not to degrade the environment in their area of responsibility.

5.14.2: Environmental Responsibilities. Important environmental responsibilities include the following:

- Containment basins with enough capacity have to be placed under all fuel tanks and fuel collection points.
- All wastewater has to be treated prior to being discharged to the nature.
- No burn pit. Segregation of waste (including hazardous waste) has to be undertaken for recycling and/or proper disposal in accordance with mission environmental objectives.
- Bring empty (plastic) water bottles used during patrols back to camps for proper disposal (Do not throw away bottles/wraps directly into nature).
- Undertake energy conservation measures: switch off all appliances, lights and air conditioning. Avoid vehicles idle time as much as possible.
- Undertake water conservation measures, especially in water scarce areas in order to avoid possible mission acceptance issues with the local population.
- Do not bring any plant/seeds from country of origin which is not endemic to country of deployment, and vice versa.
- Do not acquire wild plants and animals, live or dead. Avoid using charcoal.
- Know where the cultural, religious and historical sites are, and behave according to local sensitivities.

The Military Component could also set an example to the local population on environmental management through activities such as tree planting and/or recycling projects, where appropriate and in accordance with the mission’s QIPs policy and priorities. Natural resources may also be one of the drivers of the conflict, e.g., illegal exploitation of high-value and/or competition of scarce natural resources. It is thus important that the Military Component is not seen as contributing to fuel the conflict by interfering with natural resources (e.g., using charcoal) and/or being seen as a “resource competitor” (e.g., water in water scarce areas) by the local population.

References:
• DPKO/DFS Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions, 2009.6.
• Draft DPKO/DFS Environmental Guidelines for UN Field Missions (2007).

5.15: Communications and Public Information.

5.15.1: General. Communications and public information (CPI) are key tools for all peacekeeping operations, a force multiplier to help advance mandate objectives, and to manage engagement with local actors and communities as well as perceptions and expectations of missions. There are two basic ways peacekeeping operations engage in CPI work: 1) engagement with independent media; 2) activities and products generated by the missions themselves.

Each mission should develop a comprehensive communications strategy, based on thorough cross-disciplinary analysis of the mandate, operating environment and the priorities of mission leadership. The civilian CPIO leads this process, and should involve the Military Component in planning as well as elements of implementation.

“Communications” indicates that this work includes but is more than one-way information dissemination or the broadcasting of messages. CPI work involves engagement with stakeholders and audiences, seeking to understand and influence their perceptions, objectives and actions. CPI work involves listening, analysis, and targeted engagement with identified audiences in order to achieve clear objectives.
The UN is committed to being open and transparent in its dealings with media, balancing this with security and operational imperatives. Military Components should also engage with CPI produced media and communications platforms, such as UN radio and video programmes. CPI can act as a force multiplier for the Military Component. CPI can also help to manage expectations and protect against potential negative perceptions and in this way, help create conducive and safer operating conditions for all mission personnel. CPI also has an important role in generating international support for UN Peacekeeping, including among Member States and TCCs.

Force HQs and HoMC should be aware of the rapidly changing nature of global communications, through digital media channels and devices. This rapidly changing communications landscape is affecting mission environments and the demands on mission communications strategies. This includes the ability for information (including misinformation) to move much faster; for information to be generated by small groups with strong agendas; and for powerful images from the local level to achieve global reach rapidly. Missions must monitor and engage in this new media landscape to be successful communicators. Civilian CPIOs can advise Force HQs on the specific nature of the media landscape in their respective area of operations.

5.15.2: Communications and Public Information Office (CPIO). Multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations include a civilian CPIO, usually headed by a Director or Chief who is the senior CPI staff member in the Mission. In addition to leading the CPIO, the Director/Chief of CPI advises the SRSG/HoM and the senior management group of the mission. The Director usually reports directly to the SRSG/HoM.

Most CPIOs include multi-faceted communications capacities: spokesperson and media relations; multi-media production and broadcast, including TV, radio, photo, web and digital media channels; and outreach activities and partnerships with local communications bodies. National staff usually plays a key role in CPIOs, helping mission communications strategies effectively reach local audiences, including through local languages.

The CPIO also coordinates with all other UN actors, including the UNCT in the Host country, through the UN Communications Group, and with all key communications actors at UNHQ. This includes daily media lines to DPKO-DFS and the Secretary-General’s Spokesperson’s Office, as well as multi media products disseminated to Department of Public Information (DPI) channels and, increasingly, digital and social media outreach to targeted international audiences, such as TCCs and PCCs. The CPIO works with UNHQ to tell the UN peacekeeping story globally.

In Missions where there is no civilian CPIO, the HoMC/FC should nominate a Military Public Information focal point, who can liaise with UNHQ. Specific guidance should be generated for each such mission on its communications strategy.

5.15.3: Communication Strategy. Each UN peacekeeping mission should have a comprehensive communications strategy, signed off by the SRSG/HoM. The civilian CPIO develops this strategy, and should consult all mission components in this process which also defines the roles and activities of each component in the implementation of the strategy. Force HQ should be involved in these processes. Key elements of a strategy include:

- Communications objectives of the mission (including sequencing and priorities related to key events)
- Target audiences, locally and internationally
- An assessment of the communications landscape of the host country, including identifying risks and ways to mitigate these.
- Agreed division of roles and responsibilities within the mission, including intra-mission coordinating mechanisms on communications.
- A platform of programmes, products and activities to ensure that communications and public information reaches target audiences to achieve objectives.
- Identified resources, including human resources throughout all mission components.
- Contingency planning for crises

5.15.3: Relations with the Media. Independent media has an important role to play in helping to create conditions for sustained stability and peace in the environments in which peacekeeping operations are deployed. By engaging pro-actively and professionally with independent media, peacekeeping operations show their respect for democratic norms and at the same time utilize an important opportunity to shape the narrative of peace processes and events as well as the perception of the UN operation. International media plays a key role in the wider perception of the success of missions and, by extension, UN Peacekeeping globally.

Force HQ should receive advice from the civilian CPIO on the local media environment in order to engage effectively. Media in post conflict countries is often still developing in terms of professional standards and independence from political and other forces. The CPIO will produce regular media monitoring bulletins, which are made available to Force HQ. The advice of the civilian CPIO is critical to maintaining successful engagement. While the policy of the UN is that personnel may speak to the media about their daily work, this needs to be managed carefully in sensitive post conflict environments. The SRSG/HoM determines who may speak with the media in a Mission environment, and all inquiries or requests should be channeled through the civilian CPIO.

The HoMC plays a public role with the media when required, especially at key moments of Mandate implementation or during times of significant crisis. He will generally restrict his comments to military and security matters, and not comment on wider, political aspects. The HoMC may nominate a Military Spokesperson to work with the civilian CPIO and Mission Spokesperson to ensure regular flow of information to and engagement with the media. He may also approve other Officers and Unit Commanders to speak with media in relation to their specific areas of responsibility. Indeed this is to be encouraged when officers are well prepared and are able to demonstrate the relevance and impact of their operations.

All press releases or other official material disseminated to the media should be cleared through the civilian CPIO. The civilian CPIO will ensure all necessary coordination with UNHQ. For requests by independent media to embed with peacekeeping troops, to cover activities, the Force HQ should seek advice and support from the civilian CPIO. The civilian CPIO also produces media material, including radio and TV programming for local and international audiences. In missions with large UN radio stations; these channels are often the most effective way to reach out to the wider population. The HoMC should develop methods for facilitating regular coverage of the activities of the Military Component by the civilian CPIO.

5.15.4: Integration. The Director/Chief CPIO usually reports to the SRSG/HoM. S/he will also be a member of the senior management group, and advise this group on all public communications matters. Public communications should be optimized as a strategic force multiplier, helping civilian and uniformed components of the mission to achieve their common objectives in support of the mandate implementation. Operational cooperation and partnership between the HoMC and Director CPIO is essential to optimise the efficacy of the communication strategy. The CPI structure within the Military Component can vary from mission to mission. The Force HQ should liaise with the Director/Chief CPIO to determine the optimum approach for each given mission. Minimally, the Military Component should have a senior officer as Military Public Information Officer (MPIO) as focal point with the civilian CPIO. In some missions this person may also be the Military Spokesperson of the mission, who will coordinate all media work with under the overall management of the Director/Chief CPIO.
5.15.5: Force HQ Responsibilities. The HoMC should plan for the following:

- Appoint an adequately skilled senior Military Public Information Officer (MPIO) at the HQ, who will have the role of liaising with the civilian CPIO which leads mission communications strategy. This person may be the Military Spokesperson.
- Provide additional MPIOs (including photographer/videographer, etc) when appropriate, especially for documenting Military Component activities such as medal parades and activities to promote TCC achievements.
- In large missions with regional offices, appoint Military Public Information focal points in reach regional HQ. Work with the civilian CPIO to determine and meet training needs of military Public Information focal points.
- Establish mechanisms at Force HQ to facilitate timely briefing and updating of media on mission activities and especially reports related to incidents. Be ready to brief early, often and regularly in order to shape the story and public perception.
- Correct misinformation at the earliest.
- Plan and prepare for crisis communications in coordination with the civilian CPIO.
- Plan and prepare systems for early liaison with the Director/Chief CPIO in allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) involving the Military Component. The Director/Chief is responsible in such matters for guiding mission media strategy, and coordinating this with UNHQ media strategy.
- Establish channels for regular internal communications to all troops, and ensure that all UN military personnel/contingent members are aware of the mission mandate, strategic goals and standards of conduct, including the zero tolerance policy on matters of SEA.
- Educate and sensitize all members of the Military Component on informal positive communication in the course of execution of operational responsibilities. How members of military contingents conduct themselves in public, what they do and how they are perceived in communities, is the first level of public communications.
- With the Director/Chief CPIO, develop guidelines for allowing CPIO professionals to accompany and/or embed with troops, in order to film, photograph and tell the UN peacekeeping story.
- Issue guidance to Military Component through formal and informal internal communications. The director of public information can advise the HoMC/FC on internal communications, but is not responsible to conduct these within Military Component.

Reference:

5.16: Local Perceptions.

Local perceptions are the ways in which situations, events and dynamics are regarded by local people (including opinions, concerns, aspirations and priorities). Analysis includes perceptions of all the people in the Mission AOO, including perceptions of less dominant groups, spoilers/hostile groups, etc. Perceptions of vulnerability and threat are important factors in conflict and may not be visible through other sources, and thus an understanding of local perceptions is necessary to target efforts to build confidence in the peace process, as well as the mission itself.

Mission HQ can use local perceptions to help inform strategic decisions and measure change in the conflict zone. Mission HQ can define effective, responsive strategies and programmes to test assumptions and understand local priorities. Perception analysis can provide the data needed to set benchmarks and measure progress, especially on governance and security issues. This data can also be used by the Public Information Office to assess public confidence in the Mission and design communications strategies. By bringing the voices of marginalized section of society closer to the National government, Missions can assist States in strengthening State-society dialogue, improving State responsiveness and ensuring accountability by assisting populations in articulating their needs to the State.
Awareness of local perceptions reported through the chain of command or shared by the civilian substantive component to provide the Mission/Force HQ/Military Component with the following:

- Broader situational awareness to assist in planning and execution of peacekeeping operations.
- Help identify risks and vulnerabilities.
- Guide CIMIC and QUIPs programmes.
- Facilitate targeted and effective communications/messaging activities.
- Facilitate adjustment of own activities/operations to factor in and/or address local concerns.
- Design people-friendly military operations.
- Contribute to better force protection.
- Support context-appropriate protection of civilian’s strategies.
- Trend analysis can assist in identifying high risk localities for priority intervention.
- Helps the Mission to devise strategies and measures to restore/inculcate faith and trust in the peace process and confidence in the Mission.
- Assess/understand local expectations to factor in operational activities and provide feedback in the chain of command and to the CPIO for developing strategy to manage local expectations. It is essential that the local population understand the mission’s mandate, objectives, and limitations.

In Mission HQ, the JMAC and Communications and Public Information Office will plan and coordinate activities to gather and analyse local perceptions. Research on local perceptions uses standard templates and methods that facilitate collection, synthesis and analysis across components in a safe and ethical manner. Military peacekeepers deployed in the field regularly interact with the local population through patrols, local security meetings, coordination groups, etc. Through these interactions, peacekeepers can passively gain an understanding of local perceptions on issues such as the security situation, law and order and political development. They can also gauge how the mission and its activities are perceived by the local population and should be reported up the chain of command. However, proactively gathering local perceptions is a complex technical process that requires specific skills and knowledge and carries a number of operational and ethical risks. Research on Public perception should be centrally controlled at commanders level and due caution be exercised by all personnel involved in the process is vital. Mission substantive elements and Community Liaison Assistants deployed in sectors or co-located, may also gather local perceptions and will share this information with the Military Commander.

5.17: Knowledge Management.

Military commanders must clearly articulate and support the organization’s expectation to learn and share knowledge through the use of standardized knowledge sharing tools. Military commanders should be aware of both the military and civilian best practice capacity and resources available in their mission, including the Peacekeeping Policy and Practice Database (PPDB); the Community of Practice (CoP) and the Best Practices Toolbox. The PPDB contains lessons learned, best practices and approved peacekeeping policy and guidance; the Toolbox contains document templates and guidance for After Action Reviews (AAR), Hand over Notes, End of Assignment Reports (EoAR), Survey of Practice and Lessons Learned. The PPDB and Toolbox are available from the Peace Operations Intranet (POINT).

Reference:
5.18: Ethics.

General. All UN peacekeepers must perform their functions with competence and integrity. Commanders/leaders and Staff at all levels play an important role in upholding the standards reflected in the UN Charter. Commanders must establish and exhibit high standards of ethical conduct in their day to day work. The concept of ethics addresses behaviour that exceeds the legal requirements. It reflects a commitment to “doing the right thing, for the right reasons.” It also means making the best decision when the rules are unclear, or do not dictate the right decision in a given situation. The foundation for ethical behaviour is reinforced by compliance with the laws, regulations and rules. Ethical behaviour not only includes compliance with rules, but also requires consideration of how to avoid unnecessary entanglement in questionable situations.

Ethical Values. UN Military Component should establish and demonstrate the following central ethical values of the UN:

- **Independence**: UN personnel shall maintain their independence and shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other person or entity external to the UN, and shall refrain from any action that might reflect negatively on their position as UN personnel responsible only to the UN.

- **Loyalty**: Loyalty to the purposes, values and principles of the UN is a fundamental obligation of all UN personnel. They shall be loyal to the UN and shall at all times, discharge their functions and regulate their conduct only with the interests of the UN only in view.

- **Impartiality**: UN personnel, in the performance of their official duties, shall always act with impartiality, objectivity and professionalism. They shall ensure that expressions of their personal beliefs do not compromise the performance of their official duties or the interests of the UN. They shall not act in a way that unjustifiably could lead to actual or perceived preferential treatment for or against particular individuals, groups or interests.

- **Integrity**: UN personnel shall maintain the highest standards of integrity, including honesty, truthfulness, fairness and incorruptibility, in all matters affecting their official duties and the interests of the UN.

- **Accountability**: UN personnel shall be accountable for the proper discharge of their functions and for their decisions and actions. In fulfilling their official duties and responsibilities, UN personnel shall make decisions in the interests of the UN. They shall submit themselves to scrutiny as required by their position.

- **Respect for human rights**: UN personnel shall fully respect the human rights, dignity and worth of all persons and shall act with understanding, tolerance, and sensitivity, respect for diversity, and without discrimination of any kind.

Areas of Relevance. Ethical standards form part of the daily functioning of each mission and of the Organization as a whole. Ethical standards become particularly important, however, with regard to:

- Use of UN resources;
- Maintaining confidential information;
- Use of social media and social networks;
- Acceptance of gifts, honours or awards;
- Outside activities and employment;
- Political activities;
- Issuing publications or public statements; and
- Personal financial investments and assets.

UN peacekeepers, particularly the personnel of Military Component, represent not only the UN, but also their respective countries in the mission area. Therefore, their conduct (on/off-duty, personal or social) must reflect UN ethical values. To help ensure an environment
where those who serve on behalf of the UN do so with ethics and integrity, Force HQ Commanders and their staff should:

- Lead by example and affirm the need to follow UN regulations, rules and policies that govern the work of peacekeeping.
- Listen attentively when staff members raise ethics-related questions and concerns.
- Take prompt action to respond to questions and correct problems.
- Foster an environment of trust, in which staff members can speak up without fear of retaliation.

Reference:

5.19: Conclusion.
The formal and informal guidance are developed after extensive consultations and are living documents liable for periodic review. Commanders, Staff and all military peacekeepers must be abreast of all the relevant policies and adhere to its implementation in the field. The guidance must be reflected in the Military Component orders, directives, tactics, techniques and procedures. These must be regularly updated by incorporating new/reviewed guidance issued by the UNHQ and/or the DPKO/DFS from time to time.
Chapter 6: Integration with Mission Entities

6.1: Overview
In multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the Military Component interacts with all other Mission Components, such as Civilian and Police Components. The interaction with the Political Component includes joint strategic planning for mandate implementation and adjusting the tasks of the military component to the changing political realities on the ground. The interaction with Police Component is also essential for sharing information, monitoring law and order situation as well as conducting joint operations. The Military Component also interacts frequently with the substantive and support entities of the Mission, particularly on joint logistics and supply issues. Public information is another area that requires close cooperation. The Military Component may have its own public information personnel and spokespersons. To ensure a common strategy and messages, they must work in close collaboration with the Mission’s public information office, particularly the designated Mission spokesperson responsible for media relations for the Mission as a whole. Close coordination between the Military Component and other mission components is also necessary for SSR/DSR, DDR, humanitarian activities, human rights monitoring, civil affairs and the restoration of law and order.

6.2: Purpose.
The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a brief outline of internal Mission integration framework with specific reference to the Civilian (substantive and support entities) and Police Components, as also the integration and coordination with Mission integrated entities and Mission security management structure, as relevant to the Military Component.

6.3: Mission Integration.
All peacekeeping personnel must have a basic understanding of the important contribution of each component and function within a Mission. Everyone in a Mission has an important contribution to make in achieving the Mandate according to the Mission Concept. Understanding the role, responsibilities and importance of other components and entities is particularly vital in multidimensional peacekeeping operations which have complex mandates and operate in difficult environments. The work of each component affects and influences the tasks of other components.

Mission Mandates can only be accomplished with synergy and coherence amongst all actors and the strategic employment of the capabilities of the military, police and civilian components optimally as per Mission Concept/ISF. Therefore it is imperative for all UN peacekeepers to acquire basic understanding of the main tasks and functions of the different components in a Mission and know how and when to coordinate/integrate with each other in achieving the Mandate. All entities of a UN peacekeeping operation function under the same Mandate, report to the same HoM, share a single budget, and depend on the same integrated support services. However, there are significant cultural differences. These include national, institutional and professional differences. These differences are both within the components and between them. Military and police staff often minimize by making informed assumptions within a strong planning culture. Peacekeeping personnel must work to bridge these differing “institutional cultures”. At the same time, it is important not to stifle the cultural and institutional diversity that is one of the UN’s main strengths.

6.4: Civilian Component.
6.4.1: General. The configuration of Civilian Component is determined based on the Mission Mandate and may have a variety of substantive and support entities in a field. Military oriented UN peacekeeping Missions have a limited number of substantive civilian components. In multidimensional peacekeeping operations, there are many different civilian substantive components, such as, political affairs, civil affairs, human rights, gender, child protection, public information, etc. There are no uniform or collective reporting lines for
these substantive civilian components, although ultimately they all report to the HoM. The substantive elements of the Civilian Component functions under the DSRSG and the support elements functions under the Director or Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS). The Mission Chief of Staff (CoS) is responsible for coordination amongst all the components with in the Mission and with the external partners.

6.4.2: Functions of Substantive Civilian Component. The Civilian Component of a Mission may undertake the following functions:
- Developing and DDR programs with military, humanitarian and development partners.
- Developing SSR/DSR programs.
- Electoral assistance.
- Gender mainstreaming.
- Justice and corrections.
- Mine action assistance.
- Public relations and communications.
- Building human rights and rule of law.
- Capacity building of the host country government.
- Support to emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes.

6.4.3: Functions of Support Civilian Component. The support entities of the Civilian Component of a Mission may undertake the following functions:
- Administrative services.
- Ensuring health and safety of mission personnel.
- Communications.
- Financial support: preparation and execution of mission budget, paying staff and vendors.
- Logistical support to all components.
- Recruitment, training, and career development.
- Monitoring mission compliance with local laws and respect for UN privileges and immunities and SOFA/SOMA.

6.5: Integrated Joint Structures.
Mission HQ will generally have the following integrated joint structures (read in conjunction with Chapter 2, Section 2.9, p.24):
- Strategic Planning Coordination Cell (SPCC).
- Joint Operations Centre (JOC).
- Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC).
- Integrated Support Services (ISS).
- Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC).
- Integrated Mission Training Cell (IMTC).

These integrated joint structures, with the provision of sufficient resources and support by senior management, can act as force multipliers across the full range of capabilities and tasks of a UN peacekeeping operation. They need strong managerial support from the beginning as well as quality personnel seconded from other components. They can be important tools for bringing together and adding value to the work of the mission’s components. Joint structures support not just one manager; they produce synthesised products of value to the MLT as a whole. As mission-wide resources, these structures generally report administratively to CoS or DSRSG.

6.6.: Strategic Planning Coordination Cell (SPCC).
6.6.1: General. The Mission SPCC is a dedicated planning and coordination function (under a senior planning officer under the direction of COS) to support the SRSG/HoM and with the involvement of the entire SMG and UNCT. It is further supported by Mission integrated entities (such as, JOC, JMAC, SIOC, etc.) and nominated planning experts from civilian, military and police components.
6.6.2: Responsibilities. Functionally, the SPCC shall ensure the following:

- Establishing a Mission level planning and coordination framework in accordance with the Mandate and Mission Concept.
- Prepare short/medium/long term planning objectives as per Mission benchmarks and mandate implementation plan.
- Provide advance panning support to the SRSG/HoM, MLT and integrated entities.
- Support Mission crisis CMT and crisis response.
- Carry out prognosis in conjunction with integrated entities and component planning leads.

6.6.3: Engagement with UNCT and ITF. SPCC also works in close cooperation with the Strategic Planner(s) in the UNCT on integration-related strategy and planning. Focal points from the Mission and UNCT form part of a shared analytical and planning capacity and have a joint ToR. SPCC may serve as a secretariat to mission-UNCT integrated planning and coordination bodies and provide support to the development of a UN system-wide integrated strategic framework. SPCC should work closely with the UNHQ-based ITF.

6.7: The Joint Operations Centre (JOC)\textsuperscript{19}.

JOC is a jointly staffed information hub established at mission headquarters to support the decision-making of the MLT and UNHQ. The purpose of the JOC is to ensure 24/7 mission-wide situational awareness through the collation of information from all mission sources and the production of integrated reporting on current operations and day-to-day situational reporting. During crises, the JOC will act as the mission crisis management centre and provide support to the Mission's Crisis Management Team.

Mission components contribute both uniformed and civilian personnel to the JOC and ensure that appropriate expertise is made available for the effective integration of operations. The Chief JOC exercises tasking authority over all personnel assigned to the JOC and is responsible for their day-to-day management. The HOMC and HOPC retain UN operational control over military and police personnel assigned to JOC. In order to improve information flow and overall situational awareness, JOCs should be co-located with Force HQ MOC (U3) and relevant UNDSS and UNPOL units, and if possible in close proximity to the JMAC and JLOCs.

6.8: Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC)\textsuperscript{20}.

JMAC is an integrated structure to support planning and decision making by the HOM and the MLT. Whereas the JOC focuses on day to day situational awareness, the JMAC generates medium to long-term integrated analytical products, providing the HOM and MLT with an incisive understanding of issues and trends, their implications and potential developments, as well as assessments of cross-cutting issues and threats that may affect the implementation of the mission’s mandate. The JMAC is not a decision making body and does not replace existing management, command or decision-making structures at any level in the mission. The HOM, in consultation with the MLT, is responsible for tasking the JMAC with information and analytical requirements and priorities through a tasking order, often termed a ‘Priority Information Requirement’ (PIR). The PIR details the scope of analytical projects for the JMAC, their priority, production deadline and dissemination. The PIR should be periodically revised by Chief JMAC in consultation with the HoM and MLT.

The JMAC should be co-located with the U2 and other relevant UNDSS and UNPOL structures, preferably in close proximity to the JOC and the JLOC. All missions are required to have a capacity to undertake integrated analysis derived from multiple sources of

\textsuperscript{19} DPKO/DFS Draft Policy and Guidelines: Joint Operations Centre, 2013.
information. The decision as to whether to establish a JMAC will depend both on the nature of the mission’s mandate and the environment in which the mission is operating. Multidimensional missions shall establish a JMAC if they meet at least four of the following parameters which pertain to the mission’s mandate and the operating environment:

- Executive authority (total or partial);
- Robust military mandate;
- DDR/SSR programme;
- Unstable/volatile security environment;
- Poor cooperation with host government to carry out mission’s mandate;
- Presence of hostile international forces and/or other international actors;
- Regional conflict; and
- Internal conflict.

6.9: Integrated Support Services (ISS)\(^{21}\).

6.9.1: General. The ISS is the backbone of support in a peacekeeping mission. To ensure effective, efficient, economic and timely use of limited logistics resources, it is important that these resources are consolidated, centrally controlled and used in an integrated manner according to the laid down priorities. The consolidation and integration of support is achieved through establishment of the ISS under a CISS. The ISS employs the largest number of international and local national staff and controls almost 60 percent of the mission’s budget.

6.9.2: CISS. The CISS is responsible for providing logistics support to all mission components including regions/sectors according to the priorities laid down by the senior mission management. The CISS controls all logistics resources in the mission to include the UN owned, commercially contracted and military enabling assets and services like military logistics, construction and maintenance engineering, medical, movements control, communications and information technology, geographical information services (GIS), supply, and air and surface transport units/resources in the mission. While the CISS controls all second, third and fourth line resources present in the mission area, the first line and self-sustainment resources are controlled by the respective national contingent commanders.

6.9.3: The Role of Military and Staff Officers in the ISS.

- **Military Logistics.** Military logistics capability comes fully-staffed and equipped, can operate in the most hostile environments and be mobilized relatively quickly. Military capability is very effective at locations that are not sufficiently secure for civilian operations. In addition certain operational support requirements can only be met by military enabling units.

- **Working Relations.** While the CISS reports to the DMS/CMS, he/she maintains a working relationship of trust and cooperation with the military and police components. While being the biggest clients of the ISS, the military and police components are also among the critical resource providers for the ISS. In addition to an ISS representation at daily military and police briefings, the CISS makes an endeavour to personally attend such briefings as frequently as possible. For routine issues, the CISS invites HoMC’s/HoPC’s logistics advisor for all ISS meetings.

- **Staffing.** All sections and units of the ISS are staffed with civilian and military/police officers at all levels of the management structure. The Deputy CISS is a seconded military or police officer, recruited on a UN contract by DPKO, answerable directly to the CISS. The individual is placed on contract in order to meet UN financial accountability requirements, and by doing so means the DCISS can fully deputise in the absence of the CISS. Due to the requirement of experience at the management level, need for continuity, financial accountability, the Section Chiefs normally are civilian staff members. It is normal for the second-in-command in each section to be a military/police officer.

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6.10: Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC)\textsuperscript{22}.

6.10.1: General. The JLOC is the nerve centre for logistics functions in a mission involving information gathering, analysis, planning, coordination, execution, monitoring and feedback. It is to provide all mission components, other UN and non-UN entities with a single point of coordination for all aspects of logistics support in the mission area. The Chief JLOC is the principal advisor to the CISS/DCISS on all logistics planning and operational matters.

6.10.2: JLOC Composition. In general, JLOC has the following sections (It should be noted that not all field operations will have all of the suggested units/cells, the size of JLOC or its structure will vary depending on the size and layout of the Mission):
- Logistics Plans Unit.
- Current Logistics Operations Unit.
- Regional Support Unit.
- Information and Reporting Cell.
- Liaison Cells between UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) and JLOC.
- Contractor Coordination Cell.
- Joint Movements Control Centre (JMCC).
- Mission Air Operations Centre (MAOC).
- Mission Maritime Operations Centre (MMOC).

Note: In UNMISS, ISS has been renamed as Mission Supply Chain (MSC) and JLOC as Service Delivery.

6.10.3: Joint Logistic Operations Centre Structure

6.10.4: Role of Military Staff Officers in JLOC. JLOC is jointly staffed by military, police and civilian staff. Integration ensures that an in-house capacity is available to analyse, plan and implement logistics operations in support of any entity. This synergy of effort is important for efficiency and smooth provision of logistics support especially during the mission start-up period and during special events like elections, referendums, etc. In addition logistics staff from the advance and/or rear parties of the military contingents may be deployed to the JLOC to coordinate deployment and repatriation respectively.

6.11: Integrated Mission Training Cell (IMTC)\textsuperscript{23}.

6.11.1: General. The primary responsibility of the IMTC is to coordinate the development and implementation of a comprehensive Mission Training Plan, on behalf of the MLT, which leads to improved mandate implementation. This is achieved through identifying mission

\textsuperscript{22} DPKO/DFS SOP: Joint Logistics Operations Centre: Organisation, Functions and Tasks, 2011.


training needs; coordinating the planning, development, delivery, and evaluation of mission training plans and programmes (in coordination with the UNCT as appropriate); and sharing best practices with other missions and ITS/DPET. Chief of the IMTC is the senior civilian trainer in the Mission. Reporting to the DMS/CMS either directly or through the CAS, and responsive to the Mission CoS, the Chief IMTC has a technical reporting and communication link to ITS/DPET. Military and police personnel shall be assigned to the IMTC by respective Heads of Component to ensure, *inter alia*, that their training needs are reflected in the Mission Training Plan and implemented. The Chief IMTC shall exercise tasking authority over military and police personnel assigned to the IMTC while the Heads of the military and police components in the mission continue to exercise UN Operational Control over their respective training officers in the IMTC.

6.11.2: Responsibilities of IMTC. The Chief IMTC is responsible for:

- Address the special-to-mission training needs in the Mission Training Plan.
- Transmit priority strategic, job-specific and technical training priorities.
- Prepare the Mission Training Plan in accordance with Mission Concept and RBB.
- Coordinate, prepare and implement mission training budget.
- Allocate resources to avoid duplication of effort.
- Ensure cost-effective training and maximize operational impact.
- Implement and monitor Mission Training Plan.
- Keep the MLT and ITS/DPET on progress and constraints on training.


6.12.1: Security Management Team (SMT). Every mission and country team has an SMT chaired by the DO (who in DPKO-DFS missions could be the SRSG or the FC). In integrated missions, members of the SMT are all the country directors of the agencies, funds and programmes, and the heads of the substantive sections of the mission. The convener of the meeting is the Chief Security Adviser/Chief Security Officer (CSA/CSO), as applicable. The SMT is the senior body taking decisions on mission level with regard to security. The CSA/CSO acts as the principal adviser to the SMT on security matters. Membership of the SMT is mandatory for the people involved and attendance of meetings is obligatory. The SMT is specifically named in the Framework of Accountability. SMTs meet as the situation demands but in highly volatile missions normally once per week.

6.12.2: Crisis Management Team (CMT). (Refer to Chapter 2, Section 2.8.5, p.25).

6.12.3: Security Information and Operations Centres (SIOC). In some missions the security section may have a SIOC. This organ comprises a security information analysis cell and an operations cell. The function of the SIOC is to create security situational awareness. In this way it complements the JMAC which is primarily charged with analysis of mandate related issues. The SIOC monitors, supports or manage security operational matters as required.

6.12.4: Security Information Coordination Unit (SICU). In missions that do not have a SIOC, a SICU may be present. The SICU is a smaller version of the information cell of a SIOC, but has the same basic function. In other missions the JMAC may develop security analysis as well and may have one or more security analysts attached from the security section.

6.12.5: Security Section. Each mission has a security section. In integrated missions this will generally be headed by a CSA appointed by the Department of Safety and Security (DSS). The security section generally comprises four elements, namely security management; security operational control; security information analysis; and security support. The size of the security section will depend on the size of the mission. Generally DSS provides a CSA and a Deputy CSA and DPKO provide an additional Deputy CSA and all the rest of the
security personnel. In non-integrated missions the security section will be headed by a CSO who, together with the rest of the security personnel, is appointed by DPKO.

6.12.6. Relationship with CSA/CSO. The relationship of the CSA/CSO to the FC will depend on whether there is an SRSG and a FC, or just the latter. Where there is an SRSG, he/she will usually be appointed as Designated Official for security (DO). If not, the FC may be appointed as DO. In both cases the CSA/CSO acts as the principal security adviser to the DO on all matters pertaining to security according to the applicability policy mentioned later. The CSA/CSO is not responsible for force protection of deployed contingents. The security section will also have a training officer. This person is tasked with all general and mission-specific security training. This could include training on convoy procedures; use of personal protection equipment; country-specific security awareness; new security technologies; and arranging external trainers where required.

6.13: Coordination with other Substantive Sections.
6.13.1: General. Brief descriptions on various substantive sections, such as Human Rights, Civil Affairs, Communications and Public Information, Gender, Child Protection, SSR, DSR, Rule of Law, HIV/AIDS, etc. are provided in Chapter 5 with explanations of its application by the Force HQ/Military Component. In addition, particular role of Human Rights Adviser/Focal Point and the Mission Best Practices Officer is explained in the succeeding paragraphs. The Force HQ Staff should coordinate with all the civilian substantive section in the following spheres:
- Understanding the policy/guidance framework of each entity.
- Guidelines on the application of the policies/guidance in the Field Mission.
- Relevance to military operations.
- Dissemination of the guidance to all sectors and units/sub-units for implementation.
- Joint monitoring of progress/adherence to guidance.
- Coordination of military support/assistance to substantive sections in executing their respective functions.
- Coordination of sensitisation/training of military peacekeepers in respective fields.

6.14.1: The Logistic Support Concept in the Field. Due to complex nature of peacekeeping operations and its support requirements, there is necessity for an entity which can receive requests for logistics support; analyse the requirement; prioritise according to overall guidance provided by senior mission management; plan and coordinate implementation of tasks related to the request; task technical/other sections; and then monitor implementation. In addition there is a requirement to coordinate logistics support with other UN and non-UN entities operating in the mission area. It is the JLOC that has been organised and staffed to effectively carry out above-mentioned functions.

6.14.2: Communication and Information Technology Support. The Communications and Information Technology Section (CITS), headed by the Chief CITS (CCITS), has the overall responsibility for providing sustainable, reliable and secure CIT services to all civilian, military and police elements, headquarters and sites. This includes planning, governance, compliance, oversight, implementation and management of the Mission’s CIT support. CITS is a part of the UN Mission HQ and reports to the Chief Integrated Support Services (ISS) and/or to the Director of Mission Support (DMS). Some of the responsibilities of CITS include:
- Provide all strategic links to Forces HQ, Battalion HQ and independently operating units.
- Provide common UN enterprise and telecommunication services as well as IT equipment to all civilian and military/police staff members and Internet access based on the UN standards for the scale of issue.
- Provide technical and user support for UN provided IT- and Telecommunication services for military/police staff members and for internal military/police systems and applications.
- Provide CIT support for static facilities and compounds, such as HQ and offices.
- Provide CIT support for temporary facilities, such as command and observation posts.
- Provide CIT support for mobile tactical operations.

6.14.3: Medical Support. The health and well-being of members of UN peacekeeping operations depend on planning, co-ordination, execution, monitoring and professional supervision of excellent medical care in the field. UN peacekeeping operations are characterized by unique features that impact fundamentally on the provision of medical support. These include:
  - Political complexity and dynamic nature of peacekeeping operations.
  - Geographic, demographic, cultural and linguistic variations within mission areas.
  - Specific prevailing epidemiological and disease patterns.
  - Multinational participation in peacekeeping operations, with varying national standards of training, operational procedures, equipment and supplies.

Gender, cultural and religious sensitivities should be considered in the development of a medical support plan for each mission to meet specific operational demands. These should remain flexible to adapt to changing demands and circumstances. These plans should be acceptable to the respective Mission HQ and the participating TCCs, and are to be approved at the HQ level by DPKO. Adaptation to the national system in place may be necessary.

References:

6.14.4: Mission Welfare and Recreation. The provision of welfare and recreation facilities is an essential part of ensuring a “healthy” working, living and recreational environment for all categories of UN personnel serving in the mission. It aims to achieve the following:
  - Facilitating adjustment to life in the mission.
  - Bringing about significant improvement in the working environment.
  - Improving the morale and team spirit of mission personnel.
  - Improving productivity and, overall, the operational capability of the mission.
  - Promoting good conduct and discipline by alleviating conditions that may contribute to misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse.
  - Helping to manage stress, alleviate boredom, loneliness and feelings of isolation and vulnerability.
  - Helping to alleviate the conditions that contribute to certain mental and psychological illnesses.
  - Contributing to making mission assignment more manageable and prevent high staff turnover.

The HoM has overall responsibility and authority for the provision of adequate welfare and recreation facilities and activities for mission personnel. The Mission's CAO, on behalf of the HOM, shall be responsible for disseminating, implementing, monitoring and providing oversight of the entire welfare and recreation program. Staff representative bodies and welfare and recreation committees/focal points shall be established.

The Mission welfare and recreation policy is implemented by the Welfare and Recreation Committee. The HoM shall designate regional welfare and recreation teams to implement the work plan of the Mission HQ Welfare Committee in the regions. However, it does not preclude welfare arrangements made by military units themselves. The HoM may utilize from existing mission budgets or from extra budgetary sources. However, these funds should not
be used to duplicate or replace internal contingent welfare provisions. Participation in organized welfare and recreation activities will, unless the circumstances prove otherwise, be considered to be part of official duties.

TCCs have the primary responsibility to provide their contingent members with welfare and recreation facilities. Eight dollars per month per soldier is provided for welfare activities in the mission area. Welfare and recreation facilities shall be discussed and assessed during the predeployment visits and the provision of such facilities in missions be monitored by the Mission and Force HQ. The OMA and DPKO (independent evaluation function) shall monitor and report on compliance of the military Component with the Welfare and recreation policy and its related SOP.

References:

6.15: UN Police Component.

6.15.1: Overview. The United Nations Police (UNPOL) support the provision of public order and safety while building capacity of the host-state policing and other law enforcement agencies in order to deliver better security and access to justice. They help lay the foundation for effective and fair policing, supporting the move toward sustainable peace. The Military and Police Component function together in accomplishment of the Mission Mandate. The succeeding sections provide a broad outline of the role/responsibilities and tasks of the Police Component.

6.15.2: Principles. UNPOLs are guided by the following fundamental principles:
- **Service.** Assist and support the Host State in establishing a fair and effective police and other law enforcement service.
- **Consent and Cooperation.** UNPOL are deployed with the consent of the Host State, and cooperate with all parties to promote the peace process.
- **Defence of Human Rights.** Human rights are pivotal to the work of UNPOL.
- **Impartiality and Objectivity.** Promote the enforcement of local law and international human rights standards without prejudice toward any party.
- **Unity of Command.** Responsible and accountable to the E/SRSG, and all actions are conducted in coordination with other components of the mission.
- **Partnership.** Coordinate work with non-UN entities, apart from the UN AFPs.
- **Integration in SSR.** Police development is coupled with reform in other parts of the criminal justice system and wider efforts to solidify the rule of law.
- **Capacity Building.** All assistance is directed towards allowing local police assume full control of ensuring domestic security.
- **Achievable Goals.** UNPOL assistance is structured around clearly articulated and achievable goals.
- **Accountability.** UN assistance to Host State policing and other law enforcement agencies is subject to regular monitoring and evaluation.
- **Transparency.** All aspects of the work of UNPOL are open to local and international scrutiny.
- **Minimum Use of Force.** UNPOL execute their duties using the least force necessary, in line with the Mission Mandate, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, and the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement.
- **Gender Sensitivity.** UNPOL helps protect vulnerable groups, including women, children, and displaced populations, and supports efforts to reduce sexual and gender-based violence.

6.15.3: UNPOL Components. UNPOL component comprise two distinct, but coordinated elements as follows:
• **Individual Police Officers (IPO).** IPOs are experienced individual police professionals, conversant in the language of the Mission; and

• **Formed Police Units (FPU).** FPUs comprise usually between 140-160 personnel from a single country and are deployed together for restricted duties, such as patrol or public order management.

• **Non-Police Staff.** In addition to seconded police, many mission duties are performed by non-police staff, including locally recruited staff. Civilians can contribute in the areas of human resource management; budget and finance; procurement; data and assets management; forensic and information technologies; policy development; donor liaison and resource mobilisation; project management, and change management.

6.15.4: **Responsibilities.** Major responsibilities of UNPOL in UN peacekeeping operations are:

• To support the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of National police and other law enforcement institutions;

• To provide operational support to the Host State police; and

• To carry out executive policing functions as an interim measure until the local police were able to perform such functions effectively through FPUs.

6.15.5: **Basic UNPOL Tasks.**

• **Assess and engage with local law enforcement.**
  - Support Host State police to improve basic public safety.
  - Assess the state of the Host State police, including gathering information on the resources available, the number of personnel, and their current activities.
  - Early operational activities include efforts to standardise routines and paperwork, build positive relations between the police and the community, and lay the foundations for the process of capacity building.

• **Protect civilians.**
  - Promote the safety of the local population.
  - If mandated to perform interim policing, provide physical protection against imminent threats.
  - In other missions, assist the Host State police in structuring their operations in a way that promotes civilian protection.
  - Help strengthen relations between communities and the Host State police over time, which will improve early warning of, and rapid response to, threats to civilians.
  - Contribute to protecting civilians from imminent physical threats and help secure public order, but when violence exceeds a given threshold, responsibility must be transferred to the military component of the mission.

• **Protect UN personnel and facilities.** Tasks include guard duties, protection of convoys; and relocation of staff.

• **The core tasks of FPUs are:**
  - Public order management;
  - Protection of UN personnel and facilities;
  - Supporting police operations that require a formed response and may involve higher risk.

6.15.9: **Mandate-specific UNPOL Tasks.** Mandate-specific UNPOL tasks can be categorised into three types, described as follows:

• **Mission Type A: Mentor, Advice and Monitor.** Mentoring, advising and monitoring are tools to transfer skills from UNPOL to the Host State police, and can provide a bridge between formal training and Host State autonomy.
  - **Mentoring** is a comprehensive, long-term, one-on-one relationship between a more experienced professional and a less experienced individual, involving counseling, guidance, and instruction, promoting both personal and professional growth.
Advising is typically a short-term relationship aimed at directing solutions to individual problems as part of a longer-term development process. Monitoring involves regular reporting on activities related to mandated tasks within a UN peace operation, including issues, such as Host State police conduct, operations, service delivery, and investigations.

- **Mission Type B: Reform, Restructure, and Rebuild.**
  - **Institution development.**
    - Capacity-building and skills development of individual Host State police officers, and cultivating and strengthening of the institutions they serve.
    - Provide advice and facilitate the transfer of material support, including information and communications systems, office equipment, uniforms, firearms, vehicles and protective gear.
    - Institutional restructuring requires skills not typically found in police missions, but these can be supplemented with professional postings of sufficient longevity to see through the process.
    - Help Host State police to change the environment in which institutions operate by improving police-community relations.
  - **Training of Host State Police Officers and Units.**
    - Assist in the development or reform of basic curricula on topics, such as firearms certification, managerial skills, close security protection, community-based policing, traffic management, basic criminal investigations, basic intelligence, operational policing skills, and disciplinary investigations.
    - Provide public order management training through specialist trainers, while FPUs can support capacity-building through joint exercises with Host State police units.
    - Provide management training, including strategic planning and administration.
  - **Develop organisational infrastructure.**
    - Promote institutional reform by developing material infrastructure; organisational structure; rules and procedures; strategic planning; and effective oversight mechanisms.
    - Promote institutional development by sharing expertise on rank and salary structures, disciplinary mechanisms, budgeting, procurement, administration, change management and resource mobilisation.
  - **Strengthen internal accountability and external oversight.**
    - Help build institutional integrity and public trust, including assisting in the development of internal rules and procedures on internal accountability and external oversight, such as codes of conduct and disciplinary mechanisms.
    - Help reviewing incentive structures, providing human rights training, conducting vetting of personnel, promoting gender and minority representation, enhancing financial accountability, and suggesting anti-corruption safeguards.
    - Police oversight not only serves to ensure accountability, but also helps to prevent political interference in operational police matters (such as drafting of legislation).

- **Mission Type C: Interim Policing.**
  - **General.**
    - Where the Host State police have completely collapsed, UNPOL may be asked to provide interim policing, effectively becoming the police service of the country.
    - Wherever possible, it is preferable for UNPOL to work with whatever local police capacity remains, rather than trying to substitute for this capacity.
    - Success depends on the ability to interact with the justice and corrections systems, which may also be in a state of disarray.
    - The arrest powers of UNPOL, present only in interim policing missions, are described in the Interim SOP on Detention in UN Peace Operations of 2010, which dictates that detainees “shall be released or handed over to National law
enforcement officials of the Host State or other relevant authorities as soon as possible.”

- **Provide Operational Support.**
  - Short of taking on full authority, UNPOL can provide operational support to Host State police in a variety of ways, including through the development of operational plans, joint patrolling, and assistance with public order management.
  - When the Mission is in possession of the requisite skills, UNPOL can help build procedures on a range of issues, including incident reporting, the conduct of investigations, community-based policing, and traffic policing.

- **Help Secure Elections.**
  - A central responsibility of UN peacekeeping operations and Special Political Missions is to support Host State authorities in organising national and local elections, and UNPOL components are commonly tasked with assisting law enforcement agencies in providing security and protecting human rights.
  - The UN electoral component of a Mission has the lead on these matters, and all UNPOL activities should be coordinated as part of a mission-wide strategy.
  - UNPOL support electoral security by conducting risk assessments and drafting security plans; establishing security coordination mechanisms; developing codes of conduct and training host-state police; contributing to campaign security; securing voting materials and voting sites; and investigating incidents during and after Election Day.

- **Support the Fight Against Organised Crime.**
  - While many factors impede the ability of UNPOL to engage with the problem of organized crime – including difficulty in recruiting specialised expertise, frequent rotations of personnel, lack of language skills and lack of familiarity with host-state societies – the prevention of organized crime is an important task for UNPOL, because it can undermine stability and development if left unchecked.
  - UNPOL can assist the Host State police to develop units and strategies aimed at addressing organized crime problems, and can facilitate transnational cooperation to combat contraband flows.

- **Manage Public Order.**
  - One of the primary roles of the FPUs is public order management, mostly conducted jointly with Host State police, intended to support the public in the exercise of their democratic rights and to prevent assemblies from threatening public safety.
  - The FPUs or IPOs may engage in joint patrols with the Host State police, which serve to increase visibility, improve public confidence, and gather information vital to the maintenance of public order.

### 6.15.10: Military and Police Component Coordination

The Military and Police Components conducts joint operations or assist/support each other in execution of their specific roles. Joint planning, coordination, establishment of joint HQ, defining specific responsibilities of each component, etc are important. Some of the areas of coordination are as follows:

- Information Sharing.
- Public Disorder Management.
- Joint Operations (refer to Chapter 8, Section 8.6.5, p.167).
- Crowd Management. (refer to Chapter 8, 8.7.1, p.172).
- Detention (refer to Chapter 8, 8.8.4, p.187).
- Elections (refer to Chapter 8, Section 8.7.5, p.184).
- Crisis Management (refer to Chapter 8, Section 8.6.6, p169).

**Note:**
- Conduct of Joint Operations, Crowd management and Detention is explained in Section and Section respectively.
6.16: Conclusion.
Success of a UN peacekeeping mission to a large extent hinges on the level of integration achieved amongst the Mission Components, as well as, the synergy and coherence in implementing the mandate in the field. Mission components are expected to establish proactive and positive mechanisms to foster the mission spirit-de-corps and camaraderie, which will contribute cumulatively to mission efficiency and effectiveness. A collaborative, participatory and inclusive planning, decision making and execution process is crucial to maintain required levels of momentum in mission activities. The Force leadership, Force HQ Staff, subordinate HQ and various contingents in the Military Component must play its pivotal part in achieving and sustaining effective integration in the Mission.
Chapter 7: Partnership and Engagement with UN and Non-UN Entities

7.1: General.
UN peacekeeping is a unique global partnership. It draws together the legal and political authority of the SC, the personnel and financial contributions of Member States, the support of host countries and the accumulated experience of the Secretariat in managing operations in the field. It is this partnership that gives UN peacekeeping its legitimacy, sustainability and global reach. In a complex and evolving political and security context, it is essential to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN’s response. Integration and/or engagement in the field should be based on the principles of mutual respect, shared responsibility, value addition and complementarity, to develop a common and unified approach and required level of synergy amongst all partners. Furthermore, in the current economic climate, concerted efforts are required to ensure optimal burden sharing and to maximise finite global peacekeeping resources. In the field, partners and actors include, but are not limited to, the UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes (AFP), associated humanitarian and developmental partners, Host Nation authorities, armed/rebel groups/spoilers, interest groups and neighbouring countries, international/regional/sub-regional organisations and the various international/national Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO).

7.2: Purpose.
The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a broad overview and profile of the partnership and engagement of UN and Non-UN entities in the field, with particular reference to UNCT, UN Regional Offices, Special Advisers and Special Envoys, humanitarian actors, Host Nation authorities, spoilers/armed groups, International/regional Organisations, Member States (including neighbouring states in a conflict Zone) and International/National Non-Governmental organizations.

7.3: UN Integration.
7.3.1: General.
The Secretary-General, further to his 2008 Decision, has reaffirmed integration as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, whether or not these presences are structurally integrated. The main purpose of integration is to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN’s response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace. Applying the practice of “integration” can take different forms, depending on the requirements and circumstances on the ground. The Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP), endorsed by the Secretary-General in April 2013, stipulates that at the minimum, when a multi-dimensional peacekeeping or field-based special political mission is considered or deployed alongside the UN Country Team (UNCT) composed of UN AFPs, the UN system must conduct a joint assessment, develop a common vision and priorities, and establish joint mechanisms for coordinated planning and implementation on the ground, as well as for monitoring and reporting.

7.3.2: Integrated Approach.
The mandates of multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations have strong linkages with the objectives and programmes of UN AFPs that necessitate an “integrated approach” for all parts of the UN system in the mission area to work towards the same strategic vision. They engage in joint assessments and planning through integrated coordination mechanisms to develop common vision and priorities. Depending on the context, common work plans and joint teams could be set up to support projects in key areas. There may also be regional UN offices outside the capital where mission and UNCT personnel share the same facilities. The success of the peacekeeping mission depends not only on its peacekeeping personnel, but on effective working relationships with other actors working in the country.
7.3.3: Integrated Presence and Integrated Mission.

Integrated Presence. UN presence in a particular country/area that consists of:

- A multidimensional peacekeeping or field-based special political mission deployed to respond to a crisis or deterioration of the security or political situation, and;
- The UN AFPs – composing the UNCT - providing humanitarian and/or development assistance.

Integrated Mission. It is a particular form of a UN integrated presence, where the mission leadership is structurally integrated, with a DSRSG acting as the RC and/or HC for the UNCT or, in some cases involving political missions, the HoM also assuming the function of the RC and possibly that of HC as well. Not all multi-dimensional peacekeeping or special political mission are structured this way (e.g., the AU-UN Mission in Darfur).

7.4: Challenges.
Integration and coordination present a number of challenges. Some of the major challenges include:

- Challenges to Integration with UN Entities.
  - Differences in institutional cultures, management styles and operational perspectives leading to insufficient mutual understanding.
  - UN AFPs are governed by mandates, decision making and accountability structures, and funding mechanisms, as well as planning and funding cycles that are different from those of the peacekeeping mission.
  - Some of the UN AFPs are more decentralized in their governance and management than missions.
  - Unlike peacekeeping missions, other UN agencies are accountable to the Host Nation, donors and other UN governance structures outside of the SC.
  - Humanitarian actors tend to focus on immediate life-saving need; a UN Mission usually operates in the aftermath of conflict; and development agencies look toward longer-term sustainability in their activities.
  - Most humanitarian interventions are likely to remain outside the scope of integration.

- Challenges to Partnerships with Non-UN Entities.
  - Political and security challenges posed by Host Nation may restrict a UN mission’s ability to function effectively.
  - The cooperation and support from Host civil administration, law and order machinery, and the security forces at national, provincial and state levels may not be effective.
  - Dealing with rebel groups/non-signatories to the peace process may have serious ramifications.
  - Coordination, cooperation and interaction with international/regional /non-governmental organizations which have separate mandates.
  - Managing the perceptions, expectations and aspirations of the local people.

7.5: United Nations Country Team (UNCT).

7.5.1: General. The UNCT is composed of representatives of UN AFPs that provide humanitarian, early recovery and development support within a particular country or territory. The RC/HC ensures inter-agency coordination and decision-making at the country level. UN peacekeeping mission under the leadership of the SRSG, duly assisted by the MLT must forge a coherent and mutually supportive strategic partnership with all the UN actors in the mission area. HoMC/FC and the Force HQ Staff are expected to liaise with the elements of UNCT in their respective AOR and coordinate functions, security and/or any other support, as per operational requirement/environment as per mission policy. This partnership should be based on a shared vision and common understanding of the operating environment among all UN actors. The nature and level of integration depends on the needs and context of its application. This Section should be read in conjunction with Chapter 1 (Strategic Assessments, ITF and ISF) and Chapter 2 (Role of SRSG/DSRSG/MLT) in p. 6 and p. 21 respectively.
7.5.2: Linkages. In several cases, many of the UN agencies will have been operating on the ground long before the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission and will continue to stay long after the mission leaves. Regardless of whether a peacekeeping operation is formally considered an “integrated mission” or not, it is important for all peacekeeping personnel to share information with their UNCT partners and ensure that their activities are appropriately coordinated to ensure the maximum impact for the local population. The UNCT provides a valuable resource to any peacekeeping operation because it:

- Is a source of extensive knowledge about the host country and the conflict situation, particularly for those agencies present prior to the arrival of the peacekeeping operation;
- Can help identify and build relationships with key national partners (national and local authorities as well as with local civil society groups);
- Create mechanisms to ensure that peacebuilding activities introduced during the stabilization or humanitarian phases are carried over into the development phase when the peacekeeping operation withdraws;
- Has financial resources and expertise in programming, which peacekeeping operations often do not have.

7.5.3: Handling Relations with United Nations Agencies and Funds. Mission-specific guidance regarding the relationship between the HoM, the RC and/or HC and UN agencies in the field will be laid down and issued by the Secretary-General after coordination in Policy Committee Secretariat. The following guidelines merit attention:

- At UNHQ level, an ITF chaired by DPKO and consisting of the relevant Secretariat Departments and UN entities is usually established to assist the SRSG in carrying out the multiple duties. Any issues related to integration which cannot be resolved at the field level by the SRSG, the matter shall be reported to the USG, DPKO. DPKO will take up the issue either directly with the entities concerned or through the Task Force. Matters related to the interpretation or implementation of relevant integration policies may also be referred to the Integration Steering Group.
- The SRSG is the most senior UN representative in the country and has overall authority over the activities of the UN. S/he represents the Secretary-General and speaks on behalf of the UN.
- Whereas the SRSG has overall authority for the coordination of UN activities, the DSRSG/RC/HC serves as the principal interface between the Mission and the UNCT. S/he will lead the coordination of humanitarian, development and recovery/peacebuilding activities and bring concerns raised by the UNCT to the attention of the SRSG. The DSRSG/RC/HC also engages with non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
- On security matters, HoM may serve as the DO.

7.6: UN Regional Offices, Special Advisers and Special Envoys. There are UN Offices that interact and coordinate with ROs; such as United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA); and a number of Special Advisers (such as Special Adviser on Africa) and Special Envoys (such as Special Envoy to Great Lakes Region, Sahel and, Sudan and South Sudan) who have specific responsibilities as defined by the Secretary General. UN Peacekeeping Mission and the MLT must have good liaison, coordination and interaction with such entities to ensure common vision and unified approaches to harmonise mandate implementation. The Offices, Advisers and Envoys may also have responsibilities to coordinate, mediate, monitor and report on the peace process, which needs close support from the MLT. Joint planning, assessments and information sharing as required may be coordinated by the Mission/Force HQ.

7.7: Humanitarian Affairs. 7.7.1: Overview. Modern peacekeeping operations are often referred to as multidimensional operations because their mandates are more varied and complex than ever before, bringing together diverse configurations of uniformed and civilian personnel. Functions include the facilitation of political peace processes, assistance to DDR, support the organization of
elections, protect and promote human rights and assistance in restoring the rule of law. In addition, there are often a number of areas in which the role of peacekeeping operations involves facilitating the activities of other actors within and outside the UN system.

7.7.2: Responsibility. While the responsibility for the provision of humanitarian assistance rests primarily with the relevant UN AFPs, as well as the International Committee of Red Cross/Red Crescent (ICRC) and the range of international and local NGOs; peacekeeping operations are frequently mandated to support humanitarian assistance operations, including through the provision of a secure and stable environment within which humanitarian actors may carry out their activities, access populations in need of assistance, and conduct operations for the protection of civilians.

7.7.3: Strategies. Humanitarian strategies for engaging and coordinating with UN Mission, including the Military Component, are driven primarily by the context, mandate and humanitarian requirements in each emergency. Humanitarian civil-military coordination (UN-CMCoord) strategies are on a continuum ranging from cooperation (normally reserved for disaster relief operations) to coexistence (normally found in conflict or complex emergencies). UN-CMCoord strategies may also vary within the context of the specific operation, based on the roles and missions of individual military actors – peacekeeping, peace enforcement, intervention force or party to the conflict. The specific strategy that will be employed by the humanitarian community will be articulated by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).

7.7.4: Principled Humanitarian Assistance. Humanitarian assistance is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. As per UN GA Resolution 46/182, humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

- **Humanity**: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.
- **Neutrality**: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.
- **Impartiality**: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.
- **Operational Independence**: Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regards to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

7.7.5: Humanitarian-Military Engagement. In determining whether and to what extent humanitarian agencies will engage with military forces, humanitarian agencies must be aware of the potential consequences of too close an affiliation with military actors or even the perception of such affiliation, especially as these could jeopardize the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. Humanitarian agencies must also maintain their ability to obtain access to all vulnerable populations and to negotiate such access with all parties to the conflict. Particular care must also be taken to ensure the sustainability of access. Coordination with the military will be considered to the extent that it facilitates, secures and sustains, but does not hinder, humanitarian access.

7.7.6: Principled Approach. Humanitarian decision making related to engagement with military actors is methodical and based on guidelines developed through experience and the integration of best practices. An example, the updated IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (February 2013), do not seek to promote or endorse the use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys, but clearly propose to prioritise
the need to consider alternative means for establishing and maintaining access to the affected people in the first instance. The overriding principled approach articulated in this document for considerations of humanitarian community is that the armed escorts should be used only as a last resort, in exceptional cases, and then only when a set of key criteria is fulfilled. In circumstances when not all of these criteria can be fully met, utmost care must be taken to balancing security risks with program criticality.

7.7.7: Pragmatic Approach. However, key humanitarian objectives of providing protection and assistance to populations in need may at times necessitate a more pragmatic approach, which might include closer coordination between humanitarian and military actors. Even so, ample consideration must be given to finding the right balance between a pragmatic and a principled response, so that coordination with the military will not compromise humanitarian imperatives and principles.

7.7.8: Humanitarian Coordination. GA resolution 46/182 in December 1991 and Humanitarian Reform Agenda of 2005 lays down the foundation for international humanitarian coordination system. The newly introduced “Cluster Approach” in the agenda is intended to enhance predictability, accountability and partnership. Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations, both UN and non-UN, in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. water, health and logistics. They are designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and have clear responsibilities for coordination. The core functions of a cluster at the country-level are:

- Supporting service delivery by providing a platform for agreement on approaches and elimination of duplication.
- Informing strategic decision-making of the HC/HCT for the humanitarian response through coordination of needs assessment, gap analysis and prioritization.
- Planning and strategy development including sectoral plans, adherence to standards and funding needs.
- Advocacy to address identified concerns on behalf of cluster participants and the affected population.
- Monitoring and reporting on the cluster strategy and results; recommending corrective action where necessary.
- Contingency planning/preparedness/capacity building where needed and where capacity exists within the cluster.

7.7.9: Humanitarian Clusters
While coordination between peacekeeping forces and individual humanitarian clusters may be required, military actors are generally discouraged from attendance at cluster meetings. While this may vary based on context, it is recommended that Force HQ Staff engage with cluster leads on a bilateral basis or through UN humanitarian civil-military coordination officers (OCHA UN-CMCoord Officers) serving as interlocutors. It is also important that HoMC/FC and HC establish and maintain a regular and constructive dialogue to enhance coordination between humanitarian actors and peacekeeping forces.

7.7.10: UN-CMCoord. It is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and Military Component in humanitarian emergencies that are necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

Information Sharing. The foundation of effective coordination between humanitarian and Military Component relies on information sharing, regardless of the UN-CMCoord strategy that is employed. While not all information will be shared between the Force HQ and humanitarian actors, some types of information (e.g. security, unexploded ordnance, land mines) can almost always be shared. It is important to define early, what type of information can and cannot be shared by the Mission/Force HQs and humanitarian actors in order to manage expectations and avoid friction.

Interface Structures. The type of civil-military interface for information sharing will vary based on the context of the emergency. Under a cooperation strategy (natural disasters), it may be appropriate to establish a co-location coordination structure, such as a Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) or Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC), or as part of Mission’s JOC. This structure will facilitate agility and speed in the response by allowing for joint planning, prioritization and tasking within a centralized structure. As the context of the emergency moves more towards a coexistence strategy (complex emergencies), co-location is usually not an option. Therefore, interaction models, such as liaison exchange, limited liaison, or liaison through a third-party conduit may be employed. Regardless of the civil-military coordination model that is used, it is often useful to establish a civil-military working group that meets regularly to share information, de-conflict operations, resolve disputes, and, when required, coordinate the use of military assets in support of humanitarian operations. These working groups are usually established by the Force HQ U-9 Staff (CIMIC Cell) and the humanitarian community’s UN-CMCoord officer(s). The civil-military working group can also serve as the basis for drafting country-specific civil-military guidelines.

7.7.11: Way Ahead. It is important to incorporate the key principles and concepts of the Oslo and Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) Guidelines for natural disasters and complex emergencies, respectively and adapt them to the context-specific realities of the emergency. This process is also a valuable tool in defining the roles and responsibilities of humanitarian and military actors, managing expectations, building rapport and trust between the communities, and providing a solid foundation for future coordination and information sharing.

7.8: Coordination, Interaction and Engagement with Host Nation Entities.
7.8.1: General. Mission and Force leadership, as well as the commanders down the channel must engage constructively with the Host authorities at the national, provincial and local levels. The interaction between the UN peacekeeping mission and the Host government occurs on many levels from high-level political discussions between the SRSG and the senior government officials, to the frequent working level interaction between mission support personnel and their national counterparts. This section should be read in conjunction with Chapter 1, Section 1.10, p.12. Appropriate and authorized coordination, integration and engagement with Host Nation authorities are essential at the political, social and security
spheres for securing necessary support for Mission’s functioning and for Mandate implementation.

**7.8.2: Target Audience.** In keeping with the UN peacekeeping principle of consent, multidimensional peacekeeping operations work with and through national governmental authorities in several areas including, elections, demining, or the DDR, SSR/DSR, etc. The UN mission’s interaction with the Host population is not solely conducted through the national government. At the tactical level, the Sector/Contingent/Unit Commanders may be required to interact with local government officials (Civil Administration/Military/Police officials), other civilian dignitaries and civil society groups in respective areas of responsibility to ensure effective mandate implementation. Direct and constant contact is often essential with political parties and even faction leaders. Regular dialogue is maintained with religious leaders, women and student associations, academics, professional organizations, and the many other parts of the national civil society, which are central to the rebuilding of their country. It is through these contacts that mission personnel can get to understand the society in which they are working, and support them to help ensure the sustainability of the peace. Deliberate and systematic interaction with identified target groups is an essential part of the Mission’s outreach and engagement strategy which is vital for understanding and influencing public perceptions and attitudes.

**7.8.3: National Ownership.** Dialogue with civil society groups and different political parties is an important element of maintaining impartiality and ensuring national ownership in order to solidify the peace process. UN efforts must be aligned with Host Nation’s peace consolidation priorities to the extent possible and as appropriate to the context. Partnerships with national actors should be agreed upon with due regard to impartiality, wide representation, inclusiveness, and gender considerations. The activities of a peacekeeping operation must be informed by the need to support and build national capacity. National ownership is an essential condition for the sustainability of peace. Missions must recognize that there are wide varieties of political views and social groups within the host country that should be taken into account. All opinions and views need to be understood, ensuring that ownership and participation are not limited to small elite groups.

**7.8.4: Host Security Forces.** Close liaison must be maintained with key leadership of the Host Nation security forces, within the framework of the Mission Strategy. The Host Nation security forces are responsible for the safety and security of all the people in the country, including the mission personnel. Host Nation authorities also have the primary responsibilities for the protection of civilians. The Host police forces have a primary responsibility to enforce rule of law and maintain the law and order in the country. However, in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, the Host Nation may not be in a position to exercise its full authority effectively in all parts of the country. Therefore, it is imperative that the Mission/Force HQ provide necessary support to the Host Nation, as defined in the mandate to establish its authority through the state machinery.

**7.8.5: Support to Host Nation.** The increasing number of participating actors and the widening scope of work in multidimensional peacekeeping operations require a broader interface between military and non-military components. A Military Component in a UN peacekeeping operation may have responsibilities to support the DDR/SSR/DSR/De-mining programmes, undertaken by the substantive components in support of Host Nation. In certain Missions, the UN Military Component may be mandated to support the Host security forces to conduct legitimate operations as part of enhancing safety and security, as well as to extend state authority. This may entail providing assistance to the Host security forces in terms of restructuring of forces, joint planning, training, prescribed operational and logistics support, among others. However, while providing such support, due care must be taken to the risk that human rights violations may be committed by these forces and UN support must be provided
in conformity with the Secretary-General’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to non-UN Security Forces.

7.8.6: Role of Force HQ. All modes of engagement shall conform to the Mandate, SOFA/SOMA, UN policies, standards and practices. The HoMC and the Force HQ shall engage the top leadership of the Host security forces/defence establishment in furtherance of the Mission Mandate and in conformity with the Mission Concept. Military Component entities down the channel shall liaise and coordinate the following activities at respective levels:

- Execution of operational activities of the military units and sub-units (as defined in Chapter 8, p.151).
- Provision of safe and secure environment, including protection of civilians, freedom of movement, etc.
- Information sharing.
- Exchange of liaison officers and direct hotline communication.
- Coordination between UN and Host security forces local military commanders.
- Provision of operational and logistics support as per mandate.
- Conduct of joint planning (establish joint planning HQ, as required).
- Conduct joint operations (including joint monitoring and verification, human rights vetting, operational logistics support, fire support, etc) as applicable.
- Training assistance (train the trainer courses and mentoring).
- Support to make the security forces responsible and accountable.
- Facilitate/coordinate third party assistance.
- Utilisation of training and infrastructural facilities.
- Provide close protection to leadership, key political stakeholders and vital institutions, if mandated/directed.
- Support/assist mediation and negotiation measures to further peace process.

7.8.7: Security Coordination. The Mission CSA/CSO should develop a close working relationship with host country security entities, including the military, police and intelligence services. This relationship is essential to insure the development of situational awareness; to obtain details of security incidents; to share threat warnings; to arrange passage through sensitive or blocked areas; to ensure the safety of UN staff generally; to arrange permits, access, etc. to government facilities; and a wide variety of other liaison tasks.

7.9: Engagement of Spoiler Groups.

7.9.1: Profile. Various armed or otherwise hostile groups may include rebels, defectors, militias, war lords, criminal gangs, etc. and may pose a serious threat to the safety and security of UN and associated personnel and/or to civilians and other protected persons. Such spoiler groups may also undermine the stability of a State or threaten peace agreements, peace processes or other national reconciliation efforts. These groups are often armed and may be funded, equipped, trained and/or even controlled by state and/or non-state actors.

7.9.2: Considerations. Important considerations for engaging such spoiler groups (as applicable to specific context) are:

- All modes of engagement shall conform to the Mandate, UN policies and practices and executed as defined in the Mission Concept.
- The MLT may constructively engage the rebel leadership to find political solutions within the peace process or other reconciliation efforts.
- Engagement must be aimed at furthering the peace process or reconciliation efforts and at preventing them from jeopardizing the peace and security in the mission area.
- Care must be taken that the engagement does not lead to recognizing or otherwise legitimizing the group/groups concerned.
- Depending on the political dynamics, engagement, if any, may be complete or limited to a specific purpose.
Sometimes support of an interlocutor(s) may be necessary.

Engagement through established and recognized institutions, such as Joint Verifications Mechanisms, Joint Coordination Mechanisms and Ceasefire Commissions, etc. would be preferable where possible.

At the tactical level, efforts should be made to sensitise and influence the spoiler groups to conform to the peace process or reconciliation efforts and to avoid any resort to violence especially against civilians.

Mission resources, including of the military component, must be maintained in high state of readiness to protect the mandate through in-direct support, and/or direct operations.

7.9.3: Engagement. Subject to the particular mandate and the applicable ROE, the Military Component must be willing and operationally ready to prevent or respond to armed attacks or other hostile acts by spoiler groups to prevent them from jeopardising the safety and security of civilians and other protected persons as well as UN and associated personnel. The following issues merit attention while engaging armed groups:

- Handle issues firmly within the framework of the Mandate and as defined in the Mission Concept and strategy.
- Ensure accurate, reliable and timely situational awareness.
- Keep the MLT, SMG, relevant commanders and staff (at all levels) informed.
- Establish formal communication channels with the group leadership at all levels (if considered necessary by the MLT. On the contrary, there could also be armed groups with which the Mission may decide not engage at all, due to political or other considerations.
- Keep informal communication means and channels activated and open.
- Effectively utilise liaison officers, mediators, negotiators, civic group leaders, and or any influential group/individuals to further the peace process or other reconciliation efforts.
- Encourage/facilitate bringing the armed groups into negotiations or dialogue with relevant entities.
- Establish effective mechanisms to check and limit the operational and logistic sustainability of the armed groups.
- Initiate steps to sensitise the rank and file of the rebel/armed/spoiler groups to join the process of DDR or DDRRR, in order to maintain a safe and secure environment.
- Ensure proactive political engagement, prophylactic operations and pre-emptive actions to execute the mandate.
- In specific cases, targeted offensive operations to neutralize the armed groups may be undertaken, as specified in the Mandate and in accordance with the ROE.

7.10: Partnership with Member States, International Organizations (IO)/Regional Organisations (RO), and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

In increasingly complex and challenging contexts, UN endeavours are being made possible largely by the strategic partnerships with other UN entities, IO/ROs, NGOs and other relevant entities in the field. It aims at creating a common vision, support capacity building and facilitates burden sharing. Furthermore, the Military Component of UN peacekeeping operations increasingly have to work in conjunction with the military forces or civilian and political presences of other entities, such as regional/sub-regional organizations, bilateral military forces or international military coalitions, as well as political actors to achieve their mandated objectives. The type of cooperation varies in each context and is subject to political, operational and technical considerations. To that extent, a HoM/HoMC must maintain close contact with the governments of interested countries, IO/ROs, NGOs and bilateral donors, as appropriate.

7.11: Partnership with Member States.

HoM/HoMC should maintain close relations with the diplomatic representatives of the SC, particularly the permanent members, and TCCs, meeting with them from time to time. The individual Member States that provide the UN mission with its mandate, troops, police,
finances, and political support are also likely to have Embassies or Missions in the Host Country. Senior UN mission and agency staff must allocate time and attention to the diplomatic community to retain their confidence and support. Furthermore, many of these countries also are providing technical and financial assistance directly to the Host National authorities. They are doing this either through their embassies or national development agencies. Close coordination is essential to prevent duplication of effort and misunderstandings, as well as to achieve cohesion and synergy in developing strategies. Support of Member States is also vital to ensure that UN missions are appropriately mandated and resourced, in particular with regard to the capabilities needed to ensure the fulfillment of the mandates set by the SC. Member States may also have military forces, advisors and liaison officers deployed in the Host Country with specific roles and responsibilities that would be complementary to the UN Mission. HoM/HoMC should foster close relation with the military entities of various Member States located in the Host Country to achieve effective coordination, cooperation and support.

7.12: Partnership with Neighboring Countries in a Conflict Zone. Countries neighbouring or in proximity to a UN peacekeeping mission may provide assistance for logistic support/sustenance of the mission (logistics bases, transport infrastructure, supply materials, hospitals, air fields, sea ports, etc.), facilitate induction and rotation of troops through their area (airfields, lines of communication, infrastructural facilities, customs assistance, etc.) and address security concerns in the conflict zone (Border control, verification, monitoring, etc.), as appropriate. UN Mission may deploy MLOs in the neighbouring countries to liaise, coordinate and engage relevant national authorities to optimize the support. Security of the UN installations, legal clearances and movement control support should be coordinated with the countries providing the support. Prior coordination with countries in the region where a peacekeeping mission is already deployed is essential to support IMC, as and when required to be implemented.

7.13: Partnership with International/Regional Organisations (IO/RO) and Coalitions.

7.13.1: General. UN SC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Chapter VIII of UN Charter provides the framework for regional involvement in peace and security questions. It recognizes “the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action”24. Strengthening the provisions in the Charter further, creative partnerships with ROs are becoming a regular feature in UN peacekeeping that can enable early and effective responses to disputes and emerging crises. To quote former Secretary General Kofi Annan, “the support from regional organizations is both necessary and expected”.

7.13.2: Partnership Profile. Every conflict and crisis is unique, and the roles of the UN and regional/other international actors are mostly driven by the specific context and political factors. Some of the recent examples where UN has worked in close partnership with ROs are; the African Union (AU) in Mali and Darfur; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo and Afghanistan; the execution of European Union (EU) military operation in Chad and the assumption of rule of law responsibilities by EULEX in Kosovo. In addition, UN has been engaging the Organization of American States (OAS), League of Arab States (LAS), Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as similar sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for effective collective response. UN has been actively encouraging and promoting regional partners to cooperate between the countries in the region and the UN on world peace and security matters and to contribute positively to regional stability.

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24 UN Charter, Chapter VIII, Article 52.1
7.13.3: Role. The close proximity to the conflict zone, knowledge of the area of operations and actors, understanding of the conflict dynamics, as well as direct or indirect involvement of its constituents, and the potential ramifications of the conflict that could endanger the whole region, drives the ROs to be major stakeholders (to engage in full range of activities, such as monitoring, capacity-building, “peacekeeping” or stabilisation, political etc.) in maintaining regional peace and stability. The RO military forces may be able to respond faster, have adequate situational awareness and incisive knowledge on the root causes and may come from similar culture and traditions that makes them most suitable as first responders. The fields of cooperation between UN and RO include; (political) consultation, diplomatic (and financial) support, operational support, co-deployment and joint operations. The UN may also undertake joint analysis and assessments with other IOs, such as the World Bank (eg: Post Conflict Needs Assessments –PCNA, which are conducted jointly by the UN, the EU and the World Bank). As such, ROs/IOs play a vital role in providing a political basis for establishment of peace efforts, support diplomatic negotiations and mediations or intervene with regional forces either preventively or to stabilize a deteriorating situation.

7.13.4: Process. The presence of ROs on the ground is base either on invitation by the Host Nation, such as bilateral agreements on provision of security, decisions of regional and sub-regional organizations’ decision-making organs like the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), training support, etc. or mandated by the UN SC in support of the peacekeeping operation. The cooperation, coordination and integration of different military units and political actors in the peacekeeping mission area, will be defined through resolutions, agreements and orders and the Force HQ needs to take this into account, when planning and executing operations.

7.13.5: Presence and Involvement of ROs/Coalitions. ROs may have diplomatic and military presence in a mission area in addition to political involvement in the peace process. A Force HQ and Military Component must be cognizant of the mandates, role and responsibilities, command and control issues, reporting channels, operational parameters and logistics aspects of military forces from Regional/Sub-regional and Coalition Forces in a mission area to avoid conflicting mandate implementation and ensure a coherent framework for peacekeeping. Presence of such military forces could take the following forms:

- **Parallel Deployment.** A bilateral force, coalition force or a Regional/Sub-regional presence may co-exist with a UN Mission with different but complementary mandates. High degree of coordination of responsibilities, area of operations and conduct of operations would be vital. (e.g. UNMIK-KFOR, UNAMA-ISAF, UNOCI-LICORNE, etc.). A RO in this context may also provide logistics support and guarantee the safety of the UN mission (UN observer Force in Georgia supported by CIS).

- **Co-Deployments.** Small observer missions of ROs/Sub-regional organisations may be co-deployed with UN missions (e.g. AU observer missions with UNMEE and MONUSCO). Sometimes, these small missions benefit from basic logistics support from the existing UN missions and they serve as useful mechanism for the RO to have an understanding of the development in the mission area and provides with additional information for further regional engagement on the political front. The intention of the AU and ECOWAS to establish a joint presence in Mali as part of their post AFISMA strategy lays credence to this type of cooperation. The main difference between parallel forces and co-deployments are in the sphere of the nature of Mandate, magnitude of force levels, scope of role and responsibilities, means of support, and the relationship with the UN actors.

- **Hybrid Deployments.** A Regional/Sub-regional force may be combined with the UN Mission under a UN mandate and functioning as defined by UN operational procedures (TTPs). The Regional/Sub-regional entity may have an alternate reporting channel with the RO concerned. The Mission will have a Joint HQ comprising joint leadership

appointment limited to top posts) and staff structure with a single chain of command to manage the mission and conduct joint operations (e.g. UNAMID). However, it should be noted that there is no generic model for UN-RO cooperation in peacekeeping and different situations require different responses.

- **Sequential Forces.** Depending on the operational emergencies, need for quick response, time and space factors or regional compulsions, either a Regional/Sub-regional force or a UN Mission may be deployed in a sequential manner. In either case, one entity will be responsible to stabilize the situation or undertake initial response to do the first-stage work and be subsequently replaced by the other in a systematic and coordinated manner (E.g. INTERFET-UNTAET, UNMIL-ECOMIL, ONUB-AMIB, MINURCAT-EUFOR). Both entities could either have independent mandates or the RO may be authorised by the SC to undertake specific responsibility through a UN mandate. Regional/Sub-regional forces may also be re-hatted as UN missions as authorized by the SC. (e.g. MINUSMA). This idea is also in tune with the concept of the African Standby Force (ASF), where the ASF is expected to deploy into a non-benign environment, similar to what we have in Somalia, with the intent that it would be able to create an enabling environment for a future UNPKO.

- **UN Supported Forces.** UN may provide logistic support to Regional/Sub-regional force which is engaged in maintenance of international peace and security. (e.g. AMISOM AMIS, etc.). It assumes relevance if and when a deployment of a follow-on UN Mission is required to be established or an IMC need to be executed.

- **Over the Horizon Forces.** Over the Horizon Forces may be deployed by a Member State/Coalition or a RO either preemptively to stabilize a deteriorating security situation or it could be deployed in support of a deployed mission to undertake specific operational tasks. Over the Horizon Forces may or may not have a UN mandate, but would be complementary to the UN approaches/UN Missions Mandate. High degree of coordination in terms of reception, deployment, conduct of operations and logistics support is essential for success (e.g. MONUC-EUFOR). An over the horizon force may also be deployed to reinforce a UN force already on the ground.

**7.13.6: Approach to Partnership.** The above categorization, however, should not rule out the possibility of innovative and tailored approaches and arrangements in complex situations that may require joint actions, operations, or enhanced partnership. Such arrangements should aim to maximise the political leverage of both organizations as appropriate to the political situation on the ground, while preserving the unity of command, strategic direction of the mission and ensuring the provision of critical resource and capability requirements. The political and operational features of each situation will continue to demand case-specific approach to partnerships with regional actors and will drive diverse operational responses in the field. A unity of strategic vision, common understanding and mutual accountability for all peacekeeping partners is the basis for unity of purpose and effective action. While there is no generic model for cooperation, nature of our partnership should be based on maximizing political leverage, considering the comparative advantages and constraints of each organization. Some of the major considerations are:

- Need for harmonizing strategic and operational assessment, planning and decision-making.
- Clear command and control arrangements at the HQ and field levels are critical.
- Need for strategic consultations and reconciling conflicting directions to the Mission leadership.
- Analyse restrictions on the UN’s ability in planning, deployment and management due to the Mission political and security contexts.
- Analyse Host Nation commitment and sensitivities that may impact the UN Mission.
- Plan and coordinate adherence to HRDDP.
7.13.7: Coordination with RO. In missions where UN is closely working with a RO, following issues merit attention for ensuring coherence planning and synergy in implementation:

- Foster strong cooperation and sharing responsibilities to work hand in hand.
- Emphasis on sharing the labour as opposed to division of labour.
- Establish a formal joint leadership and supervisory mechanism (Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism) with terms of reference.
- Establish information sharing and joint messaging mechanisms at leadership levels.
- Establish formal liaison and coordination mechanisms at all levels.
- Establish IOT at DPKO, RO and Mission levels.
- Formalise cooperation at working level through joint planning teams.
- Ensure timely and daily information sharing at tactical levels.
- Develop, as appropriate, joint operational and contingency plans.
- Develop concrete action points for immediate follow-up.
- Coordinate draft reports to mitigate disparate messaging.
- Coordinate, provide and monitor UN support (fuel, rations, medical evacuation, logistics support, etc.).

7.13.8: Re-hatting. RO Military Forces may be re-hatted (or vice-a-versa) as UN peacekeeping force, particularly as part of sequential deployments. In such conditions, from the military planning perspective, following issues needs attention and coordination:

- Assessment of current operational, organizational and equipment profile.
- Establishment of required force levels for deployment (existing forces of RO and plus/minus additional UN troops).
- Timeframe and formalities for changeover (including MoU, SOFA, ROE, CONOPS, HoMC Directive, etc).
- Establish Command and Control, and reporting parameters.
- Reorganisation/re-structuring as per UN guidance.
- Address capability gaps including equipment profile.
- Provide training support.
- Provide operational advisory/staff support to coordinate changeover and establish UN Mission.
- Establish conditions for adherence of UN minimum standards.
- Review and adjust mission support as per UN standards.

7.14: International/National NGOs.
NGOs are private organizations such as associations, federations, unions, institutes, and other groups; they are not established by a government or by intergovernmental agreement. NGOs can play a role in international affairs by virtue of their activities, but they do not necessarily possess any official status, nor do they have a mandate for their existence or activities. Some of the best-known international NGOs include Médecins Sans Frontières, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, and so on. A Force HQ/Military Component may have the following interaction with NGOs:

- As implementing partners for QIPs; for example, small infrastructure rehabilitation projects or short-term employment activities.
- Provision of transport for NGO workers.
- Local knowledge sharing.
- Acquiring information through OCHA and/or UNDP offices or directly on the organizations activities, their projects and areas of intervention, to factor in Force/Mission planning and coordinate where required.

7.15: Conclusion.
A HoMC either as part of the MLT, or as HoM in military led peacekeeping missions, has a vital role to play in strategic key leader engagement, liaison, coordination and integration with external entities. The HoM/HoMC must endeavour to ensure, through regular contacts,
that the activities of UN partners and non-UN entities, such as NGOs and bilateral donors, are in harmony with the aims of the mission. Cultivating and fostering required levels of consensus and synergy amongst all actors is crucial for the effective implementation of the mandate. Coherence in planning, organizing and execution of mission objectives requires articulation of shared vision, creating common understanding, sustained commitment of the MLT, combined with an inclusive, collaborative and participatory approach.

References:

- The Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration, 2008.
- Cluster Information: http://clusters.humanitarianresponse.info/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach.
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Quick Impact Projects (March 2009).
Chapter 8: Operational Responsibilities

8.1: Overview.
UN peacekeeping mission’s objectives and activities are determined and driven by the mission-specific Mandate promulgated through the relevant SCRs. All activities of the Military Component abide by and reflect the provisions and conditionalities of the Mandate. Military Component of a UN peacekeeping mission is expected to play a significant role in the stabilization phase of the Mission, which includes both operational and non-operational tasks. The CONOPS and Mission Concept driving the Mandate stipulates Military Components role, responsibilities and mission essential tasks to be undertaken in a specific mission set-up. Moreover, in a UN peacekeeping context, the Military Component is entrusted with multifaceted operational responsibilities, including playing a pivotal role in crisis management and to bolster critical support tasks as defined by the respective Mandates.

8.2: Purpose.
The purpose of this Chapter is to provide brief descriptions, dimensions and considerations for execution of overarching, core and support operational responsibilities of the Military Component in peacekeeping operations.

8.3: Operational Responsibilities.
Major Operational responsibilities performed by the Military Component include, but are not limited to the following:

- **Overarching Responsibilities:**
  - Support to Peacemaking and Political Negotiations.
  - Preventive Deployment.
  - Interposition.
  - Establish Safe and Secure Environment.
  - Observation and Monitoring.
  - Enforcement of Sanctions.

- **Core Operational Responsibilities:**
  - Patrolling.
  - Observation Post.
  - Buffer Zone.
  - Checkpoint.
  - Convoy and Escort.
  - Military Operation Base.
  - Infrastructure and Asset Protection.
  - Extract.
  - Evacuation.

- **Crosscutting Responsibilities:**
  - Early Peacebuilding Activities.
  - Situational Awareness.
  - Outreach and Engagement.
  - Protection of Civilians.
  - Joint Operations.
  - Crisis Management.
  - Inter Mission Cooperation.

- **Support Responsibilities:**
  - Crowd Management.
  - Defence Sector Reform.
  - Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.
  - Support to Humanitarian Activities.
  - Election Support.

- **Miscellaneous Responsibilities:**
  - De-mining.
- Restoration and Maintenance of Law and Order.
- Human Rights Monitoring.
- Detention.
- Response to Natural and Man-Made Disasters and Mass Casualty Incidents.

8.4: Overarching Responsibilities.

8.4.1: Support to Peacemaking and Political Negotiations. Military expertise is essential to the successful conduct of peacemaking and peace negotiations in situations of armed conflict. A small number of military officers can provide technical support to political mediators conducting negotiations. The advice could range from the practical arrangements for monitoring ceasefire agreements to establishing the feasibility of proposals for the use of military capability and the suitability of military arrangements such as weapons-free and demilitarized zones (DMZ), zones of separation and requirements for effective disarmament and demobilization.

8.4.2: Preventive Deployment. While all peacekeeping operations are preventive in nature (since one of the major objectives in deploying a peacekeeping operation is to prevent conflict from recurring), in certain instances, military forces can be deployed before conflict has even broken out to prevent it from occurring or spreading. Preventive deployments also serve as a confidence-building measure and may be purely military or have a combination of military and civilian elements.

8.4.3: Interposition. An interposition operation may be authorized between conflicting States or between conflicting parties within a State, depending on the circumstances. It involves placing a UN military presence between warring parties to prevent a recurrence of hostilities. Interposition often leads to the creation of a buffer zone (BZ) or a zone of separation in which only UN personnel are allowed, forcing the parties to physically pull back from each other. In some situations, parties may agree to weapons-free areas on either side of the BZ, further contributing to the reduction of tension and building confidence.

8.4.4: Establish Safe and Secure Environment. Provision of a safe and secure environment in the Mission AOO to allow other aspects of the mission’s mandate or peace process to be implemented is one of the primary responsibilities of the Military Component. A secure environment is generally a precondition for moving ahead on several elements of peace agreements, such as safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP), cantonment, disarmament and demobilization, the free flow of persons and goods and delivery of humanitarian assistance. As part of the task of providing a secure environment, the Military Component may be asked to provide a visible deterrent presence, control movement and access through checkpoints, provide armed escort for safety and to facilitate access, conduct cordon and search operations, control crowds or confiscate weapons. This is achieved through a range of passive and active operational measures, deployments and execution of METs.

8.4.5: Observation and Monitoring. The Military Component in a peacekeeping operation may be asked, as its primary task, to monitor and supervise, through observation and reporting, a military arrangement such as a truce or ceasefire agreement, a DMZ or a BZ. This is done through both static (observation posts) and mobile (regular patrols, inspections and investigations of suspected violations) means. There have been several UN peacekeeping operations in which observation and monitoring are the only tasks of the Military Component. In more complex operations, however, observation and monitoring may be just one element of the Military Component’s activities. The military observers, air observation team and Maritime reconnaissance units play a vital role in observation and monitoring. Electronic observation assets (Un-manned, un-armed aerial platforms, radars and sensors) provide required levels of early warning and ability shape the peacekeeping AOO.
8.4.6: Enforcement of Sanctions. The enforcement of sanctions authorized by the UN SC, particularly arms and materiel embargoes, may be tasked to a Military Component of a peacekeeping operation.

8.5: Core Operational Responsibilities.
8.5.1: Patrolling. Patrolling is a means and method to promote a visible presence of the UN in a mission AOO for the purposes of outreach with local communities, restoring and maintaining a safe and secure environment, establishing credibility and legitimacy of the mission and acting as deterrence on spoilers. Patrols provide wide area mission security and protection across the AoR and contribute positively to force protection and mandate implementation. Patrols also act as “eyes and ears” for the Force HQ. Patrols must also be tasked to further various information and operational requirements and objectives of the Force HQ.

Patrolling should display a friendly but determined posture to establish rapport with the local population, generate faith in the peace process, and build confidence and trust in the Missions effort in bringing stability and normalcy. Active patrolling is required to achieve and maintain complete freedom of movement. Any movement between UN bases, regardless of the intended task or purpose, may be considered to be a patrol in order to ensure that sufficient planning and coordination takes place. A patrol should always retain its tactical balance and be capable of executing operational tasks to address any threat that may endanger the execution of the mandate.

Some of the activities related to patrolling in a mission area are as follows:
- Observe, monitor, supervise and verify ceasefire lines/compliance of agreements/troop deployments and interpose between warring factions.
- Observe and report on movements of other armed groups/hostile elements/spoilers.
- Establish mobile OPs/CPs to observe areas that fixed OPs and CPs cannot observe and/or observe from isolated/occupied OPs.
- Establish TOBs/FOBs or long range patrols in specific areas to ensure extended UN presence and to deter potential spoilers/Armed Groups.
- Establish a physical link and maintain lines of communication between adjoining but relatively isolated UN positions.
- Demonstrate the presence and visibility of the UN and act as deterrence to all parties in the AOR.
- Carry out reconnaissance to gather or confirm information.
- Establish and maintain freedom of movement for UN forces as per mandate.
- Reassure and protect isolated/threatened communities and IDPs especially women and children at risk and deter potential spoilers and human rights violators.
- Inspect existing or abandoned positions.
- Conduct inspections or verifications of activities and incidents.
- Investigate incidents (within context, capability and level).
- Conduct Joint Monitoring Team Patrols or escort or conduct joint patrolling with Integrated Mission Teams comprising UN civilian components (Gender, CP, CA, PI, HR, etc.) and UN police/local police or military elements for specific purposes.
- Establish liaison and contact with local leaders, societal factions and local population.
- Interact with local communities to understand threats to their physical safety.
- Recognise early-warning indicators for sexual and gender-based violence.
- Record observed allegations of human rights violations and share with the human rights component for verification and follow-up.
- Provide protection to local population travelling without UN escort especially for women travelling to and from regular destinations (e.g., markets, fields, water sources).
- Monitor curfews.
- Conduct route reconnaissance, route clearing/securing and protect traffic on a route.
- Create a safe and secure environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance.
• Conduct patrols in areas that have been identified as at risk routes for women.
• Conduct CIMIC tasks when necessary and support CIMIC teams and operators from other units tasked in the AOR.
• Carry out patrolling by aerial insertion to address inaccessible areas and patrolling with riverine/ naval assets.

8.5.2: Observation Post. The Observation Post (OP) is a manned peacekeeping position established to monitor and observe a certain area, object or event. An OP can be permanent, temporary, static, or mobile. Reports from OPs provide timely, accurate, and relevant information to Force/Sector HQ, adjacent units and other mission components in the Sector. A thorough analysis of accurate and timely OP observations and reports provide the Commanders and staff with critical information required for recording and understanding developing situations that effect UN peacekeeping missions.

The basic activities of an OP are to:
• Observe and report all activities in the observation area to Force/Sector HQ through established SOPs and to adjacent OPs or units as required or appropriate.
• Increase security in the AOO by demonstrating vigilant and visible peacekeeper presence to all parties and populations especially women in the area.
• Monitor movement in and around airspace, coastal areas, airfields, BZ, ceasefire lines (CFL) boundaries, borders and protected zones.
• Count special traffic, such as military vehicles, tanks, armored personnel carriers (APC), artillery, etc.
• Monitor activities of parties involved in the conflict and all other abnormal or suspicious activities, including threats to civilians. Be aware of the use of women as “porters” in transporting illegal weapons.
• Monitor violations of international agreements or conventions.
• Observe and record IHRL and IHL violations and promptly share information with the human rights component.
• Observe BZ restrictions.
• Support other military operations as required.

8.5.3: Buffer Zone (BZ). A BZ is primarily established to separate the warring factions by interposing UN peacekeeping forces to repose or withdraw the opposing forces back to a predetermined and agreed upon line of deployment and creation of a DMZ/BZ under UN control with a view to restore international peace and security. The main purpose of establishing a BZ would be to establish a visible presence, maintain operational domination with credible force projection and preserve the truce sanctity. The following important activities encompass the BZ operations:
• Deployment of tactical sub-units and detachments (both permanent and temporary) to effectively cover the entire frontage.
• Ensure effective aerial, mobile and static monitoring and surveillance of the area.
• Observing, monitoring, supervising and verifying the cessation of hostilities/ceasefire/ truce/ armistice agreements, compliance of agreements, troop deployments, etc.
• Prevent any violation of ceasefire/peace agreement clauses.
• Prevent/contain violations/cross border attacks/isolated incidents taking place and if taken place, prevent it from escalating in to major conflicts.
• Proactive troop deployment to prevent an incident or its recurrence.
• Interposing between opposing forces to stabilize the situation, where formal peace agreements are not in force.
• Follow up on violations by investigations.
• Find a negotiated/mediated settlement or resolution of disputes. Act as go-betweens for the hostile parties with good liaison, close contact and effective coordination.
• Assist UN mediator and undertake mediation and negotiation when tasked or required.
• To foster reconciliation and rapprochement amongst communities/parties to the conflict, play an active and constructive role to prevent initiation of a flash point/ recurrence of
hostilities that is detrimental to the peace process and work towards a comprehensive political solution.

- Supervising the implementation of the disengagement agreement.
- Accompany and support opposing/belligerent forces to redeploy/withdraw to agreed dispositions and subsequent adherence to military status quo.
- Establish control over BZ by ensuring no presence of military personnel, weapons, installations and activities, assist in securing the respective parties areas/line to prevent/intervene entry/intrusion of the military personnel, arms or related material in the BZ without consent.
- Visit, monitor and ascertain compliance of activities periodically in stipulated “Areas of Limitations” (where military restrictions on deployment of body of troops and weapons systems and massing of troops not permitted).
- Protect the civilians in the BZ.
- Facilitate daily subsistence and routine activities of civilians in the BZ.
- Monitor Crossing/Control Points across BZ for safe and orderly passage through by civilians in conjunction with opposing forces.
- Assist/coordinate with local Government/belligerent parties in restoring its effective authority in respective areas.
- Facilitate good governance in the area of separation/buffer zone, contribute to maintenance and restoration of law and order and policing, establish interface with the inhabitants and help resumption of routine civilian activity (farming, electricity, water, medical support) for establishing normalcy.
- Extend assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations, provision of medical aid and facilitate voluntary and safe return of IDPs.
- Facilitate exchange of prisoners, refugees, IDPs, dead bodies and to retrieve livestock.
- Assist/support FPUs, IPOs, IO/ROs, UNCT/AFPs, in the area when tasked.
- Support mine awareness, identify and mark minefields, and help in clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance.

8.5.4: Checkpoint. A Checkpoint (CP) is a manned and self-contained position deployed on a road or track to observe/check, inspect/search personnel or vehicles and control movement into and out of a designated area (e.g. BZ or DMZ, or a specific area in a unit/sub-unit AOR). To that end, information collected through CP should be referred to relevant stakeholders through pre-determined information-management structures and processes. A CP can be either permanent or temporary. Permanent CPs are established on the main access routes and cannot be moved or closed without the authorization of the HoMC/FC. Temporary CPs (helicopter/vehicle/foot based mobile CPs) may be set up on minor routes, for a specific duration, usually with authorization of the Unit Commander. CPs are set up to display UN “will and capacity” to exercise control and facilitate the following activities:

- Project UN presence and operational reach to all parties and the population in the area to reassure and build confidence.
- Dominate the area of responsibility around the control point.
- Control movement in and out of a designated area in support of the overall safety and security in the AOR.
- Control movements into/out of a DMZ, particularly during a crisis.
- Control movement of crowds, enforce a curfew and/or detain criminals, wanted personnel and known offenders as part of public order management.
- Prevent illegal armed personnel or groups from passing through a particular area.
- Prevent smuggling of weapons, ammunition, explosives and other illegal/contraband material, drugs or items.
- Confiscate illegal items and apprehend the persons carrying them.
- Carry out specific vehicle/personnel search.
- Act as an OP as part of the Force observation plan.
- Carry out specific survey, monitoring and information-gathering activity and share observations with relevant stakeholders.
8.5.5: Convoy and Escort. Operational flexibility of a peacekeeping force depends on its organic capability to logistically sustain itself. In addition, the mandate itself may authorize the Mission to protect civilians and have objectives of providing safety, security and freedom of movement to various UN AFPs, humanitarian aid agencies and others, including NGOs operating in the Mission AOO. To support it logistically and to provide security to these entities, UN military units may be tasked to organise movement of convoys and provide escorts. The purpose of conducting convoy operations is to organise and escort group of vehicles, to facilitate a secure and timely movement from a designated start point to an intended destination for the following purposes:

- Movement of UN Personnel (civilians or military or both).
- Force logistics supply.
- Administrative convoys of deployed troops.
- Movement of humanitarian aid and personnel\(^\text{26}\).
- Movement of election staff and equipment.
- Escort duties for very important dignitaries.
- Movement of refugees/IDPs or prisoners of war.
- Escort support to local government authorities in specific cases (e.g., money disbursement).

8.5.6: Military Operation Base. The establishment and maintenance of a secure and functional operation base for the UN military unit and its sub-units is a priority mission of the commanders at all levels. Operational bases are established and maintained as secure locations for conducting operations and logistics support activities. These bases also serve as the planning, administrative, and logistic hubs of UN mission support in the AOR. The operational bases should be dispersed and be utilised as self-supporting projection platforms that enable operational coverage and extended reach throughout the Mission AOR. The Force HQ in consultation with OMA shall deploy the COBs and TOBs. Military Operation Bases provide/facilitate the following:

- A secure and static firm base for the mobile elements of the military units to conduct dynamic, relentless and proactive peacekeeping operations in execution of MET.
- Protection to the UN military and other peacekeepers.
- Rest and recuperation of personnel, resupply of logistics sustenance, repair and maintenance of equipment and establish facilities to plan and organize operations.
- Deployment in an integrated operational grid to execute the MET optimally and cover the respective AOR effectively and facilitate mutual support and synergy.
- A security framework in order to protect civilians.
- Support to monitoring and reporting of all developments in the AOR that have an implication on the peace process.
- Capability to initiate rapid response to deal with any emergency to contain and restore adverse situations.
- Effective outreach and engagement; promoting confidence-building measures; generate situational awareness and help establish rapport with the local population.
- Observation and domination of key terrain, buffer zones, or population centres.
- Safeguard key installations and infrastructure by being closely located.
- Stockpiling of supplies in support of other UN components.
- A secure environment for other agencies and Host Nation forces.

\(^{26}\) Refer to IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, 27 February 2013.
8.5.7: Infrastructure and Assets Protection. As part of the major responsibility of restoring, creating and preserving safety and security in the AOR, the Force HQ may be involved in providing protection of various IO/ROs, public and civilian infrastructure and assets that are vital to the peace process. These are identified, analysed and decided upon at the Mission/Force HQ level in consultation with the Host National authorities and based on the risk assessment and operational conditions prevailing. Danger or damage to such assets may have serious functional and political implications in peaceful coexistence and economic well-being and therefore need to be protected temporarily by the UN forces until the Host National security forces or agencies are capable of taking on the responsibility. Such responsibilities have high public visibility and impact on the attitude of local people towards the UN and mission entities and therefore, the Force HQ should take utmost care to prevent any untoward incident. In addition to the mission force protection, the Military Component may be tasked to provide protection to various international and civilian institutions and infrastructural facilities which are vital to the Host Nation and need to be preserved for sustained peace. Such infrastructure and assets to be protected include but are not limited to the following:

- UN System entities outside the mission, other IOs (ICRC, etc.), RO, NGOs working for the protection and benefit of the people, etc. who are under physical threat of violence.
- Local Government HQ, civil authorities, power generation facilities, water works, communication centres, logistics dump, river/seaports, air fields and bases and other sensitive offices/installations which have a direct bearing in essential services and good governance.
- Judicial institutions, police institutions, correction institutions etc which have a predominant role in restoring and maintaining rule of law.
- Important religious sites, structures of cultural/historic value, important city centres, hospitals and schools or areas that provide daily subsistence and livelihood to the local people and protect vulnerable key leaders.
- Protect critical roads, bridges and defiles to maintain freedom of movement in a chosen area.

8.5.8: Extract. The Force HQ/Military Component may be required to plan and execute extraction of military peacekeepers, UN personnel or civilians (personnel from IO/ROs, NGOs, Host Nation personnel, etc.) who are either detained, taken hostage or under imminent threat of physical violence. UN military units/sub-units will have to be tasked to ensure rapid and spontaneous action to safeguard and extricate the UN personnel or associated personnel. Extraction involves the following:

- Mobilise appropriate force level to the place of incident/action.
- Negotiate release.
- Isolate, contain and dominate the location.
- Physical extraction by military means as per Rules of Engagement and guidelines on the use of force.
- Conduct organized move out from the location.

8.5.9: Evacuation. Deterioration of security situation in a country and the resultant relocation or evacuation in a mission area also encompasses all the UN elements in the country and entails fine judgement by mission leadership, high degree of situational awareness, operational capability to respond adequately in emergencies and flexibility in implementation. Certain security situations demands prompt an immediate evacuation of UN personnel, Mission/Force HQ, logistics installations, military contingents or other UN system entities deployed in the Mission AOO to safe areas. In a UN Mission, it is centrally coordinated and controlled under the DO, supported by the Mission Security Component (CSA/CSO). Therefore, The Military Component must be trained and be ready to assist and support the overall execution of evacuation plans of the Mission Security Component. Notwithstanding own preparations and readiness to deal with security issues, the Host Government has the ultimate responsibility for the safety and security of UN peacekeeping operation and its personnel in a mission area.
- Liaise and coordinate with CSA/CSO, mission components and other UN elements in AOR for developing an integrated evacuation support.
- Protect vulnerable UN elements in the AOR.
- Establish safe areas/safe corridors for sequential extrication of evacuees.
- Ensure timely shifting of vulnerable elements to a safe staging area.
- Provide security and logistics support of a staging area.
- Coordinate and execute systematic evacuation of personnel and essential material.
- Maintain safety and security of UN personnel as per ROE until completion of evacuation even to the extent of using force.
- UN military elements shall be evacuated only after all other Mission components/elements have been evacuated.

8.6: Crosscutting Operational Responsibilities.
8.6.1: Early Peacebuilding Activities.

Peacebuilding - Background. The term peacebuilding emerged to elaborate the creation of peacebuilding structures to promote sustainable peace by addressing the "root causes" of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution. Peacebuilding is defined as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.” Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.

Peacebuilding Actors. In most post-conflict situations there are a variety of national and international actors, functioning at different levels (political, operational, technical, national, sub-national, etc.) and across many closely linked sectors. The three key peacebuilding actors are as follows:
- Humanitarian and Development Agencies which may be in a country before, during and after the conflict can lay the important foundations for the peacebuilding process by providing early peace dividends.
- Peacekeeping operations play a significant role as early peace builders through multidimensional mandates, such as DDR, SSR and support to electoral processes, etc.
- DPA Special Political Missions and Integrated Peacebuilding Missions are also given the mandate to cover a wide range of peacebuilding tasks.

Peacebuilding-Peacekeeping Nexus. Peacebuilding entails a range of activities aimed at making peace self-sustaining and reducing the risk of relapse into conflict. It is fundamentally a political process requiring ongoing political mediation, the strengthening of National capacities at several levels for conflict management, and sensitivity to the political, historical, economic and cultural context and dynamics. Peacebuilding may begin prior to the arrival of a peacekeeping mission and always continues beyond its departure. Peacebuilding priorities vary in response to the demands of each context, but typically include following activities:
- Basic safety and security including protection of civilians and rule of law.
- Inclusive political processes.
- Delivery of basic services.
- Restoring core government functions.
- Economic revitalization.

Within the UN, effective support requires integrated action across the peacekeeping, development, human rights and humanitarian pillars of the system. Integration arrangements on the ground ensure that peacekeeping missions and UN agencies work in close partnership
and maximize the UN’s overall contribution. Beyond the UN, close collaboration with key partners, such as international financial institutions and ROs, has become critical. In some areas, such as economic revitalization and the delivery of basic services, peacekeeping missions may play a supporting role. However, peacekeeping operations have to be mindful of unintended consequences in these areas, such as effects on the local labor market, and can make a positive contribution when they work effectively with key partners.

UN Peacekeepers are ‘early peacebuilders’. They contribute to the overall peacebuilding effort in three key ways as follows:

- Articulating peacebuilding priorities by supporting consensus among national counterparts and the broader international community, and guiding overall strategy development and implementation.
- Enabling other national and international actors to implement peacebuilding tasks, by providing a security umbrella, monitoring commitments entered into by parties to the conflict, expanding and preserving political space, coordinating assistance efforts, delivering administrative and logistical enabling support and coordination or direct management of various resource streams.
- Implementing certain early peacebuilding tasks themselves, including engaging in early capacity building in certain areas, in close collaboration with other partners.

**Early Peacebuilding Tasks.** The early peacebuilding strategy provides guidance to UN peacekeepers on prioritizing, sequencing and planning critical early peacebuilding tasks. Priority initiatives are those that advance the peace process or political objectives of a mission and ensure security and/or lay the foundation for longer-term institution building. Sequencing will be determined in each setting, based on the feasibility of executing priority tasks.

**Principal Objectives.** These initiatives are undertaken in a phased manner, commencing with pre-deployment activities followed by operational initiatives, which may commence simultaneously and further two principal objectives:

- **Track 1.** Activities that provide security, facilitate and build confidence in a peace process, and provide space for other UN and international actors.
- **Track 2.** Initiatives that help to consolidate the peace process and facilitate a smooth peacekeeping exit by laying the foundation for longer term institution building.

**Critical Risk/Success Factors.** Factors critical to the success of priority early peacebuilding initiatives include the following:

- Political will at national, regional, international levels.
- Local knowledge through in-depth assessments.
- Clear and achievable mandate supported with adequate financing.
- Strong leadership.
- Partnerships that reflect clear roles, comparative strengths and integrated approaches.
- National and local ownership.
- Popular engagement in prioritization.
- Availability of appropriate skills and equipment.
- Rapid deployment capacity.

**Role of Military Component in Early Peacebuilding.** In most cases, military peacekeepers will be the first to deploy to a region in the aftermath of conflict. The Force Generation process to obtain new peacekeepers can only begin following authorisation from the UN SC and this invariably imposes a delay in initial deployment. Military enablers are also vital at the early stages to provide critical transport, medical and engineer assets. The immediate

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mandate of military peacekeepers will be to support the restoration of security and to provide a secure environment within which the humanitarian agencies and others can operate.

**Track 1.** Activities for military peacekeepers are likely to include the following:

- **Security.** Provision of security at specific locations, such as national institutions, key installations, IDP camps, or working with UN Police (if deployed at this stage) in containing public disorder.
- **Patrolling.** Establish quickly a patrolling routine that can do much to calm a volatile situation, reassure the population, and provide a visible demonstration of external support in a time of need. As UN Police arrive, patrolling is likely to be done jointly, with the lead gradually shifting to the UN Police as the situation calms.
- **Key Leader Engagement.** Engagement will subsequently be made with key national civil and military leaders to provide reassurance and mutual awareness and understanding.
- **Protection.** Carry out targeted patrols addressing recurrent human rights violations such as sexual and gender-based violence, including escorting women to gather firewood or crops, when they would otherwise routinely be attacked or assaulted.

**Track 2.** Initiatives may include the following:

- **DSR.** Support to or training of some National forces.
- **Joint Operations.** If mandated, conduct joint operations with Host security forces.28
- **POC.** Adapt basic military skills to undertake activities in support of the mandate in a given peacekeeping environment to provide effective protection of civilians.
- **Training.** Special-to-mission skills also need to be included in core military training to optimise effectiveness upon arrival in the Mission AOO, and these can include language training, training in specialist skills such as long-range patrolling and communications, and effective liaison with other contingents and factions.
- **Reporting.** Reporting skills are also vital, to enable military components to ensure that accurate and timely information is provided to the Force HQ, JOC, JMC to inform the senior leadership.
- **Miscellaneous.** Develop skills in handling integrated planning, public information and CIMIC.

This strategy aims to improve the capability of peacekeeping operations to deliver predictably, effectively and accountably in the complex areas of security, basic service provision, support to political processes, restoration and extension of state authority.

References:

- Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Clarifying the Nexus, September 2010.

**8.6.2: Situational Awareness & Information Management.**

**Background.** The Military Component often operates in hazardous and unpredictable conflict environments where establishing situational awareness is a critical task. Military commanders at all levels require real-time, accurate and reliable information to plan, prevent or respond appropriately to various operational challenges in the mission. The efficient gathering and processing of information and its dissemination, therefore is critical to the success of peacekeeping operations. To be effective, the Force HQ should proactively acquire and deliberately analyze the information about the operational conditions in the mission area.

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of responsibility. Situational Awareness (SA) comprises knowledge, understanding and anticipation. Ensuring effective SA involves establishing information requirements; collecting and verifying information; collating information in data banks; analyzing the information; and disseminating it to concerned parties in real time.

The ultimate aim of maintaining an effective situational awareness is to ensure an effective early warning system and support the leadership’s decision-making process. Effective SA helps to generate a comprehensive picture of the operating environment and enhances the quality of decision-making for accomplishment of a variety of mandated tasks. It provides ability to take proactive measures to prevent rather than react to situations. At Force HQ level, the following issues need to be tackled to achieve effective SA:

- Constant surveillance and monitoring of the operational situation utilizing authorized resources available in the Military Component (technical and human).
- Generate real time and accurate information for planning and execution of the mandate.
- Carry out realistic “Risk/Threat Analysis” to identify and assess vulnerabilities to the peace process, the population and various mission elements from the spoilers and other actors.
- To liaise and cooperate with other elements of the mission, (Military Units, JOC, JMAC, MLO, Human Rights and DSS);
- To liaise and cooperate with UNCT (particularly OCHA and UNDP), IOs (e.g. ICRC, HR Monitors), ROs and NGOs.
- Provide early-warning to the HoMC to support decision-making and to initiate preventive or mitigation actions.
- Undertake preventive/stabilization actions within AOO based on predictive analysis.
- Encourage the military units to carry out engagement with key leaders to assess intentions and changes in attitudes to help take preventive actions.
- Encourage the military units to carry out grass-roots engagement with the local population to establish rapport, create accessible human information channels, develop faith and credibility, thereby, generate trust and hope in the peace process.
- Monitor migration, internal displacement, refugee movements, etc.
- Maintain contact with spoilers and armed groups to analyze their capabilities and intentions. Create environment of trust and to motivate them to join the peace process.
- Monitor activities, capabilities and intentions of the opposing parties and neutral sympathizers.
- Every member of the Military Component should understand their role as “eyes and ears” of the mission to contribute as information gatherers.

**SA Considerations.** The process of information gathering and SA is complex and yet crucial in a peacekeeping environment. Tactical failures can have disastrous strategic or political ramifications on the peace process and stability and impact on the safety and security of the mission itself. More often than not, the action or reactions of various parties to the conflict to situations is ambiguous, unpredictable and volatile, demanding a proactive and reliable SA to respond appropriately and in a timely manner. The Military Component should not be fixated with operational information requirements alone, but should endeavor to develop a comprehensive and all-encompassing information effort in support of the peacekeeping mission needs. All military personnel involved on the information process should be cognizant of politico-socio-economic, factional and humanitarian implications of their efforts in maintaining an information edge. Synchronization of military information process at the Force HQ level, based on formalization of threat/risk assessment and information-collection plan, tasking collection, analysis (interpretation and prediction), dissemination/sharing and reporting process is crucial. As part of the Peacekeeping Information Preparation (PIP) of AOO, the following considerations assume importance:

- The Force HQ Military Information Staff Branch (U-2) should ensure accuracy, timeliness, utilization of authorized multiple sources, set priorities; and carry out liaison and coordination with all other entities in the field to gain relevant information.
• The methodology of information management for effective SA should conform to the principles and spirit of the UN and within the confines of the peacekeeping mission mandate and operational requirements. Special care needs to be emphasized to prevent violation of host national interests, laws and privacy in the employment of means and methods of information gathering.

• Information acquired should be guarded from all belligerent parties to a conflict, to ensure that impartiality is not compromised, that civilians are not put at risk, and the consent of the parties maintained and fostered. Information security (protect from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, perusal, inspection, recording or destruction) and confidentiality has to be maintained and disseminated/shared only on a “need to know” basis.

• As part of the Mission Information Management, JOC is acts as the ‘information hub’ and is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the situation throughout the mission’s AOR on a 24/7 basis. Military operational information and situational information acquired by the military component should be reported to the JOC through the Force HQ. Drawing on all sources of information, including mission components, the JMAC is responsible for producing integrated analysis, as a basis for enhanced mission planning and decision-making; and for assessing threats to the implementation of the mission’s mandate. The JOC and JMAC coordinate the information processing cycle at the mission level. The Force HQ U-2 Branch will guide the military units in its SA activities, and facilitate interaction with the JOC and JMAC.

• The JMAC will lead on determining the mission leadership’s Priority Information Requirements (PIR) and on that basis develop information Collection Plan with application across the mission. The U-2 Branch should ascertain the Force HQ/HoMC PIRs to support military decision making and generate Additional Information Requirements for the Military Component.

• Based on the mission PIRs, the U-2 Branch, in coordination with U-3 and U-5 Branches, will prepare detailed SA Plan indicating information requirements, information acquisition, timelines and guidelines.

• The PIP of Mission AOO is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the risks, challenges and operational environment in a specific peacekeeping conflict zone or geographical area to describe the operational environment and its effects on the Military Component. It is designed to support staff estimates and military decision-making process. This process helps the HoMC/FC to selectively apply responses and optimize the effect of the military units capabilities at critical points in time and space in the AOR by determining the likely capabilities, vulnerabilities and options available to potential aggressors, spoilers or parties to the conflict and the courses of action open to the Military Component. It is a continuous process which consists of four steps:
  - Define the peacekeeping environment.
  - Describe the peacekeeping conflict zone’s effects.
  - Analyze and evaluate the challenges and risks in the AOO.
  - Determine various courses of action.

• The U-2 Branch will carry out a proactive “PIP” by using multiple resources to collect and corroborate, managing inflow of information, evaluation of predictive information reports, profile the personalities involved, monitor the operational situation, updating the history of the conflict, monitor the media and political scene and analyze the motives of various parties and leadership.

• The U-2 Branch should prepare databanks containing the background knowledge of the mission area and causes of the conflict, terrain analysis and implications (lay of the ground, vegetation, going conditions, weather effect on terrain), security issues (tactical positions and strength of belligerents, DMZ, minefields, ERW, etc.), local culture customs and practices and how it relates to the operational environment, and the operational peculiarities of the AOO.
Apply authorized information-gathering technology in a judicious manner. Although UN PKO generally involves a low technology environment and more reliance on human inputs, the use of modern technology is a policy that has been pursued by DPKO.

**SA Requirements.** The SA requirement for a UN PKO environment will be guided by the mission mandate, PIRs and Collection Plan, and may include the following:

- Historical background and regional, religious, ethnic/sectarian, cultural, socio-economic and political dynamics that have an impact in the mission.
- Location (including deployments), strength, organizational structure, equipment profile, support facilities (including foreign support), inter group nexus and rivalry, attitude towards the population and UN, and the capabilities of parties to the conflict.
- Tactics used by belligerents for political/military gain e.g., abduction, forced labor, sexual violence, recruitment, forced displacement, etc.
- Personalities, motives and intentions of opposing faction commanders.
- Spoiler/splinter groups, their support structure, factional tensions and competing claims.
- Likely humanitarian and gender effect of the conflict and areas where these could manifest.
- Report humanitarian situation/needs of the local people to humanitarian actors.
- Understand political dynamics and likely triggers that can escalate into breakdown of peace.
- Appreciate “Law and Order” indicators (organized crime, human trafficking, SGBV/CRSV, domestic violence, smuggling, ethnic/religious sensibilities, local groups, criminal gangs, warlords, trouble makers, etc.).
- Appreciate tribal/ethnic dynamics and identify escalatory interplays with potential to spiral out of control.
- Assess and identify specific vulnerabilities to civilians, including children, women, elderly and ethnic/sectarian groups as part of POC.
- Information on violations committed against the civilian population such as the presence of children in armed groups, reports of killings, sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals and violations for which the peacekeeping mission is tasked by the UN SC to report on should be signaled to relevant civilian components such as child protection, human rights, etc.
- Efficacy of DDR process.
- Local attitudes, emotions, opinions, identities, sensibilities, key players and their role in the situation. Include the attitudes of women who can play a key role in encouraging both negative and positive sentiments in the community.
- Analyze perspectives, perceptions, expectations, and concerns of the population about the conflict situation, their security and the UN roles.
- Facilitate effective dissemination and analyze the impact of ideas and themes of the mission “Public Information” campaign and activities of Civil Affairs.
- Responding to Requests for Information generated from the JMAC, and verification of information, as requested by the mission JOC and JMAC.

**Counter-Information Management.** The U-2 Branch should analyze and address vulnerabilities to its information documents, procedures, personnel and IT systems, through counter information best practices, threat assessments, security awareness training, internal monitoring and investigations of lapses. All UN military staff must protect the confidentiality of the information and its source.

**8.6.3: Outreach and Engagement.**

**General.** Outreach and engagement comprises all actions taken by the military units to carry out constructive and active engagement of the local population and other actors in the field to generate trust and faith in the peace process. The Military Component should undertake genuine and purpose oriented confidence-building measures to establish normalcy, alleviate suffering of the deprived, mitigate the threats and vulnerabilities to the local population, and
find sustainable solutions in close coordination with other relevant stakeholders. This includes, Host Nation authorities, military and police organizations; the parties to the conflict and spoilers, the CIMIC engagements with UN system entities and other partners – IOs, ROs, NGOs, etc., welfare activities and the planned QIPs undertaken in the AOR as part of a integrated and comprehensive mission level effort. Contingents are also required to work closely with civilian components of the mission including Human Rights, Child Protection, UNHCR, etc. The Military Component will perform Outreach and Engagement through the following primary functions.

**Operational Responsibilities.**

- Conduct robust mobile operations, extensive patrolling (including standing and long-range patrols) and establishment of TOBs to increase operational reach to inaccessible or remote areas to dominate, deter and enhance security to the populace.
- Direct operational activities to restore, create and maintain a safe and secure environment in which all sections of the population can live without fear and with full freedom and also to ensure the peace process remains on track.
- POC, based on a comprehensive mission-wide strategy to include joint planning, coordination with other protection actors, information sharing, risk analysis and conduct of MET, assumes importance at unit and sub-unit level. As the units go about their daily work, it is essential that they interact with the local communities they come in contact with. This will help to establish trust, manage expectations of the local community by indicating the extent of the mission’s capabilities regarding the protection of civilians, and gain a more comprehensive understanding of the threats and vulnerabilities facing civilians in the mission area. Regular outreach and engagement with local communities will also help to determine how early-warning mechanisms can be established to inform the military component of imminent threat of violence to civilians.
- Undertake stabilization operations to address sanctuaries of potential aggressors or spoilers/armed groups and engage with their leadership to conform to the peace process.
- Carry out liaison with the Host Government officials, civil society groups, and other political/military/social/ethnic factions and hostile/spoiler/armed elements.
- Carry out emergency Mine/UXO/IED clearance in AOR in conjunction with Mission MACC, mark minefields and conduct mine-awareness training.
- Facilitate and support DDR efforts of the Mission including provision of security cover, logistics support and conduct proactive disarmament operations as mandated/authorized.

**Societal Responsibilities.**

- Provide a safe and secure environment to create the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance. If appropriate, and at the request of humanitarian actors, the use of military and mission assets to support humanitarian assistance should be based on identified humanitarian needs, timely, unique in capability and availability.
- Identify societal vulnerabilities with particular focus to ethnic/religious/sectarian groups, women, children and the elderly; and take measures to prevent threat manifestation and protect from danger.
- Prevent, mitigate or reduce sexual and gender based violence, and sexual violence used as a tactic of war as well as prevent any sexual exploitation and abuse in the AOR; the Military Component should be informed and trained on local referral arrangements (with local contact details for response services) regarding incidents of sexual violence.
- Ensure protection of children as per UN Guidelines.
- Ensure freedom of movement for livelihood and other routine activities including specific protection of women’s daily activities (collecting wood, water, travelling to market, etc. without fear of life or danger.
- Engage key leaders (including women) in the AOR to include social elites, community bodies, religious heads, tribal/ethnic chieftains, political heads, factional leaders and local governmental officials/police and military authorities to find amicable solutions and to prevent any triggers that may endanger the peace and tranquillity in the AOR.
- Prevent and mitigate environmental impacts of its operations.

**Organizational responsibilities.**
- Assist local administration (within capability) to comply with the principles of good governance and maintenance of public law and order may be carried out as required. The Military Component should establish links with the local and provincial level authorities for coordination and integrated efforts. Ensure that the support to and collaboration with the national/local security sector promotes a gender-sensitive approach and adheres to UN HRDDP. Support to local administration should be systematically coordinated with relevant civilian components and UN agencies.
- Facilitate and support the early peacebuilding activities undertaken by the mission and the larger humanitarian and international community for faster recovery and sustained development.
- Facilitate effective interface between the Military Component and the political, humanitarian, developmental, human rights, gender, child protection and rule of law components of the mission in the AOR and others in the larger peacebuilding system. It helps to build trust and close working partnership with all actors.
- Implement QIPs to build confidence in the mission, mandate or the peace process. In order not to jeopardize humanitarian access, implementation of a QIP project requires close coordination and consultation with the Humanitarian Country Team.
- Support of the mission public information campaign through Military Component’s static deployments and mobile operational elements to disseminate information and gather feedbacks from the targeted population.
- The local media has to be carefully and proactively managed to create a positive atmosphere and prevent negative publicity in consonance with the mission policy. Commanders and troops of the military units should be cognizant of the flash points and other socio-cultural sensitivities that could be exploited by the media and institute appropriate measures.

**Tactical Level Responsibilities.** All outreach and engagement activities at the tactical level should be in coordination and coherence with mission priorities.
- Targeted use of confidence-building measures and people oriented non-military initiatives aimed at perception management and winning hearts and minds be applied.
- Establish close liaison to build trust, confidence and credibility in the Military Component’s role.
- Carry out socially productive, gender-sensitive and creative welfare activities to address immediate needs of the women, girls, boys and men to foster normalcy in day to day life.
- With good conduct, genuine efforts to help the populace, undertaking initiatives for societal reconciliation and upholding the UN principles, the military units should play a key role in changing attitudes over time.

8.6.4: Protection of Civilians (POC).  
**Overview.** Civilians continue to be the victims of human rights and IHL violations in armed conflict. In the UN peacekeeping environment, the SC has mandated a number of peacekeeping operations with the mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. This challenging mandate is often the yardstick by which the international community, and those whom peacekeeping endeavors to protect, judge peacekeepers worth. In close coordination with other mission components, tasks related to the POC are carried out by the Military Component on a daily basis. Commanders at all levels have the responsibility to act upon threats and vulnerabilities to the population, and should incorporate relevant operational aspects of POC into the planning and execution of MET.

**Guiding Principles and Definition.** The protection of civilians mandate is guided by a set of practical tenets, rooted in the principles of the UN Charter, international law, and lessons of application. These concepts serve as fundamental guides and apply to all missions with
protection of civilians mandates. For a full explanation of the POC mandate, see the DPKO-DFS Operational Concept for the Protection of Civilians.

- **A priority mandate**: Where a mission is mandated to protect civilians, the UN SC ‘stresses’ that mandated protection activities must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources’. (Resolution 1894).

- **The responsibility of governments**: Sovereign governments hold the primary responsibility to protect civilians inside their borders; this message must be consistently reinforced at the highest levels. Where the host government lacks capacity, UN peacekeepers may undertake protection activities in support of or in parallel with government actors. Peacekeepers may act independently to protect civilians within the mission’s area of operations in the absence of an effective Host Government effort to protect, or where government forces themselves pose a threat to civilians.

- **The principles of peacekeeping and the use of force**: Missions operate within the principles of peacekeeping, including maintaining the consent of the host state and the non-use-of-force except in self-defence or defence of the mandate. Missions are authorized to use force against elements of government forces at the tactical level where such forces are themselves engaged in or threaten physical violence against civilians.

- **Whole-of-mission activity**: Each component of a peacekeeping mission have a role and act jointly to contribute to the implementation of the protection of civilians mandate. Protection of civilians is thus a whole-of-mission activity that can involve a host of non-forceful measures, including good offices, mediation, advocacy, training, and reporting. All of these activities and more fall within the ‘necessary actions’ authorized by the mandate.

- **Strategic and preventive**: Protecting civilians is not a reactive endeavour but is planned, deliberate and ongoing. Missions do not engage in protection only in reaction to an attack, but should be constantly working to analyse threats and prevent or mitigate harm to civilians. Preventive action is the focus of all protection of civilians activity, and the use of force is always a last resort.

**Definitions.** The protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping is a mandated task defined through relevant SCR. This mandate authorises all necessary means, including the use of force, to protect civilians from the imminent threat of physical violence. While the language of such mandates may vary slightly between Resolutions, the following phrases are common to all or most protection of civilians mandates:

*The Security Council, ....................Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, ...Decides that [the peacekeeping mission] is authorized to take the necessary action [or 'use all necessary means'], in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of [the host country], to protect civilians [or 'ensure the protection of civilians'] under imminent threat of physical violence.*

This language, or the corresponding language of a particular SCR, defines the protection of civilians mandate, authorizing missions to take a broad range of action to protect civilians from physical violence. Key elements to understand in the mandate are below.

- **‘Civilians’**: The mandate authorizes protection for ‘civilians’. ‘Civilians’ means any person who is not participating directly in hostilities or other acts of violence. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered a civilian. Determining which groups of civilians are the focus of the mission’s protection of civilians efforts is undertaken through the POC risk assessment and the POC strategy.

- **‘Physical violence’**: The mandate focuses on protection from the threat of physical violence. This includes but is not limited to acts intended to kill, torture, maim, beat, rape or otherwise sexually assault. Incidents that do not involve intentional direct injury (such as natural disasters and famine) or violations of international human rights or international humanitarian law that do not concern physical injury (such as denial of the
right to education or media censorship) do not fall within the scope of the protection of civilians mandate.

- **‘Imminent’**: The mandate specifies an ‘imminent’ threat of physical violence; however, ‘imminent’ does not imply that violence is guaranteed to happen in the immediate future. A credible threat to civilians may exist if there is a reasonable belief that a potential aggressor has the intent to inflict physical violence. A threat of violence against civilians is imminent from the time it is identified until such time that the mission can determine that the threat no longer exists. Peacekeepers with a protection of civilians mandate are authorized to use force in any circumstance in which they reasonably believe that an imminent threat of violence against civilians exists.

- **‘Without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government’**: The host state always has a responsibility to protect civilians within its borders and this responsibility is not diminished when a peacekeeping mission is deployed with a protection mandate. The mission’s protection mandate does not supplant that of the host state, but the mission should support the host state’s protection efforts or act independently to protect civilians when appropriate.

- **‘Within its capabilities’**: Within the wide scope of possible incidents of physical violence against civilians, the mission must prioritize those situations or incidents of greatest concern and allocate its resources accordingly. As specified in the mandate, it can only act within its capabilities and areas of deployment: The mandate does not demand that peacekeepers engage in actions for which they are not equipped. At the same time, no peacekeeping force will be able to address all protection threats at all times. All missions must employ accurate threat and vulnerability analyses and coherent operational planning to deploy existing resources to maximize their protective effect for at-risk civilians.

**Application of Protection of Civilians Concept in Field Missions.** The role of UN peacekeeping operations in the protection of civilians is organized under three mutually reinforcing and inter-linked tiers:

- **Tier One**: Protection through political dialogue.
- **Tier Two**: Providing protection from physical violence.
- **Tier Three**: Establishing a protective environment.

At the Mission level, the POC responsibility is exercised simultaneously through all three tiers in a coordinated manner, in accordance with Mandate and operational environment. Aspects of information collection, analysis, and early warning, as well as a focus on preventive action, are common to all three tiers.

**Tier One: Protection Through Political Dialogue.** Tier one focuses on the mediation, good offices and liaison with government, reconciliation, and messaging activities carried out by the MLT in liaison with their national counterparts to support the protection of civilians from physical violence. Force HQ may be required to:

- Liaise with Host Government military or security services and advocate for the Government to fulfil its POC responsibilities.
- Direct troops to liaise with local communities in areas of concern.

**Tier Two: Physical Protection.** Tier two involve using the mission’s physical presence to protect civilians from physical violence, ranging from the visible presence of unarmed mission actors, to proactive measures designed to deter potential attackers, to logistical support for the Host State in defending civilians from attack, to the use of force to protect civilians. Tier two activities are primarily in the domain of the Military and Police Components, the will be supported by other substantive/support components and Mission Actors. Situational awareness, outreach and engagement with local population/communities, engagement of parties to the conflict and spoilers/armed groups, drawing on civilian expertise of the country context, and leveraging the mission’s integrated analysis may all be vital.
Physical protection requires understanding, analyzing, and judging a complex set of factors. The overwhelming majority of missions’ physical protection activities, including those carried out by armed actors; may not involve the use of force; but where armed mission actors are involved, many such activities involve an implied threat of force. The failure to use force to protect civilians from the imminent threat of physical violence when required to do so can also have dire consequences, including the loss of civilian life, the loss of confidence in the mission among the local population, and the emboldening of perpetrators to repeat their offenses against civilians. Mission POC strategy must lay down a clear concept of how mission action will protect civilians and what the limits of such protection may be.

Physical protection measures may be described as a set of non-sequential phases as below:

- **Assurance and Awareness**: The measures in this phase are aimed at providing a visible presence to deter threats and assure the population of the mission’s intent to protect them. In the process, mission components conduct information collection and analysis to improve the mission’s understanding of threats and risks to civilians. These activities may be conducted in areas where risks to civilians are suspected or latent, but no clear threat has materialized.

- **Pre-emption**: When likely risks to civilians are identified, more active measures may be required to pre-empt the threat. An active, high-visibility presence and targeted political engagement are examples of pre-emptive action. These actions may also be accompanied by heightened monitoring of an area.

- **Response**: When the threat of physical violence to civilians is apparent, and other actions are not sufficient, enhanced active measures aimed at deterring potential aggressors from executing hostile acts may be necessary. Force may be used as a last resort. Heightened Tier one political engagement, including at the international and regional level, must complement Tier two responses.

- **Consolidation**: Consolidation activities aim to stabilise a post-crisis situation. The objective is to assist the local population and Host authorities to return to a state of normalcy, and create the conditions in which a return to crisis is diminished.

The use of mission military or police assets to, e.g., provide protection for humanitarian convoys or civilian mission staff, or support development/peacebuilding projects generally do not fall within the POC Mandate.

**Tier Three: Building a Protective Environment.** Tier three focuses on supporting the establishment of an environment that enhances the safety and protects civilians from physical violence. The majority of activities in this tier are directed at supporting host state capacities to protect, including aspects of rule of law, SSR, and training on human rights, child protection, gender and sexual violence. Force HQ may have a supporting role to play in Tier three activities.

**Force HQ Responsibilities**: In missions with protection of civilians mandates, the Force HQ is required to integrate protection of civilians responsibility in military perspectives and ensure that all operational activities reflect and contributes towards fulfilment of the Mandate. Key areas that need attention are as follows:

- **Risk Assessment.** Support development of the protection of civilians risk assessment at Mission level to identify and prioritise communities at risk. Understanding the protection risks to civilians is essential in planning force deployment, operational tasks and tactical manoeuvres. Being the primary responder, Force HQ must continuously acquire military information, analyse threats and vulnerabilities and factor them in the Military Components planning and execution.

- **Mission Strategy.** The Mission POC Strategy articulates the overarching mission-strategic vision for implementing the protection of civilians mandate. Force HQ should provide necessary inputs and perspectives to ensure that the POC Strategy is pragmatic and responsive to the challenges. The POC strategy will:
- Establish a shared, Mission-wide analysis of threats to civilians in the AOO.
- Clarify roles and responsibilities within the Mission and with key partners.
- Detail protection of civilian’s coordination mechanisms within the Mission and with key partners.
- Ensure conduct of reviews and lessons learned exercises periodically, especially during changes in operational environment and after an adverse incident.

**Planning.** Based on the Mission POC Strategy and its own assessments, the Force HQ must put in place systematic and detailed planning at all levels of the Military Component for effective execution of the responsibility. Scenario-based analysis of threats and responses will dictate various COAs and contingency planning.

**Coordination.** Participate and support integrated/joint forums to coordinate protection of civilians activity across all mission components. Coordinated protection of civilians planning includes:
- Joint assessments of threats to civilians, conducted with JMAC, Civil Affairs, Human Rights, or other relevant civilian actors;
- Joint operational planning of POC operations to ensure a whole-of-mission approach, conducted with JOC and other relevant civilian actors;
- Joint forward planning for POC, including plans for force deployment to address POC needs.

**Assess Resources/Capabilities.** Force HQ should support mission-wide efforts to assess resources and capabilities for the protection of civilians. Deficiencies or inadequate capacities to fulfil the Mandate must be raised with Mission HQ. For more information, refer to the Protection of Civilians Resources and Capabilities Matrix.

**Directives and Orders.** Issue HoMC/FC Orders, Directives, operational plans, SOPs to effectively implement physical protection responses. These guidance documents define the MET, resources and UN specific TTPs for adherence by all units/sub-units of the Military Component. The guidance documents should cover the following aspects.
- Baseline expectations and goals for implementing the POC mandate.
- The posture and actions expected in POC implementation.
- Clarifying the relationship between the Force, other mission components, and other actors (including humanitarians).
- Guidance for responding to civilians seeking shelter at UN facilities.
- Identifying specific groups or communities of civilians who may be at risk.
- Identifying specific groups who are potential perpetrators of attacks against civilians.

**POC Posturing.** Military Component must be deployed on a POC operational grid to cover vulnerable areas and retaining operational flexibility to respond in time and space through deployment of permanent operational bases, TOBs and mobile operational teams. Operational activities must be oriented to conduct prophylactic, relentless and proactive operations to establish moral and operational ascendancy.

**Situational Awareness.** Capacity and ability of HQ, units and sub-units in generating actionable military information is the key to maintain effective and timely situational awareness that supports Mission’s preventive, proactive, deterrent or active responses to a developing situation.

**Monitoring and Reporting.** Force HQ and successive echelons of the Military Component must be cognizant of the evolving challenges and institute active monitoring systems and measures for early warning, realistic and timely assessment and to maintain required levels of operational readiness. Timely, accurate and detailed reporting is essential to provide clear understanding of the situation to the Mission leadership to generate suitable options and COAs for a comprehensive mission-wide response.

**Response.** All elements of the Military Component must be kept in high state of operational readiness to respond to fluid situations with spontaneous, rapid and effective responses. Commanders at all levels must be clear on roles, responsibilities and tasks and the units and sub-units must be mission capable to execute the mandate. The Force and Mission HQ should mobilise all resources from within the Mission, from neighbouring
Missions, or from other partners to stabilise, contain and mitigate a deteriorating or adverse situation.

References:
Normative or superior references.

Related procedures or guidelines.

8.6.5: Joint Operations.
Overview. UN military units may be required to carry out joint operations with UN police and/or Host police and/or Host military forces, in support of peacekeeping operations. Conflict and post-conflict countries are often characterized by a collapse of public law and order and major security and human rights deficits leading to the erosion of public confidence in the security sector. The presence of a UN Peacekeeping Force, which includes the military contingents and UNPOL, contributes to restoring popular confidence in the Host-state police and rule of law structures as a whole.

Joint Operations with UN Police. In most peacekeeping missions the UN police component operates in an integrated manner with other mission entities. There are specific roles and responsibilities laid down for all entities in a mission area and in addressing some critical issues, the military and police have to operate jointly to accomplish common objectives or provide complementary support to their respective functions. The military chain of command and staff should consider the capability of the UNPOL and the strong interdependence of each other in peacekeeping environment to develop collaborative strategies to bridge the functional gap and ensure convergence of effort. Visibility of UNPOL and/or local police enhances effective establishment of rule of law and the legitimacy and credibility of the mission as a whole, the peacekeeping force and of the good governance of host authorities.

Particularly, during the stabilization phase of a peacekeeping operation, the complementarities of both military and police would facilitate better outreach and engagement and faster restoration of safety and security. Needless to say, the battalion should take the initiative to liaise, coordinate with the corresponding police entities to develop a coherent and comprehensive joint plan. Joint operations have to be carried out within an integrated framework with well-defined roles and responsibilities. The division of labour will vary in each case but will broadly follow the below description. The contribution of the military and the police respectively is based on their comparative advantages. The military
units should utilize the legal authority—where relevant—and functional expertise of the UNPOL in handling public safety issues. Similarly, UN police should combine its effort with the Military Component to exploit the latter’s wider operational reach, enormous resources and force potential.

**Circumstances for Joint Operations.** Joint operations entail the battalion personnel operating with UN police to accomplish a common objective or act in support of each other. Joint operations may take place in the following circumstances:

- When the UN police require military assistance to execute their functions.
- When the military units require support of police in conduct of its operational activities.
- When the operational situation escalates beyond the capacity of UN police.
- When mandated to provide support to host Security Forces.

**Joint Operations with Host Nation Police Forces.** Given that the Host State police has the primary responsibility for law and order in the vast majority of cases, elements of the Host-State police personnel should be incorporated with UN military units, where the situation so demands and where it is operationally feasible. Host Nation police is a major asset to help the UN military units in executing civil functions including interrogation, arrest, detention, where legal implications are involved and their knowledge of local circumstances and their role as an interface with local communities. However, the UN military units must comply with the Secretary-Generals HRDDP on UN Support to non-UN Security Forces, while operating with Host Nation security forces, including the police. The participation of women as members of the National police is essential and should be encouraged. Most missions have provided assistance to Host Nations to train and develop public order managing police entities with the support of UN Police and may be working in conjunction with the FPU, when the UN military is also requisitioned. Therefore, additional coordination and integration with local police forces will have to be carried out by the Military Component.

**Joint Operations with/Support to Host Nation Military Forces.** In certain multidimensional peacekeeping missions, UN military units may be required to conduct joint operations and/or provide support to the military forces of the Host Nation. Such support/joint operations will be strictly in accordance with the mission mandate and the conditions specified in the Secretary-General’s HRDDP on non-UN security forces (July 2011). In such missions, UN military units may be required to carry out the following activities:

- Conduct joint operations if mandated to do so as per overall mission strategy.
- Support in joint planning and execution, fire support, medical support, logistics, etc. as defined in mission-specific policy.
- Organize formal non-combat training courses (e.g., training of paramedics).
- Supervise training and mentoring of host military and auxiliary security services personnel in basic military and security aspects and in respect for and promotion of human rights in accordance with international professional standards, norms, security needs of the society and the state).
- Guide National security services to operate lawfully (respect for rule of law of the country and IHL).
- Assist in improvement in delivery of security services to address and prevent sexual and gender based violence.
- Coordinate, assist and ensure proper border management by parties concerned.
- Assist/train elements involved in dealing with civil emergencies/disasters.
- Facilitate identification and disarmament of illegal armed groups, prevention of illegal infiltration, controlling violent spoilers and criminal elements in the battalion AOR.
- Identify potential drivers and spoilers to the reform process, analyze their role and assess likely future course and report to the HQ on the political momentum that may affect the success of the process.
• Assist local authorities in reintegration of retrenched personnel and disposal of surplus military equipment.
• Build awareness on role of defence institutions within the State, and application of IHRL, IHL, etc.

8.6.6: Crisis Management.

Overview. UN peacekeeping missions operate in environments where a significant deterioration of the security situation may occur rapidly. The environment may also present numerous natural hazards that could endanger UN personnel or impair the effective functioning of the mission. Effective crisis management requires clear roles and responsibilities; enhanced information flow; streamlined decision-making processes and accelerated response procedures. All missions should have in place a crisis management SOP identifying arrangements that can be activated at short notice to enable effective crisis management. Consistent with the decentralised nature of UN peacekeeping, crisis management is devolved to the extent possible. The mission manages the crisis, while UNHQ New York (DPKO and DFS) provide a support role. With the exception of hostage incidents or purely humanitarian crises, as the senior most UN official in the area, the HoM will lead the UN crisis response. At UNHQ New York, DPKO will lead the crisis management support, coordinating with other departments, as required. The details of Peacekeeping Situation Centre (SitCen) and the UN Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) is at Annex X (p.260).

During a crisis, lines of C2 and decision-making processes are not altered. Effective crisis management should be focussed on accelerating existing decision-making and response processes. The Military Component will have a critical role in responding to most crisis situations. The Military Component will usually be required to work with other mission components as part of an integrated response, and/or together with UNCT, Host State or other external partners. The same management procedures apply to all hazards, encompassing both crises that directly affect mission personnel, property and functioning; and crises that affect others, but require a mission response consistent with the mandate, such as for the protection of civilians. In accordance with DPKO-DFS policies, a crisis is understood to be an action, incident or event that presents an exceptional and imminent threat to any of the following: safety and security of personnel; security of mission assets and premises; effective functioning of the mission; and viability of the mission mandate.

Authority. During a crisis, mission command and control arrangements are maintained. The HoM retains overall responsibility for, and executive direction of, the mission. The crisis situation is managed by the HoM (or designate) in line with the standard delegation of decision-making and operational responsibilities. The HoMC/FC maintains the C2 arrangements with respect to the Military Component of the mission.

DPKO and DFS. DPKO and DFS support missions’ crisis management efforts, including through the procedures set out in the DPKO-DFS SOP on ‘Headquarters Crisis Response in Support of DPKO-led Field Missions’. In the case of a catastrophic event that renders the mission incapable of exercising command, DPKO and DFS shall take over all necessary decision-making functions, including crisis management. In such circumstances, the USG/DPKO (or designate) may serve as de facto HoM until senior managers in the field can resume their designated roles or replacements can be deployed.

Crisis Management Team. (Refer to Chapter 2, Section 2.8.5, p. 25).

Crisis Manager. The HoM or OIC should nominate a Crisis Manager, who will normally be one of the DSRSGs or the Mission CoS, depending on the severity and type of crisis. The Crisis Manager is responsible for chairing the CMT meetings and directing the mission response to the crisis.
Integrated Operations Coordination Mechanism. The mission should have an integrated operations coordination mechanism, which will be a forum for coordinating operational planning to ensure a coherent approach to the implementation of CMT decisions and directions. The forum will also be responsible for integrated contingency planning and developing options and recommendations for the CMT. The respective components (and in particular component-specific operations centres) and UNCT elements retain responsibility for operational tasking and direction. The mission should convene an integrated operations coordination forum regularly, not just in crisis situations. When a crisis occurs, the mechanism needs to be practiced and understood by all.

JOC. Chief JOC will be the crisis management facilitator at the Mission HQ level. The JOC will be responsible for alerting senior management to an impending or occurring crisis; ensuring the flow of timely, accurate and relevant information to mission and UNCT personnel; ensuring the operational readiness of the CMT meeting venues and acting as the secretariat for the CMT. Chief JOC will also be responsible for monitoring follow-up to decisions made in the CMT, through the integrated operations coordination forum.

Host Government and Others. When responding to a crisis situation missions should coordinate their efforts with the host Government and others (including foreign governments with a presence in the country and International NGOs) to the extent possible and appropriate. Strategic coordination with the Government should be undertaken by the Office of the HOM or the Mission CoS; coordination with the National military by the HoMC/FC; and coordination with the National police by the HoPC/PC. Operational coordination between the Government and the mission should be undertaken through the development of an operations coordination mechanism.

- The Military Component should be represented in the integrated operations coordination forum, which reports to the CMT.
- The U-2, U-3 and U-5 should work closely with the JOC, particularly during a crisis situation.

References:
- UN Policy and Directive on UNHQ-level Crisis Management.
- DPKO-DFS SOP on Headquarters Crisis Response in Support of DPKO-led Field Missions.
- SOP on OMA Support to DPKO Crisis Management.
- Mission specific crisis management policies / SOPs.

8.6.7: Inter-Mission Cooperation IMC).

General. IMC is the short/medium or long-term transfer or temporary sharing or pooling of military, police or civilian resources (including operational and logistics assets) between two UN peacekeeping missions, particularly those operating in close geographic proximity, with a view to achieving specific objectives in support of filling the gap of a needed capability, mandate implementation or in response to a crisis situation. It increases the UN operational flexibility, timely response and optimisation of resources. It is an interim/ad-hoc solution in anticipation of possible force generation and is based on a politico-legal-military process involving the UN SC, UN HQ, TCCs, Mission HQ and the Host Nation. IMC cannot be a substitute for strategic or over-the-horizon reserves/forces. It has symbolic and psychological impact (“the international community is reinforcing UN peacekeeping mission”) may be much stronger than its actual operational impact. It is imperative that provisions of IMC may be built into the MOU signed between the TCC and UN Secretariat. Efforts to secure respective national legislative bodies must be taken ab-inito to ensure speedier response during crisis.

Objectives. IMC has been used (temporarily) to achieve the following:
- Fill existing capacity/capability gaps in times of heightened tension or crisis;
• Provide temporary surges, in the absence of strategic reserves, at times of crisis or at mission start up;
• Ensure joint planning, implementation or coordination; and
• Achieve efficiency gains, savings or the rational use of scarce resources through the sharing or pooling of logistical, military or other assets.
• Responding to natural/manmade calamities.

**Past Experience.** Examples of past IMC operations in UN peacekeeping operations are as follows:

- **Natural Disaster.** Response to Earthquake in MINUSTAH.
- **Mission Surge.** Surge during Mission Start-up for UNMISS (Jonglei Crisis).
- **Response to Operational Crisis.** Temporary transfer of Utility Helicopters from MONUSCO to UNMISS to address crisis situation.
- **Response to Political Crisis.** Temporary surge from UNMIL to UNOCI (3 x Infantry Companies, 2x Utility helicopters and 3x Attack Helicopters) to address post electoral political crisis.
- **Mission Start-up.** Redeployment of UNMOs and SOs to support UNSMIL from the neighbouring missions, including assets transfer from UNIFIL and UNMISS/UNAMID support for start up of UNISFA.
- **Joint Planning/Implementation/Coordination.** Current regional LRA strategy involving MONUSCO, UNMISS, BONUCA, UNAMID and UNOCA; future cooperation between UNAMID, UNMISS and UNISFA on supporting the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring; and West Africa initiative on transnational crime.
- **Standing Sharing of Assets/Efficiencies/Savings:** arrangements between UNMIL and UNOCI for the sharing of tactical aviation assets; sharing of long term lease wide-bodied aircraft to support troop rotations.

**Military Resources for IMC.** The military resources that may be committed for IMC include, but not limited to the following:

- Special Force.
- Force Reserve Battalions/Quick Reaction Forces.
- Other Sectoral/Unit reserves.
- Force Multipliers, such as Attack Helicopters, Reconnaissance Flights, UAVs, etc.
- Enabling units, such as Engineer Units, Medical units, Transport, etc.
- Special capabilities/equipments, such as surveillance assets, communication assets, EOD assets, etc.

**Important Factors for Consideration.**

- **Assessment.** Force HQ must carry out risk assessment for identifying military-specific IMC needs so as to prepare to respond effectively when required.
- **Tasking.** Force HQ must identify the resources and task them accordingly so that planning, preparations and training are undertaken well in time.
- **Operational Readiness.** Units/capabilities tasked for IMC must maintain high state of operational readiness and be capable of rapid mobilization to respond to crisis situations.
- **Interoperability.** Interoperability challenges must be identified and addressed well in advance to ensure coordinated and coherent response.
- **Standardization.** All activities and procedures, including the tactics, techniques and procedures amongst all actors must be standardized.
- **Strategic Mobility.** The Mission/Force HQ shall plan, coordinate and facilitate strategic mobility support to deploy IMC assets and units.
- **Contingency Planning.** Based on the risk analysis and anticipated operational challenges, the Force HQ and the earmarked IMC assets/units must carry out contingency planning and preparations.
- **Rehearsals.** Training of designated IMC units (including joint training) and rehearsals must be carried out under coordination of the Force HQ.

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Reconnaissance. Units/assets earmarked for IMC, preferably should carry out reconnaissance of the intended area of deployment. Operational and terrain familiarization is the key for effective execution of tasks.

Coordination. Spontaneity and rapidity in response can be only achieved through prior coordination and integration amongst the Mission components as well as other relevant stakeholders.

C3I. Command, control and information are crucial elements for successful IMC.

Logistics Agility. The Mission Support Component must be fully geared to support and sustain IMC endeavours, until such time, the deployed resources are integrated into the support systems of the receiving mission/country.

Reference:
- Presidential statement of 25 March 2004 relating to “cross border issues in West Africa” (S/PRST/2004/7)
- Report of the Secretary-General on inter-mission cooperation and possible cross-border operations between UNAMSIL, UNMIL and UNOCI of 2 March 2005 (S/2005/135)
- Security Council resolution relating to the situation in Cote d’Ivoire S/RES/1609 of 24 June 2005

8.7: Support Responsibilities.

8.7.1: Crowd Management.

General. A peacekeeping mission is deployed in the aftermath or against the backdrop of a heightened conflict situation, reflecting possible lawlessness, dysfunctional legal institutions and an ineffective police organization. Local populations may undertake demonstrations in towns and villages to air their concerns, project problems or protest issues that directly or indirectly affect them. Such gatherings, though mostly political and peaceful in nature, may turn violent, leading to disturbances/riots. The target of such demonstrations may be the host government, socio-politico or ethnic groups, or the peacekeeping mission itself.

Primary Responsibility. In principle, the responsibility for restoration and maintenance of law and order lies with the Host State, with operational support or advice provided by a UN FPU/Mission Police Component, in accordance with the mandate. Mission Police Component is usually in the lead for coordinating actions with Force/Sector HQ or Contingent/Unit Commanders, and Host civil and police authorities. In the case that Mission Police Component or civil authorities are unable to cope, military assistance may be needed as long as the mandate permits action and the ROE specify the use of crowd management means by the military. In that event, military commanders must request the presence of UN/Civil police personnel through the quickest means possible if not at the scene in an outbreak. Crowd management is followed by civil police legal action, which may be reflected in procedures like registration of criminal cases, arrests, search and seizure and subsequent prosecution action in the courts. The civil (usually) and Mission Police Component are trained and equipped to handle these activities and military commanders should readily use this expertise in field situations wherever necessary.

Technique. Crowd management is a sensitive operation requiring, amongst other elements, human rights compliance, training, appropriate equipment and clear command and control arrangements, to manage a calibrated and appropriate response to a volatile situation. It is important to allow the legitimate expression of views by the assembled crowd, while preventing escalation, casualties and collateral damage. Whether carried out by UN or Host State police or by military peacekeepers, the graduated use of force in crowd management will be guided by the mandate and expressed within relevant operational documents (ROE and Directives on Use of Force-DUF). Some of the important facets to be kept in mind while carrying out crowd management are:
• Advance planning and readiness to deal with various contingencies.
• Allocating and maintaining adequate resources (dedicated and trained troops, transport and specialized equipments).
• Preparation for establishing a joint HQ to coordinate and integrate planning and conduct of operations.
• Coordination and communication arrangements with all other actors.
• Key leader engagement, incorporating female interpreters of military/police forces, etc.

Scenarios. Military units may be required to handle crowd management in the following four scenarios:

• **Scenario A.** When charged with securing the perimeter of the tactical area of operation within which the Host State police and/or UN police are managing public order.
• **Scenario B.** When the situation is beyond the control of the Host State police and/or UN police and has evolved into a public disorder.
• **Scenario C.** When the Host State police or UN police are not available and cannot reach the area in time.
• **Scenario D.** When called upon to protect UN staff, facilities, equipment, installations or institutions.

**Scenario A.** The most typical scenario is for the police (host State or UN) to have primacy in crowd management. In this scenario, the role of Military Component may be to assist host State and/or UN police by deploying and controlling a military security support zone surrounding the police area of operation. The senior most UN Police Officer in location exercises tactical control in these situations. The military unit support role should follow the mission-specific SOP on military-police cooperation in defining the division of responsibility, the respective tactical AOR and the transfer of authority. A joint command post/incident control point is to be established to monitor and coordinate operations.

**Scenario B.** When the public order situation evolves to become public disorder of a military nature, i.e. where there is sustained use of firearms or military weaponry, there is a transfer of authority to the senior most military commander at location to exercise tactical control, since the police primacy as described in Scenario A is no longer sustainable. The military commander may request FPU personnel and/or other security personnel of the mission to perform specific tasks in support of crowd management. The assignment of FPU personnel should be coordinated with the HoPC or his/her delegate (Chief Operations, Deputy Chief Operations (FPU) or Regional Commander).

**Scenario C.** When local police or UN police is not present, the military unit should monitor and report to the HQ on crowd gathering, and share information with the nearest and relevant Host State police and UN police representatives. Part of the situational awareness might be to identify and limit the AOO. The task might involve protecting host government institutions, civilians and officials. If resources are available, establish perimeter security at an appropriate distance to restrict access and prevent crowd from further swelling. In collaboration with local authorities, it may be possible to identify routes which the crowd can use to easily disperse. Otherwise, the battalion should keep a distance from the crowd, if possible and wait for the crowd to disperse. Authority should be transferred to Host State police or UN police at the earliest possible moment in order to restore law and order.

**Scenario D.** When called upon to protect UN staff, facilities, installations or institutions or in protection of the COBs, mobile troops and vehicles, the military unit may be required to reinforce, provide security, disperse the crowd and extricate the UN personnel to safety, if required.

**Considerations.** Careful planning, deliberate preparations, timely interface and controlled execution are essential at Force HQ level. Important issues that merit attention are:
• Conduct regular joint military-police scenario-based training, rehearsals and exercises within the contingents and jointly with the police.
• Coordinate C2 arrangements, interoperability issues and application of ROE and DUF.
• Assess likely disturbances, probable locations and strengths, preventive actions, and envisaged role for military units.
• Plan (including contingency planning) and organise forces respond effectively.
• Develop an effective situational awareness network and institute monitoring mechanisms for early-warning. Prepare information-collection plan and estimate the overall situation and mood of the people.
• Assess requirement of securing/holding key terrain and infrastructures in accomplishment of the task.
• Create joint police and military operational HQ/command post, where appropriate, to establish a joint working mechanism between the civil, police and the military elements in the area for a coordinated response and measures for securing the exercise of C2.
• Carry out constructive outreach and engagement, and liaison with key leaders in advance to discourage initiation or development of any unlawful activity.
• Engage women’s groups to understand their particular concerns.
• Plans (resources and responses) should be well coordinated amongst all mission-wide responders and implemented in an integrated manner.
• The channels through which requests for military help is required to be processed should be well defined.
• The arrangements for representatives of the civil authorities, who may be police officers, to join the troops in execution of the responsibility.
• Assess requirement and earmark troops for each task and locality.
• Assessment and configuration of a reserve force.
• Joint reconnaissance with various responders should be carried out if possible.
• Prepare special stores like public address equipment, barbed wire, sandbags, crowd management equipment, fire fighting equipment and emergency lighting.
• Provision of crowd management equipment, riot control agents and maps for reinforcing units.
• Coordinate movement, deployment and support to be provided with the local administration and police authorities.
• The reception, briefings, guidance, deployment and administrative support to the reinforcements.
• Plan to record/collect evidence with cameras, videos and by written or tape recorded eye witness accounts.
• Plans to divert civil traffic, which should include provision for maintaining cleared routes for use by military reinforcements.
• Interpreters will be of great help in interacting with the locals to establish contact, engage key leaders and in diffusing situations. Note that interpreters will also need to be trained, fully trusted and protected.

8.7.2: Support Defence Sector Reform (DSR).

**General.** The SSR/DSR support is provided at the request of national governments and/or in response to Security Council resolutions or General Assembly mandates, as well as during development and implementation of a peace agreement, in particular in the aftermath of a conflict. Where mandated or requested, the goal of the UN engagement in DSR is to support national efforts to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, accountability and affordability of the defence sector and its components, in order to contribute to sustainable peace, security, good governance and development for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law, and in accordance with national and international norms, laws and nation-specific agreements. In post conflict settings, DSR is often both a complex political process and a long-term technical endeavour. As such, both dimensions have different momentums within the life of the reforming exercise that shall be carefully considered by the UN leadership and/or experts in order to successfully carry
out the different support tasks and activities stipulated in the Mission Concept.

**DSR Implementation and/or Development Plan.** UN support to national DSR effort can be exercised at the political and/or technical dimensions, as well as, at strategic, operational and/or tactical level. The mission DSR activities shall be guided by a Mission Concept, which shall be derived from a National DSR Implementation Plan or synonymous guiding document that articulates the goals, roles, responsibilities and tasks of the national authorities, the UN, as well as relevant national and international partners. The national strategic defence review and appraisal defines whether the goal is to reconcile, reform, transform, restructure, reengineer, enhance or develop the defence sector, including to what extent the strategic, operational and tactical capabilities and capacities of the host nations’ defence institutions are to be modified. Based on the Mission Concept, the international stakeholders and/or UN may provide structural/functional/infrastructure/asset/defence legislation, policy and/or doctrinal reforms.

**Considerations for UN Support.** DSR support provided by the UN shall:

- Consider existing security and defence institutions, concepts, approaches and cultures.
- Respect and ensure the commitment of the defence sector and its oversight bodies to national and international norms, laws, and nation-specific agreements.
- Adhere to the basic principles of transparency, accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, and affordability, while respecting the host-nation’s right to confidentiality.
- Strengthen trust and confidence between the State and people within its jurisdiction, defence sector components and other security sector actors, to enhance legitimacy.
- Be approached comprehensibly, and consider other related reform processes to develop a single politico-strategic vision and programme.
- Include all national stakeholders within the defence sector (government, legislative bodies, defence institutions, security and justice sectors, civil society and the media, etc.).
- Focus on the development of sufficient national governance, management, institutional, resource (human, material and financial) and technical capacities and capabilities, in the strategic, operational and tactical dimensions of a national defence sector.
- Be tailored and defined taking into consideration, the national requests and the will of host-nation authorities; the level, breadth and depth of the reform required; available capacities and resources of both national and other different stakeholders; partnerships and roles at the international, regional and national levels; potential scenarios typical for implementation of DSR; and identification of the appropriate initiation/start-up point for UN DSR support, etc.
- Facilitate the initiation of DSR at the outset of a peace process and its incorporation into early recovery and development strategies.
- Promote the planning of DSR as a long-term endeavour, underscoring the implications for subsequent generations and factors of national power.

**Restrictions.** Following restrictions are applicable to UN support to DSR:

- Avoid support in absence of civilian oversight, accountability and management.
- No support that compromises the sovereignty of the state or the human rights of the people (in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy).
- No field training or related support to enhance war-waging.
- No military armaments, military equipment or related operational funds.

Note:
In certain Missions, operational environment may require innovative measures to ensure safety and stability in the conflict zone. For example, the UN SC, vide SCR 2098, MONUSCO was authorized to support creation of a Congolese Rapid reaction Force able to take over responsibility for achieving the objective of the intervention brigade. It further stipulates “provision of good offices, advice and support to the Government of DRC for a

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reform of the army, including as a first step, the establishment of a vetted, well trained and adequately equipped Rapid reaction Force within the FARDC”.

Core DSR Tasks. The core tasks of the UN include, inter alia providing advice and assistance in the areas of norms and standards; governance and oversight; education and awareness-building; consensus-building amongst all national stakeholders; coordination, in particular of international support; and monitoring and evaluation. More specifically, the UN support to national DSR processes includes the following:

- **Governance and Oversight Tasks** (support for the reform/development of the required mechanisms for civilian oversight and management, as well as the required legislative framework of the defence sector and rules for measuring the level of accountability, including issues concerned with the delineation of roles and responsibilities within the security sector and between defence, police and other security and justice actors).

- **Defence Legislation, Norms, Doctrine and/or Overall Reform Plan Development Tasks** (development of a defence policy and/or strategy on the basis of a national security policy and/or strategy; planning for reconciling, reforming, transforming, restructuring, reengineering, enhancing or developing the defence sector).

- **Administration, Budget Development and Management Tasks** (ensuring the affordability, financial sustainability and transparent administration of the defence sector in line with national defence policies, strategies, priorities, reform plans and initiatives).

- **Formation and Education Tasks** (education and/or awareness-building initiatives within the defence sector, such as the role of the defence institutions within the State; human rights; gender; and international humanitarian law and other bodies of international law).

- **Consensus Building amongst National Stakeholders and Reconciliation Tasks** (facilitation of national dialogue/s on DSR).

- **Defence Sector Review, Appraisal and Coordination Tasks**, (defence sector evaluation and determinations of potential defence arrangements, synchronization and harmonization of international support and resource mobilisation, for implementation of the aforementioned defence reform plan; provision of programming tools and monitoring and evaluation of the reform programmes, processes and initiatives).

- **Field Training Advice and Support.** Provide field training advice and support if mandated.

Mission Level DSR Management. Working with the national authorities, the HoM/HoMC and the Head of the SSR component (or the lead DSR expert), shall be responsible for overseeing and leading support to national DSR efforts, through an appropriate implementation strategy, in consultation with relevant UNHQ entities, (OMA, SSRU, etc.), and relevant national and international partners including bilateral donors and implementers. Heads of SSR components/lead DSR expert, shall be responsible for ensuring regular, timely and accurate reporting on DSR plans, programmes/projects, issues, challenges, lessons learned and best practices, to both DPKO and DPA. Heads of human rights components shall ensure human rights monitoring capacity, accountability of defence sector institutions as well as transitional justice including vetting processes in the context of conflict and post-conflict situations.

Role of Military Component. The Mission Concept shall articulate the envisaged role of Military Component (including the Force HQ), which will be reflected in the Force OPORD. Generally, following support functions may be performed by the Military Component:

- Strategic advice by HoMC to the SRSG and the MLT as required.
- Host Government leadership engagement by Force leadership, in support of the Mission DSR plan.
- Provide guidance on DSR to host Security Forces.
- Provide advice on structuring/restructuring/re-engineering of the Security sector.
- Provide basic training assistance.
- Provide Human Rights education and monitoring support.
- Promote functional abilities and accountability of the security forces.
- Facilitate mediation and reconciliation amongst warring factions.

References:
- Defence Sector Reform (DSR) Policy, 2011.

8.7.3: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).

**General.** If a UN peacekeeping mandate includes the supervision of a DDR programme, the military component will normally be directly involved only in the disarmament phase and partially involved in the demobilization phase. The reintegration task is a civilian function normally undertaken by the national authorities and assisted by the international community, including the peacekeeping operation. The three phases are inter-linked and interdependent, however. Reintegration of former combatants into a viable civilian life has important repercussions for the peace process and can often determine the extent to which even the disarmament and demobilization phases will be successful. Therefore, the DDR process needs to be properly planned as a continuous process and appropriately resourced from the outset.

**Overview.** The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants is a complex process with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions that necessitates support from multiple components of the mission. The overarching goal of DDR is to contribute to the enhancement and consolidation of security in support of the political process so that post-conflict reconstruction and recovery can begin. Therefore, DDR programmes are often at the nexus of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development efforts, and involve a variety of national and international, military, police and civilian actors and institutions.

DDR addresses the security challenges arising from ex-combatants left without livelihoods in the post-conflict transition period, through a comprehensive process of disarmament, preparation for civilian life and provision of opportunities for sustainable economic and social reintegration. Current DDR practices, as detailed in the Integrated DDR Standards (2006), reflect two decades of field experience. While this is an important achievement, the evolving peacekeeping environment has led DDR practitioners to adapt to new contexts and challenges, moving from the traditional DDR model, which is a highly structured and formalized process that deals with recognized armed forces or groups. The increasingly complex settings in which DDR operate have led DDR practitioners to develop forward leaning approaches in response to these emerging challenges. The DPKO study “Second Generation DDR Practices in Peace Operations” (2010) provides an analysis of situations where the traditional pre-conditions for DDR do not exist, as well as a set of alternative or complementary DDR-related options.

The success of DDR is in large part subject to the political and operational framework surrounding its process. The initiation and implementation of DDR may be difficult and even stalled when the political climate is not set, or when there is lack of capacity to design, plan and implement DDR programmes. For this reason, the role of the mission’s senior leadership, including the Force Commander, as an effective and proactive enabler is critical for the planning and implementation of peacebuilding processes such as DDR. This manual gives an up-to-date overview of traditional and contemporary DDR and discusses the strategic role of the Force Commander in supporting this process. It underlines the essential role of the Force Commander in providing guidance and directives to its military unit, and informs on the
scope of its involvement in DDR. Further, the manual outlines the types of military coordination, cooperation and support necessary to achieve various DDR operations.

**Basic Principles of DDR and Related Activities.** The objective of a DDR or related programme is to contribute to security and stability in a post-conflict environment, so that recovery and development can begin. The following are some basic principles underlining DDR:

- **National Ownership:** The primary responsibility for DDR programmes rests with national actors (e.g. the Government, political parties, armed groups, national or local military, police and civil society). The UN role is to support the DDR process as an impartial actor through the provision of technical expertise, advice to the national authorities and different types of resources including personnel, funds and logistics.

- **DDR is a voluntary process:** Ensuring the voluntary nature of participation is critical to preserving the credibility of any DDR programme. The role of the Mission in providing safekeeping for combatants and dependents as they move through the DDR process is essential in this regard.

- **Integration into a broader, multi-dimensional approach to peacebuilding:** DDR must be part of the broader peacebuilding and recovery strategy for the country. In particular, DDR must be linked to broader security sector issues, such as the reorganization of armed forces.

- **Conceived in accordance with Security Council resolutions:** DDR and related operations must be conceived in accordance with the Security Council resolutions that lay the foundation for the overall objectives of the mission.

- **Based on relevant Accords/Agreements:** When peace accords or agreement are signed, it is imperative that DDR and related operations are conceived based on these frameworks as they constitute the milestones of post-conflict stabilization.

**The HoMC Role in Support to DDR.** The function of the HoMC/FC as the head of the Force Headquarters can be particularly salient in the planning considerations for DDR. As military resources and assets for peacekeeping are limited and often provided for multiple purposes, it is important to identify DDR tasks at an early stage in the mission planning process so that appropriately trained and equipped units are available for the task. For the military, DDR planning is not very different from planning related to other military tasks in a UN peacekeeping operation. It is however important to distinguish between operational military tasks in support of DDR, which are directed by the military chain of command, and engagement in the often politically sensitive DDR planning and policymaking process, which is led by civilian Chief of the DDR component in consultation with the wider mission Senior leadership. UN Military Observers, Military Staff Officers and Military Liaison Officers are also incorporated into the force command structure. In this regard, the directives of the Force Commander and the Force HQ, following consultation with other mission Senior Leadership, are useful in informing the scope of the involvement of the military unit as well as establishing adequate coordination mechanisms and integration with other elements.

**The Military Component's Role and Contribution to DDR.** While the primary contribution made by the military component to DDR is the provision of security, the employment of various military capabilities, technical expertise and skills can be vital to the planning and implementation of a DDR programme. The following provides a list of possible military support in various phases of DDR, or in its related activities.

- **Support for Planning.**
  - **Information gathering and sharing:** The military component can contribute to DDR operations by seeking information on the locations, strengths and intentions of former combatants who may become part of a DDR programme. The information-gathering process can be a specific task of the military component, but it can also be a by-product of its normal operations, e.g., information gathered by patrols and the
activities of Military Observers (MILOBs). MILOBs provide a unique opportunity to develop cooperation between DDR and the military force, as they can interpret capabilities, constraints and requirements of the military forces and DDR civilian staff in ways that can build better understanding and cooperation. MILOBs conduct liaison between DDR components and respective military forces and facilitate the exchange of information on operations and requirements.

- **Sensitization (dissemination of information):** The military component normally is widely spread across the post-conflict region, and can therefore assist by distributing information on a DDR programme to potential participants and the local population. This is particularly useful when armed factions command chains and communications are poor.

- **Examples of Military-DDR Cooperation for DDR planning.**
  - Joint armed group analysis: The military component can assist in conducting armed groups analysis as part of the public information and sensitization campaign associated with DDR. A Mission’s Joint Mission Analysis Centre should coordinate the information-gathering and reporting activities.
  - Jointly developed CONOPS or SOPs: Military and civilian DDR officers often collaborate in the production of guidelines that mutually affect their scope of activities. Collaboration could come through DDR contribution to military concept of operations, or military contribution in the development of DDR Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
  - Joint assessment missions: Military staff officers may participate, when required and available, in joint assessment missions to assist in determining the military operational requirement specifically needed to support a DDR programme.

- **Support to disarmament and demobilization operations (including reinsertion) for national combatants.** In many disarmament and demobilization operations, the military component of the mission would provide valuable resources and capabilities, which are often difficult for the civilian components of UN peacekeeping operations to obtain. The following list details key areas of strategic support:
  - Providing security: If mandated and resourced, military capability can be used to provide security that is specifically related to a DDR programme. This can include camp and/or cantonment security, weapons and ammunition management, security of disarmament and/or demobilization sites, escorts to movement of participants in the programme. If the mandate and the concept of operations specify that military support should be provided to DDR to carry out specific tasks, then this support should be factored into the force structure when the concept is drawn up rather than after the start of the mission.
  - Disarming ex-combatants and securing weapons, ammunition and explosives: DDR personnel generally have not been trained to handle weapons, ammunition and explosives. They often have to call on the military or Mine Action Service (MAS) to assist with weapons, ammunition and explosives that are turned in by ex-combatants entering the DDR process. Early and comprehensive planning should identify whether this is a requirement, and military units/capabilities should be generated accordingly.
  - Support to Reinsertion: Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. Various assets of the mission can be used in support of reinsertion activities, such as its staff and logistical capacity (equipment, vehicles, military engineers etc.).

- **Support to Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) for foreign combatants.** Disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) targets combatants and their dependents that are active on foreign soil, and includes operations supporting the voluntary disarmament, demobilization and repatriation to their countries of origin. Activities are conducted in accordance with the Security Council resolutions and arrangements made with the combatants’ home countries. While only the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has so far been tasked with a DDRRR mandate, an increasingly large number of missions are faced with foreign and exiled combatants issues (BINUCA and UNMISS for issues related to the Lord’s Resistance Army, or UNOCI and UNMIL for the repatriation of exiled combatants to name a few.)

Support to Repatriation. In addition to the support for disarmament and demobilization described above, the military component’s support may be requested in the following activities related to the reception of foreign elements of armed groups and their repatriation to their country of origin:

- **Reception and safekeeping:** When implementing DDRRR, it is critical that the military component of the mission provides safekeeping to ex-combatants and/or dependents that voluntarily enter the process. In such cases, the military should be briefed at all levels and aware of the procedures to accept combatants. At military bases where there is not a DDR presence, the military must receive and protect combatants and/or dependants in a secure area where their former armed group members cannot harm.

- **Extraction:** When it is necessary to coordinate the extraction of ex-combatants and dependents from their location to transit camps, support may be requested from the mission military (where present) in the form of security, communication and transport.

- **Repatriation:** Military escorts or transportation to the border area may be requested in case the foreign combatant or dependent are volunteers to repatriation.

**DDR-Military Coordination in Robust Peace Enforcement Mandate.** In some peace operations contexts, a more robust mandate of peace enforcement would require close coordination with the DDR component of the mission. If and when planned, the employment of military means to address armed groups should be closely coordinated with non-military means, especially DDR and DDRRR, as these are critical in the stabilization process in offering options for voluntary defections from combatants of armed groups (see above, Section IV). It should also be noted that armed groups may include dependents of combatants, and children associated with armed groups and forces, and therefore it is critical for DDR initiatives to be initiated before, during, and after any military operation, to provide them with a safe way out.

In the context of military operations, supported or conducted by the UN, support could include enhanced security for DDR sites and camps, setting up of Quick Reaction Team, reinforced military escorts accompanying DDR teams on operations, and securing DDR corridors to allow preventive and voluntary desertion of combatants and dependants from armed groups before, during and after military operations. Further, coordination between military operations and DDR would allow for information and sensitization campaigns (aimed at increasing the chances of combatants and dependents to voluntarily defect from armed groups) to complement military operations.

**Military Support in Second Generation DDR activities.** The increasingly complex settings in which peace operations are deployed require new dynamic and innovative modes of conducting peacekeeping. DDR practitioners have needed to develop forward leaning approaches in response to the emerging challenges they face in the field. The “Second Generation DDR Practices in Peace Operations” (2010) study documents and learns from innovative and best practices in the field. The report recognizes that “traditional DDR,” which is a highly structured and formalized process that deals with recognized armed forces or groups can no longer be assumed as a default option. Second Generation DDR, which
addresses communities at large, organized crime, spoilers and other special groups, will likely be conducted in complement to the traditional model or even as an alternative.

Second Generation approaches to DDR primarily target unregulated armed groups such as militias, gangs and other non-state armed actors as well as communities at large. This type of DDR may involve addressing failed or weak aspects or ongoing security challenges linked to conventional peacekeeping operations efforts and those of development partners. Therefore, Second Generation DDR aims to support practical and strategic links between security and development and offers the possibility to facilitate a much smoother transition between stabilisation or early peacebuilding and longer-term processes.

Planning for second-generation DDR activities requires a thorough assessment of the context, conflict issues, political considerations and national capacities. These assessments should feed into the DDR process not only during the pre-planning state, but also throughout the lifecycle of the mission. In missions, information collected by the DDR unit, the military unit and the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) inform on what kind of DDR activities should be implemented in order to best address the situation on the ground. In Liberia for example, these assessments were jointly carried out by the Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery Section (successor of DDR Section) and involved Military Observers as well as JMAC and UN police, and had the potential to be used more widely for other UN programmatic activities.

8.7.4: Support to Humanitarian Activities.

Overview. The military component will not normally be structured, trained or funded for the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance, which is a civilian task. The military is more likely to be asked to provide a secure environment in which humanitarian assistance can be delivered successfully or to provide security and protection for humanitarian relief operations. This may take the form of ensuring freedom of movement, convoy escorts, protection of humanitarian personnel and storage sites, amongst other assistance. The military component often, however, has assets and capabilities, such as transport and other logistical support that are useful in a humanitarian effort. Use of military assets for humanitarian tasks should be coordinated by an appropriate civilian authority as part of a coordinated plan of emergency relief. Within the UN system, managing humanitarian assistance is normally the task of the humanitarian coordinator in that particular mission area.

Role of military Contingents. Military contingents also undertake humanitarian activities on their own initiative, using their own resources. Some governments consider this humanitarian dimension an essential part of their peacekeeping contribution and, often, an important factor in mobilizing national support for the military deployment. Humanitarian projects undertaken by the military can contribute significantly to improving relations with the local population and the parties to the conflict, thereby increasing security and building consent. These activities should be based on the international humanitarian objectives and policy framework in the mission area and avoid duplication of effort with humanitarian agencies. It is vital that the initiatives help build local capacity and be sustainable in the long term.

Humanitarian Assistance Operations. While the primary humanitarian expectation for military assistance is to provide a safe and secure environment in which humanitarian organisations can operate, for the purposes of military planning, assistance can be divided into three categories based on the degree of contact with the affected population. These categories are important because they help define which types of humanitarian activities might be appropriate to support with peacekeeping mission assets and resources under different conditions, given that ample consultation has been conducted with all concerned parties to explain the nature and necessity of the assistance.

- **Direct Assistance** is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services.
• **Indirect Assistance** is at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel.

• **Infrastructure Support** involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace management, port rehabilitation, and power generation that facilitate relief operations, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population.

Peacekeeping forces should only undertake *direct assistance* operations in extremis, if humanitarian organisations are unable to access a population in need and if there is no other civilian alternative, and only after coordination with and the agreement of the HC. In order to capitalize on the strengths of the peacekeeping mission and to maintain coherence with principled humanitarian assistance, Force HQ should plan and prioritize their potential support operations to *infrastructure support* and *indirect assistance* operations, based on identified needs and only upon request by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).

QIPs are increasingly understood by humanitarian actors as fundamental to peacekeeping mission objectives and it remain a sensitive issue amongst the humanitarian community. QIPs are not intended as humanitarian or long-term development aid or for use as programmable resources to implement mandated tasks (although they may complement the programme of work of mission components). Where the project has humanitarian or developmental elements, close coordination with other UN bodies engaged in these activities is required through the Project Review Committee to ensure that approved projects complement and do not duplicate or undermine the activities of other actors in these fields.

**Planning for Humanitarian Operations.** The context of the emergency will determine how closely the Force HQ and humanitarian actors will plan and execute joint plans. In natural disaster response operations, it is often both appropriate and necessary joint planning between humanitarians and the Force HQ. This is required to gain the necessary operational speed and agility to meet the needs of the affected population. Best practices have demonstrated that military planning expertise and methodology has been a useful tool in creating response plans to address urgent requirements in the delivery of assistance, humanitarian infrastructure rehabilitation, and the provision of a secure and enabling environment in which to operate.

However, in complex emergency operations it generally inappropriate for humanitarians and Force HQ Staff to conduct joint planning, based on actual or perceived affiliation with parties to the conflict. However, this does not preclude humanitarian input into the Force HQ planning process, information sharing, and coordination of QIP or community action projects. The civil-military working group is an excellent tool for requesting and sharing required information.

**Challenges.** Changes and adaptations in peacekeeping mandates will provide a challenge for the Force HQ in coordinating effectively with humanitarian actors. The establishment of intervention forces within peacekeeping missions and counter-terror mandates will require the humanitarian community to adopt more restrictive and principled coordination strategies with the Force HQ and peacekeeping contingents. While this does not preclude information sharing and coordination, it will require the humanitarian community to carefully evaluate and monitor their engagement and adapt their strategies based on the specific context. Regardless of the coordination strategy employed, it is critical that sustained dialogue and information sharing remain a priority between the Force HQ and the humanitarian community.

As peacekeeping mandates continue to authorize peacekeeping forces to undertake protection of civilian and support to humanitarian assistance operations missions, there will inevitably be more concern amongst the humanitarian community about principled humanitarian action. This may result in increased friction between humanitarian and military actors regarding
individual roles and responsibilities. The result of this is the need for more engagement, more effective and comprehensive coordination, increased information sharing, deeper understanding of each others’ roles and responsibilities, common training, and more realistic situational exercises.

**Best Practices.** The following tips for effective coordination and engagement with humanitarian actors have been acquired through experience with peacekeeping missions and can be used both at the Force HQ and passed along to peacekeeping contingents.

**In the Field.**
- Help provide a safe and secure environment for humanitarian actors, especially by providing broad area security or route security rather than military or armed escorts for individual aid agencies.
- As a rule, humanitarian actors will not use military escorts or armed protection for humanitarian activities. They may request armed escorts or protection in exceptional circumstances, as a last resort, when there is no other way of meeting urgent humanitarian needs.

**In the Office.**
- Share information relevant to the security of civilians and humanitarian staff.
- Share information on the presence of mines and mine action activities.
- Share information on major movements of civilian population.
- Expect humanitarian actors to share basic information about their activities and locations, but respect the fact that they cannot share information that places their staff or beneficiaries at risk.
- When sharing information received by a humanitarian actor, treat the source as ‘anonymous’, (i.e. without referring to the names of staff and organizations).

**In the community.**
- Do not attempt to carry out humanitarian needs assessment on your own, but report any observed relief needs to the nearest OCHA office.
- Do not get involved in direct assistance (such as food, water, medical, animal health, or agriculture projects). Consider whether the mission could support by providing indirect (transport) or infrastructure assistance (e.g. rehabilitation of roads, air strips or bridges).
- Avoid raising expectations by making any promises about assistance to local authorities or population.
- Avoid harming or humiliating affected populations by asking inappropriate questions.
- Avoid creating confusion between the roles of the military & the humanitarian agencies.

**Meeting with Humanitarian Actors.**
- Make an appointment – humanitarian actors may prefer to meet in a neutral venue.
- Weapons are forbidden on humanitarian premises, facilities and vehicles.
- Don’t assume western personnel are in charge.

**Force HQ Role.** Dialogue, information sharing, coordination and consultation with humanitarian actors by the Force HQ is key to alleviating humanitarian concerns about the impact of political decisions and/or military actions compromising the real or perceived neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian action. Force HQ leadership should be conscious of the fundamental need to maintain the civilian character of humanitarian assistance, and shall be asked to ensure that the use of mission military assets to support humanitarian assistance is appropriate, timely, unique in capability and availability, based on identified needs, in conformity with international law and humanitarian principles, as well as internationally established guidelines, such as the Oslo Guidelines, the Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines), as well as country/context-specific guidelines, where present. Force HQ must be prepared to participate in the dialogue with humanitarian actors.
8.7.5: Elections and the UN.

Overview. Elections are the process by which citizens express their will on who should represent them, the legitimacy of a government is established, and politicians are held to account. They are a vital part of democratic transitions and the implementation of peace processes around the globe. The UN plays a major role in providing international assistance in these processes. In the past, the Organization supervised and observed referenda and elections. These days it focuses on providing technical assistance to help Member States build credible and sustainable national electoral systems. More than 100 countries have requested and have received UN election assistance since 1991.

System-wide Endeavour. UN electoral assistance is a system-wide endeavour, tapping the complementary expertise and capacities of many parts of the UN family. These include:

- **The Department of Political Affairs (DPA).** The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs serves as the UN Focal Point for electoral assistance, and is supported in that function by DPA’s Electoral Assistance Division (EAD). All requests for UN electoral assistance are decided upon by the Under-Secretary-General. In addition to its broad coordination role in electoral assistance, DPA oversees field-based political missions which engage in electoral assistance activities as part of their conflict prevention or peace-building mandates.

- **DPKO.** In peacekeeping and many post-conflict environments, assistance is generally provided through electoral components of DPKO field missions. In those cases, EAD works closely with DPKO in planning and managing electoral support aspects of peacekeeping operations. For more details of peacekeeping involvement in elections, see further below.

- **UNDP.** UNDP is the major implementing body for UN electoral support, providing technical assistance, mainly in development contexts; but often as important parts of integrated peacekeeping operations. UNDP also engages with Member States on long-term capacity development of electoral management bodies.

- **OHCHR.** OHCHR monitors the human rights situation in a country, before, during and after elections in order to foster an environment conducive to credible elections. OHCHR also produces guidelines on human rights standards applicable to elections.

- **United Nations Volunteers (UNV).** The UNV programme provides substantive and operational support, complementing the staffing with experienced professionals, often in large numbers.

- **The United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS).** UNOPS is a service provider to the UN system and its Member States. UNOPS has provided operational and other support to electoral assistance in a number of countries and often works in close cooperation with UNDP.

Principles and Types of UN Electoral Assistance. Before the UN provides any type of electoral assistance, two preconditions must be met: there must be a UN SC or GA mandate or an official request from a member state or territory. Moreover, a needs assessment must be carried out by the UN Focal Point for electoral assistance in consultation with relevant UN entities. UN electoral assistance will always take into account the specific context of the country, but must also adhere to certain principles, including the following. Elections are sovereign processes, and it is the national authorities of UN Member States that are ultimately responsible for their conduct (unless the UN is mandated to do so). UN assistance must be objective, impartial, neutral and independent: UN personnel may not favour one group or the other. It is guided by the understanding that there is no single model of democracy. The UN should generally not be prescriptive, but this does not prevent the UN from advising a requesting state on the implementation of its own international commitments, norms and principles. UN electoral assistance recognizes that elections are fundamentally political events; it therefore aims to facilitate maximum political participation and to contribute to longer-term political stability. All electoral assistance in peacekeeping settings should be
delivered in a fully integrated manner from the outset, whether or not the mission is structurally integrated.

**Assistance.** The UN practice has evolved over time. At present, the UN provides six basic types of electoral assistance:
- Organization and conduct of elections.
- Certification.
- Technical assistance.
- Expert panels.
- Operational support to international observers.
- Support to creating conducive environment.

Technical assistance is by far the most frequent form of support. It can cover a range of activities, including advice to national authorities, operational support and the use of transport assets, support to security forces, and materials support. In the past, the UN also supervised and observed elections, but such mandates have not been provided for many years now.

**Elections and Conflict.** Elections can be overshadowed by political discord or violence, especially after results are announced. Such violence can be triggered by electoral shortcomings, such as severely flawed voter lists or real or perceived fraud. However, most often technical shortcomings are not the fundamental cause of violence, but merely the spark that ignites deeper-rooted tensions. Whatever the underlying causes of violence are, UN personnel involved in supporting an election should understand the political stakes and the potential for controversy or conflict. Where appropriate, the UN should take specific measures to prevent or mitigate violent conflict related to elections.

**Operational Roles of UN Military components in Elections.** Within the framework of UN electoral assistance, the UN Military can be requested to provide security or logistical support in the conduct of electoral operations. The specific role of UN Military will normally be determined by the legal framework of the host country, the overall threat to peace and security within a given country, the UN mandate and the capacity of national entities such as the Electoral Management Body and the Security Forces.

Election operations will normally comprise many important phases, all with different security and logistical implications. These include voter registration, candidate registration/nomination, political campaigns, voter information and education, polling and counting, tallying and announcement of results, and a post-electoral phase. In most cases, primary responsibility for the provision of security for electoral operations rests with the national police force, who would take the lead in the planning, coordination and implementation of all security components of an electoral operation. Within the context of UN Peacekeeping operations, the national police forces are usually aided in their role by UN police contingents who will usually carry out an advisory, mentoring, training or support role. They may on occasion provide logistics support to the national police. In most cases the national army, and in some cases other security forces such as border control or navy, also provide security support. This may involve area or perimeter security (not directly at polling sites) or border security, quick response support and possibly logistical support.

Depending on the previously mentioned factors UN Military may perform a number of supporting roles to the national military which may include advisory, mentoring or training roles. Depending on circumstances UN military may also be required to provide back up security, primary security or logistical support. Military observers will also play a role in the electoral process but this is normally confined to exercising their normal observation roles adapted to the electoral period when the security situation may become tense. Below are some typical operational roles performed by the national military with support from UN Military Component:
• **Security planning and coordination**: Generally some form of security planning and coordination meeting is established during the planning stage of any electoral process. The composition is usually all security components, including the Police and Military, the Electoral Management Body (EMB), UN Police and Military and UN/International electoral advisors. Such meetings are usually chaired by the national police or possibly the EMB. The main focus will be to identify security requirements and to agree responsibilities for all phases of the process and thereby develop an electoral security plan. These requirements will usually be based on the EMB election operational plan and timeline. It is advisable to identify focal point/liaison officer(s) from the UN Military to be regularly part of these meetings. Similar planning and coordination is often replicated at regional and other levels. All UN involvement in planning and coordination of this nature should be carried out in an integrated manner, in line with UN policy on integration, and closely coordinated with the UN electoral team on the ground.

• **Border security**: The Military’s primary security responsibility during elections is to protect the borders of the country against external threats. Given the fact that UN missions usually provide electoral support in post-conflict situations, there may be a number of additional factors that need to be considered in terms of border security. These include the existence of refugees living in neighbouring countries, who may or may not be eligible to participate in the electoral process, the existence of armed groups in neighbouring countries or the existence of armed groups within but close to borders.

• **Area or perimeter security for registration/voting areas**: Static security at voter registration centres/polling centres, and other electoral locations such as EMB offices, warehouses or tally centres, is generally the responsibility of the Police. In support the Military may be required to provide area or perimeter security during voter registration and polling activities. This may take the form of mobile patrols or static security.

• **Crisis Response**: In providing perimeter security, the military may also be requested to provide rapid response in support of the Police at specific points of disturbance or emergencies during an electoral operation.

• **Security of Election Materials**: The military may also be requested to support or provide security for movement or storage of election materials.

• **Logistics support**: The Military may be requested to provide logistical support to an electoral operation. This can include air and ground assets in the delivery and retrieval of election materials and sometimes election officials. UN military will normally carry out a supporting role here but depending on circumstance on the ground and the availability of UN military assets they may be requested to provide direct logistical support.

• **Threat Assessment**: The military may also be required to support or conduct threat assessments for the various phases of an electoral operation. This may include a series of activities like identifying potential hot spots and regular visits to registration/polling centres during their patrols. The period surrounding the tabulation and announcement of results can be particularly tense and should be one of the focuses of any threat assessments.

• **Communication support**: The Military may be required to provide support for effective communication during electoral operations. This may include providing assets in setting up security coordination cells or assisting the EMB with its own communications.

• **Training/Briefing**: UN Military personnel can be requested to provide training or briefing to their national counterparts in order to facilitate and build their capacity to carry out the above responsibilities. Such activities should be closely coordinated with the UN electoral assistance team in the country.

#### 8.8: Miscellaneous Responsibilities

8. **8.1: Demining.** The military component will normally be responsible for mine and explosives clearance for the operational needs of the peacekeeping operation, such as movement and deployment of troops and other personnel, maintenance of supply lines to deployment sites and increased access to all parts of the mission area. The military will normally not undertake demining for strictly humanitarian purposes, such as reclaiming land
for agriculture and the return of displaced persons, because these are seen as civilian activities requiring long-term and sustainable solutions implemented by National authorities.

8.8.2: Restoration and Maintenance of Law and Order. In situations where there is no effective national or international policing capability, the military component may be tasked to assist in the restoration and maintenance of law and order. This is not normally a military task and requires significant specialized training. For these reasons, maintenance of law and order will be a task for the military only in exceptional circumstances, with the goal of returning to civilian policing as soon as possible.

8.8.3: Human Rights Monitoring. As with the maintenance of law and order, the monitoring of human rights is a specialized and essentially civilian function, and military forces are not trained to act as human rights monitors. The military component can assist in this function, however, by observing, gathering information and reporting it to UN civilian or political authorities. Human rights violations are a good indicator of the potential for conflict in an area of operation, and the military component collects it as essential input for its own threat and risk assessments.

8.8.4: Detention. UN Personnel in missions are sometimes required under the terms of their mandates to detain persons in application of mission-specific military rules of engagement or police directives on the use of force and related matters issued by the DPKO. It is required that detained persons be handled humanely and in compliance with military-specific ROE and SOFA/SOMA, police directives on the use of force and applicable IHRL, IHL and refugee law, norms and standards. The operational framework for detentions within UN peacekeeping operations is provided in the Interim SOP on Detention. The ISOP remains applicable until such a time that final SOPs are approved. However, the ISOP does not address issues of criminal procedures which are governed by the relevant laws of the host State, and are not applicable to missions with executive mandate or interim law enforcement function, where handling of detainees will be governed by the law applicable in the Mission area. A military unit may be required to detain suspected persons or criminals in the following circumstances:

- While conducting cordon and search operations.
- At the CP.
- When a person commits an offence in the presence of a patrol against any vulnerable section of the society (women, children, elderly, etc.).
- When grave danger or reasonable threat to life is imminent or exists.
- As part of support to law and public order management.
- Whilst carrying out proactive disarmament.
- In protection of UN personnel and property where danger is imminent.
- When an intrusion/trespass or attempt to commit an infraction or violation in UN premises takes place.

References:


8.8.5: Response to Natural and Man-Made Disasters and Mass Casualty Incidents. Deployed UN Missions, by virtue of being present in the country in which a natural or man-made disasters or Mass Casualty incidents occur have a bounden duty to respond immediately to support the Host State in saving lives and restoring normalcy in the area. Such eventualities must be catered as contingency plans and advance planning, resource

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allocations, tasking and coordination at the Mission and Force HQ level must be instituted. UN Peacekeeping Missions may undertake the following tasks/measures:

- Conduct rescue operations.
- Carry out evacuation.
- Coordinate rescue and support efforts of other actors.
- Provide Mission assets (Air crafts, helicopters, vehicles, engineers, medical facilities, tents, etc.) to the Host State and other actors.
- Coordinate provision/employment of international response assets.
- Coordinate provision of basic amenities (food, shelter, clothing, medicines, etc.).
- Restore/provide essential services.
- Establish temporary camps.

8.9: Conclusion.
The accomplishment of the METs of each military unit and the execution of specified roles and responsibilities by the Military Component are to be synchronized with the Mandate, Mission Concept (of the mission concerned) and the Military Strategic CONOPS (issued by the DPKO). Operational responsibilities are set at the Force HQ level and delegated selectively to subordinate HQ, while units and sub-units are tasked through specified METs through the OPORD. Force HQ shall maintain an effective oversight of the MET execution, including its effect in the AOO and must play its part in overarching, crosscutting and support roles and responsibilities of the military Component. Despite the uniqueness of the UN TTPs, military units, sub-units and personnel must at all times ensure professional approach, high operational readiness, tactical flexibility and resilience, effective coordination and integration, safety and security of personnel, equipments and premises, to accomplish objectives set for them.
Chapter 9: Training of UN Military Component

9.1: Overview.
The aim of UN peacekeeping training is to enhance the capacities and capabilities at individual and collective levels with requisite knowledge, skills, and attitudes for effective implementation of mandate, in line with DPKO/DFS Policy on Training. Training enables all UN peacekeepers to perform specialist functions and address operational challenges in accordance with DPKO/DFS principles, policies, and guidelines, as well as the best practices and lessons learned from the field, in an effective, professional, and integrated manner, while demonstrating the core values and competencies of the UN.

Maintaining high standards of training is the key to effective performance and successful execution of the mandated objectives. Since military personnel are primarily trained for conventional war fighting in a sustained manner, it is imperative that due attention and effort is devoted to their systematic orientation to UN peacekeeping role, which has many unique constraints, challenges and opportunities. The standards achieved during the predeployment training must be further refined in the mission, with an aim to reinforce existing capacities/capabilities and maintain high degree of operational readiness to respond effectively to various operational challenges.

Once deployed in the mission, there is also a need to synchronise the skills and capabilities achieved during the predeployment training with the geographic conditions and operational environment to develop calibrated responses to crisis situation through in-mission training and evaluation. UN military units must have the ability to quickly adapt and adjust to the new environment, systematically upgrade their tactics techniques and procedures, maintain a proactive and robust posture, institute rapid response mechanisms, and retain high degree of operational resilience, that cumulatively contributes to credible deterrence, moral ascendency and effective implementation of the Mandate.

9.2: Purpose.
The purpose of this Chapter is to elucidate briefly on the UN peacekeeping training framework, provide guidelines/parameters on predeployment and in-mission training of the Military Component and define the roles and responsibilities of the Force HQ.

9.3: Training Framework.
9.3.1: General. UN peacekeeping training is to be oriented towards, and contribute to enhancing mandate implementation, so as to ensure that all UN peacekeepers have a common understanding of UN peacekeeping and are able to function in an integrated manner. Training of Military Component (Force HQ Staff, UNMEM and contingents) is a shared responsibility. The key stakeholders are the TCCs, Field Missions and the DPKO. In support of that function, OMA is responsible for developing military-specific capability standards, while DPKO/DFS’ responsibility is to provide standards on crosscutting issues, which collectively forms the basis for peacekeeping training.

9.3.2: Integrated Training Service (ITS). As part of DPET, ITS is responsible for the direction and coordination of peacekeeping training and provides peacekeeping training standards for all phases of training, particularly for the predeployment phase, based on departmental priorities, policies, lessons learned and best practices. The training standards are disseminated by ITS to all peacekeeping training partners, including Member States and Field Missions.

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9.3.3: Predeployment Training (PDT). Under General Assembly resolution 49/37 of 9 December 1994, Member States are responsible for the predeployment training of all military and police personnel provided to UN peacekeeping operations. Training shall be provided in conformity with UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards. Member States and Peacekeeping Training Institutions (PKTIs) participate in the process of assessing peacekeeping training needs and the development of training standards.

9.3.4: In-Mission Training. In-Mission training is the responsibility of respective MLT to meet the peculiar and specific needs of mission operational environment, and maintain high state of operational readiness to enhance mandate implementation. It should also aim at developing high level of integration, interoperability and coherence amongst all mission components and also with other stakeholders who complement the mission’s effort in implementation of mandate.

9.4: PDT.

9.4.1: General. PDT is the generic, specialized, mission-specific and scenario-based peacekeeping training conducted by the Member States, based on the UN standards for all designated military commanders, staff, UNMEM and contingent personnel, prior to deployment to field operations. The Mission U-7 Branch should support the planning and preparation of PDT by the TCCs to share mission-specific standards and scenarios. The UN generic training standards are provided in the Core Predeployment Training Modules (CPTM), which should be delivered as a pre-requisite before any other specialized training, as given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Training Standard:</th>
<th>Audience</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit 1: Strategic Overview of UN Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Generic individual and collective training</td>
<td>To present the essential knowledge required by all peacekeepers to function effectively in UN Mission</td>
<td>Training package should be tailored to the needs of audience (Commanders, staff; junior leaders; troops, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit 2: Establishing and Functioning of UN Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>All peacekeepers, from the Force Commander to the enlisted soldier</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit 3: Effective Mandate Implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit 4: Standards, Values and Safety of UN Personnel</td>
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</table>

9.4.2: Training of Force Senior Leaders. Preferably, the HoMC, DFC, and COS designates should have qualified in the senior leadership and management training programmes, such as:

- **Senior Mission Leaders Course (SML).** The SML is designed to prepare potential civilian, military and police mission leaders at D-1 level, for the roles and responsibilities of senior leaders in UN peacekeeping operations. It also helps the Member State officials responsible for UN peacekeeping issues to better understand how current UN peacekeeping operations are managed. The focus of the course is to create awareness and understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the various components of complex peacekeeping operations, and how these can be addressed by an effective Senior Leadership Team. It is facilitated by the ITS, with the support of a host Member State.

- **Senior Leadership Induction Programme (SLIP).** SLIP is a mandatory five-day course intended to provide newly-appointed senior leaders in field missions with an orientation on peacekeeping issues. It is facilitated by the ITS for the senior military, police and civilian leaders at the D-2 level, within their first six months of service in the mission. It provides wider strategic orientation on peacekeeping issues, such as analysing and responding to challenges in mandate implementation, relationship between the field and UNHQ, etc.

- **Intensive Orientation Course (IOC).** IOC is a five days course conducted by OMA (CMOS lead) at New York for newly appointed HoMC, who in some missions are also the HoM. IOC aims to prepare HoMCs to integrate rapidly and effectively into the
specific and unique UN peacekeeping environment, especially during the initial stages in the mission area. IOC is supported by a Mentor (a former HoMC) and a Special Advisor (a former senior UN civilian official). Briefings are provided by subject matter experts from DPKO, DFS, and other Departments and Offices. This generic Course is followed by a Mission-specific In-Briefing in UNHQ.

- **Senior In-Briefings.** In-Briefings in UNHQ are organized by OMA (CMOS lead) for 3 days, and may include additional two days if the HoMC/HOM is also the DO. The purpose of In-Briefings is to acquaint the inducting senior military officers with relevant information required for smooth take over of their new assignment. It helps the incoming HoMCs to address specific challenges of their new tasks and to familiarize them with the UN working environment. Interaction with relevant DPKO/DFS offices and other UNHQ entities, such as OCHA, OLA, OHCHR, etc. are organized as part of In-Briefing.

- **Mandatory UN (OHRM) Courses.** Following mandatory courses shall be undertaken by Force senior leadership:
  - Basic and Advanced Security in the Field.
  - Integrity Awareness Initiative.
  - Prevention of Workplace Harassment, Sexual Harassment, and Abuse of Authority in the Workplace.
  - Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Orientation Session.
  - HIV/AIDS Orientation Session.
  - Working Together: Professional Ethics and Integrity in our Daily Work.
  - Performance Management and Development for Supervisors and Managers.
  - Other awareness generation sessions/online training that introduces new systems, such as the IPSAS and CBTI.

9.4.3: **PDT of UN Military Staff Officers.** The introduction of a multi-dimensional approach to peacekeeping comes with new challenges especially in respect of performance standards of military staff officers (SOs) at the Force and Sector HQs. Considering the crucial interfacing roles of SOs between strategic, operational and tactical levels, they need to be proficient in performing staff duties, while also ensuring and applying common and standard procedures in such multinational HQs.

It is a national responsibility to select qualified SOs who have completed national or international training courses as part of mission and function-specific PDT (focussed on CPTMs and STM for SOs). SOs must have functional experience (as per Job Description) and comply, as a minimum, with the existing UN training standards. A designated UN Team under the aegis of ITS can also support the process through “Training of Trainers” (ToT) activity (two weeks) or training support provided by a PKTI complying with the UN training standards.

**Training Guidance.** The broad outline for Specialized Training Materials (STM) for Military Staff Officers is given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Training Standard : STM for Military SOs</th>
<th>Audience</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Module 1 - The Organisation and Basic Staff Procedures</td>
<td>Generic</td>
<td>To prepare individual military SOs to perform in a complex field Mission HQ.</td>
<td>This training package contains all necessary contents to prepare individual SOs to UNPKOs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Module 2 - Legal Aspects of UNPKO</td>
<td>individual training.</td>
<td>Military SOs at Force and Sector HQ.</td>
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<td>Module 3 - Integrated Assessment and Planning</td>
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<td>Module 4 - Information Gathering</td>
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<td>Module 5 - Military Decision Making Process</td>
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<td>Module 6 - UN Logistics</td>
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<td>Module 7 - Crisis Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Module 8 - Integrated Exercise</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
9.4.4: PDT of UN Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM). UNMEM includes UNMOs, UN MLOs and UN MILADs, who undertake observer, liaison or advisory tasks in support of mission mandate implementation. They are expected to have basic soldiering skills, in addition to the UN-specific skills specified in the DPKO/DFS Guidelines on the Roles and Training Standards for the UN Military Experts on Mission. UNMEM are expected to have undergone a role specific national/regional or international UN peacekeeping predeployment course, that covers the CPTMs and specialist training as specified in the ibid guidelines. PDT of UNMEM must be based on mission-specific, scenario-based interactive sessions, command post/staff/field exercises that culminate into a self-evaluation at the TCC level. TCCs are expected to deploy only trained and tested UNMEM, who have the requisite skill set and ability to work in an integrated and challenging environment. ITS will be developing new training modules for the UNMOs, MLOs and MILADs, which will be made available to all the stakeholders in 2014.

9.4.5: PDT of Contingents. This training is delivered by Member States to military and police personnel and formed units in their home country according to national peculiarities and resources. For a military unit, this is the most important and essential phase in which the unit should become proficient in peacekeeping TTPs to deliver effectively in executing the METs. During PDT, the unit re-orientates itself from conventional mode to UN peacekeeping mode to achieve a high degree of operational readiness and become mission capable for deployment in the field. Mission-specific guidance can be obtained from documents issued by the OMA/DPKO (CONOPS, ROE, HoMC Directives, Statement of Force Requirements, Statement of Unit Requirements and Generic Guidelines to TCCs Deploying Military Units to the UN Peacekeeping Operations, UN Infantry Battalion Manual, amongst others) and Predeployment Information Packages (PIP), CPTMs and related Specialised Training Materials (STM), issued by the ITS, as well as in the Force Commanders Training Directive issued by the field missions. On a case to case basis and on request, Field Mission’s experts from the Force HQ and Mission Support Component may be deputed to observe field exercise/self-evaluation of TCC unit under deployment or form part of operational advisory team of OMA or predeployment visit team of DPKO/DFS.

Guidelines for Conducting PDT. Important principles for adherence during PDT by the TCCs are:
- PDT should be conducted under the direct supervision of a formation HQ or a PKTI.
- Training should be realistic. All necessary efforts shall be fulfilled to replicate possible real situations that the unit might face on the ground.
- Training should be mission-specific. There is a need to bring the mission operational reality to the training environment. Training on mission-specific aspects is essential to prepare the unit for the challenges in the mission area.
- Individual and collective training should be focused on integration with different mission elements, mission partners and other actors present in the area of operations.
- Training methodology should be based on practice.
- Training should be undertaken exclusively based on applicable mission ROE.
- A reconnaissance of the AOR by the incoming unit commander and staff is always recommended as an excellent means to bring mission-specific content to the PDT curriculum.
- Self-evaluation at sub-unit and unit level is a key to operational readiness and effective performance.

Suggested Design and Timings for PDT. PDT of a military contribution takes approximately three months. This is envisaged as the minimum time required for a fully trained conventional unit to acquire generic, crosscutting and mission-specific UN peacekeeping orientation and skills. The process of assembling, grouping and equipping the unit should be completed prior to the minimum proposed period for PDT. It is envisaged that, approximately 6 to 7 months will be required for a unit to train and prepare for the UN
peacekeeping operations, particularly for the units deploying to challenging environments. Preferably, a unit impending deployment should have completed all the prescribed training and evaluation, minimum a fortnight prior to actual deployment. Adequate allowance in time must be factored in the training curriculum for mid course corrections, adjustments and additional emphasis as required. The induction and on-going training in the mission area will be coordinated by the Force HQ and guided by Force Commanders Training Directive. A suggested time schedule for PDT of a military unit is given below:

- Reinforcement on basic/common individual and collective military capabilities and skills as applicable to peacekeeping – Two weeks.
- Training on UN peacekeeping capabilities and skills (generic and crosscutting) – Three to four weeks.
- Training on mission-specific capabilities and skills (including scenario-based training for subordinate units and unit level self-evaluation) - Four to five weeks.
- Conducting a unit level mission-specific field exercise by a higher national military authority as part of the operational readiness assurance policy – One week.

9.4.6: Self-evaluation. Self-Evaluation of individuals and units throughout the PDT and especially at the end of the phase is vital to achieve the necessary operational readiness before deployment to the field mission. Member States are encouraged to conduct self-evaluation with or without support of DPKO/DFS, including ITS. Following DPKO/DFS documents provides guidance on self-evaluation and certification process:
- **Force HQ.** Draft DPKO/DFS SOP on Operational Readiness Assurance (2013).
- **Other Military Units.** Guidance (UN Military Units Manuals) being issued separately by DPKO/DFS (2014/2015).
- **SOs.** Roles and Training Standards for UN Military Staff Officers (2009).

9.5: In-Mission Training.

9.5.1: General. In-Mission training refers to any on-going training or learning activity for military, police, or civilian peacekeeping personnel undertaken during their duty assignment. In-Mission training is vital to ensure sustained operational readiness and performance levels. In-Mission training of all military personnel (SOs, UNMEM, contingents, etc.) shall be the responsibility of the HoMC/FC, duly assisted by the DFC (under the delegated authority) and the Force COS. In-Mission training of Military Component will be planned, coordinated and executed by the Chief U-7 in consultation with the DFC and Force COS. The structure and responsibilities of Force Training Branch (U-7) are explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.5.10, p. 77. The priorities of the mission in respect of military training shall be defined through issuance of the HoMC/FC’s training directive. The DFC and Force COS shall provide training guidance as necessary, establish coordination mechanisms with other components and maintain effective oversight over the training activities of the Military Component. The Force HQ should ascertain from the incoming unit on the level of training and operational readiness achieved during the predeployment phase and if required, tailor the induction training to match the mission requirements prior to the deployment.

9.5.2: IMTC. At the Mission level, integrated training on generic and crosscutting issues are coordinated by the IMTC and the constituent Military Training Cell (MTC). The Force HQ shall assign sufficient qualified instructional staff to the MTC in support of the IMTC training schedule to organise training of Military Component of the mission and support the delivery of other mission training initiatives. MTC will coordinate and execute the integration training for the Military Component on an as required basis. The IMTC shall be responsible for:
- **Needs Assessment.** Identify mission-specific training requirements and conduct annual training needs assessment.
- **Mission Training Plan.** Develop and implement a comprehensive mission training plan, in order to ensure that priorities, budget provisions and training initiatives are aligned.
• **Implementation.** Coordinate the planning, development, delivery and evaluation of mission training plans and programmes.

• **Exercises.** Develop mission-specific and scenario-based training packages and exercises for the commanders, staff, contingent trainers and contingents.

• **Information Package.** Prepare predeployment mission information package, in consultation with Mission Components and other integrated entities (JOC, JMAC, JLOC).

• **Induction Training.** Coordinate and conduct induction and training of trainer (TOT) programmes training.

• **Impact Assessment.** Monitor and evaluate impact of training on skills, competencies and performance of peacekeepers.

• **Joint Training.** Coordinate joint training with all components and other stakeholders.

• **Budget.** Coordinate the preparation and implementation of the Mission Training Budget.

• **ITS Support.** Coordinate and utilise ITS support in terms of strategic guidance, provision of training standards, training and budget advice, materials and other forms of assistance as required.

9.5.3: **Induction Training.** Induction training is the training delivered to military, police, and civilian personnel on arrival in peacekeeping missions intended to supplement predeployment training and to orientate them to the mission operational environment. Upon deployment in a UN peacekeeping mission, all military personnel shall undergo induction training under the supervision of the IMTC/MTC. However, for the contingents, IMTC shall conduct a Training of the Trainers (ToT) capsule for extending further training to the unit/sub-unit personnel. The objective, contents, duration and methods of training and evaluation shall be defined by the IMTC based on the mission operational environment and in consultation with Force HQ. Duplication of predeployment training should be avoided.

9.5.4: **On-Going Training.** Ongoing training refers to any training or learning activity for military, police, or civilian peacekeeping personnel undertaken during their duty assignment, subsequent to induction. Such training can take the form of maintenance of standards or remedial training (e.g. live firing exercises, scenario-based exercises). Joint training in the mission area is also highly desirable to attain interoperability with other components (UN Police, civilians and other partners) and should also be an object of guidance from the Mission leadership. The Force HQ and subordinate HQ shall monitor and guide the on-going training effort of all the military units in the mission area, and where required, provide assistance through the MTC. Specific emphasis should be laid on “On the Job Training” (OJT) on functional areas and to execute operational role and responsibilities.

9.5.5: **Joint Training.** In order to maintain effective integration, interoperability, synergy and operational readiness, it is essential that SOs, UNMEM and contingents undergo training and rehearsals for joint operations with the mission entities (UNPOL and civilian component) and other external partners (UN system entities, Host Nation security Forces, etc.) as applicable. Such training activities include, but are not limited to, crisis response, employment of QRF, IMC, etc. Deliberate considerations and guidance at the level of MLT and coordination at the functional level are essential to establish operational integration to meet crisis situations effectively. Joint training must be practised as a routine at all levels of the mission.

9.5.6: **Special Training.** Special training in the mission aims to enhance proficiency in handling UN Owned Equipment/Mission-specific equipment, as also on mission-specific tactics techniques and procedures. Special training will also address performance gaps and adoption of new training methodology based on the changes in the operational environment. Based on assessment, evaluation and validation of the operational performance, the Force HQ shall streamline and apply mid course corrections, and where necessary, coordinate refresher training, additional ToT capsules or special training through the MTC/IMTCs/ITS.
9.5.7: Force HQ Responsibility. The Force HQ shall be responsible for:

- **Command Responsibility.** In-Mission training of all categories of the Military Component is a command responsibility and accordingly shall remain a key priority.

- **Integration with IMTC.** All matters related to training shall be coordinated and consulted with IMTC to align with Mission priorities. IMTC shall be kept informed on training activities of the Military Component. MTC shall provide required feedbacks, reports and assessments to support the IMTC.

- **Training Needs Assessment (TNA).** Carry out regular mission-specific Force training needs assessment (TNA) to design and deliver appropriate training guidance to support the Military Component. Furthermore, MTC shall provide inputs to IMTC to support scheduled mission-specific TNA being carried out under the aegis of ITS. MTC shall provide feedback to IMTC, OMA and ITS on training requirements and priorities of the Military Component.

- **Priorities.** Set training priorities based on the prevailing and emerging operational environment in the mission.

- **Training Plan.** Identify special-to-mission individual and collective training requirements in coordination with IMTC and develop a comprehensive Force training work plan. Provide relevant inputs to IMTC for inclusion in the Mission comprehensive training plan.

- **Mission Information Package (MIP).** Provide MIP to in-coming units to aid PDT and preparations well in advance through the deployed national units or through OMA. Regularly review the Military-specific aspects of the MIP for submission to the IMTC towards the periodic update of the MIP, in consultation with JOC, JMAC, Mission/Force BPOs and other Mission Components.

- **Alignment.** Align training activities based on DPKO-DFS Strategic Peacekeeping Training Priorities, OMA technical advice and guidance on mission-specific operational tasks and measures to address challenges, as well as Mission training priorities.

- **Standards.** Develop Mission-specific operational standards (in addition to minimum generic standards specified in the DPKO-DFS capability standards Military Units Manuals) and corresponding force training standards in collaboration with IMTC.

- **Integration.** Foster common understanding of UN policies and practices, as well as, UN tactics, techniques and procedures to inculcate a spirit integrated and coherent functioning.

- **Crosscutting and Overarching Issues.** Specific attention shall be paid in harnessing skills achieved on crosscutting and overarching issues, such as, HR, IHL, POC, gender, child protection, conduct and discipline, cross cultural communication, safety and security, perception management, etc. and periodically re-emphasised through targeted refresher training.

- **Training Directive.** The HoMC/FC shall issue a Force Training Directive for the military component on a yearly basis or as and when a major change in the operational environment occurs. The Force Training Directive shall be in congruence with Mission Concept, Mission Training Plan, RBB and HoMC Compact. The Training Directive along with training guidelines (including mission-specific training standards, list of Do’s and Don’ts, etc.) should be provided to the incoming units at least four months in advance for incorporating in the predeployment Training. This will in-turn will facilitate high standards of operational readiness of an incoming unit from the very beginning. The Force Training Directive shall be reviewed every quarter and/or as necessitated by the prevailing/emerging operational environment. A suggested template of HoMC/FC Training Directive is attached as **Annex Y** (p.261).

- **SOPs.** Develop training related mission-specific SOPs for the Military Component in collaboration with IMTC.

- **MTC.** Assign qualified Military Staff to the IMTC. OMA shall engage Member States to ensure only experienced and certified UN trainers are deployed as part of MTC. Force HQ shall monitor activities and utilisation of MTC to optimize the training requirements and facilitate effective integration with IMTC.
• **Training of Force HQ.** HoMC shall organise periodic collective training of the Force HQ staff to effectively prepare and validate appropriate responses to various operational contingencies and crisis situations.

• **Exercises and Rehearsals.** Develop Mission-specific; scenario-based exercises and rehearsals for the Force and Subordinate HQ, as well as the military Units and Sub-Units.

• **Ranges.** Provision of firing ranges in coordination with DMS for live firing practices.

• **Assistance to Contingents.** Assist planning and conduct of operational training of contingents on as requested basis.

• **Special Training.** Coordinate provision of specialised training to address identified gaps through IMTC/MTC/Force HQ Staff/Contingent concerned as appropriate.

• **Outside Support.** Coordinate training support through ITS (including rapidly deployable training teams to meet urgent training requirements) or a third party support (Member States/Regional Organisations/training centres, etc) to address an identified gap.

• **Monitoring.** Monitor and advise on peacekeeping training delivery for the Military Component, to ensure consistency and quality.

• **Evaluation.** Carryout training evaluation in collaboration with IMTC to ensure maximum impact and meet mission-level operational needs. The Chiefs of Personnel, Planning and Training Staff Branches, under the direct supervision of the Force CoS/DCoS shall form a Training and Evaluation Team, to support the Force HQ in this function. Preferably, evaluation should be carried out every quarter. However, depending on the operational requirement and training proficiency, the Force HQ may either increase or decrease the frequency.

• **Performance Review.** The Force HQ shall carryout routine training impact assessments based performance of the units to review the current and future needs and incorporate modifications as applicable.

• **Knowledge Management.** Ensure lessons learnt and best practices are periodically integrated into the predeployment and in-Mission training curricula. Disseminate best practices and lessons learnt (both from UNHQ and mission-specific) with the Military Component and share with other components as required, in collaboration with Mission BPO and MBPO.

**9.5.8: In-Mission Military SO Training.** UN Military SOs play a vital role in maintaining an oversight and managing the execution of MET by the Military Component in an integrated and multidimensional environment. To that extent, the selection and deployment of qualified Military SOs with job-specific skill-set by the TCCs and OMA is crucial. The Force CoS shall be responsible for all the Force SOs training and employment. The Force HQ shall carryout a preliminary induction test of the SOs upon arrival to ascertain their suitability as per job description. To maintain efficiency of the military SOs, following training activities shall be instituted:

• **Induction Training.** All Military SOs shall undergo mission-specific induction training under the aegis of the IMTC.

• **Orientation Training.** On induction, all SOs shall undergo staff orientation training conducted by the Force HQ under the supervision of the Force COS to have a broad understanding of the functioning of the Mission HQ, Force HQ, other components and other stakeholders in the mission area.

• **On the Job Technical Training.** All SOs shall undergo job-specific technical training to gain functional efficiency and effectiveness in their respective disciplines. This will be planned and organised by the branch Chiefs and monitored and evaluated by the Force COS.

• **Refresher Training.** Periodic/quarterly refresher training to retain effectiveness, address areas of improvement required and adapt to changes in operational environment shall be planned and executed at the Force HQ by the MTC.

• **Regional Training and Workshop.** Force HQ Staff and nominated personnel from the subordinate entities should take part in regional training programmes and workshops
organised by the ITS and UN system substantive entities, as also other partners (if deemed necessary).

9.5.9: In-Mission UNMEM Training. UNMEM has a wider role and responsibility in support of the mission’s mandate implementation. All UNMEM shall be tested on arrival as per functional role and shall undergo the induction training, orientation training, on the job technical training and refresher training, similar to that of Military SOs training schedule. Training will be guided by the HoMC Training Directive, under the supervision of the DFC, duly assisted by the Force COS, Chief IMTC and Chief U-7.

9.5.10: In-Mission Military Contingent Training. Force HQ shall monitor routine on-going training of contingents and evaluate operational performance to assess the impact of training or advise mid-course corrections to address performance gaps. The personnel, planning and training branches of the Force HQ, under the Force COS shall establish a mission-specific reporting; monitoring and evaluation mechanism to ensure that required levels of performance is maintained. Contingents and TCC delegations must be encouraged to periodically review their standards to provide actionable feedback to the predeployment training of subsequent rotations.

- Contingent level rehearsals/exercises. Units and sub-units should carry out regular rehearsals and exercises to maintain high state of readiness and capability.
- Joint Exercises. Mission-specific scenario-based component specific and joint (police and civilian component) exercises shall be conducted periodically.
- Interoperability. Individual and collective training should focus on interaction with different mission elements and other partners present in AOR.
- ROE. Contingent commanders and personnel should be trained on ROE.
- Operational Readiness Exercises. Crisis Management workshops and exercises to respond effectively to various operational contingencies must be discussed and rehearsed.

9.6: Conclusion.
Training of UN Military Peacekeepers is vital for the successful implementation of military tasks and also for the safety and security of peacekeepers. UN military personnel should retain their basic military and peacekeeping skills throughout the deployment to ensure effective performance, particularly during crisis. Therefore, the Force HQ should ensure that the three complementary pillars - training, readiness and performance- are given due priority in its operational planning and execution.

References:
- Core Predeployment Training Materials (CPTM) in English and French (under revision);
- Specialized Training Materials for Military Staff Officers in English (2012);
- Specialised Training Materials for Military Experts on Mission (English);
- Specialized Training Materials on Protection of Civilians (English);
- SOP on Training Recognition (2009).
- SOP on Mobile Training Support Team (2009).
- SOP on Training of Trainers Courses (2009).
- Predeployment Information Packages (PIP) Issued by ITS.
- Mission-specific Statement of Force and Unit Requirements.
- Draft Generic Guidelines to TCCs Deploying Military Units to the UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2013.
• Draft Policy, SOP and Guidelines on Operational Readiness Assurance, 2013.

Note:
These documents are also available at Peacekeeping Resource Hub and Policy and practices Database (POINT) website.
( http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx ).
Chapter 10: Operational Readiness

10.1: Overview.
Military Component in UN Peacekeeping Missions has been entrusted with multidimensional responsibilities and is expected to operate effectively in an increasingly complex and challenging environment, often compounded by asymmetric threats. Ability to respond spontaneously, rapidly and effectively, in time and space to critical challenges in the field necessitates maintenance of high state of operational readiness by the Military Component at all times. It not only assures force protection, overall safety and security of all mission personnel, and enhanced performance, but also builds the credibility of the Mission.

10.2: Purpose.
The purpose of this Chapter is to define a suggested Operational Readiness Assurance framework assigning roles and responsibilities of UNHQ, Field Mission/Force HQ/Sector HQ, and the contingents/units on maintaining the required levels of operational readiness to improve field Mission performance.

10.3: Operational Readiness Assurance (ORA) Policy Framework.
DPKO/DFS Policy on ORA lays out the overarching framework, duly supported through an SOP for the Field Missions and a Guideline for the TCCs. This framework incorporates wide range of experiences, best practices and lessons learnt, and capabilities and capacities, of the various UN Military units and sub-units to foster the required level of integration, coherence and operational performance in the execution of MET. The framework is intended to achieve the following:

- Validate the operational readiness of deployed military units in a “Top-Down Process”
- Support TCCs for the deployment preparation through self-evaluation/assessment and certification of national contributions in a “Bottom-up Process”.
- Enhance and maintain In-Mission operational readiness.
- Provide transparent procedures and measurable criteria to evaluate and confirm the operational readiness.
- Foster increased confidence amongst stakeholders that military contributions meet the requisite qualitative capabilities and are at consistent levels of readiness.

10.4: ORA Principles.
The ORA process is underpinned by eight key principles that support the evaluation, certification and validation of the Military Component.

- **Key Stakeholder Support.** Commitment of the TCC (political, administrative, military, population, etc.) to maintain required levels of operational readiness.
- **Leadership Commitment.** Commitment and support of senior political and military leadership, as also the military unit/sub-unit leadership deployed in the mission.
- **Cooperation and effective communication.** Shared vision, common understanding and coherent approaches between the UNHQ, Member States/TCCs and field missions.
- **Quality assurance.** Adoption of appropriate, credible, up-to-date, effective and consistent methods to evaluate operational readiness.
- **Universality.** Applicability of same generic and mission-specific standards to all the national contributions.
- **Dynamic response and flexibility.** Adaptability to changing operational environments and challenges reflecting new/reviewed mission-specific requirements, updated standards and lessons learnt. It must be flexible to provide national commanders with scope to design their own programs for training and activities to confirm individual and unit readiness.
- **Transparency and confidentiality.** Inculcate greater confidence in the certification process through open, transparent and confidential dialogue between UN and a TCC.
- **Currency.** Utilisation of the most up-to-date generic and mission-specific standards.
10.5: Role and Responsibilities of DPKO/DFS.

1.5.1: General. The DPKO/DFS shall have the following responsibilities:
- Provide higher direction and guidance.
- Engage Member States (Donors and TCCs) through their Permanent missions.
- Generate appropriate force levels with required capabilities.
- Establish an effective mission support mechanism.
- Provide strategic situational awareness.
- Monitor political developments and operational activities in the field.
- Maintain effective oversight to ensure maintenance of required levels of operational readiness.

10.5.2: Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership (OPSP). OPSP is a new non-executive function in the Office of the USG DPKO to address issues related to field uniformed personnel. The function reports directly to the USG DPKO/DFS and supports the field missions and the TCCs/Member States in enhancing partnership. Field uniformed personnel includes the Force HQ, UNMEMs, Military Contingents, FPU and the FPU coordinating cells in a field Mission. Major functions include, but are not limited to the following:
- Identify gaps that impact delivery of mandate;
- Focus on systemic issues in Peacekeeping;
- Making recommendations to ensure the safety, security, welfare and support to field uniformed personnel;
- Making recommendations to incorporate lessons learned and the best practices from peacekeeping missions into peacekeeping operations.
- Evaluate and monitor:
  - Efficiency and effectiveness of deployed uniformed personnel;
  - Mandated task delivery, as per operational documents;
  - Operational readiness and preparedness, conditions of service, safety and security, morale and discipline;
  - Compliance with UN policies, practices and procedures, including training, and safety & security rules;
  - Utilisation of T/PCC resources against agreed frameworks and endorsed requirements.

10.6: Role and Responsibilities of the Mission HQ.

10.6.1: General. A UN Mission draws its legitimacy and authority from the UN Security Council Resolution and the Mandate given to the mission as a whole. The HoM shall lead and direct all the mission components and ensure unity of effort and coherence amongst all the UN entities in the mission area, in accordance with the ISF for the mission. The operational and technical control of the mandate implementation, as delegated by the HoM shall be exercised by respective heads of components.

10.6.2: Role of Mission HQ. The Mission HQ shall be primarily responsible for comprehensive and constructive political engagement of all parties in the conflict zone, in furtherance of peace and stability. In support of that, the Mission HQ shall provide mission-wide operational direction and guidance, including decisions on resource allocation.

10.6.3: Mission HQ Responsibilities. Primary responsibilities of the Mission HQ are laid out in Chapter 2, Section 2.7, p.23.

10.6.4: Pillars of ORA. Operational readiness of Military Component is founded in the following six pillars:
- Training and Preparations. Deploying mission capable and committed units to UN missions.
- **UN Orientation.** Adherence to UN principles, values, ethics, policies and practices (including international/national legal issues).
- **Command and Control.** Providing effective leadership and control systems.
- **Operational Capabilities.** Capabilities and capacities to execute MET with positive impact and establishment of an effective operational response mechanism in support of the mandate implementation.
- **Mission Support.** Agile and efficient mission support structure that matches the operational requirements.
- **Outreach and Engagement.** Ability to support the Host Nation and meet aspirations of the people.

10.7: **Operational Readiness of a UN Military Force HQ.**

10.7.1: **Introduction.** Maintaining operational readiness of all elements of the Military Component is a command responsibility. The mission resources and the Force HQ staff must be integrated and made responsive and accountable to carry out realistic and detailed forecasting, planning, organising and executing mandated role and responsibilities of the Military Component. It is imperative that the Mission and Force leadership must have a clear understanding of the shape and contours of the current challenges and carry out a prognosis of the emerging socio-politico-security situations, addressing the anticipated short, medium and long term impact on the peacekeeping operations. Mission/Force HQ must analyse these likely scenarios and develop suitable courses of action to maintain operational readiness and respond effectively to various critical situations. The Force leadership must be prepared to ensure that the current and future challenges are addressed timely, effectively and appropriately without any negative impact on the mission. The commitment of commanders to the process at all levels is vital to sustain operational readiness. The Force HQ shall provide objective formal appraisals of the units’ operational readiness on arrival and during their tenure in the mission.

The Mission and Force HQ shall ensure dissemination and sensitisation of the Mission Essential Tasks, the mission-specific best practices and lessons learnt; as well as tactics techniques and procedures to the mission components as relevant for adherence in mandate implementation. These must be physically rehearsed and confirmed through coordinated exercises; and reviewed and updated regularly. The requirements and shortcomings should be conveyed by the HoMC to the OMA as well as the TCCs in a timely manner (through the contingent commander).

10.7.2: **Role and Responsibilities of Force HQ.** The HoMC/Force HQ shall implement military tasks and exercise operational control over all military personnel in accordance with the Mission Concept, Military-Strategic CONOPS, UN rules and regulations, ROE, SOFA/SOMA, HoMC Directive, the UN’s policy on Command and Control, OPORD and Mission/Force/Military Component-specific SOPs.
- HoMC is responsible for the operational organization, efficient functioning and conduct of military personnel within a mission.
- HoMC shall report to the HoM on all matters and maintain a technical reporting and communication link with the Military Advisor in UN HQ.
- In support of maintaining a high state of operational readiness, the HoMC should keep the DMS/CMS informed of all operational aspects of current and planned activities of the Military Component as these will likely have administrative and logistical implications.
- Similarly, necessary coordination with HoPC should be carried out in maintaining operational readiness and in support of mandate implementation.
- Issue a mission level directive to subordinate commanders and key staff within the Military Component in the form of an OPORD, which complies with the military strategic CONOPs and guidance/directions of HoM.
• Issue SOPs to encompass all military activities and integrated activities as applicable to commanders at all levels, the staff, military experts on mission and contingents (units and personnel).
• In support of the Mission Security Management System (SMS) act as the DO (if appointed) and/or as HoMC institute measures for security and safety of members of Military Component.
• The HoMC should identify practical implementation methods or exercises that will confirm a unit’s ability to discharge its operational capability requirements in the field.
• Consistent and effective dialogue between the HoMC, the deployed Senior National Contingent Commander, the Unit Commander and OMA on issues related to SUR, ROEs and unit readiness in the lead up to the deployment, employment in the mission area and during repatriation is important to address issues in a timely manner.
• To maintain currency, the HoMCs must ensure correctness of SFR and SUR in the mission and review them periodically to align with changing operational environment and requirements. Mission and Force HQs should analyse current and futuristic operational requirements and project additional requirements with sufficient lead time for the identification of the capability and its generation process.
• The HoMC should ensure clear and transparent dialogue on the state of readiness of a Unit/Sub-unit with the Senior National Contingent Commander and the Unit/Sub-unit Commander.
• Assessments such as self-evaluation, final test exercise, etc. by TCCs prior to deployment and in-mission evaluation by the units or Force HQ are vital to ensure that shortcomings with readiness are identified and addressed early.
• HoMC shall maintain confidentiality on the evaluations and validations, which will be shared only with the TCC/unit concerned as well as the Mission and DPKO-DFS hierarchy.

10.7.3: Staff. The Force HQ Staff plays an important role in planning, organising and facilitating mandate implementation of the Military Component. The charter and responsibilities of the staff should be clearly laid down. Staff inductees shall undergo “on the job” induction staff training and grooming with a senior staff mentor and will be verified for the job assigned. Area familiarisation, visits to units and regular training shall be organized to maintain operational readiness. Force HQ and Subordinate HQ shall conduct Quarterly Staff Assessment (Staff Exercise based on operational environment). The staff shall carry out periodic perspective analysis to plan and prepare the military units to maintain high standards of operational readiness. Necessary documentation formats, computerised office management systems, SOPs, and staff instructions shall be prepared and disseminated to end users. All official guidance, directions and other important documents will be regularly reviewed and updated as necessary. The staff should align the Military Component SOPs to reflect current UN policies, procedures and directions.

10.7.4: Predeployment Assistance.
• Mission Information Package (MIP). The Force HQ should prepare and issue a detailed MIP in the form of mission operational and logistics brief, which includes mission-specific situational, operational and logistics information to the incoming military contributions to aid predeployment training and operational preparedness. It should be current and updated regularly.
• Mission Orders, Standards and Requirements. Relevant extracts of CONOPs and OPORD, as well as, mission-specific capability standards, SOPs, Force Training Directive, and other operational and logistics requirements to maintain operational readiness be provided in advance to factor in to the PDT and enhance operational responsiveness.
• Guidance. Provide operational and logistics brief and render operational advice through timely and periodic interface as required to the incoming military units.
• **Operational Reconnaissance.** Force HQ will coordinate the operational recce of the command elements of the incoming unit. Special information briefing at all levels will be organised to develop greater understanding of the mission operational environment and provide clarity in the role and responsibilities.

• **Operational Advisory.** Field Missions may be co-opted with DPKO/DFS team in providing operational advisory support.

10.7.5: Deployment/Redeployment.

• **Movement coordination and monitoring.** The movement of incoming and outgoing military contribution will be planned, coordinated and monitored by the Force HQ in conjunction with UN HQ (FGS and DFS MOVCON) and the TCC concerned.

• **Reception and deployment.** The reception, rotation and deployment will be centrally planned and coordinated by the Force HQ. It is deemed that, on arrival in the mission area, the incoming unit/sub-unit is operational and therefore maintains initial operational readiness within their capability. Full operational capability will be assumed once the transfer of authority has been promulgated. In the interim, the incoming unit or sub-unit shall remain operationally ready for dealing with any emergency situations and/or execute mission essential tasks as required.

• **Logistics support and dependency.** Force HQ and the staff in coordination with Mission ISS shall facilitate commencement of logistics support through the dependent/supporting agency at the earliest. Prior planning, organizing and coordination are essential to ensure that the incoming unit/sub-unit is well supported, which in turn contributes to high operational readiness.

• **Employment of enablers.** The force enablers (engineers, transport, air assets, logistics assets, etc.) must be utilised optimally by the Force HQ in conjunction with DMS/CMS for a speedy deployment and effective employment.

10.7.6: Transfer of Operational Responsibility

• **Operational Familiarisation.** Operational familiarisation of incoming units/sub-units will be centrally planned, coordinated and executed by the Force HQ. Familiarisation of the terrain and operational role will be jointly conducted by both outgoing and incoming units. Particular focus will be paid to familiarisation by commanders at all levels.

• **Handover/takeover.** Detailed handing taking over of operational responsibility and operational and logistic assets will be carried out between the outgoing and incoming units/sub-units. Force HQ will monitor and coordinate sequential repatriation of the outgoing unit. Both the units/sub-units will maintain operational readiness within their capability and under respective C2, to respond to any challenges as required by the mandate. Until the completion of handing taking over, the outgoing unit remains operationally responsible.

• **Assumption of operational role.** At an appointed time/day, promulgated by the Force HQ, and after the completion of handing/taking over, the incoming unit will assume full operational responsibility. The elements of outgoing unit/sub-unit will maintain operational readiness within its capability and under its own C2, until finally repatriated. Based on operational environment, transfer of operational responsibility can be in home country or after arrival in Mission

10.7.7: Inspections/Visits/Quality Management.

• **FC.** The HoMC/FC retains the prerogative of visiting/inspecting any military contribution deployed under operational control of the UN at all times. In addition, routine operational advisory visits by HoMC/FC/DFC should be planned to ensure that requisite operational readiness are being maintained by all.

• **COE.** Force HQ will facilitate, coordinate and monitor the COE arrival inspection, COE periodic inspection (quarterly), six monthly operational readiness inspection and repatriation inspection by the mission COE Unit.
Operational Visits. The Force leadership (HoMC/FC or DFC) should visit an incoming unit in the first month of their deployment to sensitize and align the unit/sub-unit responsibilities. This will be followed by quarterly visits by senior leadership of the Force HQ to review and advise the unit concerned, as required. During such visits, operational readiness, logistics preparedness and administrative abilities shall be verified.

Internal Operational Audit. Under the overall coordination of the Mission HQ, the Force HQ shall carry out a quarterly internal operational audit to confirm/validate its capacities and responsiveness in an integrated mission environment. It may entail conducting Command Post Exercise, Staff Exercise, operational discussions, and field exercise/rehearsals as per operational environment.

Operational Inspection. An operational inspection of any military contribution in a mission area may be carried out by a team of officers nominated by the Force HQ/Mission HQ/DPKO, particularly when the readiness or capability of a unit/sub-unit seems to be below the UN specified standards. The findings of the inspection shall be shared with the Unit/Sub-Unit concerned and the contingent commander. Recommendations, including for remedial actions will be processed through the mission HQ with copy to OMA for further disposal.

National Inspection. TCCs are encouraged to send a national inspection team to visit their contingents and carry out an operational audit during the mid-term (either in 3rd month or 6th month depending on a six-month/one year rotation respectively). Visits of such national teams shall be coordinated by the Force HQ, and necessary briefing/de-briefing may be carried out. Such visits however must be agreed to and coordinated with the FC, OMA and the OPSP function at UNHQ to deconflict activities and avoid having a negative impact on ongoing operations.

Command Conclaves. Force HQ shall organise quarterly Command Conclaves for unit commanders and principal staff officers to sensitize and synchronize the military role and responsibilities in mandate implementation.

10.7.8: In-mission Training. Refer to Chapter 9, Section 9.5, p.193 for the guidance on maintaining operational readiness through In-Mission Training.

10.7.9: Operational Support. The Force HQ, in liaison with the Mission HQ, shall coordinate allocation and employment of the tactical, operational and strategic operational assets and support to various military units as per operational requirements. Employment of Force Multipliers and Enablers at critical times will enhance operational readiness and response. The Force HQ shall earmark and task troops and resources for reinforcement and coordinate and execute re-deployment of forces within the mission AoR. Reserves shall be earmarked for speedy employment and once committed, shall be recreated at all levels. Force Reserves will maintain high state of readiness and will be employed by the Force HQ to restore any adverse situation. Necessary resources for movement, deployment and employment shall be provisioned and coordinated at Mission/Force HQ level. During operational visits or inspections, the readiness of a unit and/or its reserves shall be confirmed.

10.7.10: C2. The HoMC shall exercise UN Operational Control (OPCON) over all personnel in Military Component by directing or assigning forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks, usually limited by function, time or location (or a combination); to deploy units or personnel and to retain or assign Tactical Command (TACOM) or Tactical Control (TACON) of these units or personnel. As per demands of operational conditions, separate tasks shall be assigned to sub-units of a contingent in consultation with the Contingent Commander, the HoM and as approved by USG DPKO. The HoMC/authorized military officials of the Force HQ shall maintain a technical reporting and communication link with the DPKO (OMA). The Force HQ shall reinforce the UN Operational Control over the military units and sensitize the need for quick response based on the mission operational requirements. The effort to maintain alternate C2 by military units should be discouraged. It is important not only to lay down clear C2 control arrangements and channels of reporting, but also the Force
HQ/Subordinate HQ leadership should exercise its provisions. In addition, the Force HQ shall institute the following measures to educate the military leadership:

- Sensitization (information sharing and scenario-based operational discussions).
- Quarterly Command Conclave.
- Mentoring of military leadership of various entities.

10.7.11: Integration.

- The Force HQ shall monitor, coordinate, and support functioning of mission integrated set up (JOC, JMAC, ISS, ILOC, IMTC, etc.).
- Force HQ shall review the Military Components role and responsibilities in coordination and integration of other actors in the field mission, such as, civilian and police components, UN system entities, UNCT, host State security forces, local population.
- Necessary SOPs/SOIs shall be developed, coordinated and established in areas where integrated response is required (joint operations, employment of reserves, POC, etc.).
- Streamline restoration and maintenance of safety, security and stability, the situational awareness (integrating information management cycle), and undertaking outreach and engagement (including CIMIC), to improve operational readiness and response.
- Coordinate in advance with CMS/DMS for foolproof operational logistics support to deal with various operational emergencies and contingencies.

10.7.12: Equipment Management. The quality of maintenance of equipment is an important determinant of operational readiness. All categories of UNOE and COE must be in specified state of readiness at all times to aid operations.

- Cultivate a high sense of preventive management culture.
- Institute periodic inspections to identify correctness, serviceability and maintenance.
- Monitor and coordinate timely repairs, recovery, replacement or rotation and routine re-supply/replenishment.
- Equipment shall be tested for its effectiveness and capacity.

10.7.13: Conduct of Operations. The Force HQ shall plan, organise, coordinate, support execute and monitor all the operations in the mission area.

- Based on the mandate and the role and responsibility of the Military Component, ensure correct tasking of the staff, subordinate HQ, units and sub-units.
- Provide clarity in understanding and interpretation of the mission documents (Mandate, CONOPS, OOPRD, MET, ROE, SOFA/SOMA etc.).
- Issue OPORD and lay down Mission Essential Tasks. Validate the subordinate HQ/unit operational orders to align with the mission operational planning and conduct.
- Maintain effective control over all operations by planning, assisting, monitoring and supporting the subordinate HQ and units involved.
- Coordinate and direct employment of enablers and force multipliers.
- Coordinate, direct and employ reserves (internal and external) to restore any adverse situation.

10.7.14: Crisis Management. Mission leadership and the Force HQ shall carryout prognosis and predictive analysis to forecast probable changes in the operational scenarios and anticipate emergence of crisis situations. To maintain operational readiness to deal with crisis situations, the Force HQ shall carryout the following:

- Plan, coordinate and establish institutional mechanism for integrated response.
- Define Military Component’s role and responsibilities.
- Carry out staff checks and resource allocation.
- Carry out advance planning, coordination and rehearsals for effective implementation.
- Provide inputs to Mission Crisis Management Team.

10.7.15: Intra-Mission Cooperation. Formal plans and contingency plans shall be in place for inter-sectoral operational support, disseminated and coordinated with relevant entities.
Resources in terms of troops, operational assets, enablers, air assets, etc. need to be earmarked, tasked, trained, rehearsed and supported by the Mission and Force HQ. Similarly, operational support between two co-located contingents/units from different Member States shall be formalised and coordinated as per envisaged operational challenges.

10.7.16: Inter-Mission Cooperation. Force HQ shall plan the modalities, means and methods for inter-mission cooperation and carry out a realistic assessment (operational environment, task, timings, resources, terrain parameters, etc.) to arrive at a plan of action. Troops and resources must be identified, tasked, trained, rehearsed and supported in a timely and effective manner. Additional coordination in terms of C2 and logistics (strategic lift, sustenance, specific operational resources, etc.) need to be planned and coordinated in advance. The operational response capability of the earmarked unit/sub-unit and the various support elements/enablers must be verified periodically to maintain fool proof readiness.

10.7.17: Knowledge Management. To maintain high state of readiness and preparations, it is important to establish an effective knowledge management system that facilitates institutional memory and provides feedback on lessons learnt and best practices. The HoMC/FC shall develop systems and procedures for the collection and institutionalization of best practices and lessons-learned by the Military Component. Proper documentation (print and digital), analysis, dissemination and socialisation shall be centrally coordinated. Incident reports, investigation reports, operational reports, After Action Reports (AAR) and End of Assignment Reports (EoAR) are to be carefully analysed to establish systemic gaps and to institute necessary measures to address or mitigate them. Following issues merit attention of the Force HQ:

- Establishment of a Mission-specific Military Best Practices Database.
- Dissemination and implementation of existing best practices.
- Systems and procedures for processing lessons identified and lessons learned.
- Coordination and integration with Mission BPO.
- Timely sharing of Military best practices with other identified stakeholders.
- Reflection/incorporation of best practices in Military Component guidance and activities.

10.7.18: Miscellaneous.

- Caveats. In UN peacekeeping operations, Member States/TCCs are encouraged to desist from stating national caveats. However, if a TCC strongly wishes to state caveat (s), it should be stated prior to the signing of the MoU and must be in consonance with the spirit and values of UN peacekeeping operations. In any event, during critical times and when expeditious crisis response is required, a military unit/sub-unit should not put forward a new caveat, which compromises mandate implementation. Unwillingness to execute mission essential tasks during night and/or, away from static bases and/or, from temporary bases, etc. in the name of caveats will impede mission effectiveness and are restrictive in nature. The Force HQ should be in the know of the caveats if any, so as to factor into the operational planning and execution.

- Mindset. For a soldier, peacekeeping is a challenging task. It involves additional training and orientation to operate in a restrictive and often provocative environment. However, no amount of training and preparation can useful, if the mindset is offensive or indiscriminate or indifferent or simple avoidance. Commanders at all levels need to identify such retro-mindset which has serious ramifications to the efficacy of peacekeeping operations and institute necessary measures to cultivate and foster a positive mindset.

- Morale, Motivation and Welfare. The trio, in combination is a catalyst for operational readiness and mandate implementation. Commanders at all levels must endeavour to identify/ascertain gaps/inadequacies or sagging standards, by carefully studying relevant indicators. An effort to maintain/restore high standards of morale, motivation and welfare by all commanders is an important success factor.
• **Capability Differentials.** A Force HQ/Subordinate HQ should be cognizant of existence of capability differentials of various military units co-located, and needs to establish a balance in provision of operational support. Necessary steps should be taken to ensure that weakness of one unit does not jeopardise or adversely affect performance or security of another unit. Therefore, the identification of such differential and its mitigation is an important command function.

• **Result Based Budgeting (RBB).** The Force HQ shall develop and formulate its own annual RBB framework to include pre-defined objectives/desired results, resources required, activities, performance indicators, etc. on which actual performance is measured at the end of the annual financial year. This tool not only aids advance planning and preparations, but also drives operational readiness in performance of the mandated objectives.

10.8: Responsibilities for Maintaining Operational Readiness.

10.8.1: **General.** All military elements shall maintain specified level of operational readiness issued by the Force HQ to deal with any critical situations in a timely, effective and positive manner, within the framework of peacekeeping operations. Cooperation between TCCs and DPKO/DFS, as well as the Force HQ and the deployed units is essential for ensuring mission wide safety and security. To achieve (during predeployment phase), maintain (once deployed in the mission) and sustain (in the face of crisis situations) operational readiness and effectiveness, the following shall be institutionalised for UN peacekeeping missions:

10.8.2: **TCC/Military Unit/Sub-unit Responsibility.** TCC should assure that their military contributions TCCs are expected to provide mission capable military contributions at the required level of operational readiness for effective implementation of the mission mandate. In support of this process, it is envisaged that TCCs will bear the responsibility to apply, at a minimum, available UN guidance materials, and/or national standards at the same or higher level for their contingents to demonstrate enhanced operational readiness throughout their preparation, employment in the mission area and on rotation. TCCs should assure the DPKO/DFS, that its Units/Sub-Units meets the quality and operational ability to accomplish the mandate. They must arrive in the mission area in high state of operational readiness (well resourced, grouped, trained, tested, motivated and led) and ensure its sustainability throughout the period of deployment. TCC commanders should carry out periodic in-mission self-evaluation and internal operational audit to maintain and sustain the requisite readiness level. Depending of the challenges in the mission area and/or levels of performance/effectiveness, TCCs should institute necessary mid-course corrections and institute additional efforts to make the Units/Sub-Units mission capable. A TCC military team from the respective national capital is encouraged to visit the mission and conduct a performance evaluation in support of the contingent.

10.8.3: **Sector/Brigade HQ Responsibility.** The Subordinate HQ shall provide guidance and assistance to the military units deployed under its OPCON in executing MET as per mandate. It shall coordinate and monitor routine operations of the military component and shall direct and execute operations that involve operational/humanitarian crisis, to ensure desired effect and performance levels. The Sector/Brigade HQ shall carryout operational visits, rehearsals, exercises, etc. to ascertain and validate a military unit’s level of preparations and readiness.

10.8.4: **Force HQ and Mission Responsibility.** The Mission HQ shall provide overall direction and coordination for integrated response. The Force HQ shall lay down the directions and orders for implementation of the mandate by the military. Force HQ shall provide guidance and support to the subordinate HQ and military units in conduct of mission-specific operations. HoMCs are expected to carry out operational visits and institute quarterly, biannually or annually updated Mission-specific scenario-based rehearsals and exercises to ascertain and validate the operational readiness of the subordinate HQ and military units. Feedback on such assessments shall be conveyed through the deployed
contingents by Force HQ and to the TCCs through the Permanent Missions in New York by DPKO/OMA to assist in necessary preparations for future deployments.

10.8.5: DPKO Responsibility. Based on the principles of ORA, the UN has established a process that elaborates and facilitates a comprehensive approach to achieving the preparation for and the delivery of peacekeeping objectives in a professional and predictable manner. This process encompasses both UN (UNHQ and mission) responsibilities and expectations of TCCs. In support of this process the DPKO will provided MS as much training and guidance assistance as possible within resources. Further, the DPKO will institute appropriate mechanisms and processes for internal and external confirmation of achievement of desired levels of quality. A designated team of OMA shall undertake operational evaluation of a Force HQ/ Subordinate HQ/Military Unit/Sub-Unit, as deemed necessary and determined by the DPKO to analyse and verify facts related to operational readiness. In addition, an independent senior level function in the DPKO shall assist to assess and review the operational readiness and, monitor and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of the uniformed personnel in the implementation of the mandated tasks in compliance with UN policies, practices and standards.

10.9: Operational Readiness Assessment/Evaluation/Validation Process.

10.9.1: General. Operational readiness can be ascertained through a variety of tools designed to support the readiness of military component, such as, self-evaluation, field test exercise, formal certification, assessment by commanders, validation of operational effectiveness, official visits, inspections, formal and informal interactions and any other information gathering/feedback mechanisms established in the mission. The same standards must be applied to the full range of military contributions to ensure a consistent level of understanding, capability and readiness within a mission and across missions. This will ensure synergetic effect, operational flexibility and the integrity of the ORA processes.

10.9.2: Military Units/Sub-Units. It is expected that all military contributions provided by the TCCs have undergone self-evaluation and are mission capable in all respect prior to the deployment. Military Units/Sub-Units shall arrive in the mission area in full operational readiness. They shall provide a copy of the TCC certification to the Force HQ. The details of PDT and the standards achieved thereof shall also be intimated to the Force HQ. The Unit Commander shall subject the unit under the Operational Control of the HoMC/FC for the duration of the deployment (until final repatriation) in execution of the mission mandate in the spirit of UN. The Unit/Sub-Unit shall support an operational readiness validation by the Force HQ/OMA/DPKO in the following circumstances:
- To validate best practices/lessons learned.
- To validate lessons learnt in the wake of a major incident.
- To carryout operational needs assessment in support of achieving, maintaining and sustaining operational readiness.
- When the Force HQ or Sector/Brigade HQ is subjected to a validation.

10.9.3: Integrated Entities. All integrated entities of the mission (JOC, JMAC, IMTC, JLOC/ISS, SIOC, etc.) shall fall under the preview of the operational readiness validation, in whatsoever capacity it interacts with the Force HQ and the Military Component. It may be validated either independently or as part of the Mission/Force HQ validation. Integrated entities shall be subjected to the following validations:
- Effectiveness in execution of role and responsibilities.
- Effectiveness of integration and coordination.
- Impact of support at grassroots level.
- Scenario based rehearsals/exercises.

10.9.4: Support Units. The mission support structure under the DMS/CMS shall fall under the preview of the operational readiness validation, in whatsoever capacity it interacts and
supports the Military Component. It may be validated either independently or as part of the Mission/Force HQ validation, primarily through scenario based rehearsals/exercises. Integrated Support entities shall be subjected to the following validations:

- Effectiveness in role and responsibilities (preparedness).
- Effectiveness of execution of mission logistics support (agility).
- Impact of support at grassroots level (satisfaction).

10.9.5: Force HQ/Subordinate HQ Staff. At the discretion of the DPKO or on the recommendation of OMA, a Force HQ and/or its Subordinate HQ shall undergo an operational readiness validation. Such validation may be carried out to ascertain best practices, and/or, establish lessons learnt from the operational performance, including handling crisis situations, and/or, to identify an operational needs assessment/gap analysis, and/or, when the Mission HQ is subjected to a validation. Validation of Force HQ/Subordinate HQ shall cover the following:

- Force HQ Leadership.
- Force HQ Staff.
- UNMEM (UNMOs, MLOs and MILADs) as applicable.
- Subordinate HQ Leadership.
- Subordinate HQ Staff.
- All elements of Military Component (Units and Sub-Units).
- Any other component and/or associated personnel grouped with the military component for integrated operation or support function.

10.9.6: Mission HQ. At the discretion of the DPKO/DFS and/or on the recommendation of UNSC/GA, a Mission HQ shall be subjected to an evaluation by a senior function from the DPKO/DFS to validate the mission effectiveness, identify gaps and define needs in support of and to sustain positive performance. Mission HQ validation shall include assessing the effectiveness and operational readiness of all the mission components. The validation team shall carry out a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the mission effectiveness and in discussion with the SRSG/HOM shall make recommendations to the UNDPKO/DFS for review and necessary implementation.

10.10: Conclusion.
Maintaining operational readiness of the Military Component in the field is a joint responsibility of the contributing TCCs, the Unit/Sub-unit Commanders, HoMC and the Staff at Force HQ, the Mission HQ and the DPKO/DFS. OMA shall monitor preparedness and readiness of units prior to deployment through established mechanisms. For the deployed elements of the Military Component, OMA will maintain an objective oversight and technical link to ascertain best practices, lessons learnt and gaps in performance, if any. An effective information management system that can generate mission-wide situational awareness, maintenance of operational balance through relentless prophylactic operations, extensive logistic agility and the ability to handle crisis situations effectively are essential elements of operational readiness. Continuous training and rehearsals, provisioning of adequate resources (skilled personnel and equipment as per SFR/SUR), adaptability of units to changing operational environments, dynamic leadership, adherence to UN values and practices, as also the level of motivation and will to perform during crisis situations support enhanced operational readiness.

Achieving and maintaining operational readiness by all units and personnel of Military Component is a command responsibility. Based on continuous analysis of prevailing operational environment and developing a prognosis on anticipated future threats and challenges, commanders at all levels must institute appropriate response mechanisms to effectively deal with critical situations. Spontaneous, systematic and rapid response can only be possible when the required level of operational readiness has been achieved and due deliberations, coordination and rehearsals have been established well in advance with all
actors in the field. The sustenance of operational readiness of the Military Component and the resultant operational ability and willingness to proactively engage critical situations, not only act as deterrence but also enhances UN’s credibility in the peacekeeping mission area.

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Mission Concept Template

Summary.
This Mission Concept defines the overall strategy, priorities, and approach of the UN Mission in XX (UNMXXX). The main focus of UNMXX in the initial period will be (a) the deployment and establishment of the Mission and (b) the implementation of selected priorities in accordance with resolution [XXX] of the Security Council dated [XXX].

A. Context.
Briefly describe the role/comparative advantage of the mission vis-à-vis local, national and international actors and how the mission intends to engage local and national interlocutors

B. Overall Mission Objectives.
Describe the desired achievement by the Mission/ end-state of mandate implementation (e.g., the presence of favorable conditions for credible and peaceful elections, as in the UNOM Strategic Paper).

C. Key Assumptions and Risks. e.g.,
- Timeline for deployment
- Logistic issues
- Security constraints
- Contingency measures in case of crises

D. Mission Phases.
UNMXX is anticipated to be in the start-up phase for the initial period of 18 months, given the time required to build the mission infrastructure and deploy uniformed contingents, assets, and substantive civilian personnel.

The start-up phase will begin with [the expansion of UNMXX through the Security Council mandate, or transfer of authority from UNMXX to Mission X] and end with [the deployment of XX % of uniformed and civilian personnel, or the establishment of five regional offices, etc].

Within the start-up period of 18 months from July 20XX to December 20XX, there will be three distinct sub-phases, with associated milestones. The scope of mission activities during these sub-phases will be contingent on the development of the mission structure and outreach, as outlined below, as well as external factors, such as the commitment of national counterparts.

Phase I (July- December 20XX):
- Initial deployment of uniformed personnel.
- Establishment of regional offices in [XX locations], with requisite support and security personnel.
- Advance teams of substantive sections to continue operating in Bamako and beyond through field visits/placement of mobile teams.

Phase II (January-July 20XX):
- Initial deployment of substantive civilian personnel to the regions (likely to co-locate with uniformed personnel in the initial stage).
- Further establishment of regional offices in XX locations [or establishment of sub-regional offices in XX locations].
- Expansion of field visits by substantive sections.
Phase III (July-December 20XX):
- Completion of the establishment of all regional [and sub-regional] offices.
- Deployment of substantive civilian personnel to the regional offices.
- Commencement of mission activities at the regional and sub-regional levels.

E. Priorities.
In the start-up period, UNOM will focus on the following five priorities. *Describe briefly why and how these priorities were selected.*
- Human rights.
- Political dialogue.
- Strengthening of security institutions.
- Community-level violence reduction.
- Security sector reform.

Describe expected accomplishments of the mission in these priority areas by the end of the start-up period (not activities, but what the mission expects to see as the result of the activities).

F. Core Tasks/Outputs.
*Mission-wide deliverables that will contribute to the expected accomplishments (outputs of activities).*
- Phase I: July-December 20XX.
- Phase II: January-July 20XX.
- Phase III: July-December 20XX.

G. Strategic Guidance to Components.
e.g., main responsibilities, cross-pillar planning, and thematic coordination (including with UN country teams and others, as appropriate).

H. Resource Implications.
*Mission structure and requisite assets.*
**Annex B**

(Refers to Chapter 3, Section 3.6, p.36)

**DPKO-DFS Organisation**

**UNited Nations Peacekeeping Group: Capabilities to Ensure Integration**

**Department of Peacekeeping Operations**

- Office of the Under-Secretary-General (DPKO/OSG)
  - Office of the Secretary-General
    - Office of the Assistant Secretary-General
      - Africa I Division
        - Sudan Integrated Operational Team (SIOT)
        - East Africa IOT
      - Africa II Division
        - West Africa IOT
        - Great Lakes IOT
      - Asia and Middle East Division
        - Asia IOT
        - Afghanistan IOT
        - Middle East and Western Sahara IOT
      - Europe and Latin America Division
        - Europe and Latin America Team IOT
  - Office of the Under-Secretary-General (DPKO/OSG)
  - Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
    - Security Sector Reform Unit
    - Police Division
    - Office of the Police Adviser
    - Strategic Policy & Development Section
    - Mission Management & Support Section
    - Standing Police Capacity (Stabpol, Inc.)
    - Criminal Law & Justice Advisory Service
    - Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Section
    - Mine Action Service
    - Office of the Director
    - Programme Management Section
    - Policy, Information & Resource Management Section
  - Office of Military Affairs
    - Office of the Military Adviser
    - Current Military Operations Service
    - Military Planning Service
    - Force Generation Service
  - Joint Management Team
    - Executive Office
    - Situation Centre
    - Public Affairs Section
    - Peacemaking Information Management Unit
    - Focal Point for Security
    - Senior Leadership Appointments Section
    - Audit and Response to Boards of Inquiry Section
    - Conduct and Discipline Unit
    - Policy, Evaluation and Training Division
    - Peacekeeping Field Practiced Section
    - Integrated Training Service

**Department of Field Support**

- Office of the Under-Secretary-General (DFS/OSG)
  - Assistant Secretary-General
    - Office of the Assistant Secretary-General
      - Field Procurement & Human Resource Section
  - Field Personnel Division
    - Office of the Director
  - Field Personnel Operations Service
    - Africa 1 Section
    - Africa 2 Section
    - Europe & Other Sections
  - Field Budget & Finance Division
    - Office of the Director
  - Field & Performance Reporting Service
  - UNO & Claims Management Section
  - Logistics Support Division
    - Office of the Director
      - Operational Support Service
        - Aviation and Safety Section
        - Logistics Operations Section
        - Strategic Deployment Blocks Unit
        - Specialist Support Service
          - Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section
          - Engineering Section
          - Medical Support Section
          - Supply Section
          - Cartographic Section
        - Transportation & Movement Service
          - Air Transport Section
          - Movement Control Section
          - Surface Transport Section
        - UN Logistics Base (Brindisi, Italy)
        - Information & Communications Technology Division
          - Office of the Director
              - Field Communications & IT Operations Service
              - Field Technology and Security Section
Annex-C
(Refers to Chapter 3, Section 3.6.2, p.36)

Office of Military Affairs
Organisational Chart

Military Adviser (ASG)

Deputy Military Adviser

Chief of Staff

Special Assistant to MilAd

Special Assistant to DMilAd

Special Assistant to the COS

Legal Adviser

Administration Management

General Staff

Force Generation Service

Current Military Operations Service

Military Planning Service

Assessment Team

Policy and Doctrine Team

Liaison Team

IOT Embedded DFS Embedded

Military Component Operations Order

Overview.
The Force Operations Order (OPORD) is developed from the CONOPS by the Force HQ. An OPORD describes the situation facing the Mission, the overall Mission for the military component and what activities will be conducted to achieve the mission goals.

It is subsequently issued to subordinate formations / sectors for implementation. Each subordinate military element, as they receive the OPORD, will develop their own orders. On receipt of an OPORD, each subordinate formation will in turn develop their own OPORD which removes unnecessary detail and adds focused information on what and how that unit will implement the higher level OPORD. So an OPORD at a particular level of the military structure will lead to other units involved developing their own OPORD which will borrow from the original OPORD so far as the situation and mission but will then add additional details for the activities a specific unit is to conduct.

Contents. A standard OPORD contains the following sections.

- Situation
- Mission
- Execution
- Service Support
- Command and Signal

A more detailed structure is overleaf. The structure is a guide and should assist with the dissemination of orders not hinder the process. The structure can be adjusted as required by each organization drafting the OPORD to suit their requirements.

Template

Force
HQ/UNXX
X

XXX 20XX

OPORD XX/20XX: UN MISSION NAME OPERATIONAL ORDER

References:
A. United Nations Security Council Resolution…
B. DPKO/OMA/MPS …
C. ROE dated…
D. SOFA …, etc

SITUATION.

1) Background. Short summary of key issues.
   a) Current Situation. Relevant detail on the current situation.
   b) Threat Assessment. Key features of threat, further detail in Annex.

2) United Nations.
   a) UNXXX Mandate. Explain mandate and tasks.
   b) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Intent.
c) UNXXX Military-Strategic End State.
d) DPKO Military Strategic Concept of Operations: Summary of key parts of OMA CONOPs with outline of phases.
   I. Flanking Missions. Where applicable – mention neighbouring or nearby missions and Inter Mission Cooperation.

MISSION.

EXECUTION.
3) Force Commander’s (FC) Intent. Simple explanation that explains what the FC is trying to achieve in the OPORD.
   a) Key Tasks. List key tasks identified in the CONOPs.
   b) End-state.
      Concept of Operations.
   c) Phases.
      I. Phase One (xxx).
      II. Phase Two (xxx).
      III. Phase Three (xxx).
   d) Tasks. (Examples include those listed below)
      I. Force HQ is to:
      II. Sector HQs are to:
      III. Infantry Battalions are to:
      IV. MLOs are to:
      V. FRB is to:
      VI. Mission Support Division (MSD) is requested to:
   e) Coordinating Instructions.
      I. Locations.
      II. Control Measures.
      III. Reports and Returns.
   f) Enabling Components.
      I. UN Civil / Military Cooperation (UN-CIMIC).
      II. Information Operations (IOs).
      III. Engineer Operations.
      IV. Military Aviation Operations.

SERVICE SUPPORT.
4) Support Concept.
   a) Supply.
   b) Transport.
   c) Medical.
   d) Logistic and Support standards and requirements:

COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
5) HQ Locations.
   a) Force HQ.
   b) Sector HQs.
   c) Infantry Battalion HQs.
   d) FRB.
6) Command Relationships and Operational Tasking.
   a) Enablers.
   b) MLOs.
7) Operational Reporting.
8) Computer and information Technology Services (CITS).
9) Signals.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

XX XXX
MAJOR GENERAL
UNXXX Force Commander
(date)

Annexes: (could include but are not limited to the examples below)
A. UNXXX Force Deployment Plan
B. UNXXX Threat Assessment (UN CLASSIFIED)
C. UNXXX Structure
D. UN-Civil/Military Coordination
E. UNXXX Military Reports and Returns
F. UNXXX Concept of Logistics Support

Distribution:
 a)
Annex E
(Refers to Chapter 3, Section 3.11.7, p.53)

Suggested List of Orders, Directives and SOPs

1. Force Operations Order.
3. SOP on Force Operational Activities.
5. SOPs on each Mission Essential Task.
6. SOPs on each Functional Branch.
7. Medical/casualty Evacuation.
8. COE Management.
10. Live Firing.
11. Evaluation/Validation.
14. Command and Control; and Reporting Procedures.
15. Knowledge Management.
17. Inter-Mission Cooperation.
18. Force HQ Routine.
20. SOP on Reports and Returns.
21. SOP on Transfer of Authority.
22. SOP on Medal Parades.
23. SOP on Outreach and Engagement.
24. SOP on Key Leader Engagement.
25. SOP on Night Operations.
26. SOP on Surveillance and Monitoring.
27. SOP on Force Welfare and Recreational Activities.
28. SOP on Ammunition and Explosive Storage and Handling.
Annex- F
(Refers to Chapter 3, Section 3.12.4, p.55)

Operations Reports Repository

Overview.
The Operations Reports Repository (ORR) is a secure web-based tool for the registration, approval, authorised access and storage of mission situation reports. Authorised mission and UNHQ users may access the ORR directly through the UNHQ or UN mission networks. The ORR supports the following tasks: document uploading with automated notifications, document browsing, full-text document search, and secure, long-term document storage as well as user administration.

ORR User Access.
All users will require webmail accounts to access the ORR. In new missions, once webmail accounts are established, users should contact the Peacekeeping Information Management Unit, OCOS/DPKO/DFS at peacekeeping-imu@un.org for registration, access and guidance on the use of the system. In existing missions, users should contact the mission ORR administrator to access the system.

Log In.
The log in information for ORR is as follows: URL: https://orr.dfs.un.org/
Username: The first part of the user’s UN e-mail address (i.e. ‘surname’ for surname@un.org). Password: The user’s Lotus Notes webmail password.

Procedures for SitRep upload and approval in the ORR.

Uploading SitReps in the ORR:
- Users must log in with username and password.
- Click ‘Register Document’ on the top right-hand corner.
- Upload the SitRep in Word format.
- The only two fields that need to be entered are (i) the document date; and (ii) the document type (daily or weekly SitRep). The document title and other fields are automatically completed based on this information.
- E-mail addresses of approving officers will automatically appear. Click ‘Submit’. This will send an e-mail notification to approving officers for approval of the document.

Approval of SitReps in the ORR:
- Upon receipt of email notification of a SitRep available for approval click the ORR link.
- Users must log in with username and password.
- Right-click on the document to be approved.
- Select ‘Approve/Reject’, then click ‘Approve’ to approve the report.
- A non-editable version of the SitRep will then be released to those with authorised access in the mission and UNHQ.
- Mission ORR administrators also have the access necessary to approve SitReps if required.

Reference:
UN DPKO/DFS Ref. 2012/01- Integrated Reporting from DPKO-Led Field Missions to UNHQ
**Format for ‘Status of Mission Personnel and Others’ Reporting Table**

- To be completed daily and annexed to daily SitReps during crises -

**Status of Mission Personnel and Others**

[MISSION NAME] Reporting for the period: [Date] [Hour] - [Date] [Hour]

Cumulative reporting for the period: [Date] [Hour] - [Date] [Hour]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total assigned as</th>
<th>Accounted for</th>
<th>Unaccounted for (ii)</th>
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<td>at initiation of reporting (i)</td>
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<td>Injured</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Mission Personnel**

- **Military personnel**
  - Contingent members
  - Experts on mission

- **Police personnel**
  - FPU members
  - Individual police officers

- **Civilian personnel**
  - International
  - Locally recruited
  - Experts on mission

**UNVs**

**UNCT (vi)**

- Agency, Fund, Programme personnel
The figures in column A should equal the sum of the figures in columns D, E, F, G and H. The figures in columns B and C (casualties) should be incorporated in the figures in D, E, F and G (location). \( A = D + E + F + G + H \)

Notes:

i The number of personnel in each category at the time of the crisis event or the activation of Crisis Response mode.
ii Personnel must be recorded as ‘unaccounted for’ until their actual status and location have been confirmed through direct contact.
iii Casualty reporting must accord with reporting undertaken pursuant to the DPKO-DFS SOP on Notification of Casualties (NOTICAS). Deceased and injured personnel must also be recorded in the location reporting.
iv Location reporting must include the number of deceased and injured personnel in each location category.
v This category covers personnel who were out of country at the time of the crisis event or activation of Enhanced Preparedness or Crisis Response mode and told to hold in place, including people on leave, R&R or TDY. This category also includes those personnel who have departed the country, including those who have been medically evacuated. Personnel should only be included in this category once the mission has confirmed their actual location through direct contact.
vi Reporting on the status of UNCT personnel is required from integrated missions in which the DSRSG is also the head of the UNCT.

The categories of other personnel for which the mission assumes security responsibility, and upon which it must report will differ between missions in accordance with the UN Security Management System. These may include independent contractors, consultants, NGO personnel, non-recognised dependants etc. Additional rows should be added to, or removed from, this table to reflect the spectrum of personnel for whom the mission assumes security responsibility.

Reference:
UN DPKO/DFS Ref. 2012/01- Integrated Reporting from DPKO-Led Field Missions to UNHQ.
FORMAT FOR ‘DAILY SITUATION REPORTS’

CONFIDENTIAL

DAILY SITUATION REPORT [MISSION NAME]
Daily Situation Report Covering Period: [Date] (00:01-24:00hrs)

HIGHLIGHTS
[The purpose of this section is to ensure that key developments and events are not overlooked by SitRep readers. Three or four bullet points should summarise the most significant events during the reporting period. In addition (and as appropriate), specific mention should be made under ‘HIGHLIGHTS’ of any developments pertaining to:

- New challenges to mandate implementation [indicate either NSTR or reference relevant report section].
- Protection of civilians [indicate either NSTR or reference relevant report section].
- Sexual and gender-based violence [indicate either NSTR or reference relevant report section].
- Security of peacekeepers [indicate either NSTR or reference relevant report section].

POLITICAL
[This section should cover events, incidents or developments with a notable political impact.]

OPERATIONAL
[This section should cover events, incidents or developments with a notable operational impact, irrespective of the mission component(s) affected, e.g. humanitarian, human rights, civil affairs, logistics, military, police, mine action and others, as applicable.]

SECURITY/SAFETY
[This section should cover incidents or developments with a significant impact on the security situation in the mission area. It should cover any new threats to personnel, special security measures established or lifted during the reporting period, and an update on any personnel missing, seriously wounded or killed during the reporting period, where applicable.]

[OTHER SUB-HEADINGS IF REQUIRED]
[Additional sections can be added if considered necessary for purposes of clarity. However, the most simplified reporting format is preferable.]

COMMENTS
[This section is optional. Comments can also be added to specific events described in the main text as long as they are clearly indicated as such.]

Reference:
UN DPKO/DFS Ref. 2012/01- Integrated Reporting from DPKO-Led Field Missions to UNHQ.
CONFIDENTIAL WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT

[MISSION NAME]
Weekly Situation Report Covering Period: Tuesday [Date] (00:01hrs) to Monday [Date] (24:00hrs)

SUMMARY
[The purpose of this section is to ensure that key developments and events are not overlooked by SitRep readers. The section should summarise and analyse the most significant events during the reporting period.]

POLITICAL
[This section should provide a summary and analysis of events, incidents or developments with a notable political impact.]

OPERATIONAL
[This section should provide a summary and analysis of events, incidents or developments with a notable operational impact, irrespective of the mission component(s) affected, e.g. humanitarian, human rights, civil affairs, logistics, military, police, mine action and others, as applicable.]

SECURITY/SAFETY
[This section should provide a summary and analysis of incidents or developments with a significant impact on the security situation in the mission area. It should cover any new threats to personnel, special security measures established or lifted during the reporting period, and an update on any personnel missing, seriously wounded or killed during the reporting period, where applicable.]

[OTHER SUB-HEADINGS IF REQUIRED]
[Additional sections can be added if considered necessary for purposes of clarity. However, the most simplified reporting format is preferable.]

COMMENTS
[This section is optional and may not be necessary given that the main body of the text should have an analytical focus.]

Reference:
UN DPKO/DFS Ref. 2012/01- Integrated Reporting from DPKO-Led Field Missions to UNHQ.
Weekly Information Summary
(To be submitted to OMA Assessment Team)

1. Latest Operational Developments
   - Key issues occurred during the reported period.

2. Assessment
   - Identified threats.
   - Analysis on the impact for the military activities and for the security environment.
   - The risk level to UN military contingents and assets (very low, low, medium, high, very high).

3. Conclusions
   - Short term forecast.
   - Any long term analysis.

4. Annexure
   - When it applies, maps, figures, pictures, graphics, etc can be attached to the report.
Incident Report

1. LOGIN DATE:
   - xxxx
2. UNIT:
   - xxxx
3. LOGIN TIME:
   - xxxx
4. INCIDENT TYPE:
   - xxxx
5. TIME OF THE INCIDENT:
   - xxxx
6. DESCRIPTION (WHAT WHO WHEN WHERE WHY...):
   - xxxxx
7. COMMENTS/ASSESSMENT
   - xxxxxxx
8. ATTACHMENTS
   - xxxx

Prepared by:
Rank
Name
POSITION
UN IDNO
Contact No
**Flash Report**

FLASH REPORT # 6
“A SMALL IED EXPLOSION 150 METERS FROM A UN CONVOY”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHAT</th>
<th>A small IED explosion 150 meters from a UN convoy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHEN</td>
<td>On 20th May, at 1555.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHERE</td>
<td>Location ………</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>UN convoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHY/HOW</td>
<td>A small IED explosion occurred approx. 150 meters from a UN convoy. No UN casualties were sustained in the blast. UNSMIS HQ has received no indication of targeting in this instance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTIONS TAKEN</td>
<td>UNSMIS will follow through its liaison with the parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADDITIONAL INFORMATION</td>
<td>Additional information will be delivered as available.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Annex- M**

(Refers to Chapter 3, Section 3.12.4, p.55)

**Notification of Casualty**

NOTICAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference:</th>
<th>Mission:</th>
<th>Date Sent:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To</td>
<td>Military Adviser (Military Personnel Only)</td>
<td>3-123 Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police Adviser (Police Personnel Only)</td>
<td>3-321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit (Corrections Personnel Only)</td>
<td>3-231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PMSS (Civilian Personnel Only)</td>
<td>3-312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>USG DPA (Personnel from DPA led Mission Only)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A | Data on Individual**

- Last Name
- First Name and Middle Name
- Country of Nationality
- Gender
- Military Rank/Civilian Equivalent
- Service No/ID Card No
- Passport No
- Date of Birth
- Type of Casualty
- Place where Victim is Located

**B | United Nations Data**

- Name of Mission
- UN ID Card No
- Appointment Type
- On Duty at Time of incident
- Date of arrival in the Mission
- Function in the Mission

**C | Next of kin Data**

- Name
- Address
- Telephone
- Relationship

**D | Data on Incident**

- Date/Time of incident
- Incident Location
- Type of Incident Circumstances
- Description of Incident
- Additional Comments

**Authorised By**

Title: Chief Administrative Officer/Director of Administration

**Drafted By**

Name

Signature
# Casualty Report

**CASUALTY REPORT No**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>LOCATION OF CASUALTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>RANK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>UN ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>LAST NAME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>FIRST NAME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>INJURY CAUSED BY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>TIME OF INJURY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION OF INJURY/ILLNESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>CHECKED BY A LOCAL PHYSICIAN YES/NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>SITUATION Safe/Unsafe/Unpredictable/Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS Unconscious/Drowsy/Awake and Answering Questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>BREATHING Walking/Sitting/Lying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>BLEEDING Good/Bad/Not breathing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>CATEGORY Civilian/ Military/Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>NATIONALITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>SEX MALE/FEMALE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>BLOOD TYPE O/A/B/RH/RH-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:**
1. Serials A to J must be reported immediately
2. Serials K to N can be sent later, followed by serials O to R

Prepared by:

**Rank,**
**Name**
**Position**
**IDNO**
**Cont No**
### Casualty Evacuation Form

**CASUALTY EVACUATION (CASEVAC) FORM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNISFA ID</th>
<th>International Local Military Substantial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BLOOD GROUP</td>
<td>Golf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIRWAYS</td>
<td>Victor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLEEDING</td>
<td>Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRCULATION</td>
<td>Charlie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRACTURES</td>
<td>Foxtrot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEUROLOGY</td>
<td>Romeo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSPORTABILITY</td>
<td>Tango</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This message must be read as a series of letters and numbers.

**Identity:** One letter and four or five numbers

**Blood Group:** The letter GOLF followed by the letter(s) of the blood group followed by the letter for positive or negative rhesus.

**The 6 clinical parameters:** One by one, each defined by a single letter and a single number corresponding to the verbal text.

The medical message will consist of letters that are never duplicated and numbers.

**Example:** L1234 GAN V1 D1 C1 F3 R1 T1
Annex- P
(Refers to Chapter 4, Section 4.5.4, p.69)

Welfare and Recreational Activities

1. General. The following represents a non-exhaustive list of activities and facilities implemented in peacekeeping missions that can be included as part of a welfare and recreation strategy:

2. Recreational Space:
   - Establishing a club house, reading room, book club, library or internet cafe;
   - Providing a lounge area and/or coffee shop with space for social events such as playing cards, chess and other board games;
   - Setting up a bar or cafeteria that serves food or refreshments;

3. Recreational Activities, Services and Equipment.
   - Movie screening areas with televisions or projectors;
   - Provision of television with cable or satellite connection;
   - Provision of internet connection;
   - Welfare flights/trips;
   - Provision of subsidized telephone rates;
   - Purchase of sports equipment e.g. basketball, darts, pool table, tennis, ping pong;
   - Setting up of small gym or fitness center with basic weights, treadmills and stationary bicycles, together with qualified training instructors;
   - Organizing other recreational activities such as yoga, martial arts, dancing, barbeques, hikes and tours;
   - Holding sporting or talent competitions for mission personnel;
   - Educational or self improvement training or classes e.g. language classes organized and financed by the mission;
   - Opening an on-site travel agency for personnel to make easier reservations;

   - Selection of volunteer peer counselors, e.g. to offer stress or religious counseling, provided that they do not replace UN professional counselors;
   - Provision of prayer rooms for personnel;

5. Public Outreach Activities.
   - Sporting events, such as football matches, against local teams, or participation in community sporting activities when authorized by the HOM.
**Annex- Q** (Refers to Chapter 4, Section 4.5.5, p.70)

**Information Collection Plan**

**Do the conflict parties intend to hamper the deployment of UN Forces into the area of operation (Sectors).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PIR’s</th>
<th>RFI’s</th>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
<th>COLLECTION SOURCES</th>
<th>TASKS</th>
<th>REPORTING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do the xxx forces intend to hamper the deployment of infantry battalion B into the temporary security zone? If YES; How and with what force?</td>
<td>Do the xxx forces have any OP’s along the axis from A to B?</td>
<td>Comms traffic from OP’s along the axis.</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Monitor xxx forces VHF band in the area between A and B. Report on Comms activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there any xxx forces deployed between A and B?</td>
<td>Military activity along the axis. Xxx preparations for combat Ops.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Determine location of xxx forces between A and B down to platoon level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do the xxx forces have artillery covering the axis between A and B?</td>
<td>Artillery/Mortar test firing in the vicinity of the axis.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Determine location of xxx artillery covering the area between A and B. Report on any calibration firings.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do xxx forces have any mine laying capacity along the axis from A to B?</td>
<td>Minefields/obstacles.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Determine location of any obstacles /minefields/ along the road between A and B.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(X): Source has the capacity to provide information  

Battalion, H: TCC E Intelligence Company  

X: Source is tasked to provide information
Annex- R
(Refers to Chapter 4, Section 4.5.6, p.71)

Force Military Operations Centre

General. The operational constraints of peacekeeping environment in terms of new terrain, presence of multiple actors, sensitivity in public interaction, need for mature and calibrated response, unpredictable safety and security situations and the fact that a single negative incident could have wide ramifications to the peace process, entails maintaining effective command and control of activities by the commanders at all levels. Therefore, it is an imperative to establish Military Operations Centre’s at the Force HQ, Sector/Brigade HQ, as well as at the Unit and Sub-unit levels to monitor, coordinate and control all activities and responses for the execution of Mission Essential Tasks (MET) and logistics sustenance of the Force.

Configuration.

General. The Force Military Operations Centre is a Command, Control, Communication and Information centre designed to control and execute operational activities, to include, coordination, integration and timely passage of information and orders in accordance with operational plans and commander’s intention.

Force Military Operations Centre (MOC). The MOC will function under the Force Chief U-3 Operations and will have a dedicated MOC Officer assisted by one Warrant Officer and four NCOs and two signal personnel. The MOC shall have the following arrangements for effective functioning:

- Operational plans, patrolling plans, schedule of events, information collection plan, etc.
- Electronic GPS Tracking System to monitor movements of all elements of the Military Component.
- Video Tele-Conferencing (VTC) Facility.
- A forward, rear and lateral secure voice and data communication link with redundancy.
- Hotline Communication to UNOCC, SitCen, JOC, JMAC, subordinate HQ, Units and Sub-units as well as the neighbouring Missions MOC will be maintained.

Joint Operations. When conducting joint operations with police or other entities, a Joint HQ or control station will be established and co-located with the MOC as the case may be.

Role.
The Force MOC is responsible for coordinating, monitoring, executing and responding to all issues related to the current and day to day operations. It will be integrated with the Mission JOC and JMAC and support their charter of responsibilities. It shall also maintain close liaison with SIOC of the Mission Security Section. It should also preferably monitor operations by the Host nation Security Forces as well as other spoilers/rebels in the Mission Area.

Responsibilities.
The MOC must maintain utmost vigil at all times and are accountable for coordination and control of all activities and institute rapid responses in critical situations. Major responsibilities of the MOC in a peacekeeping environment are:

- **Command and Control.**
  - The MOC will be under the direct supervision of Force COS, assisted by Chief U-3.
  - The functional control will be maintained by the Operational Staff Branch U-3.
Reporting to the SRSG/MLT as well as JOC/JMAC will take place through command and staff channel respectively.

- **Readiness.**
  - Maintain a 24/7 static MOC.
  - Maintain Mobile Command Post for HoMC/DFC.
  - An Officer or a WO with minimum three NCOs will be manning the MOC at all times.
  - Ensure direct hotline communication and VTC with all commanders in the channel.

- **Routine.**
  - Remain in radio contact and in listening watch with all operational and logistics elements to ensure immediate reporting of occurrence of incidents.
  - Receive and send messages and transmissions and maintain a message log.
  - Maintain liaison with JOC, JMAC and neighbouring Missions.
  - Maintain contact with liaison officers of other entities and coordinate Force operations.
  - Provide situational updates and daily reports to the Operations Staff Branch and the Force Leadership (HoMC/FC, DFC and COS).

- **Oversight.**
  - Coordinate and monitor all operational and administrative movements in real time.
  - Monitor, coordinate and control MET/peacekeeping operations.
  - Monitor progress and guide ongoing operations by passage of information simultaneously to commanders on ground and higher commanders.
  - Coordinate and control joint operations.
  - Monitor and coordinate helicopter movements for operational, administrative and MEDEVAC purposes.

- **Situational Awareness.**
  - Maintain peacekeeping information databank.
  - Act as an information collection, processing and sharing/dissemination hub.
  - Monitor UAV employment and processing of information.
  - Coordinate with subordinate Operation Centres in analysing inputs from GS Radar data inputs.

- **Response.**
  - Ensure readiness of QRF and QRT as per SOP at all times.
  - Alert all COBs, TOBs, operational elements operating outside the static bases and other routine columns on occurrence of any incident and coordinate their movement/employment as per planned response.
  - Coordinate and control employment of QRF/QRT as proactive deployment or as reinforcements.
  - Monitor critical situations and develop appropriate responses within the battalion resources and the mission resources (force multipliers and reserves, etc.).
  - Ensure recreation of reserves once existing reserves are committed.
  - Assist Chain of Command in exercising operational coordination and control.

**Integration.**
The MOC will be integrated with the JOC/JMAC/Operations Staff at the Sector/Brigade HQ through VTC and hotline communication systems. The Mission JOC and JMAC will also have a direct access with all the Operations Centres of the military Component during critical times as laid down by the respective mission leadership.

## Standard Personnel Table for Multidimensional Mission

### Personnel Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POST NO</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>TITLE OF POSITION</th>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>MILITARY BRANCH</th>
<th>SPECIALTY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
<th>SUB TOTAL</th>
<th>PRIORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OFFICE OF THE FORCE COMMANDER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>COMMANDING OFFICER</td>
<td>FORCE COMMANDER (HEAD OF MILITARY)</td>
<td>FC (HOMC)</td>
<td></td>
<td>G-3</td>
<td>G-1</td>
<td>O-6</td>
<td>O-5</td>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>O-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>STAFF OFFICER</td>
<td>MILITARY ASSISTANT</td>
<td>MA-FC</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>STAFF OFFICER</td>
<td>AIDE DE CAMP</td>
<td>ADC-FC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>STAFF OFFICER</td>
<td>ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER</td>
<td>AO-FC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>STAFF OFFICER</td>
<td>SERGENT MAJOR</td>
<td>SM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CONTINGENT</td>
<td>ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT</td>
<td>AA-FC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>COMMANDING OFFICER</td>
<td>DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER</td>
<td>DFC</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>STAFF OFFICER</td>
<td>MILITARY ASSISTANT</td>
<td>MA-DFC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CONTINGENT</td>
<td>ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT</td>
<td>AADFC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>STAFF OFFICER</td>
<td>CHIEF OF STAFF</td>
<td>COS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>STAFF OFFICER</td>
<td>MILITARY ASSISTANT</td>
<td>MA-COS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CONTINGENT</td>
<td>ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT</td>
<td>AA-COS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Annex S**
(Refers to Chapter 4, Section 4.6, p.79)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTINGENT</th>
<th>STAFF OFFICER</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>OFFICE</th>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>DEPARTMENT</th>
<th>OPEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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**INFO OPS**

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115 STAFF OFFICER INFO OPS PLANNING OFFICER (2) IOPO-U3 1 OPEN 1
115 STAFF OFFICER INFO OPS COORDINATING OFFICER IOCO-U3 1 OPEN 1

**LIASON TEAM**

119 STAFF OFFICER SENIOR LIASON OFFICER SLO-U3 1 OPEN 1
120 STAFF OFFICER LIASON OFFICER (1) LO-U3 1 OPEN 1
121 STAFF OFFICER LIASON OFFICER (2) LO-U3 1 OPEN 1
122 STAFF OFFICER LIASON OFFICER (3) LO-U3 1 OPEN 1
123 STAFF OFFICER LIASON OFFICER (4) LO-U3 1 OPEN 1
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**DDR SUPPORT**

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# MILITARY STAFF IN INTEGRATED COMPONENT

## JOINT OPERATION CENTRE (JOC)
*Based on Policy and Guidelines on JOC (01/02/2010)*

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## JOINT MISSION ANALYSIS CENTRE (JMAC)
*Based on Policy and Guidelines on JMAC (01/02/2010)*

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### Integrated Support Services (ISS) / Joint Logistics Operation Centre (JLOC)

#### Based on Policy Directive on JLOC (06/2008)

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40
1. **General.** The Force Military Best Practices Officer (MBPO) is responsible for military related and mission-specific knowledge management, including lessons identified, lessons learned and best practices. This would entail creating a Military Best Practices (MBP) and lessons learned database to share relevant policies, guidelines, SOPs, Manuals, SG Bulletins, Directives, etc. as applicable to the Military Component. This database will benefit the commanders and staff at all levels in the Force HQ in particular and the Military Component in general.

2. **Contents.** The MBP Database must have the following details at a minimum:
   - **Policies.** Latest/current UN Guidance (Policies, guidelines, SOPs, Bulletins, etc.).
   - **Mission Documents.** Mission-specific Higher Direction (Mandate, HoM/HoMC Directive, CONOPS, ROE, SOFA/SOMA, SFR/SUR, MOUs, etc.).
   - **After Action Reports** (As applicable).
   - **End of Assignment Reports** (HoMC/DFC).
   - **Handing Taking Notes** (between all appointments and units).
   - **Incident Reports** (reports on all previous operational or other incidents).
   - **Operational Briefs (Mission, Sector, Unit and Sub-unit level).**
   - **Commanders Briefs** (HoMC/FC, DFS, Contingent Commanders, Sub-unit Commanders, Enabler unit Commanders, etc.).
   - **Staff Branch Briefs** (COS, U1 to U-9 and other special appointments).
   - **Contingents. Certification, Self-evaluation standards, COE/UNOE serviceability state, Manpower state, etc.**
   - **Rotation Plans.**
   - **Mission-specific Predeployment Information Package.**
   - **Training Folder.**
   - **Operational Folder.**
   - **Military Information Folder.**
   - **CIMIC Folder.**
   - **Medical Folder.**
   - **Welfare and Recreation Folder.**
   - **HoMC Message Board.**
   - **Feedback Folder.**

3. **Management.** The MBPO will be responsible for the management of the database under the supervision of the Force CoS. Necessary coordination with Force Signals Branch Chief and CITs shall be carried out for uploading the data. The database will be accessible only to selective/authorised audience as approved by the HoMC/FC. Confidential matters shall not be uploaded.
Introduction. The Security Policy Manual is in constant development as new policies are promulgated and old policies migrated from the former Field Security Handbook. This list is as at April 2013. New policies included in the Security Policy Manual are indicated with *, while older, but still valid, policies forming the former Field Security Handbook are also included, but without *.

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- Chapter I - Foreword /Introduction.
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  E. Relations with Host Countries on Security Issues *
  F. Role of the Department of Safety and Security
- Chapter III - Applicability of UN Security Management System.
  A. Applicability of United Nations Security Management System *
- Chapter IV - Security Management.
  ➢ Security Planning
    A. Security Risk Management *
    B. Security Level System *
    C. Determination of Acceptable Risk *
    D. Relocation, Evacuation and Alternate Work Modalities-Measures to Avoid Risk *
    E. Security of United Nations Premises *
    F. Special Events Organized or Sponsored by UNSMS *
    G. Close Protection Operations *
    H. Use of Force Policy *
    I. Armed Private Security Companies *
    J. [Operations in a Nuclear, Biological or Chemical Warfare Environment]
    K. Telecommunication Policy
    L. Information Security - Sensitivity, Classification and Handling
  ➢ Security Mitigation Measures.
    M. Country/Mission-specific Security Plan
      a. Routine Operations
      b. Evacuation
      c. Contingency Plans
    N. Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) *
    P. Blast Mitigation Policy
    Q. Crisis Management and Response
    R. Medical Plans, Equipment, Supplies, (including PEP Kit)
    S. Continuity of Operations (Business Continuity Plan)
  ➢ Management of Security-Related Incidents.
    T. Arrest and Detention *
    U. Hostage Incident Management *
V. Family and Victim Support
W. Security for Female Personnel, Dependant Spouses, Children and Unaccompanied Families
X. After Action Reports, Lessons Learned and Best Practices
Y. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) *

- **Chapter V - Compliance with Security Policies and Procedures.**
  A. Security Clearance Policy and the Travel Request Information Process (TRIP) *
  B. Safety and Security Incident Reporting System – SSIRS
  C. Security Training and Certifications
  D. Compliance and Evaluation Monitoring
  E. Disciplinary Measures
  F. Listing of Staff Members and Dependents
  G. Boards of Inquiry *

- **Chapter VI - Administrative and Logistic Support for Security Operations.**
  A. Remuneration of United Nations system staff and eligible family members on relocation/evacuation status *
  B. Security-related Staff Entitlements and Summary of Staff Members Security related Rights and Obligations
  C. Malicious Acts Insurance Policy
  D. Common-System Security Requirements and Local Cost-Share Budgets
  E. Procurement of Security Equipment and Quality Assurance
  F. Compensations for Loss of, or Damage to Personal Effects

- **Chapter VII- Provisions on Safety Matters.**
  A. Introduction
  B. Aviation Safety
  C. Fire Safety *
  D. Road Safety *
We Are United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel

The United Nations Organization embodies the aspirations of all the people of the world for peace. In this context, the Charter of the United Nations requires that all personnel must maintain the highest standards of integrity and conduct. We will comply with the Guidelines on International Humanitarian Law for Forces Undertaking United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the applicable portions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the fundamental basis of our standards.

We, as peacekeeping personnel, represent the United Nations and are present in the country to help it recover from the trauma of a conflict. As a result, we must consciously be prepared to accept special constraints in our public and private lives in order to do the work and pursue the ideals of the United Nations Organization. We will be accorded certain privileges and immunities arranged through agreements negotiated between the United Nations and the host country solely for the purpose of discharging our peacekeeping duties. Expectations of the international community and the local population will be high, and our actions, behaviour and speech will be closely monitored.

**We will always:**
- Conduct ourselves in a professional and disciplined manner, at all times.
- Dedicate ourselves to achieving the goals of the United Nations.
- Understand the mandate and mission and comply with their provisions.
- Respect the environment of the host country.
- Respect local laws, customs and practices and be aware of and respect culture, religion, traditions and gender issues.
- Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration.
- Act with impartiality, integrity and tact.
- Support and aid the infirm, sick and weak.
- Obey our United Nations superiors/supervisors and respect the chain of command.
- Respect all other peacekeeping members of the mission regardless of status, rank, ethnic or national origin, race, gender or creed.
- Support and encourage proper conduct amongst our fellow peacekeeping personnel.
- Report all acts involving sexual exploitation and abuse.
- Maintain proper dress and personal deportment at all times.
- Properly account for all money and property assigned to us as members of the mission.
- Care for all United Nations equipment placed in our charge.

**We will never:**
- Bring discredit upon the United Nations or our nations through improper personal conduct, failure to perform our duties or abuse of our positions as peacekeeping personnel.
- Take any action that might jeopardize the mission.
- Abuse alcohol, use or traffic in drugs.
- Make unauthorized communications to external agencies, including unauthorized press statements.
- Improperly disclose or use information gained through our employment.
- Use unnecessary violence or threaten anyone in custody.
- Commit any act that could result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members of the local population, especially women and children.
- Commit any act involving sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual activity with children under 18, or exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex.
• Become involved in sexual liaisons that could affect our impartiality or the well-being of others.
• Be abusive or uncivil to any member of the public.
• Willfully damage or misuse any United Nations property or equipment.
• Use a vehicle improperly or without authorization.
• Collect unauthorized souvenirs.
• Participate in any illegal activities, corrupt or improper practices.
• Attempt to use our positions for personal advantage, to make false claims or accept benefits to which we are not entitled.

We realize that the consequences of failure to act within these guidelines may:
• Erode confidence and trust in the United Nations.
• Jeopardize the achievement of the mission.
• Jeopardize our status and security as peacekeeping personnel and;
• Result in administrative, disciplinary or criminal action.
Gender: Functional Responsibilities


Gender-related responsibilities of the branches in a Force HQ. The various staff sections of the Force HQ shall address gender perspectives that may have impact on:

U1: Personnel Staff.
- Sex-disaggregated statistics of force strength.
- Code of conduct/Standards of behaviour.
- Internal policies.

U2: Information Staff.
- Information collection, HUMINT. Information should be collected on specific threats against women, men, boys and girls, the presence of women and children in armed groups.
- Risk and Security assessments.
- Knowledge development and analysis and production.

U3: Operations Staff.
- Integration of gender awareness in the short term operational planning.
- Support with assessment from a gender perspective on operational issues (patrols, recce, information operations, etc).
- Guidance on operational reporting (sex disaggregated data).
- Compile a watch-list of local actors/NGO’s active in the area to JOC, with support of Military GFP and the Gender Unit.
- Ensure that representatives of local female and male leaders are targeted by key leader engagement activities.
- Together with JMAC coordinate and manage the information gathering and reporting task to Identify or confirm the presence of women, children or wounded/disabled people within an armed force or group.
- Elaborate differences in security risks facing women and men in reporting activities, and report on trends relating to incidences of sexual violence against women and girls where they occur.
- Include information on security threats to women and girls in reporting submissions at the operational and tactical levels.

U4: Logistics Staff.
- Plan for and provide separate accommodation and bathroom facilities within a convenient distance, and augment such facilities in proportion to increases in deployment.
- Provide access to gynecological services for female peacekeepers.
- Infrastructure issues, building facilities and communication.
- Military GFP should support U4 when addressing the different needs of men and women regarding logistics and infrastructure issues. This applies internally to the headquarters organisation, as well as externally to the local population. Equal consideration should be given to women and men with respect to health services, civil engineering, supplies,
transportation, and cooking and bathroom facilities. Special consideration should be given to local customs and habits for men and women.

**U5: Planning Staff.**
- Support Operational Planning and products with a gender perspective such as Operations Order and Fragmentary Orders that take into consideration specific threats women, men, boys and girls can face.
- Including gender perspectives into operational planning could include, ensuring local women are included as a target audience for information operations, ensuring that local formal and informal female key leaders are engaged, and that information on possible threats specific to men and women, boys and girls are taken into account and responded to within capabilities.

**U7: Training Staff.**
- Externally, Military GFP can contribute to the training of national and local security forces. Military GFP should emphasise equal access and participation in security forces for males and females.
- Internally, the training modules on the DPKO/DFS gender guidelines for the military should be delivered to staff at operational and tactical levels, with the assistance of military gender focal points.

**U8: Engineering Staff.**
- Contracting and procurement.

**U9: CIMIC Staff.**
- Include gender perspective in CIMIC report forms
- Coordinate meetings with relevant IO/NGO’s and local civilian actors, including the civil administrations and authorities along with local key actor’s, leaders and stakeholders.
- CIMIC activities can be improved through consultations between the military and local women’s organisations. These projects provide a way to engage local women and identify their needs. Gender Personnel must work closely with CIMIC personnel to ensure that women have equal access to services, equal control of resources, and equal opportunity to participate in the decision-making about CIMIC projects. Other civil-military issues to consider, especially in crisis situations, are humanitarian issues, such as access to water, sanitation, medical care, education, shelter, and food security.
- CIMIC/QIPs projects have helped rehabilitate shower and latrine facilities in camps, providing lighting, improved privacy and separate entrances for men and women, which can help reduce the risk of rape.

**Military Observers.**
- UNMOs as well as civilian mission components can assist in contributing to early-warning and wider information-gathering and information distribution.
- UNMOs should take consider gender when planning for patrolling, for example by making sure to be visible where women and men are present, and by liaising with both female and male leaders, whether formal or informal.
Overview.
The Peacekeeping Situation Centre is the main point of contact at New York headquarters for JOCs.

Functions.

**SitCen.** The Peacekeeping Situation Centre is part of the UN Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC). Under this arrangement, the SitCen reports to DPKO leadership but is co-located within the joint UNOCC Watch Room and serves as a reporting focal point by providing DPKO inputs to UNOCC integrated situational awareness reports. The core functions of the Peacekeeping SitCen are:

- Monitor and report to DPKO-DFS senior leadership developments in different peacekeeping missions;
- Conduct research and prepare specialized information products related to incidents and trends that may affect current and potential operations;
- Provide technical policy guidance and support to field-level Joint Operations Centres and Joint Mission Analysis Centres in DPKO-led operations;
- Coordinate the development of guidance and standard operating procedures concerning reporting, crisis response and crisis management for DPKO-led operations;

**UNOCC.** The UNOCC commenced operations in January 2013 and is organisationally situated under the EOSG. The UNOCC comprises ten official stakeholders: EOSG, DPKO, DFS, DPA, DSS, DM, DPI, OCHA, UNDP and OHCHR. The UNOCC provides support to the UN Secretary-General and senior leaders across the UN by enabling informed, coordinated and timely decision making and strategic engagement on operations and crisis-related issues. The UNOCC achieves this through its three core functions:

- Situational awareness, which includes a joint 24/7 Watch Room to monitor and report on UN field operations activities and presences worldwide.
- Crisis response support, which includes providing a 'known venue' for crisis management at UN HQ.
- Executive communications, which provides 24/7 telephone connection and videoconferencing services for UN senior leaders at HQ and in the field

**Peacekeeping Situation Centre Contact Information**

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Desk 3 +1 212 751 2063
Annex Y
(Refers to Chapter 9, Section 9.5.7, p.195)

Force Commanders Training Directive
(Format)

Date:

Distribution No:

Force Commanders Training Directive
Mission XX

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2. Training Goals.
3. Concept/Parameters of Training.
4. Roles and Responsibilities.
5. Senior Leaders Training.
6. MILOBS/MSOs Training.
8. Sector level.
10. Training of Force Reserves/Special Forces.
12. Training Monitoring and Evaluation.
13. Conclusion.

Sd/-
HoMC/FC

Distribution:

External:

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Annex X: Training Schedule.
### Abbreviations

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<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agencies, Funds and Programmes</td>
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<td>AMO</td>
<td>Area of Maritime Operations</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>APC</td>
<td>Armoured Personnel Carrier</td>
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<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>Board of Inquiry</td>
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<td>Consolidated Appeal Process</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
<td>Conduct and Discipline Unit</td>
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<td>Common Humanitarian Action Plan</td>
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<td>Civil-Military Coordination (UN)</td>
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<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CISS</td>
<td>Chief of Integrated Support Services</td>
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<td>Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service</td>
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<td>Chief of Mission Support</td>
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<td>Crisis Management Team</td>
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<td>CoA</td>
<td>Courses of Action</td>
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<td>COB</td>
<td>Company Operating Base</td>
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<td>COE</td>
<td>Contingent Owned Equipment</td>
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<td>CoP</td>
<td>Community of Practice</td>
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<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Checkpoint</td>
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<td>Communications and Public Information Office/Officer</td>
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<td>CPTM</td>
<td>Core Predeployment Training Modules</td>
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<td>CRSV</td>
<td>Conflict Related Sexual Violence</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief Security Adviser</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Chief Security Officer</td>
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<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFC</td>
<td>Deputy Force Commander</td>
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<td>DFP</td>
<td>Detention Focal Point</td>
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<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<td>Director of Mission Support</td>
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<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>Designated Official</td>
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<td>DoA</td>
<td>Director of Administration</td>
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<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training</td>
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<td>Department of Public information</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSR</td>
<td>Defence Sector Reform</td>
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<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>DSS</td>
<td>Department of Safety and Security</td>
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<td>ECHA</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECPS</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Peace and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>EoAR</td>
<td>End of Assignment report</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnants of War</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FBFD</td>
<td>Field Budget and Finance Division</td>
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<td>FC</td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
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<td>Force Generation Service</td>
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<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operational Base</td>
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<td>FOL</td>
<td>Fuel, Oil and Lubricants</td>
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<td>FPB</td>
<td>Fast Patrol Boat</td>
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<td>FPD</td>
<td>Field Personnel Division</td>
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<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<td>FRAGO</td>
<td>Fragmentary Order</td>
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<td>GA</td>
<td>General Assembly</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
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<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus /Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>HoM</td>
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<td>Head of Military Component</td>
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<td>Head of Police Component</td>
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<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>HRDDP</td>
<td>Human Rights Due Diligence policy</td>
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<td>Integrated Planning and Assessment</td>
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<td>Inter-Agency Security Management Network</td>
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<td>International Ammunition Technical Guidelines</td>
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<td>Infantry Company Group</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of Red Cross/Crescent</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDDRS</td>
<td>Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>Individual Police Officer</td>
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<td>International Small Arms Control Standards</td>
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<td>Integrated Strategic Framework</td>
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<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
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<td>LOA</td>
<td>Letter of Assist</td>
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<td>Lines of Communications</td>
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<td>Military Component Planning Process</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MOVCON</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>MRF</td>
<td>Mobile Riverine Force</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>Video Tele-Conferencing</td>
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Annex- AA

(Refers to Chapter 1, Section 1.18, p.15)

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